Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 9: The arguments against the conclusions of the preceding chapter are answered
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
But now the arguments must be solved which fight against the propositions of the preceding chapter, and which were already briefly indicated in chapter 7.
The first argument, then, strove to prove that free choice is the acts of reason and will which precede deliberation. The reasoning was this: free choice is that through which a man has some act in his power; but a man has in his power the act of deliberating (for that is the first free act) through the act by which he wills to deliberate, and through the thought which precedes this very willing; therefore in these two acts preceding deliberation free choice consists. I answer: first, it is false that before every election deliberation precedes, and before deliberation an act of willing to deliberate. For often a man straightway embraces a thing offered, and freely; because, though he did not deliberate, yet he could have deliberated had he willed. And so not all undeliberated acts are involuntary, but only those which could not have been deliberated. Next, the name of free choice is not rightly given to all those things which are necessary for choosing freely, but only to that thing which is the productive principle of free acts, through which we are properly masters of our acts. And such a principle is the will, which produces free acts by eliciting or commanding.
The second argument endeavored to prove that free choice is not a power, but a habit, or at least a power with a habit; for free choice is defined by St. Bernard as a habit of the mind, and by Peter Lombard as a faculty of reason and will; and by the judgment of Augustine it was lost or diminished. I answer: St. Bernard does not take the name of habit in the scholastic manner, for a quality superadded to a power, but for the power itself, as it is inclined and apt for working even when it works nothing. So also Peter Lombard uses the name of faculty not for facility, but for power. Finally, St. Augustine says that free choice was lost — not that which is from necessity, but that which is from sin: for we were made servants of sin through Adam's sin, whence also we have need of a Deliverer and Redeemer. Further, free choice is said to be diminished not as to its essence, but as to its operation and strength; for many things we cannot work in the state of corrupted nature which we could have in the state of whole nature.
The third argument contended that free choice is a power distinct from reason and will — namely a moving power — that there might be in man something to complete the image of the Trinity: for reason bears the image of the Word; the will, of the Holy Spirit; but the image of the Father will be wanting, unless a third power be posited which in some manner represents him. I answer: the image of the Trinity consists in memory, mind, and will, from the doctrine of St. Augustine, book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 3 [al. 7]; and it is certain that by the name of memory cannot be understood that third moving power, but it is the same mind, as it retains the knowledge already received, and thus is fruitful and brings forth the Word, as the same St. Augustine teaches in book 14 On the Trinity, chapters 3, 4, and 6. Further, St. Thomas, in part 1, question 93, article 7, aptly enough explains the image of the Trinity, when he compares the mind to the Father; the knowledge produced by the mind, to the Son; the love proceeding from the knowledge of the mind, to the Holy Spirit. It is clear, therefore, that that third power is not necessary for completing the image of the Trinity. Add that if there were posited in the rational soul three distinct powers, of which each should produce its own acts, occasion would be given to a great error — as though in God, to whose image man was made, there were three processions, and not two only, and thereby not a Trinity of persons, but a Quaternity.
The fourth argument, with three others, attempted to prove that the understanding power is formally free, and therefore that free choice is the understanding power. The objection was woven thus: the rational powers are free, from Aristotle, book 9 of the Metaphysics, chapter 2; but the understanding power is rational; therefore free. I answer: the Philosopher does not say that the rational powers are free, but that they bear on opposites; nor does he speak of reason and will, but of the arts and sciences, which he calls rational powers because we can produce their acts when we will; and he says they bear on opposites because the science of contraries is the same. And so, even if he had called such powers free, we should nevertheless not be compelled to confess them formally free, but should understand them to be named free because they produce free acts — though the acts were free not because produced by them, but because commanded by the will. For the same Philosopher, in the same book, chapter 5, writes that all those powers are determined by election; and it is agreed well enough that election is an act of the will, not of the intelligence.
The fifth argument: free choice is a faculty of reason and will, as it is commonly defined; therefore reason too is formally free, and is named free choice. I answer: free choice is called a faculty of reason and will because reason is free radically, the will formally.
The sixth argument: reason cannot be coacted, and is indifferent to many things; therefore it is free not only from coaction, but also from necessity. I answer: this was already explained in the fifth proposition of the preceding chapter, where it was demonstrated that reason can be coacted to judge against the inclination of the whole supposit; likewise that it is so indifferent in probable matters that nevertheless it necessarily opines, or hangs in doubt, unless the inclination of the will come to it.
