Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 11: The arguments against the doctrine of the preceding chapter are answered
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
But now the arguments must be solved — not indeed all, but the chief — which are wont to be made by the authors of the contrary judgment.
The first argument, with the two following, is of those who judge the will to be a merely passive power. Thus, then, they reason: everything that is moved is moved by another; for otherwise a thing would be at once in potency and in act, if something moved itself — since what moves must be in act, what is moved, in potency. But the will is moved; therefore it is moved by another. And there is nothing that with more likelihood can actively move the will than the phantasm, or the known object, or reason itself proposing the object; therefore by these, or by some one of these, the will is actively moved. I answer: that proposition, “everything that is moved is moved by another,” is wont to be brought forward as pronounced by the Philosopher; but he nowhere wrote that everything that is moved is moved by another. Next, the intelligence, when it understands itself, does it not move itself? And is it not said to be proper to living things to move themselves? Nor yet does it thence follow that the same thing, in the same respect, is in act and in potency: for it will be in act by reason of the moving virtue, in potency by reason of the term to which it tends. For in this manner what moves toward a place need not be actually in that place; it is enough if it have the virtue of moving toward that place. And in the same way the faculty of understanding, from the cognition of principles, which it has in act, moves itself to the cognition of conclusions, which it has in potency. So then the will, from the love of the end, which it has in act, moves itself to the love of the means, which it has in potency; and about the end itself it is in act by reason of a certain general inclination toward good, through which it is moved to a particular inclination toward this or that good; and it is in potency by reason of this particular inclination, which it does not always have.
The second argument: between mover and moved there is a real relation; but of the same thing to itself there is no real relation; therefore the same thing cannot be mover and moved. I answer: the proposition is not true universally, but only then, when the extremes are really disjoined. For when one understands himself, agent and patient and object are altogether the same, nor can a real relation be feigned between them.
The third argument: an undetermined power must be determined by something; therefore by itself, or by another; but not by itself, because of itself it is undetermined; therefore by another. I answer: the will is called free, and is so, because it is so undetermined that it can itself determine. And so it does not determine itself insofar as it is undetermined, but insofar as it is active and free.
The fourth argument, with the rest, is of those who judge the human will to be partly active and partly passive. They adduce, then, the testimony of St. Thomas, who in part 1, question 80, article 2, writes that the will is a passive power with respect to the known object. I answer: the same St. Thomas, in the 1-2, question 9, article 3, says that the will moves itself; and in part 1, question 82, article 4, and On Truth, question 22, article 12, he says that the will is moved by the intellect proposing the object — as by an end. From which places we understand that the will was called by St. Thomas a passive power in a broad manner; for even to be moved by the object after the manner of an end is a certain suffering, if acting and suffering be taken for every kind of cause.
The fifth argument: the subsistent Knowledge in God actively produces Love, when the Word breathes forth the Holy Spirit; therefore any knowledge, even non-subsistent, will actively produce love; for subsistence cannot change the kind of causality. Wherefore St. Augustine, book 15 On the Trinity, chapters 25 and 26 [al. 27], absolutely pronounces that love proceeds from cognition. I answer: the subsistent Knowledge actively produces Love, not because it is knowledge, but because it is divine, and has all things that God the Father has, and thereby has also the will, and the very willing, of the Father; and so with the same will as the Father, and with the same action, it produces the Holy Spirit. And what St. Augustine says, if it be taken of the divine cognition, is to be understood in the same way; if of cognition in general, then we shall say that love is produced from cognition because the known good is the final and objective cause of love: for whatever we love, we therefore love because we understand it to be good, and agreeable to our nature.
The sixth argument: reason, through the last practical judgment, draws the will, and in a certain manner carries it off to the work; so also, when something terrible first meets the mind, we cannot but fear, and when something exceedingly delightful, we cannot but rejoice; therefore, at least in such cases, the intelligence actively moves the will. I answer: the will is moved necessarily by the last judgment of reason, and by the sudden encounters of great things — not because reason actively moves, but because the will in such cases bears itself after the manner of a natural cause, which, the object being present, cannot but act.
