Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 8: It is proved that free choice is a power, namely the will itself; and that it is so free that it is nevertheless determined by the last judgment of practical reason
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The judgments of others being explained, it remains that we comprise in several propositions what seems to us the more inclined to the truth.
The first proposition: “Free choice is not an act.” It is proved: for free choice is something implanted in man by nature, which can by no means be taken away, as St. Bernard in the book On Grace and Free Choice, and the other Fathers, commonly teach; it is not, then, an act, which now is present, now absent, and is not in us from nature, but is produced by us. Otherwise men, even sane and waking, would often lack free choice; for they do not perpetually produce those acts in which Hervaeus constituted free choice. Nor ought it to move us that the name of free choice seems to sound of an act; for it is common to many other things to take their name from acts, though they be rather the principles and causes of the acts than the acts themselves — for so we name intelligence and reason the mind itself, which is the principle of understanding and reasoning. Add that those acts in which Hervaeus places free choice are neither themselves free, so that the name of free choice could befit them, nor do they make us free, since they determine us to think and will something.
The second proposition: “Free choice is not a habit, but a power.” It is proved: for that habit would be either natural or acquired. Not natural, because, since a habit is an inclination to something, if free choice were a natural habit we should be naturally inclined to one thing, and thus liberty toward opposites would perish. Not acquired either, because we have free choice, as we said, from nature; hence we are born with it, and do not acquire it with advancing age. And so St. Thomas rightly admonishes that the acquiredness of a habit is repugnant to the naturalness (so to speak) of free choice, and the naturalness of a habit to the liberty of choice. But (thou wilt say) a power also is a certain inclination to its object; why then cannot free choice be a natural habit, if it can be a natural power? I answer: the cause is that a power is an inclination determined to good in general, but indifferent and undetermined toward particular goods; while a habit, if we would speak properly, is an inclination to some one particular good, or evil apprehended under the notion of good. And hence it comes that through our powers we are not called good or evil, but capable of both; but through good habits we are called good, through evil ones evil. And if St. Bonaventure and Albert by a natural habit understand a natural inclination toward good in common, the question will be of the name only — or rather (as St. Augustine admonishes), when the thing is agreed on, there must be no wrangling over the name.
The third proposition: “Free choice is not a universal power.” It is proved: for although the other powers, besides the will, are capable of free acts, yet their acts are not free as they proceed from them, but as they proceed from the will, by which they are commanded; hence those powers are not free, nor do they deserve the name of free choice. For that power alone is rightly called free which is mistress of its own act, and which at its pleasure can produce it or not produce it. Add that if free choice were a universal power, there would be as many free choices as there are powers — which is plainly unheard of.
The fourth proposition: “Free choice is not some third power distinct from reason and will.” It is proved: for there is no act which answers to that third power. For what some say — that the proper act of this power is to move the intelligence and the will — makes nothing to the matter: for it is the will which moves itself and all the other powers. And so those very men say that the act of that third power is: I will to judge, I will to choose. But perhaps Alexander by the third power understood the will as it is mover, and as it is distinguished from the simple will, which is even of impossible things; and then the question would be of the name only, and those greatest theologians — Alexander, Albert, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas — would, as touching the thing itself, easily agree.