The seventh argument: unless the mind in judging be truly and formally free, neither will the will be able to be free in choosing; for the will cannot choose anything other than what reason judges is to be chosen. I answer: the will is free in choosing, not because it is not necessarily determined by the last and practical judgment of reason, but because that very last and practical judgment is in the power of the will. For it must be known that, after the cognition of good in general, there straightway exists in the will a certain inclination toward it, yet not a full election; then, when various means are proposed by reason, and it is shown what of good and what of evil is in each, the will is inclined now to one side, now to another; and it is in its power to suffer itself to be moved, or to resist — not indeed by a positive act, but by a negative one, namely by not suffering itself to be moved. For through this, that the will suffers itself to be moved by one proposed reason, it comes about that the mind, other inquiry being omitted, proceeds and concludes the particular judgment, upon which election straightway follows. And so the liberty of the will seems properly to be seated in this: that, various non-necessary reasons being proposed, it suffers itself to be moved by one and not by another. And hence it is that the Philosopher says, in book 3 of the Ethics, chapter 5, that virtues and vices are in our power, though all desire that which seems good to them, because each man is in a certain manner the cause to himself that this or that seems so to him. Where the Philosopher places the virtues in our power because good elections are in our power, from whose repetition habits are generated; and the elections themselves he places in our power because the judgments, or views, upon which the elections follow, are in our power. Hence also it is that good or evil habits contribute much to good or evil election; because as each man is affected, as the Philosopher teaches in the same place, so he judges of the things themselves. Hence too St. Thomas, in question 1 On Evil, article 3, rightly said that the cause of sin is that a man works not attending to the rule of the divine law; and that of this — the not attending to the rule — no other cause is to be sought, since the liberty of the human will suffices for it. Where St. Thomas places the liberty and cause of sin in this: that the will — when on the one side it is drawn to sinning by a pleasure apprehended through sense and reason and proposed as good, and on the other is called back from the sin by reason proposing the law of God and representing that pleasure as hurtful — itself suffers itself to be moved by sense, and attends to the good proposed in the pleasure, and does not suffer itself to be moved by reason proposing the law of God, and so attends not to the true rule of good action. Finally, from these things are refuted also those four arguments by which Durandus strove to make out that reason is not only formally free, but even freer than the will itself.
The eighth argument fights against the sixth proposition, and proves that the will can choose against the last and practical judgment of reason. For this is the difference between natural and free powers: that the natural cannot not act, the object being present and the other things required for acting; but the free can — which is certain both by experience and from the doctrine of the Philosopher, book 9 of the Metaphysics, chapter 5. But the will is the power most free; therefore it can not act, however much it have the object present, represented through the last judgment of reason. And this argument can be confirmed from an absurdity: for if the will necessarily follows the last judgment of reason, it will follow that a lesser good can never be chosen, the greater being left; for reason always judges the greater good to be set before the lesser, unless perchance it err. But this seems to be false, and against experience: for often men, among non-necessary things, choose the lesser good, all error being even removed; and God himself, into whom error cannot fall, chooses and does the lesser good, though he could choose and do something greater. It is confirmed again by another reason: since it would follow that, two equal goods being proposed, neither could be chosen, since the right judgment of reason sets neither before the other; but experience teaches the contrary. It is confirmed also third, because (as St. Augustine says, book 12 On the City of God, chapter 6) if there be two equally affected in mind and body, and they light upon the same thing, which by its beauty can allure the affection, and each be tempted by the same temptation of the devil, and yet the one consent to the temptation, the other not consent, no other cause can be given than that the one wills, the other wills not. But if the will necessarily followed the judgment, it could not come to pass that, that case being posited, the one should consent and the other not consent; for reason would dictate the same to both. It is confirmed last, because it would follow that election is not election. For election is among many; therefore an act of the will which necessarily follows a determined judgment is not election; and yet in very truth it is election; therefore it is election and not election. I answer: the Philosopher, in the place cited, does not compare the will, which is properly free, with the non-free powers, but compares the rational powers — which he says are the sciences and arts — with the natural