The seventh argument: if the will, at the extrinsic presence of the object, moved itself actively, no reason could be given why all its acts should not be of the same species; for such is the effect as is the formal principle in the agent itself: why then, if the formal principle in the will is one — that is, the nature of the will — are not all the effects of the same species? Likewise, if the will works of itself at the extrinsic presence of the object, why does not the mind also know at the presence of the object, without receiving a species from it? Why likewise does sense not know without an active immutation from the object? Why do logs not burn themselves at the presence of fire? For the explication of this difficulty it must be known that in every action four causes are required — matter, or subject; efficient; form; and end; and of these, the matter and the efficient, and again the form and the end, are sometimes one and the same. For when the action is immanent, the efficient and the subject are the same; and in natural things the end and the form are the same — for the efficient has this purpose, to produce an effect like its own form; but in things done by art, the end and the form are the same [in the mind] — for he who makes something by art does not intend to produce an effect like the art through which he acts, but like the idea which he bears in his mind. Now then, in the act of the will the subject is the will itself; the efficient, the same will — for (as we said) the act of the will is immanent, and is necessarily received in that from which it proceeds. The intrinsic form through which the will acts is a certain natural inclination toward good, in which as in its virtue are included all the particular inclinations, and it is itself as it were a certain seed, whence come forth all volitions. But since that general inclination is of itself indifferent to many things, there is therefore required another, extrinsic, form, which determines the former as to specification; and this is the object itself, conceived by the mind and judged as agreeable — which is also the end of the action, for the action of the will tends to the acquisition of the object. Now this action of the will is very like the local motion of animals, in which we see the efficient and the subject to be the same; the intrinsic form to be the moving force; and the end to be the “where” itself, extrinsic, and the motion to be specified by it. It must be known moreover that by the object conceived in the mind the action of the will is indeed specified (as we said), but specified finally, not actively. For in reality the specific grade cannot be so distinguished from the generic as though something could actively concur to producing the effect as to its specific grade without concurring to producing the same effect as to its generic grade also; for the same entity is the substance of the thing and the species of the thing. And so the act of the will is specified by the object, but is in no way actively produced by the object — just as local motion too is specified by the place, or the “where,” by which nevertheless it is by no means produced. From these things we answer to the proposed argument: the acts of the will are of diverse species because the objects are diverse to which the will is borne through its inclination. Nor is that proper to the will, but is common not only to motion toward a place (as we have just said), but also to the acts of the intelligence and of all the senses; for they are all specified not by the intrinsic form of the powers themselves, but by the objects. It is common also to all works of art, and to whatever else there be in which the end does not coincide with the intrinsic form of the agent itself. To the other point, about the intelligence and the senses, which do not work at the mere presence of the object unless they receive something from it, I answer: the reason of the difference is at hand. For the apprehensive powers are not in first act unless they receive the similitude of the object, and therefore are by their nature powers partly passive, partly active; but the appetitive powers are in first act through the general inclination toward good, and therefore are simply active, and move themselves at the presence of the object, though they receive nothing from it. To that about the logs, which do not burn themselves at the presence of fire, the answer is easy: for logs contain the force of burning neither in virtue nor in act; but the will contains the virtue through which it can desire all goods. And let these things suffice on this question.
