Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 10: That free choice is not a merely passive power, nor partly passive and partly active, but simply and absolutely active
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There follows in order the discussion of the third particle of the definition, in which the act of free choice is indicated. Concerning that particle, then — “of choosing one before another, or accepting, or refusing” — the question is wont to be treated whether the office of free choice is to act or to suffer; or (what is the same) whether the human will is a passive power or an active. For there are three chief judgments of the theologians on this matter.
The first judgment, then, is of those who will have the human will to be a passive power, and teach that the act of the will is produced actively by the phantasm, or by the known object, or at least by the mind itself apprehending and judging the object. This was the judgment of Godfrey, quodlibet 6, question 7, and in part of Giles, quodlibet 3, question 16, and of others. The second judgment is of those who will have free choice to be partly passive and partly active, so that for eliciting the action of the will there concur, as partial causes, both the will itself and also the known object, or reason itself proposing the object. So teach Gregory and Gabriel on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 25, single question, and Peter Paludanus on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 49, question 3; to whom comes also Cajetan, part 1, question 80, article 2, who writes that the will is moved actively by itself as to exercise, but by the intellect as to specification. The third judgment makes free choice simply active; which judgment seems to be St. Thomas's, in part 1, question 82, article 4, and On Truth, question 22, articles 9 and 12, reply to the third; and without doubt is the judgment of Scotus on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 25; of Henry, quodlibet 10, question 9, and quodlibet 13, question 11; of Capreolus on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 24; and of Ferrara on book 1 against the Gentiles, chapter 44. Which judgment seems to us the truest, for the following reasons.
For first, the holy Fathers teach not obscurely that free choice is not a passive power, when they say that it is in the power of the will to act and not act, to will and not will, etc. See Gregory of Nyssa, book 7 On Philosophy, chapters 1 and 2; John Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, chapters 25 and 26; Augustine, book 3 On Free Choice, chapters 2 and 3. Next, the action of the will is a vital action, and thereby is necessarily produced by an internal and vital principle; it cannot, then, be done actively by some extrinsic thing, such as is the phantasm, or the object. Moreover, the action of the will is an immanent action; therefore it must be produced by that same principle in which it is received as in its subject; but it is received in the will; therefore it is actively produced by the will, not by reason or any other thing whatever. Further, if free choice were a passive power, it would falsely be called free. For it is not in the power of the patient what is done in it, but it is in the power of the agent what it does in another. For which reason prime matter is undetermined and indifferent to many things, and yet is not, nor can be called, free, since it is determined by another, and does not determine itself. But (thou wilt say) though the will be not free in acting, it can yet be free in resisting; for often some things cannot indeed act of themselves, but can by resisting hinder the action of others. I answer: if the will be a passive power, it cannot by resisting hinder another's action. For those things hinder by resisting which have a contrary quality; but the will has no contrary quality, since it is indifferent to contraries; and so it has nothing whence to resist, if by its nature it is apt to suffer physically from the object. But if the power be active, and be moved by the object as by an end, not as by an agent, then it will truly be able to resist — as in fact it often does resist, when various aspects in the same object, or various objects, are shown to it. Add that the liberty of the will is not placed only in this, that it can by resisting forbid the object to act — by removing, namely, the phantasm or the object — but also in this, that, the object being present and doing what is its own, the will can freely consent or dissent, as is clear from that example which St. Augustine sets forth in book 12 On the City of God, chapter 6.
Moreover, none of the things named by the authors of the first and second judgments is such that it could act upon the will. For the phantasm, first, is easily excluded — both because souls separated from the body lack phantasms, and yet without doubt desire something, and therein exercise an act of the will; and also because the phantasm is a bodily thing, and thereby can have no force upon the will, which is a spiritual power. Next, the object is excluded with no greater difficulty: for very often it happens that it is not in reality, but only in thought — as when a sick man desires health, or chooses to take a remedy which is not yet prepared; and in what way will that which is not work anything in reality upon the will, and that actively? Moreover, often the object is something privative, while the act of the will is positive — as when we refuse death, or flee from any evil whatever; and how can it come to pass that a privative be the efficient cause of a positive, and give to another what it has not in itself? Finally, the intelligence, or reason proposing the object (which alone remains), will be removed from this action without any trouble: both because the action of intelligence is immanent, and thereby is wholly received in the understanding mind itself, nor can be transmitted to another power; and because it is a necessary cause, and therefore the whole of human liberty would perish if it effectively produced the act of the will.