The fifth proposition: “Liberty is not formally in reason, but in the will alone.” It is proved. For first, the sacred writings attribute liberty to the will. Ecclesiasticus 15: If thou wilt keep the commandments… they shall preserve thee… Before man is life and death… that which he shall choose shall be given him. 1 Corinthians 7: having no necessity, but having power of his own will, etc. Next, the holy Fathers (as we cited in chapter 2) for this reason name it the free choice of the will, that they may show liberty to be in the will. Moreover, Gregory of Nyssa, book 7 On Philosophy, and John Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, chapter 25, write that free choice is the power of choosing; and it is agreed that election is of the will, not of reason. Finally, many of the Fathers, when they speak of free choice, call it the will itself, as is clear from Optatus, book 2 against Parmenianus, Augustine, book 3 On Free Choice, chapters 1, 2, 3, etc., and Bernard, book On Grace and Free Choice. To these come reasons drawn from absurdities: for if liberty were formally in reason, it would follow, first, that a man sins before the consent of the will; second, that the same man sins twice — when he first judges that that is to be done which is not lawful, and then chooses that very thing; third, that plainly involuntary ignorance does not excuse from sin. For nothing would be required for sinning but liberty — for a free transgression of the law is sin; wherefore, if before the consent of the will there is liberty in reason, reason will be able to sin before the consent of the will; and when afterward the consent comes, it will be another sin; and ignorance will be free, though it be involuntary. And that these things are absurd no one can deny, since they are repugnant to the common sense of the human race, and St. Augustine says, in the book On True Religion, chapter 14, that sin must be so voluntary that, if it be not voluntary, it is not sin. Let there come next also a demonstrative reason, by which it can be shown that reason is not free by any kind of liberty — that is, neither from coaction nor from necessity, neither as to specification nor as to exercise. First, then, that reason is not free from coaction in the manner in which the will is free from coaction is proved thus: the will is called free from coaction because it cannot come to pass that the will should will something against its own inclination, or that of the whole supposit; for it is inclined to all good, hence cannot will anything against its own inclination; and again, it is itself the inclination of the whole supposit, and thereby cannot will anything against the inclination of the whole supposit; thus it can in no way be coacted, because it cannot be made to will what it does not will. But reason is indeed inclined to understand all truth; yet its inclination is not the inclination of the whole supposit, and therefore it can be coacted to judge and believe against the inclination — not indeed its own, but of the whole supposit. So the demons believe, coacted, that there is one God, and therefore also tremble, as St. James says, chapter 2; and very often the sick are coacted to believe that they will shortly die — which they altogether flee from, and, were it possible, would refuse to believe. It is false, then, what Durandus writes, that reason is free from coaction equally with the will. Again, that reason is not free from necessity as to specification is proved: for reason, if necessary arguments be proposed to it, necessarily assents; if probable ones, it necessarily opines — that is, believes with misgiving; if contraries equally probable, it necessarily doubts, unless the inclination of the will come to it. And that these things are so the Philosopher witnesses in book 3 On the Soul, text 153, where he writes that we can imagine what we will, but not opine, save that which the arguments conclude is to be opined; and in book 7 of the Ethics, chapter 2, he writes that a captious syllogism necessarily induces doubt, since on the one side what is concluded seems incredible, and on the other the argument cannot be contemned until the solution appears. Experience witnesses the same: for no one deliberates whether he ought to assent to a known truth or not, but simply goes where the force of the arguments leads. The Catholic faith also witnesses it, which for this reason requires a pious affection of the will, since otherwise our mind could not easily be brought to believe things which surpass reason itself, and often (though it be not so) seem even repugnant to it. And now, that reason is not free as to exercise can be proved with easy labor. For every action is done from the desire of some good, as the Philosopher teaches in book 1 of the Ethics, chapter 1, and after him St. Thomas, part 1, question 80, article 1, and 1-2, question 1, article 2; but the desire of good in a soul endowed with reason is nothing but the will. The will itself, therefore, applies reason to understanding, or also recalls it from the act of understanding. And if the inclination of reason toward understanding be also named a desire, it is certain that such desire is natural, and inclines toward perpetual act; hence, that reason now exercises the act of speculating, or judging, or any other, and now rests, cannot be referred to reason itself, but to the desire of the whole supposit, which is none other than the will. The last reason is taken from the end. For it did not conduce to the end of the rational soul that there should be liberty in reason: for reason is the rule of human actions; but a rule ought to be immovable, uniform, determinate, necessary; otherwise it would be pernicious, and like the Lesbian rule, which (as the Philosopher witnesses, book 5 of the Ethics, chapter 10), being of lead, was easily bent in various directions.
