Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 5: The common judgment is proved, which requires for free choice liberty from necessity
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
That liberty from necessity is altogether required for free choice, and that liberty from coaction is not enough, can be demonstrated from the testimony of Scripture, from the definition of the Church, from the tradition of the Fathers, and from the light of reason.
From the divine writings we have first that of Ecclesiasticus 15: God… left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added his commandments and precepts. If thou wilt keep the commandments… they shall preserve thee. He hath set water and fire before thee: stretch forth thy hand to which thou wilt. Before man is life and death, good and evil, that which he shall choose shall be given him. Nor does it make any difference whether these words befit man for the time when he was in paradise before the sin, or for the time when he had already fallen into sins; for we are not now disputing of the free choice of fallen man, but in general. Now most openly, through Ecclesiasticus, the Holy Spirit teaches what it is to be in the hand of one's own counsel — that is, of free choice — when he says that man can, if he will, keep the law, and not keep it, if he will not; and again, that of two contraries he can choose the one — fire or water, good or evil, life or death. And thus there is liberty in man both of willing and not willing, which is the liberty of contradiction, and of choosing one of two contraries and refusing the other, which is the liberty of contrariety. Many other testimonies could be adduced; but they are not necessary in this place, and will be brought more commodiously in the fourth book.
From the definition of the Church we have the Council of Orange, canon 25, where it is declared that the baptized man can, if he will, live well; and it is agreed by experience that he can also, if he will, not live well; hence he can will and not will, live well and live ill. Likewise the Council of Trent — which, at least among Catholics, ought to have great authority — session 6, chapter 5, teaches that man freely consents to the divine inspiration, seeing that he can also reject it; and in canon 4 it says that free choice concurs in the disposition toward justification, because, as it can consent, so also it can dissent. In which place it is not to be omitted that this last Council without doubt willed to declare something against the errors lately arisen; but there is no one, nor was there, who taught that man is not free from coaction — the whole question is of liberty from necessity, which alone the heretics deny; this very thing, therefore, the Council willed to establish. And assuredly he who can consent or dissent, accept or reject, shows himself free not only from coaction but also from necessity. Add that there stands also a decree of Pius V, Pontiff, renewed again by Gregory XIII, in which these sentences are condemned: “What is done voluntarily, even though it be done necessarily, is nevertheless done freely”; and: “Only violence is repugnant to the natural liberty of man.” Where those Pontiffs did not mean to teach that what is done voluntarily but necessarily is in no way done freely, but that it is not done with that liberty which is required for constituting free choice; for of this liberty was the question.
Now the same is proved from the Fathers. Origen, book 3 On First Principles, chapter 1, says that free choice is the faculty of discerning good from evil, and of choosing what one has approved. St. Gregory Nazianzen, in the Apology, not far from the beginning: “The liberty of choice,” says he, “has an equal motion toward either side.” St. Gregory of Nyssa, book 7 On Philosophy, chapter 1, proves that man is of free choice because human actions are not done necessarily, but can also not be done; and in chapter 2 he explains what is in free choice, and says it is: to go and not to go; to give and not to give; to desire and not to desire; to rejoice and not to rejoice, and the like; and in chapter 3 he says that every elective power — such as free choice assuredly is — bears on opposites. St. John Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, chapters 25 and 26, repeats the same, and in almost the same words. St. Hilary, in the commentary on Psalm [2]: “To each one of us,” says he, “he has permitted the liberty of life and of judgment, not fastening on us a necessity toward either side.” St. Optatus of Milevis, book 2 against Parmenianus, almost at the very beginning: “The will,” says he, “has punishment; necessity, pardon. The murderer can do the crime, and can also not do it — and the rest of this kind, in which free choice is had.” St. Ambrose, book 2 [On the Faith], chapter 3: “By the choice of the