powers; and he says the rational powers, the object being present, can not work, because they depend wholly on election: for we work through the sciences and arts when we will, and cease when we will — because, namely, it is in our power to apply these habits to work. And so that testimony of the Philosopher pertains nothing to the matter. Nor yet do we deny that that difference between free and natural powers is true — that the free, the object being present, can not work, the non-free cannot. For the free powers sometimes have for object something contingent, in which the notion of good and the notion of evil are shown together; and thereby the free power can be inclined to desire by reason of the good, and to not desire, or even to refuse, by reason of the evil. But the non-free powers always have for object some one thing, proposed under one notion only, and therefore cannot but work, desiring or refusing. Nor does it hence follow that the will can not work when the object is present, proposed through the last judgment of reason; because then the object is proposed only under one notion, and hence no further room is given for option. To the first confirmation I answer: a lesser good, absolutely, can be chosen, error being removed, if in the particular, on account of some circumstance, reason judge it to be at this time best. In which manner God, when he does something, does not do it because he knows not that he can do something better, but because he judges that then that is most expedient. To the second confirmation I answer: two equal goods being proposed together, one can be chosen; because either on account of some circumstance the will will incline to one, or at least, that the matter may at some time be ended, the will will suffer itself to be moved by one; and then the last judgment will be concluded, and the election will follow. For experience teaches that, when we cannot by reason set one before the other, it is judged by all useful that one be chosen even by lot, rather than that both be left. To the third confirmation the answer is easy: for though the two be equally affected, and light upon the same beauty, yet the one, because he will will it, will judge the offered beauty to be desired, and so will consent; the other, because he will will it, will judge that the lust is to be resisted, and so will not consent. And so the last judgments in those two will be diverse, and thence also the elections diverse. To the fourth confirmation I answer: by the name of election is not understood precisely the act of the will which follows after the last judgment, but that act together with the conclusion of the last judgment itself. For this is why Aristotle, in book 3 of the Ethics, chapter 3, says that election is deliberative appetition; and in book 6, chapter 2, says it is intellective appetite, or appetitive intellect; and in book 7, chapter 3, says that election is as it were the conclusion of the practical syllogism — because, namely, the conclusion of the last practical judgment and the act of the will which thence necessarily follows are taken for one and the same. And St. Gregory of Nyssa, book 5 On Philosophy, chapter 4, writes that election is something composed of counsel and appetite. Finally St. Thomas, in the 1-2, question 13, article 1, says indeed that election is an act elicited by the will, yet that it imports also an act of reason. Thus, then, election, since it embraces both acts — namely, of the last judgment of reason and of the approbation of the will — is truly among many, and is simply in our power, and absolutely and properly free.
The ninth argument is against the last proposition, which taught that the root of liberty is in reason. The argument is this: reason does not concur to the act of the will as a cause, but as a condition without which the will would not work; for it only extrinsically represents the object to it; but “root” signifies a true cause; therefore reason is not the root of the liberty which is found in the will. I answer: reason not only represents, but also makes, the object of the will. For the thing itself, though good in itself, is not the object of the will unless it be judged good by reason, and proposed as agreeable and to be desired. Wherefore reason does not exhibit the object to the will as he who brings fire for burning, or who opens a window that the chamber may be lit; but as the light, which makes colors actually visible which without light were visible only in potency. And that this is so is manifest: for upon a mere condition action never follows — for by the mere opening of the window the chamber will not be lit, if light be wanting; nor by the application of a painted fire will true burning be done; but upon the mere judgment of reason, by which a thing is proposed as good, appetition follows, even if perchance that thing be not good. Reason, therefore, concurs not only as a condition applying the object, but as a cause making the object, while it bestows on the good thing a certain motive force, and makes that thing actually desirable which before was desirable only in potency. Since therefore powers take their essence and species from their object, it certainly follows that the will takes its essence and species from good proposed through reason as agreeable; and therefore the will is such — namely free — because reason proposes many and various things, and compares them among themselves. Wherefore the true root of liberty is reason, proposing many things, comparing them, and judging of them, as was said above.