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CAPUT XI. Solvuntur argumenta contra doctrinam capitis superioris. Sed jam argumenta solvenda sunt, non quidem omnia,' sed praecipua, quae ab au¬ ctoribus contrariae sententiae fieri solent. Primum argumentum cum duobus sequen¬ tibus est eorum, qui existimant, voluntatem esse potentiam tantum passivam. Sic igitur illi ratiocinantur. Omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur ; nam alioqui simul esset in potentia et in actu, si aliquid se ipsum mo¬ veret : quod enim movet, esse debet in actu; quod movetur, in potentia. Voluntas autem movetur, igitur ab alio movetur. Nihil vero est, quod verisimilius voluntatem active mo¬ vere possit, quam phantasma, sive objectum cognitum , aut ipsa ratio objectum propo¬ nens : igitur ab his, aut aliquo horum volun¬ tas active movetur. Respondeo : illa propositio, omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, solet adferri tam¬ quam a philosopho pronunciata; sed ille nusquam scripsit, omne quod movetur ab alio moveri. Deinde intelligentia cum se ipsa intelligit, nonne se ipsa movet ? et nonne proprium dicitur esse viventium se ipsa mo¬ vere, neque tamen inde sequitur, ut idem eadem ratione sit in actu et in potentia ; erit enim in actu, ratione virtutis motricis, erit in potentia, ratione termini, ad quem tendit. Hoc enim modo quod movet ad locum, non est necesse, ut sit actu in eo loco, sed satis est si virtutem habeat movendi ad eum lo¬ cum. Et eodem modo intelligendi facultas ex cognitione principiorum, quam actu habet, movet ipsa se ad cognitionem conclusionum, Tom. V. quam habet in potentia. Sic igitur voluntas ex amore finis, quem habet actu, movet se ad amorem mediorum, quem habet in po¬ tentia ; et circa ipsum finem est in actu, ra¬ tione inclinationis cujusdam generalis ad bonum, per quam movetur ad particularem inclinationem ad hoc aut illud bonum ; et est in potentia ratione hujus particularis incli¬ nationis, quam non semper habet. Secundum argumentum. Inter movens et motum est relatio realis ; at ejusdem ad se non est relatio realis : igitur non potest esse idem movens et motum. Respondeo : propositio non est vera in universum, sed tunc solum, cum extrema sunt re ipsa disjuncta. Nam cum quis se ipse intelligit, idem omnino sunt agens et pa¬ tiens, et objectum, neque inter ea relatio realis fingi potest. Tertium argumentum. Potentia indeter¬ minata debet ab aliquo determinari, igitur a se, vel ab alio : non autem a se, quia ex se est indeterminata, igitur ab alio. Respondeo. Voluntas ideo libera dicitur, et est, quia sic est indeterminata, ut ipsa determinare possit. Itaque non se determi¬ nat, qua est indeterminata, sed qua est acti¬ va et libera. Quartum argumentum cum caeteris est eorum, qui existimant voluntatem humanam ex parte esse activam, et ex parte passivam. Adducunt igitur testimonium S. Thomae, qui in 1. par. quaest. 80. art. 2. scribit, volun¬ tatem esse potentiam passivam, respectu objecti cogniti. Respondeo : idem S. Thomas in 1. 2. quaest. 9. art. 3. dicit, voluntatem movere se ipsam, et 1. par. quaest. 82. art. 4. de verit. quaest. 22. art. 12. dicit, voluntatem moveri ab intellectu, proponente objectum tamquam a fine. Ex quibus locis intelligi- mus, a S. Thoma vocatam esse voluntatem potentiam passivam, largo modo, nam et ipsum moveri ab objecto per modum finis, est quoddam pati, si agere et pati accipian¬ tur pro omni genere causae. Quintum argumentum. Notitia subsistens in Deo producit active amorem, cum Ver¬ bum spirat Spiritum sanctum ; igitur notitia quaelibet etiam non subsistens, producet active amorem ; non enim subsistentia mu¬ tare potest genus causalitatis. Quare sanctus Augustinus, lib. xv. de Trinit. cap. 23. et 26. absolute pronunciat, amorem a cognitione procedere. 39 602 LIBER III. Respondeo : notitia subsistens producit active amorem, non quia notitia est, sed quia divina est, et habet omnia, qua? habet Deus Pater, ac per hoc habet etiam volun¬ tatem et ipsum velle Patris. Itaque eadem voluntate, qua Pater, et eadem actione Spi¬ ritum sanctum producit. Quod autem S. Au¬ gustinus dicit, si de divina cognitione acci¬ piatur, eodem modo intelligendum erit : si de cognitione in universum, tum dicemus a cognitione produci amorem ; quia bonum cognitum est causa finalis, et objectiva amo¬ ris. Quidquid enim amamus, ideo amamus, quia intelligimus esse bonum , et naturae nostra; conveniens. Sextum argumentum. Ratio per ultimum judicium practicum trahit voluntatem, et eam quodammodo rapit ad opus : sic etiam cum primum terribile aliquid occurrit ani¬ mo, non possumus