The sixth proposition: “The election of the will depends necessarily on the last judgment of practical reason.” It is proved: for the will cannot will anything without a preceding judgment of reason; therefore, if the judgment be undetermined, it too will be undetermined; if the judgment be determined, it too will be determined. But the last practical judgment is altogether determined — for then reason says: this, now, all things considered, is to be done; therefore the will will necessarily choose that which the last practical judgment has determined is to be chosen. The antecedent of the first consequence is proved by manifest reasons. First, the will is the rational appetite; and from Aristotle, book 3 of the Ethics, chapter 2, election is intellective appetite; from Augustine, book 10 On the Trinity, chapter 1, no one can love the unknown; therefore without a preceding act of reason there can be no election. Second, the object of the will is good apprehended and judged agreeable; wherefore, if the will willed something without preceding cognition and judgment, it would work without an object — which cannot be. Third, whatever a man does, he does for some end; and hence it cannot come to pass that he be moved to choose something unless reason dictate that it is a means agreeable to the proposed end. Finally, experience teaches the same: for there is no one who, if it be asked of him why he does something, does not answer: because I judge it is so to be done. Even he who said, “let my will stand for reason,” did not exclude judgment from election, but judged it good for himself to act against reason. And so St. Bernard rightly, in the book On Grace and Free Choice: “The will,” says he, “whithersoever it turn itself, has reason always for companion — not that it is always moved from reason, but that it is never moved without reason.” Now is proved that consequence by which we gathered that, if the judgment be determined, the election also will be determined. For if, when the judgment is plainly determined to one thing, the will could choose another, or not choose that one, no reason could be given why the will chose another thing not judged, or did not choose the thing already judged; and thus there would be given election without judgment, and action without object — which we have already shown cannot be. Thou wilt say: he who chooses something against the determination of the last practical judgment can give the reason of his election — namely, that he did it to show his liberty. I answer: that very thing will then be the last practical judgment: all things considered, it is good for me now to act against reason, that I may demonstrate myself free. And thus it will be false that a reason can be given why someone acted against the determination of the last practical judgment; and that too will be false, that it can come to pass that one do something with the last judgment of reason gainsaying it. This reason is continued by a likeness. For the appetite of beasts is determined to one for this cause, that the cognition of the senses is determined to one; again, the human will, with respect to the last end, is determined to one, at least as to specification, because the judgment of reason is determined to one, nor can it represent the last end save under the notion of good; finally, the will of the blessed is determined to one even as to exercise, as touching the desire of the last end, because the judgment of reason representing that end only under the notion of good is always present and perfectly applied to the minds of the blessed. Therefore, by likeness, in the choosing of any particular thing whatever, the will will be determined to one, as to specification and as to exercise, and will in fact necessarily choose, when there is present a particular practical judgment dictating, here and now, absolutely, all things considered: this is to be chosen. For such a judgment represents the thing only under the notion of good, for that time, as it is present and perfectly applied. Thou wilt say: in the means conducing to the end there is never given such a judgment so determined to one that there is not at the same time also another judgment, that other means too are useful to that end. I answer: the last judgment does not suffer with itself another like judgment, because they would be contradicting and repugnant judgments. And so the last judgment does not deny that there are other means useful to the same end; but it says that, all things considered, here and now, this one is to be taken as the most useful, and thereby as absolutely and simply better than the rest. Wherefore, if the will should then choose something else, it would indeed have a reason why it chose that means — namely, because it is useful; but it would have no reason why it passed over that other which here and now, and simply, is judged better. For it now has but one last judgment, nor can it have more, because they would be contradictory — namely, “all things considered, this is better,” and, “all things considered, this is not better.” Let this be added to these reasons: that if it could come to pass that one choose against the dictate of the last practical judgment, it could also come to pass that there be sin in the will without any error or defect in reason or intelligence — which indeed the adversaries are compelled to admit. But certainly it seems to be against that of Solomon, Proverbs 14: They err that work evil. And it most manifestly fights with the judgment of the Philosopher, book 3 of the Ethics, chapters 1, 3, and 5; book 6, chapters 12 and 13; book 7, chapter 3; and in book 3 On the Soul, text 58.
