Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 13: That free choice is both of things present and of things future
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The second question about the object of free choice is whether free choice is also of things present, or only of things future — that is, whether man has in his power only his future actions, or his present ones also. For there seem to be three judgments on this matter.
The first is Peter Lombard's, in book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 25; likewise of William of Ockham and Gabriel, on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 38, who teach that present actions are necessary — since everything that is, while it is, must necessarily be; and hence that only future actions are in the power of free choice. The second judgment is Gregory of Rimini's, on book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 39 [al. 42-44], who thinks that the beginning of an action can be free even in the present, but that some continuation is altogether necessary. For even though one can not begin the action, and therefore the beginning is free, yet, if it be begun, it cannot cease in that very point of time, because it would be and not be — which are contradictories — if it ceased in the very instant in which it first existed; nor can it cease in the next instant either, because two immediate instants are not found; therefore it will necessarily be continued for some time. The third judgment, more common in the schools, and without doubt truer, is that which, beyond the rest, John Scotus explains and defends on book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 39, Capreolus on 2, distinction 25, and Hervaeus, quodlibet 1, question 1, doubt 6. This judgment, then, holds that free choice has in its power not only future actions but present ones also, and not only the beginning but also the continuation.
The former part is proved. For if free choice were not of things present, it would follow that it could not be of things future either. For it cannot truly be said, “this will be done freely,” if in the present it cannot truly be said, “this is being done freely”; nor will it be able to be truly said, “this was done freely,” if it could not in the present be truly said, “this is being done freely.” And so the whole of liberty will perish. Next, if there were no true liberty of present actions, God would not be truly free — he to whom nothing is past, nothing future; and that this is false and absurd we shall demonstrate afterward in its place. Third, it would follow that Christ in the first instant of his conception, and the Angels in the first instant of their creation, neither merited anything of good nor could by any means merit — which certainly seems by no means agreeable to the doctrine of the schools. Fourth, this too would be brought about, that we should never merit anything by pious works: for we do not merit when we do nothing, as is known; nor do we merit when we do something, because we do not act freely, if there is no liberty toward things present; therefore we never merit. Finally there comes also this absurdity: that they who sin would then least sin when they most sin; for a man most sins when he is in the very act and heat of the sin; but if free choice is not of things present, he who actually sins does not freely sin, and hence does not sin. By which argument is proved also the latter part, concerning continuation: for if the action must necessarily be continued, and in the continuation itself there is no liberty, it follows that a man, working well for some time, does not merit, and doing ill, does not sin. But certainly it is very absurd that a good or evil action, by this alone, that it perseveres and is continued, should cease to be good or evil.
Nor do the contrary arguments effect anything. For they object, first, that sentence of the Philosopher, “Everything that is, while it is, must necessarily be,” book 1 On Interpretation, last chapter. But the answer is easy: the Philosopher speaks of conditioned necessity, not absolute. For as, if one should say, “if men dispute with one another, they necessarily speak; but they dispute; therefore they necessarily speak” — that proposition, “they necessarily speak,” is understood not absolutely but on a supposition, in this sense: it being posited that they dispute, it cannot be but that they speak; yet absolutely they speak freely, not necessarily, because they could at their pleasure not have begun the disputation, and, it being begun, can with the same liberty drop it: so also, when we say, “that which is, when it is, necessarily is,” it must be taken of conditioned necessity, not of absolute. For an action, if it be free, cannot indeed not be when it is; yet absolutely it flows from its cause not necessarily, but contingently, and in any moment whatever it can be interrupted and dropped. The argument could also be solved by another distinction. For that which is done can be considered in two ways. In one way, as it is already in itself, and outside its causes; and in this way its becoming has passed into having-been-done, and the present into the past; and therefore that thing cannot not be while it is, because what has been done cannot be not done. In the other way, as it flows from its cause, or as it has an order to its cause; and in this way, if the cause be free or contingent, that thing can not be, and is contingently, not necessarily — because, namely, it has an order to its cause not necessary, but contingent.
