Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 6: The contrary arguments are answered
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
But now the arguments must be solved which are brought by the adversaries against what we have said.
In the first place is objected a testimony of St. Augustine, from the Enchiridion, chapter 105, where we read thus: “Nor is that will to be blamed, or is it no will, or is it not to be called free, by which we so will to be blessed that we not only will not to be miserable, but can in no way at all will it.” From this place it seems it can be gathered that there is not required liberty from necessity, but only from coaction, that the will may be called free: for we necessarily will beatitude, nor can we not will it, and yet we will it freely, because we will it not coacted, but of our own accord and gladly. I answer: our will, though it be not free in desiring felicity as to specification, because it cannot will misery, yet is free in this life as to exercise, because it can desire felicity and cease from desiring; moreover, both in this life and in the other, the will is free not only as to exercise, but also as to specification, in the choosing of other things which are not necessarily connected with felicity. This, then, is what St. Augustine says: that the will can remain free, though in some matter, or in some kind of liberty, it be not free; for in other matters, or in the same by another kind of liberty, it will be most free, and will be able at its pleasure to act and not act, will and not will.
Second is objected another testimony of the same Augustine, from the same chapter 105 of the Enchiridion, and from book 22 On the City of God, last chapter, where Augustine speaks thus of blessed men in the other life: “Nor will they on this account lack free choice, because sins will not be able to delight them. Rather will it be freer, being freed from the delight of sinning even unto an undeclinable delight of not sinning.” I answer: St. Augustine does not mean to signify that the blessed will have free choice toward sinning and not sinning — for that would fight with what he says, that they will be such as to be unable by any means to sin; but he wished to indicate that by the necessity of not sinning the free choice of the blessed is not taken away, but rather confirmed. For they who cannot sin are most free in choosing good, and can choose this good or that, or choose or not choose one and the same, without any danger of erring. But to be able to choose evil is not a virtue of free choice, but a defect; for it is nothing else than to be able to be deceived and to err in choosing. And so, this defect being removed, the free choice of the blessed does not perish, but is made stronger and freer.
Third is objected that of the same Augustine, from the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 46 [al. 49]: “How utterly absurd it is that we should say that our willing to be blessed does not pertain to our will, because we can in no way will otherwise. Nor do we dare to say that God has not a will, but a necessity, of justice, because he cannot will to sin.” In which place Augustine seems to mean that our will is free in willing beatitude, though it will it necessarily; and that God freely wills justice, though he will it necessarily. For he answers Pelagius, who had said that he is deprived of free choice who is constrained by necessity; and he himself asserts on the contrary that he is not deprived of free choice who is constrained by necessity; and he proves it by two examples — of man freely willing beatitude, and of God freely willing justice, though each be equally constrained by necessity to will them. I answer: St. Augustine signifies in that place that he who wills beatitude is indeed constrained by necessity as to specification, because he cannot will misery; yet is not therefore deprived of free choice, because as to exercise he can will and not will beatitude. By like reasoning God wills justice from necessity as to a certain specification, because he cannot will iniquity; but is not therefore deprived of free choice, because he can, both as to exercise, do and not do certain just things, and, as to specification, prefer one of many just things to another, and choose it. But (thou wilt say) that does not seem contrary to Pelagius's judgment; for he, when he says that he is deprived of free choice who is constrained by necessity, speaks of liberty and necessity with respect to the same thing and the same mode, not with respect to diverse. I answer: the words of Pelagius are ambiguous, and can carry a sense both true and false; and therefore they are not simply reprehended by St. Augustine, but only in that part in which they could be false. And so Augustine does not say that what Pelagius had said is not true, but says: “Here too there is some question”; and then he shows how it can come to pass that someone be constrained by necessity, and yet not be deprived of free choice.