The seventh proposition: “Though the will alone is formally free, yet the root of its liberty is in reason.” It is proved: for the will is free for this cause, that it is the rational appetite; as contrariwise the appetite in beasts is not free for this cause, that it is not rational; therefore the cause of liberty is reason itself. Moreover, an appetite cannot be borne toward anything unless it be proposed to it by a knowing power as good and agreeable, nor can it flee from anything unless it be proposed to it as evil and hurtful; therefore, if the knowing power be determined to one — that is, propose but one thing, whether good or evil — the appetite will necessarily tend to it, or flee from it, as we see happen in beasts, whose cognition is through sense, and thereby determined to one; but if the knowing power be undetermined, and propose various objects, showing in each the notion of good and the notion of evil, and in fine open the way to opposites — such as is our reason with respect to the means, which have no necessary connection with the end — then the appetite will be free, and can be inclined to various sides. The will, therefore, is free for this cause, that it follows reason, which proposes to it various and contingent means for obtaining the end. Thou wilt say: if the will is free on account of the undetermination of reason, why for the same cause is not reason too free? I answer: because a knowing power is not capable of liberty, as an appetitive power is. For a knowing power by its nature depends on the object, and is changed by it through the species which it receives from it; whence liberty concerning its object cannot befit it. But appetite is thence independent, since it receives nothing from the object, nor suffers from it; and therefore by its nature it is capable of liberty. Moreover, liberty was not necessary to the knowing power, because, since truth is not repugnant to truth, it can without any detriment apprehend all things and assent to all; but to the appetite it was necessary, because goods are often at strife among themselves and cannot be desired together — as virginity and marriage, pleasure and health, action and contemplation, and the like. And so the will, because it is an appetite, is capable of liberty; because it is rational, it has liberty in very fact.
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CAPUT VIII. Probatur liberum arbitrium esse potentiam , videlicet ipsam voluntatem , eamque sic esse liberam , ut tamen determinetur a judicio ultimo practicse rationis. Explicatis sententiis aliorum, restat, ut quid nobis ad veritatem propensius videa¬ tur, aliquot propositionibus complectamur. Prima propositio ; «Liberum arbitrium non est actus. » Probatur. Nam liberum arbitrium est aliquid a natura insitum homini, quod nulla ratione tolli potest, ut S. Bernardus in lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio, et alii Pa¬ tres communiterdocent : non igitur est actus qui modo adest, modo abest, et non a natu¬ ra inest, seda, nobis producitur. Alioqui sae¬ pe homines, etiam sani vigilantes libero ca¬ rerent arbitrio ; neque enim perpetuo actus illos producunt, in quibus liberum arbitrium constituebat Hervaeus. Neque movere nos debet, quod nomen li¬ beri arbitrii actum sonare videatur. Nam commune est multis alii rebus, ut nomen ac¬ cipiant ab actibus, cum tamen principia po¬ tius, et causae actuum sint, quam actusipsi, sic enim intclligcntiam et rationem nominamus ipsam mentem, quae principium intelligendi et ratiocinandi est. Adde quod actus illi, in quibus Hervaeus liberum ponit arbitrium, neque ipsi sunt liberi, ut eis nomen liberi arbitrii convenire possit; neque faciunt nos liberos, cum determinent ad aliquid cogi¬ tandum et volendum. Secunda propositio : « Liberum arbitrium non est habitus, sed potentia. » Probatur. Nam vel is habitusessct naturalis, vel aequi- 592 LIBER III. situs : non naturalis, quia cum habitus sit