will,” says he, “not by the obedience of necessity.” St. Augustine, book 2 against Faustus, chapter 5: “And we,” says he, “place the birth of no man under the doing of the stars, that we may vindicate from every bond of necessity the free choice of the will, by which one lives either well or ill, on account of the just judgment of God.” Likewise, book 3 On Free Choice, chapters 1, 2, and 3, the same Augustine perpetually opposes necessity to liberty; and in the book On True Religion, chapter 14: “If he had done it by necessity,” says he, “he would be held by no bond of sin.” Finally, in epistles 46 and 47 to Valentine he says that the question of the concord of grace and free choice is most obscure, and penetrated by few; and in the book On the Grace of Christ, chapter 47, he says this question is so entangled that, when grace is defended, free choice seems to be denied, and contrariwise, when free choice is defended, grace seems to be denied. But if free choice demanded no other liberty than from coaction, the question would be most easy — or rather, none. St. Bernard, in the book On Grace and Free Choice: “Reason was given to the will,” says he, “that it might instruct it, not destroy it. But it would destroy it, if it imposed on it any necessity, hindering it from freely turning itself at its own choice, whether to evil, consenting to appetite, or to good, following grace.” Peter Lombard (whose judgment must of necessity be brought and considered, on account of Calvin's calumny), book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 25, letter A: “That power,” says he, “which we said above is free choice, is free toward either alternative, because it can freely be moved to this or to that.” Likewise at letter B he says that free choice is not of things present or past, but of future only, because things present and past are determined to one; but free choice must be undetermined toward either alternative. At letter C he asks how there is free choice in God, since he cannot but act well, and free choice requires a power toward opposites. At letter D he answers that there is free choice in God because, though he cannot act ill, yet he does not by necessity do what he does, and could have not done it. At letter E he concludes in these words: “Whence, if it be diligently looked into, choice seems to be called free because without coaction and necessity it can desire, or choose, what it has decreed from reason.” At letter F he says that liberty from necessity was before the sin, and remained also after the sin; but liberty from sin and from misery was before the sin, not after. Thou seest, then, Reader, how openly Calvin lies when he dares to write that Peter Lombard pronounces that we are loosed only from coaction. And Peter Lombard is followed by all the scholastic theologians — as Albert on 2 of the Sentences, distinction 24; Alexander in part 2, question 72, member 3, article 3; St. Bonaventure on 2, distinction 25; St. Thomas, who, both elsewhere and in question 6 On Evil, which is on election, in its single article, writes that it is heresy, not only among the theologians but even among the philosophers, to affirm that for free election there is not required liberty from necessity, but that that suffices which is from coaction. And he says this rightly: for the Philosopher too, book 3 of the Ethics, chapters 4 and 5, distinguishes the voluntary from the free, in that it pertains to the free to be able to do and not to do; and natural reason shows the same.
For first, if liberty from coaction sufficed for constituting free choice, it would follow that there is free choice even in cattle: for they too, without any coaction, are borne of their own accord to their fodder. Second, it would follow, by the same reasoning, that in boys, madmen, and dreamers there is the use of free choice; for all these act spontaneously, from Aristotle, book 3 of the Ethics, chapter 2. Third, it would follow that God begot the Son through free choice and from election, since he begot not coacted — which is utterly absurd, as the holy Fathers everywhere teach; see Epiphanius, heresy 69, and Ambrose, book 4 On the Faith, chapter 9, and others. Fourth, there would never have been any question about free choice; nor could Aristotle be reprehended for having written that God acts from necessity; nor would any controversy remain with the heretics: for neither Aristotle, nor the Manichees, nor the Lutherans, nor any others ever denied that either God or men are free from coaction. Finally, he seems to say things that fight with each other who affirms that free choice is loosed from coaction, not from necessity. For free choice (as we have learned from Gregory of Nyssa) is not the simple will, but the will as it is the principle of election. Now the simple will can indeed be understood with liberty from coaction alone — for such is the will of beatitude, at least as to specification; but an elective power does not seem capable of being understood with determination to one and necessity. For election is among many things, and therefore deliberation precedes election. But if I must of necessity will or do some one thing, where is the deliberation? where the election?