Fourth is objected another testimony, from book 5 On the City of God, chapter 10, where we read thus: “If that be defined as necessity according to which we say it is necessary that something be so, or be so done, I know not why we should fear it, lest it take from us the liberty of the will. For we do not place either the life of God or the foreknowledge of God under necessity, if we say it is necessary that God always live, and foreknow all things.” I answer: St. Augustine, at the beginning of the chapter, distinguishes necessity into two species. For he says there is a certain necessity which brings it about that a thing is not in our power — such as the necessity of dying, for it is not in our power to die or not die; and that there is another necessity which does not make the thing not be in our power. And the former necessity indeed Augustine confesses fights with liberty, and therefore that it is not to be said that our will is under such necessity; the latter, he says, does not fight with liberty, and therefore it is not to be feared that such necessity, if admitted, should take away the liberty of the will. Of this latter necessity he sets four examples. The first is of the life of God: for it is necessary that God always live, and yet we do not place the life of God under a necessity which takes away liberty. Where by the life of God we understand his action — for God lives while he understands and wills; and although it is necessary that God always live, that is, understand and will, yet his liberty is not taken away, because he freely wills many things, and hence also freely understands by practical intelligence. And so the necessity of always living falls upon the act of understanding and willing, not upon the manner of working: for God necessarily always understands and wills, but he does not necessarily apply this act to the doing of this or that, but freely. The second example is of the foreknowledge of God: for it is necessary that God foreknow all things; and yet the foreknowledge of God is not placed under a necessity taking away liberty, because the necessity of foreknowing is on a supposition, not absolute. For, it being posited that God wills something to be future, he necessarily foreknows it to be future; but as God could absolutely not will it to be future, so he could absolutely not foreknow it to be future. The third is of the power of God, which is set down to illustrate the two above: for it is necessary that God cannot die or be deceived, and yet he is omnipotent. As therefore the power of God is not lessened by this, that he cannot die or be deceived, so neither is his liberty lessened by this, that it is necessary that he always live and foreknow all things. The fourth example makes most to the matter: “For it is necessary” (says Augustine) “that whatever a man wills, he will it by free choice”; and yet free choice is not on that account placed under a necessity taking away liberty: for that necessity of which we say that it is necessary that a man will freely, not only does not make the works of free choice not free, but compels them to be free. For that necessity falls not upon the works, but upon the manner, and is on a supposition, not absolute: for it is not absolutely necessary that a man will this or that, but it is in his power to will this or that, and to will this or not will it; yet, it being posited that he wills, it is necessary that he will freely, because his nature demands such a manner of working. Thou seest, then, that from Augustine it is manifestly gathered that the liberty of choice requires that the work be in one's power, and that it fights not only with coaction, but with every absolute necessity.
Fifth is objected a testimony of St. Bernard, from sermon 81 on the Canticles, where he speaks thus: “By I know not what perverse and wondrous manner the will itself, changed for the worse by sin, makes a necessity for itself; so that the necessity, since it is voluntary, cannot excuse the will, nor the will, since it is enticed, exclude the necessity.” And below: “Thus the soul, in a certain wondrous manner, and with an evil liberty, is held by necessity both bondmaid and free: bondmaid on account of the necessity, free on account of the will; and, what is more wondrous and more wretched, guilty in the degree that she is free, and bondmaid in the degree that she is guilty, and thereby bondmaid in the degree that she is free.” I answer: St. Bernard speaks of a conditioned necessity, which is not repugnant to liberty, not of the absolute, which cannot stand together with liberty. For as an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruits (as the Lord says, Matthew 7) — while, namely, it is evil — yet it can become good, and then bring forth good fruits: so also he who is caught in the birdlime of depraved lust, while that affection lasts, necessarily sins, because he cannot but serve the depraved lust by which he is held in a manner captive; yet absolutely he can refrain from sinning, and if he sins, he sins freely, because he can lay down the depraved affection, if he will to cooperate with the grace of God. In this manner, then, the sinner is servant and free, and therefore servant because free: for if he were not truly free with the liberty of nature, he would never truly and properly sin, and thereby could not be the servant of sin. Further, that St. Bernard did not judge free choice to be opposed to coaction alone, and not to necessity, is clear from the same sermon 81 on the Canticles, where he speaks thus: “Whence it is named free choice, in that it is permitted to turn oneself in these things at the choice of the will; thence man is able to merit. For every good or evil thing thou shalt do, which indeed it was free not to do, is deservedly reckoned unto merit; and as he is deservedly praised, not only who could do evils and did not, but also who could have not done goods and did them, so he lacks not evil merit, as well who could have not done evils and did them, as who could have done goods and did not. But where there is no liberty, neither is there merit. Therefore the animals lacking reason merit nothing, because, as they lack deliberation, so also they lack liberty.” From this place it is most openly agreed that St. Bernard requires for free choice the liberty which is toward either alternative, which is called liberty from necessity, which alone the beasts lack.