inclinatio ad aliquid, si liberum arbitrium esset habitus naturalis, naturaliter inclinati essemus ad unum, atque ita periret libertas ad opposita : non etiam acquisitus, quia li¬ berum arbitrium habemus, ut diximus, a na¬ tura, proinde cum illo nascimur, non acce¬ dente rntate illud acquirimus. Itaque recte admonet S. Thomas, habitus acquisitionem repugnare naturalitati (utsic loquamur) liberi arbitrii; habitus vero naturalitatem repug¬ nare arbitrii libertati. At (inquies) potentia quoque est inclinatio quaidam ad suum objectum : cur igitur libe¬ rum arbitrium non potest esse habitus natu¬ ralis, si potest esse potentia naturalis ? Re¬ spondeo, causam esse, quia potentia est in¬ clinatio determinata ad bonum in universum, indifferens autem et indeterminata ad bona particularia : habitus vero, si proprie loqui velimus, est inclinatio ad unum aliquod par¬ ticulare bonum, vel malum apprehensum sub ratione boni. Et ex eo fit, ut per potentias non dicamur boni vel mali, sed capaces utri- usque : at per habitus bonos, dicimur boni, per malos, mali. Quod si S. Bonaventura et Albertus per habitum naturalem intelligant inclinationem naturalem ad bonum in com¬ mune, de solo nomine erit quaestio, vel po¬ tius (ut S. Augustinus monet) cum de re constet, non erit de nomine litigandum. Tertia propositio : « Liberum arbitrium non est potentia universalis. » Probatur. Nam tametsi potentiae cacterao, praeter volun¬ tatem, sint actuum liberorum capaces; ta¬ men non sunt actus earum liberi, ut ab ip¬ sis procedunt, sed ut procedunt a voluntate, a qua imperantur. Proinde non sunt poten¬ tiae illae liberae, nec liberi arbitrii nomen me¬ rentur. Illa enim sola potentia recte dicitur libera, quae est domina sui actus, quaeque pro arbitrio potest illum producere, vel non producere. Adde quod si liberum arbitrium esset potentia universalis, tot essent libera arbitria, quot sunt potentiae, quod est plane inauditum. Quarta propositio : « Liberum arbitrium non est potentia quaedam tci'tia distincta a ratione et voluntate. » Probatur. Nam nul¬ lus est actus, qui tertiae isti potestati respon¬ deat. Quod enim aliqui dicunt, proprium a- ctum hujus potentiae, esse, movere intelli- gentiam et voluntatem, nihil facit ad rem. Nam voluntas est, quae se, et alias omnes (I) Eccl. XV, 16; I Corint. VII, 37. potentias movet. Itaque illi ipsi dicunt, actum tertia? illius potentiae esse, velo judicare, volo eligere. Sed forte Alexander per tertiam po¬ tentiam intellexit voluntatem, ut est motrix, et ut distinguitur a simplici voluntate, quae est etiam impossibilium. Et tum solum de nomine quaestio esset : et inter se summi illi Theologi Alexander, Albertus) S. Bonaven¬ tura et S. Thomas, quod attinet ad rem, fa¬ cile convenirent. Quinta propositio, « Libertas formaliter non est in ratione, sed in sola voluntate. » Provatur.Nam in primis sacrae litterae volun¬ tati libertatem tribuunt. Ecclesiastici xv. Si volueris mandata servare, conservabunt te : ante hominem vita et mors, quicquid placuerit ei dabitur illi. I Corinth. vil : Non habens ne¬ cessitatem, sed potestatem habens suce volunta¬ tis, efc. (I). Deinde S. Patres (ut citavimus cap. 2.) ideo liberum voluntatis arbitrium nominant, ut ostendant in voluntate libertatem esse. Praeterea Gregoidus Nyssenus lib. vii. de Philosophia, et Joan. Damascenus lib. ii. de fide cap. 25. scribunt, liberum arbitrium esse potestatem eligendi ; constat autem electio^ nem voluntatis esse, non rationis. Denique multi ex Patribus, cum de libero arbitrio lo¬ quuntur, voluntatem ipsam appellant, ut perspicuum est ex Optato lib. vil. contra Parmenianum, Augustino lib. m. de libero arbitrio cap. 1. 2. 