Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 7: Whether free choice is a power: the various judgments of the theologians are set forth
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Now must be discussed that particle of the definition in which free choice is said to be a “power.” And we shall be compelled to bring forward here many things which are not in controversy with the heretics, but which yet seem necessary for the controversies which are to be disputed in the fourth and fifth books; for right judgment cannot be made concerning the controversies about free choice unless the very nature and notion of free choice be well understood. It is asked, then, whether free choice is a power, and what power. Now there are many judgments of the theologians on this matter, which it has pleased us briefly to enumerate, that from their comparison the truth of the matter may shine forth more plainly.
The first judgment is of those who teach that free choice consists properly in an act, not in a habit or a power. So taught Hervaeus in the first quodlibet, question 1, who places free choice in those acts of the intellect and will which precede deliberation, or the conclusion of deliberation. His reason is this: free choice is that through which a man has some act in his power, so that he can do it, or its contrary, or do and not do the same. Now the first act which is in the power of man is deliberation, or its conclusion; for before deliberation there can be no liberty. But deliberation itself is necessarily preceded by the will of deliberating, and the will of deliberating is preceded by some thought; therefore through these acts, which necessarily precede deliberation, a man has the deliberation in his power; and thereby in these acts consists the liberty of choice.
The second judgment is St. Bonaventure's, who constitutes free choice in a certain natural habit arising from reason and will. For he writes, on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 25, article 1, questions 2, 3, and 4, that free choice is a certain facility of working which arises from the conjunction of reason and will — in the way the total power of administering a household well is in the father and mother joined together, and is found in neither separately. His reason is that free choice is defined by St. Bernard as a habit of the mind free of itself, and by Peter Lombard is said to be a faculty of reason and will; and “faculty” sounds of facility and habit rather than of power.
The third judgment is Albert's, in the Summa, part 2, question 91, members 1 and 2, and on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 24, article 5, who teaches that free choice is a power perfected by a superadded habit — not, however, acquired, but natural. His reason is both that which St. Bonaventure uses, and also another: that free choice, by the judgment of St. Augustine, was lost or diminished through sin; but a power cannot be lost or diminished — a habit can.
The fourth judgment is that free choice is a certain universal power, containing under itself all the powers of the intelligent and sentient soul. The reason is that in all these powers are found free acts, whether elicited or commanded. St. Bonaventure, in the place cited, and St. Thomas, in question 24 On Truth, article 4, report this judgment without the author's name.
The fifth judgment is Alexander of Hales's, in part 2 of the Summa, question 72, member 1, article 3, who teaches that free choice is a particular power, distinct from reason and will. His reason is that in the human soul is the image of the Trinity; and the mind, or reason, is rightly referred to the Son, who is the Word and wisdom of the Father; the will to the Holy Spirit, who is goodness; therefore there must be some power, mover of the others, which answers to the Father, to whom power is attributed; and this moving power is that which we call free choice.
The sixth judgment is Durandus's, on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 24, question 3, who teaches that free choice is the very powers of reason and will, but more of reason. The reason is that both reason and will are powers formally free, but reason is free first and more. Now that each power is formally free Durandus proves: first, because the Philosopher writes, book 9 of the Metaphysics, chapter 2, that the rational powers are free; second, because free choice is commonly defined as a faculty of reason and will; third, because neither reason nor will can be coacted, and each is indifferent to acting and not acting, and to acting this way or that — for although reason in necessary matters cannot judge otherwise than as the thing stands, yet in probable and doubtful matters, about which alone there is deliberation, it is not bound to adhere to one side rather than the other; fourth, because if reason were not free in the conclusion of its judgment, neither would the will be free in election, for the will cannot choose anything other than what, after deliberation, reason concludes is to be done. And that reason is free first and more than the will the same Durandus proves: first, because if the rational powers are free, as the Philosopher teaches, certainly that will be free first and more which is rational first and more; and that this is reason itself cannot be doubted. Second, because that is said to be free which is for its own sake and independent of others, as the Philosopher teaches in book 1 of the Metaphysics, chapter 2; but the will depends on reason, not contrariwise, as is known; therefore reason is more free than the will. Third, because the first free acts are the conclusion of judgment and election; but the conclusion of judgment, which is of reason, precedes election, which is of the will; and again, the conclusion of judgment is freer than election, since election is determined by the conclusion of judgment, not contrariwise; therefore reason is free first and more than the will. Fourth, because the root of liberty is the knowledge of the contingency of the means to the end; but knowledge is in reason; therefore the root of liberty is in reason. Wherefore, since reason not only is free, but is also the cause why the will is free, it follows that reason must be called free both first and more than the will.