But this last reason can be shaken from both sides. For if reason cannot actively move the will because intelligence is an immanent action, by the same reasoning the will cannot actively move reason and the other powers, because the will's action too is immanent. Likewise it does not seem to follow that the action of the will is not free if it be produced by intelligence, which is a necessary cause: for intelligence is not the whole cause, but partial; and therefore if the will, which is the other partial cause, will not concur, no action will follow, even though intelligence necessarily work what is its own. I answer to the first objection: the will does not move reason, or the other powers, actively as though it imprinted something in them; but it is said to move them actively because it is a certain impulsion of the whole supposit toward exercising the works of all the powers. And so the man himself, because through the will he desires to know true things, impels himself to exercise the intelligence; and the same is to be understood of the other powers. Nor can it be said, contrariwise, that in this same way the will is moved actively by reason — namely, that the man, because through reason he knows the good, impels himself to love that good through the will. For reason, or intelligence, is not an impulsion or inclination, but rather a reception and apprehension; but the will by its nature is an inclination and impulsion, not only of itself, but also (as we said) of the whole supposit. To the other objection I answer: a partial cause can freely act, and withhold its force, only then, when each partial cause concurs immediately to producing the effect; not, however, if the one cause move the other, and through it concur mediately to the work. For example: if two men are necessary for carrying some burden, without doubt no action will follow if either be wanting; and if it be free for the one to concur to carrying the burden or not to concur, the action too can be free, though the other perchance concur necessarily. But if one, seizing by force the hand of the other, through it paint letters, or do something else, it will not be in the power of him who is moved, though willing, to write or not to write the letters; and simply the writing will be necessary, if he who moves the other moves necessarily. For it cannot come to pass that this one move necessarily, and the other not be moved necessarily. Now then, intelligence and will, if they concur as partial causes to producing the act of the will, cannot concur immediately to producing the effect itself. For the act of the will is an immanent and vital act, and hence cannot be immediately produced save by an internal and vital principle — nay, by such a principle, that is, the rational appetite. And so, as it is absurd to say “the intelligence wills,” so also it is absurd to say “the intelligence immediately produces the act of the will”; for the act of the will is nothing else than the willing itself. Wherefore, if in any way the intelligence effectively produced the act of the will, it would certainly produce it by moving the will itself; from which it would follow that the liberty of the will would perish, as we posited in our argument — because intelligence is a necessary cause, and, it necessarily moving the will, it could not be but that the will be necessarily moved. Thou wilt say: an action is received in the patient after the manner of the receiver, and is tempered and modified by it; and so, since the will is a free power, the action of the intelligence, though in itself necessary, will yet be received in the will in a certain free manner, and thereby the effect also will be free, not necessary. I answer: that is true as to specification, not as to exercise. For because the action of the agent is received after the manner of the receiver, from the action of intelligence in the will there will be produced an act of the will, not an act of reason; and in this manner the mediate cause will give the species to the act, not the immediate cause. But as to exercise, it does not seem possible to understand how the action of an agent acting necessarily should be received freely in the patient. For if there is action, necessarily there is also passion; and thereby, if the intelligence necessarily moves the will, the will is necessarily moved; but to be moved is to will; therefore, if the intelligence necessarily effects in the will the willing itself, the will necessarily wills.