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CAPUT ,y. Probatur sententia communis, qux ad liberam arbitrium exigit libertatem a necessitate. Igitur libertatem a necessitate omnino re¬ quiri ad liberum arbitrium, neque satis esse libertatem a coactione, demonstrari potest ex Tom. V. testimonio Scripturae ex definitione Ecclesiae, ex traditione Patrum, ex lumine rationis. Ex divinis litteris habemus in primis illud Eccl. xv : Deus reliquit hominem in manu con¬ silii sui, adjecit mandata et praecepta ; Si vo¬ lueris mandata servare , conservabunt te. Ap¬ posuit tibi ignem et aquam ; ad quod volueris , porriges manum tuam. Ante hominem vita et mors, bonum et malum : quod placuerit ei da¬ bitur illi. Neque vero aliquid interest, utrum haec verba conveniant homini pro eo tem¬ pore, quo erat in paradiso ante peccatum, an vero pro tempore, quo jam in peccata deciderat. Non enim disputamus nunc de li¬ bero arbitrio hominis lapsi, sed in genere. Apertissime autem per Ecclesiasticum Spi¬ ritus sanctus docet, quid sit esse in manu consilii sui, id est, liberi arbitrii, cum dicit, hominem posse, si velit, servare legem, et non servare, si non velit. Et rursus ex duo¬ bus contrariis, posse alterum eligere, ignem vel aquam ; bonum vel malum ; vitam vel mortem. Atque ita esse libertatem in homine tum volendi et non volendi, quae est libertas contradictionis , tum ex duobus contrariis unum eligendi, alterum recusandi, quae est libertas contrarietatis. Alia multa testimonia adduci possent, sed ea neque hoc loco neces¬ saria sunt, et in iv. lib. commodius adfe- rentur. Ex definitione Ecclesiae habemus Concilium Arausicaiftm, can. 25. ubi declaratur, posse hominem baptizatum, si velit, bene vivere : constat autem experientia, posse eum, si velit, etiam non bene vivere. Proinde potest velle et non velle ; bene vivere et male vi¬ vere. Concilium item Tridentinum, quod sal¬ tem apud Catholicos magnam habere debet auctoritatem, sess. G. cap. 5. docet, hominem libere consentire divinae inspirationi, quippe quam rejicere etiam potest. Et can. 4. dicit, liberum arbitrium concurrere in dispositione ad justificationem, quia sicut consentire, ita etiam et dissentire potest. (Juo loco non est omittendum, Concilium hoc postremum, sine dubio aliquid voluisse declarare adver¬ sus errores nuper exortos. Nullus autem est, nec fuit, qui doceret, hominem non esse li¬ berum a coactione, sed tota quaestio est de libertate a necessitate, quam solam haeretici negant. Igitur hanc ipsam Concilium astruere voluit. Et sane qui potest consentire, vel dis¬ sentire ; acceptare, vel rejicere ; non solum a coactione, sed etiam a necessitate liberum se esse demonstrat. 38 586 LIBER III. Adde quod etiam extat decretum Pii Y. Pontificis a Gregorio XIII. rursus innovatum, in quo damnantur sententia; illa; : « Quod voluntarie fit, etiamsi necessario fiat, libere tamen fit. » Et : « Sola violentia repugnat libertati hominis naturali. » Ubi Pontifices illi non voluerunt docere, id quod volunta¬ rie, sed necessario fit, nullo modo libere fieri , sed non fieri ea libertate, qua; ad liberum arbitrium constituendum requiritur. Nam de hac libertate qua;stio erat. Jam ex Patribus idem probatur. Origenes lib. m. de principiis cap. i. dicit, liberum arbitrium esse facultatem discernendi bo¬ num a malo, et eligendi quod probaverit. S. Gregorius Nazianzenus in Apolog. non procul ab initio : « Arbitrii libertas, inquit, parem in utramque partem motum habet. » S. Gregorius Nyssenus lib. vn. de Philo¬ sophia cap. 1. probat, hominem esse liberi arbitrii, quia humana; actiones non fiunt ne¬ cessario, sed possunt etiam non fieri, et cap. 2. explicat, quid sit in libero arbitrio, et dicit esse, ire et non ire ; dare et non dare ; con¬ cupiscere et non concupiscere; laetari et non la;tari, et similia, et cap. 3. dicit, omnem electivam potestatem, qualis nimirum est li¬ berum arbitrium, esse in opposita. S. Joan. Damascenus lib. ii. de fide cap. 25. et 26. idem repetit, et verbis fere iisdem. S. Hilarius in commentario Psalm. «Uni¬ cuique, inquit, nostrum libertatem vitae, sen¬ sumque permisit, non necessitatem in alter¬ utrum affigens. » S. Optatus Milcvitanus lib. vii. adversus Parmenianum, in ipso fere principio : « Vo¬ luntas, inquit, habet poenam, necessitas ve¬ niam. Homicida scelus potest facere, potest etiam non facere, et caetera hujusmodi, in quibus liberum habetur arbitrium. » S. Ambrosius lib. ii. cap. 3. « Pro volun¬ tatis, inquit, arbitrio, non pro necessitatis obsequio. » S. Augustinus lib. n. contra Faustum cap. 5 : «Et nos, inquit, sub facto stellarum nul¬ lius hominis genesim ponimus, ut liberum arbitrium voluntatis, quo vel bene, vel male vivitur, propter justum judicium Dei ab omni necessitatis vinculo vindicemus. » Item lib. m. de libero arbitr. cap. 1.2. et 3. perpetuo libertati necessitatem idem August. opponit, et lib. de vera religione cap. 14: « Si neces¬ sitate, inquit, id fecisset, nullo peccati vin¬ culo teneretur. » Denique in epist. 