The seventh is Henry's, in the first quodlibet, question 16, and Scotus's, on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 25, who teach that free choice is one particular power — namely the will itself — and that it is so free that it does not depend on, nor is determined by, the practical judgment of reason. They prove it thus: that power is free which, all things being posited that are required for acting, can act and not act; but the will is free by the consent of all; therefore, all things being posited that are required for acting — one of which is the judgment of reason — it can act and not act. The same authors add that reason is not free, either formally or radically: not formally, because reason necessarily judges as the thing is, ignorance and error being removed; not radically, because the name of root signifies a true cause, and reason is not the true cause of the liberty of the will, but only a condition without which there would not be liberty in the will.
The eighth judgment is St. Thomas's, in part 1 of the Summa, question 83, articles 1, 2, 3, and in the 1-2, question 13, on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 24, question 1, and On Truth, question 24; likewise of Richard and Capreolus on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 24; finally of Cajetan, Conrad, and the others who are wont to follow St. Thomas — who teach that free choice is indeed one particular power, namely the will itself, as the preceding judgment held; but they add that the root of liberty is in reason, and that the will depends on, and is determined by, the last judgment of practical reason. Which judgment, since it seems to us the truest, will be established in the following chapter.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT VII. An liberum arbitrium sit potentia, proponun¬ tur varix Theologonim sententia^ Nunc discutienda est illa definitionis par¬ ticula, qua dicitur liberum arbitrium esse « potentia ». Cogemur autem multa hic ad- ferre, qua} non sunt apud haereticos in con¬ troversia, sed tamen ad controversias, quae in quarto et quinto libro disputandae sunt, necessaria esse videntur. Neque enim de controversiis circa liberum arbitrium recte judicari potest, nisi natura ipsa et ratio li¬ beri arbitrii probe intelligatur. Quaeritur igitur, an liberum arbitrium sit potentia, et quae potentia. Sunt autem de hac re multae Theologorum sententiae, quas breviter enumerare placuit, ut ex earum collatione rei veritas planius eluscescat. Prima sententia est eorum, qui docent, li¬ berum arbitrium proprie in actu consistere, non in habitu, vel potentia. Ita docuit Her- vacus in 1. quodlibeto quaest. ). qui in iis actibus intellectus et voluntatis liberum arbi¬ trium ponit, qui praecedunt deliberationem, vel deliberationis conclusionem. Ratio ejus haec est. Liberum arbitrium est id; per quod habet homo actum aliquem in potestate, ita ut possit illum facere, vel ejus contrarium, vel eumdem facere et non facere. Primus au¬ tem actus, qui est in potestate hominis, est deliberatio, vel ejus conclusio ; non enim ante deliberationem ulla esse potest libertas. At ipsam deliberationem necessario praece¬ dit voluntas deliberandi, et voluntatem deli¬ berandi praecedit cogitatio aliqua, igitur per hos actus, qui necessario deliberationem praiccdunt, habet homo deliberationem in potestate. Ac per hoc in his actibus consistit libertas arbitrii. Secunda sententia est S. Bonaventurae, qui liberum arbitrium in habitu quodam na¬ turali consurgente ex ratione et voluntate constituit. Scribit enim in 2. sent. dist. 25. art. 1. quaest. 2. 3. et 4. liberum arbitrium esse facilitatem quamdam operandi, quae ori¬ tur ex conjunctione rationis et voluntatis, quomodo potestas totalis bene administran¬ dae familiae est in patre et matre simul jun¬ ctis; et in neutro seorsim reperitur. Ratio ejus est, quoniam a S. Bernardo liberum arbitrium definitur habitus animi, liber sui, et a Petro Lombardo dicitur esse facul¬ tas rationis et voluntatis'. Facultas enim, et facilitatem et habitum magis, quam poten¬ tiam sonat. Tertia sententia est Alberti in summa par. 2. qu. 91. membr. 1. et 2. et in 2. sent. dist. 24. art. 5. qui docet, liberum arbitrium esse potentiam perfectam per habitum superad¬ ditum, non tamen acquisitum, sed natura¬ lem. Ratio ejus est tum illa, qua utitur S. Bonaventura, tum etiam alia, quia liberum arbitrium ex sententia S. Augustini, per pec¬ catum est amissum, vel imminutum, non au¬ tem amitti, vel minui potest potentia, sed habitus. Quarta sententia est, liberum arbitrium esse potentiam quamdam universalem, con¬ tinentem sub se potentias omnes animm in- telligentis et sentientis. Ratio est, quia in his omnibus potentiis inveniuntur actus liberi, vel eliciti, vel imperati. Referunt hanc sen¬ tentiam sine nomine auctoris S. Bonaventura loco citato, etS.Thomasin qua}st. 24. de ve¬ ritate art. 5. Quinta sententia est Alexandri Alensis, in 2. par. summa} quaest. 