3. etc. Et Bernardo lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio. Ilis accedunt rationes ex absurdis petita?, nam si formaliter esset in ratione libertas, sequeretur primo, hominem peccare ante consensum voluntatis. Secundo, eumdem bis peccare, cum primo judicat esse faciendum id, quod non licet, et deinde id ipsum eli¬ git. Tertio, ignorantiam plane involuntariam a peccato non excusare. Nam ad peccandum non requiretur, nisi libertas; libera enim transgressio legis, peccatum est. Quare si ante consensum voluntatis libertas est in ratione , ante consensum voluntatis ratio peccare poterit, et cum postea accedit con¬ sensus, erit aliud peccatum, et ignorantia erit libera, quamvis sit involuntaria. lla?c autem absurda esse nemo negare potest, cum repugnent communi sensui generis humani, et S. Augustinus dicat, in lib. de vera religione cap. 14, peccatum adeo esse debere voluntarium, ut, si non sit volun¬ tarium, non sit peccatum. Accedat deinde CAPUT VIII. ratio etiam ostensiva, qua demonstrari po¬ test rationem non esse liberam ullo genere libertatis, id est, nec a coactione, neque a necessitate ; neque quoad specificationem, neque quoad exercitium. Primum igitur, non esse liberam rationem a coactione eo modo, quo a coactione li¬ bera est voluntas, probatur : nam voluntas libera dicitur a coactione, quia fieri non po¬ test, ut voluntas aliquid velit contra incli¬ nationem suam, vel totius suppositi ; nam ipsa inclinatur ad omne bonum, proinde non potest aliquid velle contra suam inclinatio* nem; et rursus ipsa est inclinatio^otius suppo¬ siti, ac per hoc non pot est velle aliquid contra inclinationem totius suppositi. Jtanullo modo potest cogi, quia non potest fieri, ut velit quod non vult. At ratio inclinatur quidem ad omne verum intelligendum, tamen ejus in¬ clinatio non est inclinatio totius suppositi, et ideo potest cogi ad judicandum et creden- dugi contra inclinationem non quidem suam, sed totius suppositi. Ita daemones credunt unum esse Deum coacti, et idcirco etiam con¬ tremiscunt, ut ait S. Jacob. cap. 2. Et sae- penumero qui aegrotant, coguntur credere se brevi esse morituros, quod omnino refu¬ giunt, et si fieri posset, nollent credere. Fal¬ sum est igitur, quod scribit Durandus, ra¬ tionem esse liberam a coactione aeque ac voluntatem. Rursus non esse liberam rationem a ne¬ cessitate quoad specificationem, probatur. Ratio enim si ei proponantur argumenta ne¬ cessaria, necessario assentitur ; si probabi¬ lia, necessario opinatur, id est, cum formidi¬ ne credit ; si contraria aeque probabilia, ne¬ cessario dubitat, nisi accedat inclinatio voluntatis. Haec autem ita esse, testatur Phi¬ losophus in ii. lib. de anima tex. 153. ubi scribit, nos imaginari posse quod volumus, non autem opinari, nisi id, quod argumenta concludunt esse opinandum. Et in vii. lib. Ethic. cap. 2. scribit, syllogismum captio¬ sum necessario inducere dubitationem, cum ab una parte videatur incredibile quod con¬ cluditur, ab altera non possit contemni ar¬ gumentum, donec solutio non apparet. Te¬ statur idem experientia. Nemo enim consultat, utrum debeat veritati cognitae assentiri, nec ne, sed simpliciter eo accedit, quo argumen¬ torum vis ducit. Testatur etiam fides Catho¬ lica, quie propterea requirit pium volunta¬ tis affectum, quoniam alioqui mens nostra non facile posset adduci, ut crederet, qua} 593 rationem ipsam superant, saepe etiam (quam¬ vis non ita sit) eidem repugnare videntur. Jam vero non esse rationem liberam, quoad exercitium , facili negotio probari potest. Nam omnis actio fit ex appetitu alicujus boni, ut Philosophus docet in i. lib. Ethicor. cap. 1. Et post eum S. Thomas 1. par. quasst. 80. art. 1. et 1. 2. quaest. 1. artic. 