46 : et 47* ad Valentinum dicit, qua;stionem de concor¬ dia gratia;, et liberi arbitrii, esse obscurissi¬ mam, et a paucis penetrari, et lib. de gratia Christi cap. 47. dicit, qua;stionem hanc adeo esse implicatam, ut cum gratia defenditur, liberum arbitrium negari videatur : et con¬ tra, cum defenditur liberum arbitrium, ne¬ gari videatur gratia. At si liberum arbitrium non aliam exigeret libertatem, quam a co¬ actione, queestio esset facillima, vel potius nulla. S. Bernardus in lib. de gralia et libero ar¬ bitrio. « Est vero, inquit, ratio data voluntati, ut instruat illam, non ut destruat. Destrue¬ ret autem, si necessitatem ei ullam impone¬ ret, quo minus libere pro arbitrio sese vol¬ veret, sive in malum, consentiens appetitui, sive in bonum, gratiam sequens. » Petrus Lombardus (cujus sententia neces¬ sario adferenda et consideranda est propter calumniam Calvini) in n lib. Sentent. dist. 25. Iit. A. « Potestas, inquit, ipsa, quam su¬ pra diximus esse liberum arbitrium, libera est ad utrumlibet, quia libere potest moveri ad hoc, vel ad illud. » Item littera B. dicit, liberum arbitrium non esse praesentium, vel praeteritorum, sed futurorum tantum, quia praesentia et praeterita determinata sunt ad unum. Liberum autem arbitrium indetermi¬ natum ad utrumlibet esse debet. Lit. C. quae¬ rit, quomodo in Deo sit liberum arbitrium, cum ille non possit nisi bene agere, et liberum arbitrium requirat potestatem in opposita. Littera D. respondet, in Deo esse liberum arbitrium, quia licet non possit male agere, tamen non necessitate agit, quod agit, et potuisset illud non agere. Lit. E. concludit his verbis : « Unde si diligenter inspiciatur, liberum videtur dici arbitrium, quia sine coactione et necessitate valeat appetere, vel eligere, quod ex ratione decreverit. » LiL F. dicit, libertatem a necessitate fuisse ante peccatum, et remansisse etiam post pecca¬ tum, libertatem autem a peccato et a mi- seriafuisse ante peccatum, non postea. Vides igitur (Lector) quam aperte mentiatur Cal¬ vinus, cum scribere audet, Petrum Lom- bardum pronunciare, nos dumtaxat a co¬ actione solutos esse/ Sequuntur autem Petrum Lombardum Theologi Scholastici omnes, ut Albertus in 2. Sent. dist. 24. Alexander in 2. part. qua;st. 72, membr. 3. art. 5. S. Bonaventura in 2. dist. 25. S. Thornas cum alibi, tum in qua;st. 6. de malo, qua; est de electione, articulo unico scribit, ha;re$im esse non solum apud CAPUT VI. 587 Theologos, sed etiam apud Philosophos, af¬ firmare ad liberam electionem non requiri libertatem a necessitate, sed satis esse eam, qua) est a coactione. Et recte hoc dicit. Nam et Philosophus lib. IU. Ethicorum, cap. 4. et 5. distinguit voluntarium a libero, quod ad liberum pertineat, posse facere et non facere : et naturalis ratio idem ostendit. Primum enim si ad liberum arbitrium con¬ stituendum sufficeret libertas a coactione, sequeretur etiam in pecoribus esse liberum arbitrium. Nam et illa sine coactione ulla sponte sua feruntur ad pabulum. Secundo sequeretur, in pueris, furiosis, somniantibus esse usum liberi arbitrii, ea¬ dem ratione. Isti enim omnes sponte agunt, ex Aristot. lib. m. Ethic. cap. 2. Tertio sequentur, Deum per liberum ar¬ bitrium, et ex electione genuisse filium ; quoniam non coactus genuit. Atqui id per¬ absurdum est, ut sancti Patres passim docent. Vide Epiphanium haeres. 69. et Ambrosium lib. iv. de fide cap. 5. et alios. Quarto, nulla fuisset unquam quaestio de libero arbitrio, et neque Aristoteles repre¬ hendi posset, quod scripserit, Deum ex ne¬ cessitate agere ; neque ulla cum haereticis controversia remaneret. Nam neque Aristo¬ teles, neque Manichan, neque Lutherani, aut ulli alii negarunt unquam, vel Deum, vel ho¬ mines liberos esse a coactione. Denique pugnantia videtur dicere, qui af¬ firmat, liberum arbitrium a coactione, non a necessitate solutum esse. Siquidem libe¬ rum arbitrium (ut ex Gregorio Nysseno didi¬ cimus) non est simplex voluntas, sed volun¬ tas, ut est principium electionis. Porro vo¬ luntas simplex, potest quidem intelligi cum libertate a sola coactione ; talis enim est vo¬ luntas beatitudinis, saltem quoad specifica¬ tionem ; at potestas electiva non videtur in¬ telligi posse cum determinatione ad unum et necessitate. Electio enim est inter multa, et ideo electionem praecedit consultatio. At^si necessc habeo unum aliquid velle, aut face¬ re, ubi est consultatio ? ubi electio ? •