Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 12: That through free choice not evils are desired, but goods
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There follows the disputation on the object of free choice, on account of that particle of the definition in which we said that free choice is of those things “which lead to some end.” The treatment will be threefold: for first we shall ask whether to the object of free choice pertain goods and evils, or goods only; next, whether goods both present and future, or future only; finally, whether only the means to the end, or the end itself also.
On the first question few things need be said. For although William of Ockham, on book 3 of the Sentences, question 13, doubt 3, wrote that the object of the will is being, which comprehends good and evil, and that thereby the will can be borne toward evil under the notion of evil, yet the common judgment of the theologians is that the proper and primary object of the will is good, or something apprehended under the notion of good; and that evil does not pertain to the object of the will save secondarily and by accident — insofar, namely, as we refuse evil, and refuse it for this reason, that it is contrary to the good which of itself we will. Which both very many others teach, and above all St. Thomas, in part 1, question 19, article 1, likewise in the 1-2, question 8, article 1, and in book 3 against the Gentiles, chapters 16 and 17. The reasons for this true and common judgment are these. The first is authority: for so teach, of our own, Clement of Alexandria, book 1 of the Stromata, page 63; Dionysius, in the book On the Divine Names, chapter 4; Augustine, book 2 of the Confessions, chapter 6; Boethius, book 4 On Consolation; Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, chapter 22; of those without, Aristotle, book 1 of the Ethics, chapter 1, and Seneca, book 4 On Benefits, chapter 17. Then there are these arguments. The first: the inclination of the will toward its object is natural; therefore its author is God; wherefore it cannot be but good. But if the object of the will were evil, its inclination too would be evil; nay, it would be an inclination toward its own destruction — which without doubt is repugnant to a natural inclination; hence it would be natural and not natural, from God and not from God — which are contradictories. The second: being, as it comprehends absolutely all things, is the proper object of the intelligence; it cannot, then, be the object of the will; for the same object cannot belong to diverse powers. The third: the will desires more that which is more useful to the desirer than that which is in itself more excellent or nobler. For who would not much rather have one gold coin than ten flies or twenty gnats? Therefore the object of the will is not being absolutely, but the good and agreeable. The fourth: the object of appetite can be nothing but what is desirable; but good is what all things desire, as the Philosopher writes at the beginning of the first book of the Ethics; therefore good is properly the object of the will.
But let us see what the adversary brings against this. William's argument is only this: if one cannot will evil, and refuse good, he will not be able to merit and demerit concerning these acts — which seems absurd. For if a Christian judge it evil to worship idols, he will not be able to will to worship idols, and hence will not be able to sin and demerit concerning this; and likewise he will not be able to merit by detesting the worship of idols, because concerning that in which we cannot demerit, in the same we cannot merit. I answer: a Christian will be able to will to worship idols, though he judge it absolutely evil, because he will be able to judge it good for himself — whether for escaping torments, or for winning the favor of the heathen, or for any other cause whatever. And if one apprehend the worship of idols only under the notion of evil, he will not indeed be able to will it; yet he will be able to merit and demerit as to the exercise of the act: for he will be able not to detest that act when he is bound to detest it, and will also be able to detest it when he could freely not detest it; and in this manner he will demerit or merit.