Sixth is objected a testimony of St. Thomas, who in question 10 On Power, article 2, reply to the fifth, writes that only coaction is repugnant to the natural liberty of the will. I answer: St. Thomas speaks in that place of the simple will, not of the will as it is the principle of election — which alone is named free choice. Add that the same author seems, in his manner of speaking, to have recalled that place in part 1 of the Summa, question 41, article 2. Seventh, the same St. Thomas is objected, who in part 1, question 83, article 2, reply to the third, says that through sin the liberty of grace perished, but not the liberty of nature, “which is” (says he) “from coaction.” I answer: St. Thomas in that place takes coaction for necessity, or determination to one. For in the body of the article he had said that free choice is not a habit, but a power; because through habits we are inclined to one thing, but free choice is undetermined toward many things, even opposites.
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CAPUT VI. Solvuntur argumenta contraria. Sed jam argumenta solvenda sunt, quae adversus ea, quae diximus, ab adversariis adferuntur. Primo loco testimonium objicitur S. Au¬ gustini ex Enchiridio cap. 105. ubi sic legi¬ mus : « Neque culpanda est voluntas, aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda non est, qua beati esse sic volumus, ut esse miseri non solum nolimus, sed nequaquam prorsus velle posirnu^». Ex hoc enim loco videtur posse colligi, non requiri libertatem a necessitate, sed solum a coactione, ut voluntas libera dici possit. Nam beatitudinem necessario volu¬ mus, nec possumus eam non velle, et tamen libere volumus, quia non coacti, sed sponte, et libenter volumus. . Respondeo : voluntas nostra, tametsi libe¬ ra non sit in appetenda felicitate, quoad specificationem, quia non potest velle mise¬ riam : tamen libera est in hac vita, quoad exercitium, quia potest appetere felicitatem, et cessare ab appetendo. Praeterea tum in hac vita, tum in alia libera est voluntas, non solum quoad exercitium, sed etiam quoad specificationem in aliis rebus eligendis, qua) non sunt necessario cum felicitate connexa). Hoc igitur est, quod S. Augustinus dicit, posse voluntatem liberam remanere, licet in aliqua re, vel aliquo genere libertatis, libera non sit. Nam in aliis rebus, vel in iisdem, alio genere libertatis liberrima erit. Et pro arbitrio poterit agere et non agere, velle et non velle. Secundo, objicitur aliud ejusdem Augusti¬ ni testimonium ex eodem cap. 105. Enchiri¬ dii, et ex lib. xxii. de Civit. Dei cap. ult. ubi sic loquitur Augustinus de hominibus beatis in alia vita : « Nec ideo liberum arbi¬ trium non habebunt, quia peccata eos dele¬ ctare non poterunt. Magis quippe erit libe¬ rum a delectatione peccandi, usque ad dele¬ ctationem non peccandi, indeclinabilem li¬ bertatem. » Respondeo, non vult S. August. significa¬ re, beatos habituros liberum arbitrium ad peccandum, et non peccandum; id enim pugnaret cum eo, quod dicit, eos tales futu¬ ros, ut non possint ulla ratione peccare. Sed indicare voluit, per necessitatem non pec¬ candi, non tolli liberum arbitrium beatorum, imo potius confirmari. Qui enim peccare non possunt ; liberrimi sunt in eligendo bo¬ no, et possunt eligere hoc, aut illud bonum, vel unum et idem eligere, vel non eligere, sine ullo periculo errandi. Posse autem eli¬ gere malum, non est virtus liberi arbitrii, sed defectus, nihil enim aliud est, nisi posse in eligendo falli, et errare. Itaque hoc de- 588 LIBER III. fcctu remoto, non perit, sed fortius libe- riusque efficitur liberum arbitrium bea¬ torum. Tertio, objicitur illud ejusdem Augustini, ex lib. de natura et gratia cap. 40 : « Per quam, absurdum est, ut ideo dicamus non pertinere ad voluntatem nostram, quod beati esse volumus, quia id omnino nolle non pos¬ sumus. Nec dicere audemus, Deum non vo¬ luntatem, sed necessitatem habere justitia?, quia non potest velle peccare». Quo loco velle videtur Augustinus, voluntatem no¬ stram in eo esse liberam, quod vult beatitu- dinem, quamvis eam necessario velit : et Deum libere velle justitiam, licet necessario eam