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CAPUT X. Liberum arbitrium non esse potentiam tantum passivam , nec partim passivam, partim acti¬ vam , sed simpliciter et absolute activam. Sequitur ordine discutienda particula ter¬ tia’ definitionis, in qua indicatur actus liberi arbitrii. Igitur circa particulam illam « eli¬ gendi unum prae alio, vel acceptandi, aut respuendi », quaestio tractari solet, sit ne officium liberi arbitrii agere vel pati ; sive (quod idem est) sit ne voluntas humana po¬ tentia passiva, an activa. Tres enim de hac re praecipua? Theologorum sententia? sunt. Prima igitur sententia eorum est, qui vo¬ luntatem humanam passivam potentiam esse voluntate ac docent actum voluntatis produ¬ ci active a phantasmate, vel ab objecto co¬ gnito, vel certe ab ipsa mente apprehen¬ dente et judicante 'objectum. Haec sententia fuit Gottifrcdi quodlib. G. quaest. 7. et ex parte Aigidii quodlib. 3. qua?st. 16. et alio¬ rum. Altera sententia est eorum, qui volunt li¬ berum arbitrium partim esse passivum et partim activum, ita ut ad actionem volun¬ tatis eliciendam concurrant ut causa? partia¬ les, tum ipsa voluntas; tum etiam objectum, cognitum, sive ipsa ratio proponens objectum Ita docent Gregorius et Gabriel in 2. sentent dist. 23. qua?st. unica. Et Petrus Paludanus in 4. sent. dist. 49. qua?st. 3. quibus acedit etiam Cajet. 1. par. qu. 80. art 2. qui scribit, voluntatem moveri active a se ipsa quoad exercitium, ab intellectu autem quoad spe¬ cificationem. Tertia sententia liberum arbitrium sim¬ pliciter facit activum, qua? sententia videtur esse S. Tlnna? in 1 part. qua?st. 82. art. 4. et de veritate, qua?st 22. artic. 9 et 11 ad 3. et .sine dubio sententia est Scoti in 2. sentent. distinet. 23. Henrici quodlib. 10. qua?st9. et quodlib. 13. qua?st. 11. Capreoli in 2. sentent. dist. 24. et Ferrariensis in 1 librum contra gentes cap. 44. Qua? sententia verissima no¬ bis esse videtur, propter sequentes rationes.' Nam primum SS. Patres non obscure do¬ cent, liberum arbitrium non esse potentiam passivam, cum dicunt, in potestate voluntatis esse agere et non agere, velle et non velle etc. Vide Gregorium Nyssenum lib. vii. de Philosophia cap. 1. et 2. Joan. Damascenum 399 lib. ii. de fide cap. 23. et 26. Augustinum lib. m. de libero arbitrio cap. 2 et 3. Deinde, actio voluntatis est actio vitalis, ac per hoc a principio interno, et vitali ne¬ cessario producitur. Non igitur active fieri potest ab aliqua re extrinseca, quale est phantasma, vel objectum. Adha?c, actio voluntatis est actio imma¬ nens, igitur produci debet ab eodem illo principio, in quo tamquam subjecto recipi¬ tur : recipitur auterii a voluntate, igitur a voluntate, non a ratione, aut alia quacum¬ que re active producitur. Pra?terea, si liberum arbitrium esset po¬ tentia passiva, falso diceretur liberum. Non enim est in potestate patientis, quid in ipso liat, sed in potestate agentis est, quid in alio faciat. Qua ratione materia prima inde¬ terminata est, atque indifferens ad multa, et tamen non est, nec dici potest libera, quo¬ niam determinatur ab alio, non se ipsa de¬ terminat. At (inquies) tametsi voluntas non sit li¬ bera agendo, poterit tamen esse libera resi¬ stendo. Saepe enim aliqua non possunt qui¬ dem agere ipsa in se, sed possunt resistendo impedire actionem aliorum. Respondeo, si voluntas sit potentia passiva, non posse il¬ lam resistendo impedire actionem alterius. Illa enim resistendo impediunt, quae habent contrariam qualitatem ; voluntas autem non habet contrariam qualitatem, cum sit indif¬ ferens ad contraria. Itaque non habet, unde resistat, si ex natura sua apta est pati phy¬ sice ab objecto. Quod si potentia sit activa, et ab objecto moveatur tamquam a sim^ion tamquam ab agente, tum vere resistere po¬ terit, ut re ipsa etiam sa?pe resistit, cum va¬ ria? rationes in eodem objecto, vel varia ob¬ jecta illi demonstrantur. Adde quod libertas voluntatis, non in eo solum posita est, quod possit resistendo pro¬ hibere, ne objectum agat, amovendo videli¬ cet phantasma, sive objectum, sed etiam in eo, quod pra?sente objecto, et agente quod suum est, voluntas possit libere consentire vel dissentire, ut perspicuum est ex illo exemplo, quod S. Augustinus proponit in lib. xii. de civit. Dei, cap. 6. Praeterea nihil eorum, qua, nominantur ab auctoribus primae et secundae sententiae, tale est, ut in voluntatem agere possit. Nam phantasma in primis facile excluditur, tum quia animae a corpore separatae phantasma¬ tibus carent, et tamen sine dubio aliquid GOO LIBER III. appetunt, atque in co actum voluntatis exer¬ cent : tum etiam quia phantasma res est corporalis, ac per hoc in voluntatem, quae potentia spiritualis est, vim habere non potest. Deinde objectum non majore difficultate excluditur. Siquidem saepe numero accidit, ut non sit in re, sed tantum in cogitatione, ut cum aegrotus appetit sanitatem, vel eligit sumere pharmacum, quod nondum est para¬ tum. Quo poeto autem re ipsa in volunta¬ tem, et quidem active, aliquid operabitur id, quod non est ? Ad haec saepe