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CAPUT IX. Solvuntur argumenta contra conclusiones capitis superioris. Sed jam argumenta solvenda sunt, qua) pugnant contra superioris capitis proposi¬ tiones ; qumque jam fuerunt in cap. 7. bre¬ viter indicata. Primum igitur argumentum probare nite¬ batur, liberum arbitrium esse actus rationis et voluntatis, qui deliberationem pra)cedunt. Erat autem ha)c ratiocinatio, liberum arbi¬ trium est id, per quod habet homo actum aliquem in potestate : habet autem homo in potestate actum deliberandi (is enim est primus actus liber) per actum quo vult deli¬ berare, et per cogitationem, quae hanc ip¬ sam voluntatem pra;cedit : igitur in his duobus actibus deliberationem prandenti¬ bus liberum arbitrium consistit. Respondeo : Primum falsum est, ante om¬ nem electionem praecedere deliberationem, et ante deliberationem praecedere actum vo¬ lendi deliberare. Saepe enim homo rem obla¬ tam continuo amplectitur et libere, quia ta¬ metsi non deliberavit, tamen deliberare po¬ tuisset, si voluisset. Itaque non omnes actus indelibcrati sunt involuntarii, sed illi tantum, qui deliberari non potuerunt. Deinde, non recte tribuitur nomen liberi arbitrii omnibus illis rebus, quae sunt necessariae ad libere eligendum, sed illi tantum rei , quae est principium productivum actuum liberorum, per quod proprie domini sumus actuum no¬ strorum. Tale autem principium est volun¬ tas, qua) producit eliciendo vel imperando actus liberos. Secundum argumentum probare conaba¬ tur, liberum arbitrium non esse potentiam, sed habitum, vel certe potentiam cum habitu. Nam liberum arbitrium definitur a S. Ber- nardo habitus animi ; et a Petro Lombardo facultas rationis et voluntatis ; et ex senten¬ tia Augustini est amissum vel imminutum. Respondeo : S. Bernardus non accipit no- rpen habitus more Scholastico pro qualitate superaddita potentia), sed pro ipsa potentia, qua) est inclinata et habilis ad operandum, etiam quando nihil operatur. Sic etiam Pe¬ trus Lombardus nomen facultatis non pro facilitate, sed pro potestate usurpat. Deni¬ que S. Augustinus liberum arbitrium amis¬ sum dicit, non quod est a necessitate, sed quod est a peccato. Servi enim peccati facti sumus per Ada) peccatum, unde etiam Li¬ beratore , ac Redemptore opus habemus. Porro imminutum dicitur liberum arbitrium, non quoad essentiam, sed quoad operationem et vires. Multa enim non possumus operari in statu natura) corrupta), qua) potuissemus in statu natura) integra). Tertium argumentum contendebat, libe¬ rum arbitrium esse potentiam distinctam a 396 LIBER III. ratione et voluntate , nimirum potentiam motricem, ut esset in homine aliquid, quod compleret imaginem Trinitatis. Nam ratio, Verbi ; voluntas, Spiritus sancti imaginem gerit : deerit autem imago Patris, nisi pona¬ tur tertia potentia, quse illum aliquo modo referat. Respondeo : imago Trinitatis consistit in memoria, mente et voluntate, ex doctrina S. Augustini lib. xv. de Trinitate cap. 3. certum autem est, nomine memoriae non posse intelligi tertiam illam potentiam mo¬ tricem, sed esse eamdem mentem, ut retinet notitiam jam acceptam ; atque ita fcecunda est, et parit Verbum, ut idem S. Augusti¬ nus docet in lib. xiv. de Trinit. cap. 3. 4. et 6. Porro S. Thomas in 1. par. quaest. 93. art. 7. satis apposite explicat imaginem Tri¬ nitatis, dum mentem comparat Patui ; noti¬ tiam, a mente productam, Filio ; amorem ex notitia mentis procedentem, Spiritui sancto. Perspicuum igitur est, tertiam illam poten¬ tiam non esse necessariam ad complendam imaginem Trinitatis. Adde quod si poneretur in anima rationali tres potentiae distinctae , quarum singulae suos actus producerent , daretur occasio magno errori, quasi in Deo, ad cujus imagi¬ nem factus est homo, tres essent processio¬ nes, non duae tantum, ac per hoc persona¬ rum non Trinitas, sed Quaternitas. Quartum argumentum cum aliis tribus probare tentabat , potentiam intelligentem esse formaliter liberam, et ideo liberum ar¬ bitrium esse potentiam intelligentem. Sic igitur texebatur objectio : Potentiae rationa¬ les sunt liberae ex Aristotele lib. ix. Meta- phys. cap, 3. at potentia intelligens est ra¬ tionalis, igitur libera. Respondeo : non dicit philosophus, po¬ tentias rationales esse liberas, sed esse ad opposita, nec loquitur de ratione et volun¬ tate, sed de artibus et scientiis, quas poten¬ tias Vocat rationales, quia possumus actus earum producere quando volumus : et dicit esse ad opposita, quia eadem est scientia contrariorum. Itaque etiam si liberas ejus¬ modi potentias appellasset, non tamen co¬ geremur fateri eas formaliter esse liberas, sed intelligeremus liberas esse nominatas, quod liberos actus producerent, quamvis non ideo liberi essent, quoniam ab eis pro¬ ducerentur, sed quoniam a voluntate impe¬ rarentur. Idem enim philosophus in lib. eodem cap. G. scribit, determinari omnes istas potentias ab electione : electionem au¬ tem satis constat esse actum voluntatis, non intelligentiae. Quintum argumentum : liberum arbitrium est tacultas rationis et voluntatis, ut commu¬ niter definitnr ; igitur etiam ratio est forma¬ liter libera, et liberum arbitrium nominatur. Respondeo : liberum arbitrium dicitur fa¬ cultas rationis et voluntatis, quia ratio est li¬ bera radicaliter, voluntas formaliter. Sextum argumentum : ratio non potest co¬ gi, et est indifferens ad multa, igitur libera est non solum a coactione, sed etiam a ne¬ cessitate. Respondeo : jam hoc explicatum est in quinta propositione capitis superioris, ubi demonstratum est, rationem posse cogi ad judicandum contra inclinationem totius sup¬ positi : item sic esse indifferentem in rebus probabilibus , ut tamen necessario opine¬ tur, vel hajreat, nisi accedat inclinatio vo¬ luntatis. Septimum argumentum : nisi mens in ju¬ dicando sit vere, ac formaliter libera, neque voluntas in eligendo libera esse poterit. Non enim potest voluntas aliud eligere, quam id quod ratio judicat eligendum. Respondeo : Voluntas indigendo libera est, non quod non determinetur necessario a ju¬ dicio ultimo et practico rationis : sed quo¬ niam istud ipsum judicium ultimum et pra- cticum in potestate voluntatis est. Sciendum est enim, post cognitionem bo¬ ni in universum mox existere in voluntate inclinationem aliquam in illud, non tamen plenam electionem : deinde cum proponun¬ tur a ratione varia media, et ostenditur quid boni et quid mali sit in unoquoque, volun¬ tatem inclinari modo in unam partem, modo in aliam ; et in ejus potestate esse, ut sinat se moveri, vel resistat, non quidem actu posi¬ tivo, sed negativo, non sinendo videlicet se moveri. Per hoc enim ’ quod voluntas sinit se moveri ab una ratione proposita, fit ut mens omissa alia inquisitione pergat et con¬ cludat judicium particulare, ad quod conti¬ nuo sequitur electio. Itaque libertas volun¬ tatis in eo proprie sita esse videtur, quod propositis variis rationibus non necessariis, sinat se moveri ab una, et non ab alia. Atque hinc est quod philosophus dicit in 3. lib. Ethic. cap. o. virtutes et vitia esse in nostra potestate, licet omnes appetant id, quod bonum eis videtur, quia unusquisque sibi quodammodo causa est, ut hoc, aut illud CAPUT IX. 597 sibi videatur. Ubi philosophus ponit in nos¬ tra potestate virtutes, quia in nostra pote¬ state sunt bonae electiones, ex quarum fre¬ quentatione generantur habitus : ipsas autem electiones ponit in nostia pote-tate, quia ju¬ dicia seu visiones, ad quas electiones sequn- tur, sunt in nostra potestate. Hinc est etiam quod boni, vel mali habitus multum conferunt ad bonam, vel malam electionem, quia quomodo unusquisque af¬ fectus est, ut ubidem Philosophus docet, ita de rebus ipsis judicat. Hinc quoque S. Tho- mas in quaest. 