velit. Respondet enim Pelagio, qui di¬ xerat privari eum libero arbitrio, qui neces¬ sitate constringitur. Et contra ipse asserit, non privari libero arbitrio eum, qui necessi¬ tate constringitur. Et probat duobus exem¬ plis, hominis libere volentis beatitudinem, et Dei libere volentis justitiam, quamvis uter¬ que ad ea volenda necessitate pariter con¬ stringatur. Respondeo •: significat eo loco S. August. cum qui vult beatitudinem, constringi qui¬ dem necessitate quoad specificationem, quia non potest velle miseriam; tamen non ideo privari libero arbitrio, quia potest quoad exercitium velle, et non velle beatitudinem. Pari ratione Deum velle justitiam ex neces¬ sitate quoad quamdam specificationem, quia non potest velle iniquitatem : sed non ideo privari libero arbitrio, quia potest, et quoad exercitium, quaedam justa facere et non fa¬ cere ; et quoad specificationem ex multis justis unum alteri pra?ferre, illudque eli¬ gere. At (inquies) non videtur id contrarium sententia? Pelagii ; is enim cum ait, privari libero arbitrio eum, qui necessitate constrin¬ gitur, loquitur de libertate et necessitate re¬ spectu ejusdem rei et modi, non autem re¬ spectu diversorum. Respondeo, verba Pela¬ gii esse ambigua, et sententiam veram et falsam habere posse, et ideo a S. August. non simpliciter reprehendi, sed solum qua parte falsa esse poterant. Itaque non ait Au¬ gustinus, verum non esse quod Pelagius di¬ xerat, sed inquit : « Et hic nonnulla qua?stio est». Ac deinde ostendit, quomodo possit fieri, ut aliquis necessitate constringatur, et tamen libero arbitrio non privetur. Quarto, objicitur aliud testimonium ex lib. V. de Civit. Dei cap. 10. ubi sic legimus. « Si ulla definitur necessitas, secundum quam dicimus necesseesse, ut ita sit aliquid, vel ita flat, nescio cur eam timeamus, ne no¬ bis libertatem auferat voluntatis. Neque enim et vitam Dei, et pra?scientiam Dei sub necessitate ponimus, si dicamus, necesse esse Deum semper vivere, et cuncta pra?- scire. » Respondeo, S. August. in principio capi¬ tis, distinguit necessitatem in duas species. Dicit enim esse quamdam necessitatem, qua? facit, ut res non sit in potestate, qualis est necessitas moriendi. Non enim est in pote¬ state nostra mori, aut non mori. Aliam au¬ tem esse necessitatem, qua? non facit rem non esse in potestate. Ac priorem quidem necessitatem fatetur August. pugnare cum libertate, et ideo non esse dicendum volun¬ tatem nostram esse sub tali necessitate ; po¬ steriorem dicit, non pugnare cum libertate, et ideo non esse timendum, ne talis necessi¬ tas, si admittatur, libertatem auferat volun¬ tatis. Hujus posterioris necessitatis quatuor po¬ nit exempla. Primum est de vita Dei. Neces¬ se enim est Deum semper vivere, et tamen non ponimus vitam Dei sub necessitate, quae tollat libertatem. Ubi per vitam Dei intelli- gimus actionem, vivit enim Deus, dum intel • ligit et vult. Et quamvis necesse sit, Deum semper vivere, id est, intelligere et velle, ta¬ men non tollitur libertas ejus, quia multa libere vult, et proinde etiam libere intelligit practica intelligentia. Itaque necessitas sem¬ per vivendi cadit super actum intelligendi et volendi, non super modum operandi. Ne¬ cessario enim Deus semper intelligit et vult, sed non necessario applicat hunc actum ad hoc, aut illud faciendum, sed libere. Alterum exemplum est de praescientia Dei. Necesse enim est, Deum cuncta pra?scire ; et tamen pra?scientia Dei non ponitur sub ne¬ cessitate tollente libertatem, quia necessitas praesciendi est ex hypothesi, non absoluta. Posito enim, quod Deus velit aliquid esse futurum, necessario praescit illud esse futu¬ rum ; &d sicut poterat Deus absolute non velle illud esse futurum, ita poterat absolute non praescire esse futurum. Tertium est de potentia Dei, quod ponitur ad illustranda duo superiora. Necesse enim est Deum non posse mori aut falli, et tamen est omnipotens. Sicut igitur non minuitur potentia Dei per hoc, quod non potest mori aut falli, sic etiam non minuitur ejus liber- CAPUT VI. 589 tas per hoc, quod necesse est eum semper vivere, et cuncta praescire. Quartum exemplum maxime facit ad rem : « NeCcsse enim est (inquit