non timere , et cum ali¬ quid valde jucundum, non possumus non laetari : igitur saltem in hujusmodi intelli- gentia active voluntatem movet. Respondeo : voluntas movetur necessario a judicio ultimo rationis, et a repentinis oc¬ cursibus rerum magnarum, non quod ratio active moveat, sed quia voluntas in hujus¬ modi habet se per modum causae naturalis, quae praesente objecto, non potest non agere. Septimum argumentum. Si voluntas ad praesentiam extrinsecam objecti , se ipsa active moveret, non posset reddi ratio, cur non essent omnes ejus actus ejusdem spe¬ ciei, talis enim est effectus, quale est prin¬ cipium formale in ipso agente : cur igitur, si formale principium in voluntate est unum, id est, natura voluntatis, non sunt omnes effectus ejusdem speciei? Item si voluntas ad praesentiam extrinsecam objecti per se ope¬ ratur, cur non etiam mens ad praesentiam objecti cognoscit, nisi speciem ab illo reci¬ piat? cur item sensus non cognoscit sine im¬ mutatione activa ab objecto ? cur ligna non se ipsa comburunt ad praesentiam ignis ? Ad explicationem hujus difficultatis, scien¬ dum est, in omni actione requiri quatuor causas, materiam, sive subjectum ; efficiens; formam ; et finem ; ex his autem materiam et efficiens, et rursum formam et finem adiquando idem et unum esse. Nam cum actio est immanens, idem est efficiens et subjectum ; in rebus vero naturalibus idem est finis et forma ; efficiens enim id proposi¬ tum habet, ut effectum producat similem sua; formae. In his autem quae fiunt ex arte, finis, et forma sunt idem. Nam non intendit qui facit aliquid ex ante producere effectum similem arti, perquam agit, sed ideae, quam gerit in mente. Jam igitur in actu voluntaitis subjectum est ipsa voluntas; efficiens, eadem voluntas. Nam (ut diximus) actus voluntatis est imma¬ nens, qui necessario in eo recipitur, unde procedit. Forma intrinseca, per quam volun¬ tas agit, est inclinatio quaedam naturalis ad bonum, in qua virtute includuntur omnes particulares inclinationes, et est ipsa quaisi semen quoddaim, unde prodeunt omnes vo- litiones. Sed quoniam ista inclinatio gene¬ ralis ex se indifferens est ad multa, propterea requiritur alia forma extrinscca, quae deter¬ minet priorem quoad specificationem, et lnec est objectum ipsum mente conceptum et ju¬ dicatum ut conveniens, quod etiam finis est actionis. Tendit enim actio voluntatis ad ac¬ quisitionem objecti. Est autem haec actio vo¬ luntatis valde similis motui locali animalium, in quo videmus efficiens, et subjectum esse idem; formam intrinsecam esse vim motri- cem ; finem autem esse ipsum (Ubi) extrin- sccum, et ab eo spccificari motum. Sciendum est praderea, ab objecto in mente concepto , specificari quidem (ut diximus) actionem voluntaitis, sed tamen specificari finaliter, non active. Nam non potest in re distingui gradus specificus a generico, quasi possit aliquid active concurrere ad produ¬ cendum effectum, quoad gradum specificum, nisi concurrat ad eumdem effectum produ¬ cendum etiam quoad' gradum genericum. Eadem enim entitas est substantia rei, et species rei. Itaque actus voluntatis specifi- catur ab objecto, sed non producitur ullo modo active ab objecto : quemadmodum et motus localis specificatur a loco, sive ab (Ubi) a quo tamen nulla ratione produci¬ tur. Ex his ad argumentum propositum re¬ spondemus, actus voluntatis esse diversarum specierum, quia diversa sunt objecta, ad qua) per inclinationem voluntas fertur. Neque id est proprium voluntatis, sed commune est non solum mortui ad locum (ut jam diximus) sed etiam actibus intelligentia) et omnium sensuum. Specificantur enim illi omnes non a forma intrinseca ipsarum potentiarum, sed ab objectis. Commune quoque est omnibus artificiatis, et (si quid aliud est) in quo finis non coincidat cum forma intrinseca ipsius agentis. CAPUT XII. 603 Ad aliud de intelligentia et sensibus qu e non operantur ad solam praesentiam objecti, nisi ab illo aliquid recipiant , respondeo , rationem discriminis esse in promptu. Nam potentiae apprehcnsivae non sunt in actu pri¬ mo, nisi recipiant similitudinem objecti, et ideo sunt ex natura sua potentiae partiin pas¬ sivae , partim activae : appetitivae autem po¬ tentiae sunt in actu primo per inclinationem generalem ad bonum. Et ideo simpliciter sunt activae, et se ipse movent ad praesen¬ tiam objecti, quamvis ab eo nihil recipiant. Ad illud de lignis, quae non se ipsa com¬ burunt ad praesentiam ignis, facilis responsio est. Nam ligna non continent vim combu¬ rendi, neque virtute, neque actu : voluntas autem continet virtutem, per quam omnia bona potest appetere. Atque haec de ista quae¬ stione sufficiant.