1. de malo art. 3. recte dixit, causam peccati esse, quod homo operetur non attendens ad regulam divinae legis ; hu¬ jus autem quod est non attendere ad regulam, non esse quaerendam aliam causam, cum ad hoc sufficiat libertas voluntatis humanae. Ubi sanctus Thomas in eo ponit libertatem et causam peccati, quod voluntas cum ab una parte trahitur ad peccandum a voluptate per sensum et rationem apprehensa et pro¬ posita ut bona, ab altera revocatur a peccato per rationem proponentem legem Dei, et re¬ praesentantem voluptatem illam, ut noxiam, ipsa sinit se moveri a sensu, et attendit ad bonum propositum in voluptate, et non si¬ nit se moveri a ratione proponente legem Dei, et sic non attendit ad veram regulam bonae actionis. Denique ex his etiam refutantur quatuor illa argumenta, quibus Durandus efficere nitebatur, rationem non solum esse forma- liter liberam, sed etiam liberiorem ipsa vo¬ luntate. Octavum argumentum, pugnat cum sexta propositione, ac probat, voluntatem posse eligere contra judicium ultimum et practi- cum rationis. Nam hoc est discrimen inter potentias naturales et liberas, quod natura¬ les non possunt non agere, praesente objecto et aliis qua) ad agendum requiruntur, libe¬ rae autem possunt. Id quod certum est, tum experientia, tum ex doctrina philosophi, lib. 9. Metaphys. cap. 6. Voluntas autem estpo1- tentia maxime libera; igitur potest non age¬ re, quantumvis habeat objectum praesens repraesentatum per judicium ultimum ratio¬ nis. Et confirmari potest hoc argumentum ex absurdo. Nam si necessario voluntas sequa¬ tur judicium ultimum rationis, sequetur numquam posse eligi minus bonum relicto majori ; nam ratio semper judicat majus bo¬ num praeponendum esse minori, nisi forte erret. Atqui hoc videtur esse falsum, et con¬ tra experientiam. Saepe enim homines ex re¬ bus non necessariis eligunt minus bonum, remoto etiam omni errore, et Deus ipse, in quem error cadere non potest, eligit ac facit minus bonum, cum majus aliquid eligere fet facere posset. Confirmatur rursus alia ratione, quoniam sequeretur duobus aequalibus propositis bo¬ nis neutrum posse eligi, quoniam rectum ju¬ dicium rationis neutrum alteri praeponit; at contrarium docet experientia. Confirmatur etiam tertio, quia (ut S. Au¬ gustinus lib. xn. de Civit. Dei cap. 6. dicit) si duo sint aeque affecti animo et corpore et occurant eidem rei, quae sua' pulchritudine allicere possit affectum, et eadem diaboli tentatione uterque tentetur, et tamen unus tentioni consentiat, alter non consentiat, non potest reddi alia causa, nisi quia unus vult, alter non vult. At si voluntas necessario se¬ queretur judicium, fieri non posset, ut illo casu posito, unus consentiret alter non con¬ sentiret. Nam ratio idem dictaret utrique. Confirmatur ultimo, quia sequeretur ele¬ ctionem non esse electionem. Nam electio est inter multa, igitur actus voluntatis, qui ne¬ cessario sequitur judicium determinatum, non est electio, et tamen revera est electio ; igitur electio et non electio est. Itcspondco : Philosophus in loco citato non comparat voluntatem, quae proprie libera est, cum potentiis non liberis ; sed comparat potentias rationales, quas dicit esse scientias et artes ; cum potentiis naturalibus ; ac dicit potentias rationales praesente objecto posse non operari, quia tota; pendent ab electione : operamur enim per scientias et artes quando volumus, et cessamus quando volumus; quia videlicet in nostra potestate est applicare hos habitus ad opus. Itaque testimonium illud Philosophi nihil pertinet ad rem. Nec tamen inficiamur, verum esse discri¬ men illud inter potentias liberas et naturales, quod praesente objecto possint libene non operari, non libera) non possint. Nam libera; potentia; interdum pro objecto habent aliquid contingens, in quo ratio boni et ratio mali simul ostenditur, ac per hoc potest libera potentia inclinari ad appetendum ratione bo¬ ni, et ad non appetendum, vel etiam ad re¬ cusandum ratione mali. At potentia; non li¬ berae semper habent pro objecto aliquid unum, et sub uua tantum ratione propo¬ situm, et ideo non possunt operari appe- 598 LIBER III. tendo, vel recusando. Neque hinc sequitur, posse voluntatem non operari, pra;sente ob¬ jecto proposito, per ultimum judicium ratio¬ nis, quia tunc non proponitur objectum nis- sub una ratione ; ac proinde non datur locus amplius optioni. Ad primam confirmationem respondeo : Minus bonum absolute posse eligi remoto er¬ rore, si in particulari propter aliquam cir¬ cumstantiam ratio judicet illud hoc tempore esse optimum. Quo modo Deus cum aliquid agit, non ideo illud agit, quia nesciat se pos¬ se facere aliquid melius, sed quia judicat, tunc illud maxime expedire. Ad secundam confirmationem respondeo : duobus mqualibus bonis simul propositis, posse alterum eligi, quia vel propter aliquam circumstantiam voluntas inclinabit in alterum vel certe, ut res aliquando finiatur, voluntas sinet se moveri ab altero, et tunc judicium ultimum concludetur, et electio consequctur. Nam experientia docet, cum non possumus per rationem unum alteri prceponere, judi¬ cari ab omnibus utile, ut potius forte eli¬ gatur unum, quam utrumque relinquatur. Ad tertiam confirmationem facilis est responsio, nam tametsi duo sint teque af¬ fecti, et occurrant eidem pulchritudini, tamen unus, quia volet, judicabit esse appetendam objectam pulchritudinem, et ita consentiet, alter, quia volet, judicabit esse resistendum cupiditati, et ita non consentiet. Itaque di¬ versa erunt judicia ullimain illis duobus, et inde etiam diversse electiones. Ad quartam confirmationem respondeo: nomine electionis non intelligi praicise actum voluntatis, qui sequitur post ultimum judi¬ cium, sed actum illum cum conclusione ip¬ sius ultimi judicii. Nam ideo Aristoteles in lib. ni. Ethic. cap. 3. dicit, electionem esse consultativam appetitionem ; et in lib. 0. cap. 2. dicit, esse appetitum intellectivum, vel intellectum appetitivum. et in lib. vii. cap. 3. dicit, electionem esse quasi conclu¬ sionem syllogismi practici, quia videlicet ac¬ cipiuntur pro uno et eodem conclusio judicii ultimi practici et actus voluntatis, qui inde necessario sequitur. Et S. Gregorius Nyssc- nus lib. v. de Philosophia cap. 4. scribit, electionem esse quid compositum ex consi¬ lio et appetitu. Denique S. Thomas in 1. 2. qusest.,13. art. I. dicit quidem electionem esse actum elicitum a voluntate, tamen im¬ portare etiam actum rationi^, sic igitur ele¬ ctio, cum utrumque actum complectatur, ju¬ dicii videlicet rationis ultimi et approbationis voluntatis, 'vere est inter multa, et est sim¬ pliciter in nostra potestate, et absolute, pro- prieque libera. Nonum argumentum, est contra postre¬ mam propositionem, qua; docebat libertatis radicem esse in ratione. Est autem tale argu¬ mentum : ratio non concurrit ‘ad actum vo¬ luntatis ut causa, sed ut conditio, sine qua voluntas non operaretur; solum enim extrin- sece objectum illi representat : radix autem veram causam significat : igitur ratio non est radix libertatis, qua; in voluntate reperitur. Respondeo : Ratio non solum repraisentat, sed etiam facit objectum voluntatis. Nam res ipsa, quamvis in se bona, non est objectum voluntatis, nisi a ratione judicetur bona, et proponatur, ut conveniens et expetenda. Quare non ita ratio exhibet objectum volun¬ tati, ut is, qui adducit ignem ad comburen¬ dum, vel qui aperit fenestram ut cubiculum illustretur ; sed ut lumen quod facit colores esse visibiles actu, qui sint lumine solum in potentia erant visibiles. Id autem ita se habere manifestum est. Nam ad solam conditionem numquam sequi¬ tur actio ; neque enim per solam apertionem fenestra; cubiculum illustrabitur, si desit lu¬ men ; neque per applicationem ignis depi¬ cti flet vera combustio : at ad solum judicium rationis, quo res proponitur ut bona, sequi¬ tur appetitio, etiamsi forte res illa non sit bona. Non igitur ratio concurrit solum ut conditio applicans objectum, sed ut causa fa¬ ciens objectum, dum rei bona; tribuit vim quamdam motivam, et facit ut ea res sit ac¬ tu expetibilis, qua; solum antea erat expe¬ tibilis in potentia. Cum igitur potentia; sumant essentiam et speciem ab objecto, certe sequitur ut volun¬ tas sumat essentiam et speciem a bono per rationem proposito ut convenienti : et ideo talis sit voluntas nimirum libera, quia ratio proponit multa et varia, et ea confert inter se. Quare vera radix libertatis est ratio pro¬ ponens multa, caque conferens, ac de eis judicans, ut supra dictum est. CAPUT X.