objectum est aliquid privati¬ vum, actus autem voluntatis positivus ; ut cum nolumus mortem, aut refugimus quod- cumque malum. Qui autem fieri potest, ut privativum sit causa efficiens positivi, et det alteri quod in se ipsum non habet? Denique intelligentia, seu ratio proponens . objectum (quae una superest) ab hac actione nullo negotio removebitur ; tum quia actio intelligentiae est immanens, ac per hoc tota recipitur in ipsa mente intelligente , nec transmitti potest ad aliam potentiam ; tum quia est causa necessaria, et id circo totaper- iret humana libertas, si voluntatis actum effective ipsa produceret. Sed haec ratio postrema utrinque labefa¬ ctari potest. Nam si ratio non potest active movere voluntatem, quia intelligentia est actio immanens; eadem ratione non poterit voluntas active movere rationem, aliesque potentias, quia voluntatis actio est etiam im¬ manens. Item non videtur sequi, ut actio volunTOtis non sit libera, si producatur ab intelligentia, quae est causa necessaria. Nam intelligentia non est causa integra, sed par¬ tialis ; et propterea si voluntas, quae est al¬ tera causa partialis, nolit concurrere, nulla sequetur actio, etiamsi intelligentia, neces¬ sario quod suum est operetur. Respondeo ad primam objectionem, vo¬ luntatem non movere active rationem, aut alias potentias, quasi in illis aliquid impri¬ mat; sed dici eas movere active, quia est im¬ pulsio quaedam totius supposi ad opera exer¬ cenda omnium potentarium. Itaqne ipse homo quia per voluntatem desiderat vera cognoscere, se ipse impellit ad exercendam intelligentiam, et idem de aliis potentiis in- telligendum est. Neque potest contra dici, hoc eodem modo active moveri voluntatem a ratione, ut videlicet homo, quia per ratio¬ nem cognoscit bonum, se ipse impellat ad illud bonum per voluntatem amandum. Nam ratio, sive intelligentia, non est impulsio, seu inclinatio, sed potius susceptio et ap¬ prehensio ; voluntas autem ex natura sua est inclinatio et impulsio non solum sui, sed etiam (ut diximus) totius suppositi. Ad alteram objectionem respondeo, tunc solum partialem causam posse libere agere et non conferre vim suam, quando utraque causa partialis immediate concurrit ad effe¬ ctum producendum ; non autem si altera causa alteram moveat, et per eam mediate concurrat ad opus. Exempli causa ; si duo necessarii sint ad aliquod onus ferendum, sine dubio nulla sequetur actio, si alteruter desit ; etsi liberum sit uni concurrere ad onus ferendum, et non concurrere, poterit etiam libera esse actio, quamvis alter for¬ tasse necessario concurrat. At si unus ar- repia vi, manu alterius per eam litteras pin¬ gat, aut aliquid aliud agat, non erit in pote¬ state ejus, qui volenter movetur, scribere et non scribere litteras, et simpliciter scriptio erit necessaria, si is qui movet alterum, ne¬ cessario movet. Non enim fieri potest, ut hic necessario moveat, et alter non necessario 'moveatur. Jam igitur intelligentia et voluntas, si ut partiales causse concurrant ad producendum actum voluntatis, non possunt immediate concurrere ad effectum ipsum producendum. Nam actus voluntatis est actus immanens et vitalis, ac proinde non potest immediate produci, nisi ab interno et vitali principio, imo etiam a tali principio, id est, appetitu rationali. Itaque sicut absurdum est dicere, intelligentia vult, ita quoque absurdum est dicere, intelligentia producit immediate ac¬ tum voluntatis ; nihil est enim aliud actus voluntatis, quam ipsum velle. Quare si ullo modo intelligentia produceret, effective ac¬ tum voluntatis, certe produceret movendo ipsam voluntatem. Ex quo sequeretur, ut periret voluntatis libertas, ut in argumento nostro posuimus, quia intelligentia est causa necessaria, et ea necessario movente volun¬ tatem, fieri non posset, quin voluntas neces¬ sario moveretur. Dices, actio recipitur in patiente per mo¬ dum recipientis, atque ab eo temperatur et modificatur. Itaque cum voluntas sit poten¬ tia libera, actio intelligentiae, quamvis in se necessaria sit, tamen recipietur in voluntate libero quodam modo, ac per hoc effectus etiam liber, non necessarius erit. CAPUT XI. 601 Respondeo , id verum esse quoad specifi¬ cationem, non quoad exercitium. Quia enim actio agentis recipitur per modum recipien¬ tis, ex actione intclligentice in voluntate, pro¬ ducetur actus voluntatis, non actus rationis; et hoc modo dabit speciem actui causa me¬ diata, non causa immediata. At quoad exer¬ citium, non videtur intelligi posse, quomodo actio agentis necessario recipiatur libere in patiente. Nam si actio est, necessario etiam passio est; ac per hoc si intelligentia neces¬ sario movet voluntatem, necessario voluntas movetur ; moveri autem est velle, igitur si intelligentia necessario efficit in voluntate ipsum velle, voluntas necessario vult.