Augustinus) ut homo quicquid vult, libero velit arbitrio, et tamen non propterea liberum arbitrium po¬ nitur sub necessitate tollente libertatem, nam illa necessitas, de qua dicimus, necesse esse hominem libere velle, non solum non facit, ut opera liberi arbitrii non sint libera, sed cogit ut sint libera, non enim cadit illa necessitas super opera, sed super modum, et est ex hypothesi non absoluta. Non enim ne¬ cesse est absolute, ut homo hoc velit aut il¬ lud, sed est in ejus potestate velle hoc aut illud, et velle hoc aut non velle, tamen po¬ sito quod vellit, necesse est eum libere velle, quia talem modum operandi ejus natura po¬ stulat ». Vides igitur ex Augustino manifeste colligi, libertatem arbitrii requirere, ut opus sit in potestate, et pugnare non solum cum coactione, sed cum omni absoluta necessi¬ tate. Quinto objicitur testimonium sancti Ber- nardi ex serm. 81. in Cantica, ubi sic loqui¬ tur : « Nescio quo pravo et miro modo ipsa sibi voluntas peccato quidem in deterius mutata necessitatem faciat, ut necessitas, cum voluntaria sit, excusare non valeat vo¬ luntatem, nec voluntas cum sit illecta, exclu¬ dere necessitatem. » Et infra : «Ita anima miro quodam modo, ac male libera necessi¬ tate et ancilla tenetur, et libera : ancilla propter necessitatem, libera propter volun¬ tatem ; et quod magis mirum, magisque miserum est, eo rea quo libera, eoque ancilla quo rea, ac per hoc eo ancilla quo libera » . Respondeo, loquitur S. Bernardus de ne¬ cessitate conditionata, quae non repugnat li¬ bertati, non autem de absoluta, qua? simul cum libertate consistere non potest. Nam quemadmodum non potest arbor mala bonos fi uctus facere (ut Dominus ait Matth. vn.) dum videlicet est mala : potest tamen fieri bona, et tunc bonos fructus facere : sic e- tiam qui illectus est visco pravae cupiditatis, durante affectu illo, necessario peccat, quia non potest non servire pravae cupiditati, a qua tenetur quodammodo captivus : tamen absolute potest non peccare, et si peccat, libere peccat, quia potest deponere pravum affectum, si velit gratiae Dei cooperari. IIoc igitur modo peccator est servus et liber, et ideo servus quia liber. Nam si vere liber non esset libertate naturae, nunquam vere, pro- prieque peccaret, ac per hoc servus peccati esse non posset. Porro S. Bcrnardum non existimavisse li¬ berum arbitrium opponi soli coactioni, non autem necessitati, perspicuum est ex eodem serim 81. in Cantica, ubi sic loquitur : « Un¬ de liberum arbitrium nominatur, quod liceat aversari in his pro arbitrio voluntatis, inde homo ad promerendum potes. Omne enim quod feceris bonum, malumve, quod quidem non facere liberum sit, merito ad meritum deputatur, et ut merito laudatur, non is tan¬ tum, qui potuit facere mala, et non fecit; sed et qui potuit non facere bona, et fecit : ita malo non caret merito tam is, qui potuit non facere mala et fecit, quam qui potuit fa¬ cere bona, et non fecit. Ubi autem non est libertas, nec meritum. Propterea, quae sunt ratione carentia animalia nihil merentur, quia sicut deliberatione, ita et libertate ca¬ rent. » Ex hoc loco apertissime constat, S. Bernardum requirere ad liberum arbitrium libertatem, quae est ad utrumlibet, quse di¬ citur a necessitate, qua sola bestiae carent. Sexto, objicitur testimonium S. Thomae, qui in quaest. 10. de potentia art. 2. ad 5. scribit, solam coactionem repugnare naturali libertati voluntatis. Respondeo : loquitur eo loco S. Thomas de voluntate simplici, non de voluntate, ut est principium electionis, quae sola liberum arbitrium nominatur. Adde, quod videtur idem auctor in modo loquendi, locum istum revocasse, in 1. part. Summae quaest. 41. art. 2. Septimo, objicitur idem S. Thomas, qui in 1. par. quaest. 83. art. 2. ad 3. dicit, per peccatum periisse libertatem gratiae, sed non libertatem naturae, « quae est (inquit) a coactione » . Respondeo : Accipit eo loco S. Thomas coactionem pro necessitate, sive determina¬ tione ad unum. Nam in corpore articuli di¬ xerat, liberum arbitrium non esse habitum, sed potentiam ; quia per habitus inclinamur ad unum : liberum autem arbitrium indeter¬ minatum est ad multa etiam opposita. 590 LIBER III.