72. membr. 1. art. 3. qui docet, liberum arbitrium esse poten¬ tiam particularem, et distinctam a ratione et voluntate. Ratio ejus est, quoniam in anima humana est imago Trinitatis ; et quidem mens, seu ratio recte refertur ad filium, qui est Verbum et sapientia Patris : voluntas ad Spiritum sanctum, qui est bonitas ; igitur de¬ bet esse potentia aliqua motrix aliarum, qua} respondeat Patri, cui tribuitur potentia, et ha}C potentia motrix est id, quod dicimus li¬ berum arbitrium. Sexta sententia est Durandi, in 2. sent. dist. 24. qiuest. 3. qui docet, liberum arbi¬ trium esse ipsas potentias rationis et volun¬ tatis, sed magis rationis. Ratio est, quia tam ratio, quam voluntas est potentia formalitcr libera, sed ratio prius et magis est libera. Esse autem utramque potentiam formali- ter liberam, probat Durandus. Primo, quia Philosophus scribit in lib.ix. Metaph. cap. 3. potentias rationales esse liberas. Secundo, quia definitur communiter liberum arbitrium facultas rationis et voluntatis. Tertio, quia nec ratio, nec voluntas potest cogi, et utra¬ que est indifferens ad agendum et non agen¬ dum, et ad agendum hoc aut illud. Nam licet ratio in rebus necessariis non possit judi¬ care aliter, quam res se habeat, tamen in rebus probabilibus et dubiis, de quibus solis CAPUT VIII. 501 est consultatio, non tenetur adhaerere uni parti potius, quam alteri. Quarto, quia si ra¬ tio non esset libera in conclusione judicii, nec voluntas esset libera in electione, neque enim potest voluntas aliud eligere, nisi id, quod post deliberationem ratio concludit esse fa¬ ciendum. Esse autem rationem prius et magis libe¬ ram, quam voluntatem, probat idem Duran¬ dus. Primo, quia si potentia; rationales sunt libera;, ut Philosophus docet; certe illa prius et magis erit libera, quae prius et magis est rationalis : talis autem dubitari non potest, quin sit ipsa ratio. Secundo, quia liberum di¬ citur esse, quod est gratia sui, et indepen- dens ab aliis, ut Philosophus docet in i. lib. Metaph. cap. 2. Voluntas autem dependet a ratione, non contra, ut notum est. Igitur ra¬ tio magis est libera, quam voluntas. Tertio, quia primi liberi actus sunt conclusio judicii et electio; at conclusio judicii, quae est ratio¬ nis, prsecedit electionem, quae est voluntatis et rursus conclusio judicii liberior est, quam electio, cum electio determinetur a conclu¬ sione judicii, non contra. Igitur ratio prius et magis est libera quam voluntas. Quarto, quia radix libertatis est notitia contingentia; mediorum ad finem. Notitia autem est in ra¬ tione, igitur radix libertatis est in ratione. Quare cum ratio non solum sit libera, sed etiam sit causa cur voluntas sit libera, sequi¬ tur, ut ratio et prius et magis libera dicenda sit, quam voluntas. Septima est llenrici in 1. quodlibeto.quaest. 115. et Scoti in 2. sent. dist. 25. qui docent, liberum arbitrium esse potentiam unam et particularem, ipsam videlicet voluntatem, camque ita esse liberam, ut non pendeat, nec determinetur a judicio practico rationis ; probant, quia illa est potentia libera, qua; omnibus positis, qua; requiruntur ad agen¬ dum, potest agere et non agere : at voluntas est libera omnium consensu ; igitur omni¬ bus positis, qua; requiruntur ad agendum, quorum unum est Judicium rationis, potest agere et non agere. Addunt iidem auctores, rtitionem non esse libei-am, nec formalitcr, nec radicaliter ; non formalitcr, quia neces¬ sario ratio judicat ut res est, remota igno¬ rantia et errore : non radicaliter, quia no¬ men radicis significat veram causam ; ratio autem non est vera causa libertatis volunta¬ tis, sed solum conditio, sine qua non esset in voluntate libertas. Octava sententia estS. Thomsc in 1. par. Summa; quaest. 83. art. 1. 2. 3. et in 1.2. quaest. 13. in 2. sent. dist. 24. quaest. 1. et de Veritate quaest. 24. Item Richardi et Ca¬ preoli in 2. sent. dist. 24. Denique Cajetani, Conradi et aliorum, qui S. Thomam sequi solent, qui docent liberum arbitrium esse quidem potentiam unam et particularem, ipsam videlicet voluntatem, ut superior sen¬ tentia continebat, sed addunt, radicem li¬ bertatis esse in ratione, et voluntatem pen¬ dere, ac determinari a judicio ultimo pra- cticae rationis, qua; sententia quoniam ve¬ rissima nobis esse videtur, in sequenti cap. comprobabitur.