Besides this argument four other arguments are wont to be proposed. The first is from Scripture, since Ecclesiasticus 15: Before man is life and death, good and evil, that which he shall choose shall be given him. I answer: good can be rejected, because it can be apprehended under the notion of evil; and evil can be chosen, because it can be apprehended under the notion of good. And this alone is what Ecclesiasticus teaches. The second argument is from Augustine and Bernard. For St. Augustine writes, book 2 of the Confessions, chapter 4, that in his theft he loved nothing but the sin; and St. Bernard, sermon 35 of the short sermons, writes that the devil and certain others love evil because it is evil. I answer: St. Augustine explains in the same book, chapter 9, that in that theft he loved the sin itself, but under the notion of a delightful good — because, namely, he rejoiced with his companions in deceiving his neighbor. In which manner is to be understood also what St. Bernard writes: for the devil loves our evil under the notion of his own good, for he judges it useful to himself if many perish. The third argument: the intelligence knows the true and the false; why then should not the will also will good and evil? I answer: the intelligence apprehends the true and the false; but when judgment is to be made, it consents to the true, dissents from the false. Now the will follows the intelligence not simply as apprehending, but as judging; therefore, as the intelligence consents to truth and dissents from the false, so the will chooses good and rejects evil. The fourth argument: the will can refuse good under the notion of good, because it can hate God, who is the highest and pure good, as it can also love him; therefore it can also will evil under the notion of evil, since to refuse good and to will evil are of the same account. I answer: the human will can indeed hate God, but under the notion of evil — that is, of something burdensome and inconvenient. For so the impious think of God as a severe judge; and because they would not pay the penalties of their crimes, therefore they would have it that God did not exist, or at least were not all-knowing and almighty. Wherefore it must be denied that the will can refuse good under the notion of good, as also, contrariwise, will evil under the notion of evil. But of these things let this much have been said.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XII. Per liberum arbitrium non expeti mala , sed bona Sequitur disputatio de objecto liberi arbi¬ trii, propter illam particulam definitionis, in qua dicebamus, liberum arbitrium esse eo¬ rum, « quae ad finem aliquam ducunt. » Erit autem tripartita tractatio ; primum enim quaeremus, utrum ad objectum liberi arbitrii pertineant bona et mala, an solum bona. De¬ inde, an bona et praesentia et futura, an futura tantum. Denique, an solum media ad finem, an etiam ipse finis. De prima quaestione pauca dicenda erunt. Nam tametsi GulielmusOkam in lib. m. Sen- tent. quaest. 12. dub. 3. scripserit, voluntatis objectum esse ens, quod bonum et malum comprehendit , ac per hoc posse voluntatem ferri in mulum sub ratione mali : tamen communis sententia Theologorum est, vo¬ luntatis objectum proprium et primaVium esse bonum, sive aliquid apprehensum sub ratione boni ; malum autem non pertinere ad objectum voluntatis, nisi secundario et per accidens, quatenus videlicet malum no¬ lumus, et ideo nolumus, quia bono, quod per se volumus, contrarium est. Id quod tum alii permulti, tum praecipue S. Thomas docet in 1 . par. quaest. 20. art. 1. item in 1. 2. quaest. 