2. Appetitus autem boni in anima, ratione praedita nihil est, nisi voluntas. Ipsa igitur voluntas ratio¬ nem applicat ad intelligendum, vel etiam ab actu intelligendi revocat. Quod si incli¬ natio rationis ad intelligendum appetitus etiam nominetur, certum est ejusmodi ap¬ petitum esse naturalem, et inclinare ad per¬ petuum actum. Proinde quod ratio nunc exerceat actum speculandi, vel judicandi, vel alium quemcumque, nunc vero quiescat, non potest referri in Ipsam rationem, sed in appetitum totius suppositi, qui non est alius, nisi voluntas. Postrema ratio sumitur ex fine. Siquidem ad finem aniime rationalis non conducebat, ut in ratione esset libertas. Ratio enim est regula actionum humanarum, regula autem debetesse immobilis, uniformis, determinata, necessaria ; alioqui perniciosa esset, et Les¬ bia} regulai similis, quae (ut Philosophus te¬ statur lib. v. Ethic. cap. 10.) quod plumbea esset, facile flectebatur in varias partes. Sexta propositio : « Voluntatis electio pen¬ det necessario ab ultimo judicio practica} rationis. » Probatur. Nam voluntas non po¬ test aliquid velle sine praecedenti judicio ra¬ tionis ; ergo si judicium sit indeterminatum, et ipsa erit indeterminata, si judicium deter¬ minatum sit, et ipsa determinata erit : at judicium ultimum practicum est omnino de¬ terminatum; dicit enim tunc ratio, hoc nunc (omnibu§ consideratis) est faciendum ; igitur voluntas necessario eliget id, quod ultimum judicium practicum determinavit esse eli¬ gendum. Probatur antecedens prima} consecutionis manifestis rationibus. Primo, voluntas est appetitus rationalis ; et ex Aristotele lib. m. Ethic. cap. 2. electio est appetitus intellecti¬ vus. Ex Augustino lib. vm de Trinitate cap. 4. nemo potest amare incognitum ; igitur sine rationis actu pnecedente nulla esse po¬ test electio. Secundo, voluntafis objectum est bonum apprehensum et judicatum con¬ veniens ; quocirca si voluntas aliquid vellet sine pra}cedente cognitione et judicio, ope¬ raretur sine objecto, quod fieri non potest. 594 LIBER III. Tertio, quicquid homo agit, propter aliquem finem agit, ac proinde fieri nequit, ut mo¬ veatur ad eligendum aliquid, nisi ratio di¬ ctet illud esse medium conveniens ad propo¬ situm finem. Denique experientia idem do¬ cet. Nemo enim est, qui, si qua;ratur ab eo, cur aliquid agat, non respondeat, quia judi¬ cat ita esse faciendum. Ille etiam qui dixit, sit pro ratione voluntas, non exclusit judi¬ cium ab electione, sed judicavit, bonum sibi esse contra rationem agere. Itaque recte S. Bernardas in lib. de gratia et libero ar¬ bitrio : a Habet, inquit, voluntas quocum¬ que se volverit semper comitem rationem, non quod semper ex ratione, sed quod num- quam absque ratione moveatur. » Probatur nunc illa consecutio, qua colli¬ gebamus, si judicium sit determinatum, et electionem fore determinatam. Nam si cum est judicium plane determinatum ad unum, voluntas possit aliud eligere, aut illud non eligere, nulla reddi poterit ratio, cur volun¬ tas aliud non judicatum elegerit, aut illud jam judicatum non elegerit, atque ita dabi¬ tur electio sine judicio et actio sine objecto, quod fieri non posse jam ostendimus. Dices, illum qui contra determinationem ultimi judicii practici aliquid eliget, posse reddere rationem electionis suae, quod vide¬ licet id fecei'it, ut ostenderet suam liberta¬ tem. Respondeo : Hoc ipsum tunc futurum ultimum judicium practicum omnibus con¬ sideratis, bonum mihi est nunc contra ratio¬ nem agere, ut me liberum esse demonstrem. Atque ita falsum erit, posse reddi rationem, cur aliquis egerit contra determinationem ultimi judicii practici; nccnon et illud erit falsum, posse fieri, ut quis agat aliquid, re¬ pugnante ultimo judicio rationis. Continuatur haec ratio a simili. Nam ap¬ petitus bestiarum ideo est determinatus ad unum, quia cognitio sensuum est determi¬ nata ad unum : rursus, voluntas humana, respectu ultimi finis, determinata est ad unum, saltem quoad specificationem, quia judicium rationis determinatum est ad unum, nec potest repraesentare ultimum finem, nisi sub ratione boni : denique, voluntas beato¬ rum etiam quoad exercitium determinata est ad unum, quoad appetitum ultimi finis, quia rationis judicium repraesentans illum linem, tantum sub ratione boni, semper est praesens et perfecte applicatum mentibus beatorum, ergo a simili, in quacumque re particulari eligenda, voluntas erit determi¬ nata ad unum, quoad specificationem', et quoad exercitium, et reipsa necessario eli¬ get, quando aderit praesens judicium