8. art. 1 . et in lib. m. contra gentes, cap. 16. et 17. It ationes pro hac vera communique sen¬ tentia hae sunt. Prima est auctoritas. Siccnim docent ex nostris Clemens Alexandr. lib. i. Stromatum, pag. 63. Dionys. in lib. de divi¬ nis nominibus, cap. 4. Augustinus lib. n. Confess. cap. 6. Boethius lib. iv. de Conso¬ latione, Damasc. lib. ii. de fide, cap. 22. Ex externis, Aristoteles lib. i. Ethic. cap. 1. et Seneca in lib. iv. de beneficiis, cap. 7. De¬ inde sunt haec argumenta. Primum. Inclinatio voluntatis in suum ob¬ jectum est naturalis, igitur auctor ejus est Deus. Quare non potest esse nisi bona. At si objectum voluntatis esset malum, et inclina¬ tio ejus esset mala; irnmo esset inclinatio in perniciem propriam ; quod sine dubio natu¬ rali inclinationi repugnat ; proinde esset na¬ turalis et non naturalis, a Deo et non a Deo ; quae sunt contradicentia. Secundum. Ens, ut omnia omnino com¬ prehendit, est proprium objectum intelligen- tiae, non igitur esse potest objectum volun¬ tatis. Neque enim diversarum potentiarum idem objectum esse potest. Tertium. Voluntas magis appetit id quod est utilius appetenti, quam quod est in se praestantius, vel nobilius. Quis enim non multo malit unum aureum nummum, quam decem muscas, aut viginti culices? Igitur objectum voluntatis non est ens absolute, sed bonum et conveniens. Quartum. Objectum appetitus non potest esse, nisi id, quod est appetibile. At bonnm est, quod omnia appetunt, ut scribit Philoso¬ phus initio primi libri Ethicorum. Igitur bo¬ num proprie est objectum voluntatis. Sed videamus quid contra adversarius ad- ferat. Argumentum Gulielmi non est nisi hoc; si quis non possit velle malum, et nolle bonum, non poterit mereri et demereri circa hos actus, quod videtur absurdum. Nam si Christianus judicet malum esse colere idola, non poterit velle colere idola, ac proinde non poterit circa hoc peccaro et demereri ; et si¬ militer non poterit mereri detestando cultum idolorum, quia circa quod non possumus demereri, circa idem nec possumus me¬ reri. Respondeo : poterit Christianus velle colere idola, tametsi judicet id esse malum abso¬ lute, quia poterit judicare id esse bonum sibi, vel ad evadenda tormenta, vel ad con¬ ciliandam sibi gratiam Ethnicorum, vel alia quacumque de causa. Quod si quis appre¬ hendat cultum idolorum solum sub ratione 604 LIBER III. mali, non poterit quidem illum velle, tamen mereri poterit et demereri, quoad exerci¬ tium actus, qui poterit non detestari eum actum, quando tenetur detestari ; poterit etiam detestari, quando libere posset non detestari, et hoc modo demerebitur vel me¬ rebitur. Prajter hoc argumentum solent proponi alia quatuor argumenta. Primum est ex Scriptura, quoniam Ecclesiastici xv : Ante hominem vita et moi's , bonum et malum. Quod placueidt ei , dabitur illi (1). Respondeo , bonum potest rejici, quia potest apprehendi sub ratione mali; et malum potest eligi, quia potest apprehendi sub ratione boni. Atque hoc solum est , quod docet Eccle¬ siasticus. Secundum argumentum ex Augustino et Bernardo. Scribit enim S. Augustinus in lib. ii. confess. cap. 4. se in furto non amasse nisi peccatum. Et S. Bernardus serm. 35. ex parvis, scribit, diabolum, et alios quosdam diligere malum, quia est malum. Respondeo : S. Augustinus explicat in eodem libro, cap. 9. se amasse in eo furto ipsum peccatum, sed sub ratione boni delectabilis, quia vide¬ licet gaudebateum aliis sociis suis fallere vi¬ cinum suum. Ad quem modum intelligendum est etiam quod scribit sanctus Bernardus ; diabolus enim diligit malum nostrum sub ratione boni sui, existimat enim sibi utile esse, si multi pereant. Tertium argumentum. Intelligcntia cogno¬ scit verum et falsum ; cur igitur et voluntas non velit bonum et malum? Respondeo : in- telligentia apprehendit venum et falsum; sed cum judicandum est, vero consentit, a falso dissentit. Porro voluntas sequitur intelligen- tiam non simpliciter ut apprehendentem, sed ut judicantem. Idcirco sicut intelligentia ve¬ ritati consentit, a falso dissentit, ita voluntas eligit bonum, rejicit malum. Quartum argumentum. Potest voluntas nolle bonum sub ratione boni, quia potest Deum, qui summum ac purum est bonum, odio habere, sicut. eumdem potest diligere ; igitur etiam potest velle malum sub ratione mali ; siquidem nolle bonum et velle malum ejusdem rationis sunt. Respondeo : potest quidem voluntas humana Deum odisse, sed sub ratione mali, id est, gravis etincommodi. Sic enim impii Deum cogitant judicem seve¬ rum. Et quia nollent poenas dare scelerum suorum, ideo Deum esse, vel certe omnia scientem , et omnipotentem esse nollent. Quare negandum est posse voluntatem nolle bonum sub ratione boni, sicut etiam contra velle malum sub ratione mali. Sed de his hucusque dictum sit.