practi¬ cum particulare dictans hic et nunc absoluto omnibus consideratis, hoc est eligendum. Nam tale judicium repraesentat rem, tantum sub ratione boni, pro eo tempore, ut est praesens et perfecte applicatum. Dices : In mediis ad finem conducentibus nunquam datur tale judicium ita determi¬ natum ad unum, ut non simul etiam adsit aliud judicium, quod alia quoque sint media utilia ad illum finem. Respondeo, judicium ultimum non pati secum aliud judicium si¬ mile, quia essent contradicentia et repugnan¬ tia judicia. Itaque -ultimum judicium non negat, quin alia sint media utilia ad eumdem finem, sed, dicit, omnibus consideratis hic et nunc, hoc unum esse accipiendum tam¬ quam utilissimum, ac per hoc absolute et simpliciter melius cmteris, quare si*volun- tas tunc eligeret aliquid aliud, haberet qui¬ dem rationem, cur eligeret illud tale me¬ dium, quia nimirum est utile, sed nou habe¬ ret rationem ullam cur omitteret illud aliud quod hic et nunc, et simpliciter est judica¬ tum melius. Non enim nunc habet nisi unum ultimum judicium, nec potest habere, quia contradicentia essent, nimirum, omnibus consideratis hoc est melius, et omnibus con¬ sideratis hoc non est melius. Accedat ad has rationes, quod si posset fieri, ut quis eligeret contra dictamen ultimi judicii practici, posset etiam fieri, ut in vo¬ luntate esset peccatum sine ullo errore, vel defectu in ratione, sive intelligentia. (Juod quidem adversarii coguntur admittere. Sed certe videtur esse contra illud Salomonis, Proverb. xiv : Errant, qui operantur ma¬ lum (I). Et manifestissime pugnat cum sen¬ tentia Philosophi, lib. m. Ethic. cap. I. 3. et 5. lib. vi. cap. 12. et 13. lib. vii. cap. 3. et in lib. 3. de anima tcx. 58. Septima propositio : « Et si voluntas sola sit formaliter libera, radix tamen libertatis ejus in ratione est. » Probatup. Nam volun¬ tas ideo est libera, quia est appetitus ratio¬ nalis : sicut e contrario appetitus in bestiis, ideo non est liber, quia non est rationalis : igitur causa libertatis est ipsa ratio. Pra)ter- rea appetitus non potest in aliquid ferri, (1) Pro. XIV, 22. CAPUT IX. 593 nisi proponatur ei a potentia cognoscente tamquam bonum et conveniens, nec potest ab aliquo refugere, nisi proponatur ei ut malum et noxium ; igitur si potentia cog¬ noscens sit determinata ad unum, id est, non proponat nisi unum, sive bonum, sive malum, appetitus necessario tendet in illud, aut ab eo refugiet, ut videmus accidere in bestiis, quorum cognitio est per sensum, ac per hoc determinata ad unum ; at si poten¬ tia cognoscens sit indeterminata et proponat varia objecta, ostendens in singulis esse ra¬ tionem boni et rationem mali, ac denique viam aperiat ad opposita, qualis est ratio nostra respectu mediorum, qua) non habent necessariam connexionem cum fine, tunc appetitus erit liber, et poterit inclinari in varias partes. Voluntas igitur ideo libera est, quia sequitur rationem, qua) varia et con¬ tingentia media ad finem obtinendum ei proponit. Dices: si voluntas libera est propter inde- terminationem rationis, cur propter eamdem causam non est libera etiam ratio ? Respon¬ deo : quia potentia cognoscens non est ca¬ pax libertatis, sicut est potentia appetens. Nam potentia cognoscens ex natura sua, pendet ab objecto, et ab illo immutatur per speciem, quam ab ipso recipit. Unde non potest ei convenire libertas circa suum ob¬ jectum : appetitus autem est inde pendens, cum ab objecto nihil recipiat, nec ab eo pa¬ tiatur : et ideo sua natura capax est liberta¬ tis. Praeterea non erat necessaria libertas potentia) cognoscenti, quia cum verum vero non repugnet, sine ullo detrimento potest apprehendere omnia, et omnibus assentiri : at appetitui necessaria erat, quia sa)pe bona sunt inter se pugnantia nec simul expeti possunt, ut virginitas et matrimonium ; vo¬ luptas et sanitas ; actio et contemplatio, et similia. Itaque voluntas quia est appetitus, capax est libertatis ; quia est rationalis, ha¬ bet re ipsa libertatem.