They object, second, that free choice is of those things of which there is deliberation; but deliberation is not of things present, but of things future; therefore free choice too is not of things present, but of things future. I answer: free choice is not only of those things of which there is deliberation, but also of those of which there was deliberation, and of the deliberation itself. For we both freely, in the present, deliberate about things future, and freely, in the present, choose what we before deliberated.
They object, third, that something cannot in the same instant come to be and cease, because it would at once be and not be, which are contradictories; and again, that it cannot cease in the next instant, because a next instant is not given; hence that the action must necessarily be continued for some time, and thereby the action, while it is continued, is not free but necessary. I answer: something cannot indeed in the same instant be and not be; yet it can in the same instant begin and cease, because things which cease in the instant in which they are made begin through the first moment of their being, and cease through the last moment of their being. And so of such things it is not said, “this thing now is, because it begins to be, and now is not, because it ceases to be”; but it is said, “this thing now is, because it begins to be, and after this it will not be, because it ceases to be.” Further, that there are many things which are not continued, but perish in the same instant in which they are born, is clear from the very instants in time, and the “having-been-moved” moments in motion. That all spiritual actions also, and bodily illumination itself, are done in an instant, and begin through the first moment of their being and cease through the last moment of their being, is most known. The subtleties of the Ariminian, therefore, effect nothing against the truth.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
’ CAPUT XIII. Liberum arbitrium esse tum prxsentium, tum futurorum. Altera quaestio circa objectum liberi arbi¬ trii est, utrum liberum arbitrium sit etiam praesentium, an tantum futurorum ; hoc est, habeat ne homo in potestate actiones suas futuras tantum, an etiam praesentes. Tres enim de hac re sententiae esse videntur. Prima Petri Lombardi in lib. ii. sentent. distin. 25. Item Gulielmi Okam et Gabrielis in 4. sentent. distinet. 38. qui docent, ac¬ tiones praesentes esse necessarias, quoniam id omne quod est, dum est, necesse est esse ; ' proinde solum futuras in potestate esse liberi arbitrii. Altera sententia est Gregorii Ariminensis, in i. sentent. distin. 39. qui censet inchoa¬ tionem actionis etiam in praesenti liberam esse posse, tamen continuationem aliquam omnino esse necessariam. Nam etiamsi possit aliquis non inchoare actionem, et ideo libera sit inchoatio : tamen si inchoetur, non potest in illo ipso puncto temporis desinere, quia esset et non esset, quia sunt contradicentia, si in illo ipso instanti desineret, in quo pri¬ mum extitit : nec potest in proximo etiam instanti desinere, quia non inveniuntur duo instantia immediata; igitur necessario ad tempus aliquod continuabitur. Tertia sententia communior in scholis, ac sine dubio verior est, quam prajter cmteros explicant, et tuentur Joan. Scotus in 1. sen- tent.*distin. 39. Capreolus in 2. distin. 25. Et Hervaeus quodlib. 1. qusest. 1. dub. 6. Ha¬ bet igitur haec sententia, liberum arbitrium in potestate sua non solum futuras actiones habere, sed etiam prmsentes, nec tantum inchoationem, sed etiam continuationem. Probatur pars prior. Nam si liberum arbi¬ trium non esset praesentium, sequeretur, ut nec posset esse futurorum. Non enim vere (I) Eccl. XV, 18. CAPUT XIII. 005 dici potest : hoc libere fiet, si in praesenti non potest vere dici, hoc libere fit. Sed neque vere dici poterit : hoc libere tactum est, si non potuit in praesenti vere dici : hoc libero fit. Itaque tota peribit libertas. Deinde , si praesentium actionum nulla esset vera libertas, Deus non esset vere liber, quippe cui nihil est praeteritum, nihil futu¬ rum. Hoc autem falsum, atque absurdum esse suo loco postea demonstrabimus. Tertio sequeretur, Christum in primo in¬ stanti conceptionis, et Angelos in primo in¬ stanti creationis, neque boni aliquid me¬ ruisse, neque mereri ulla ratione potuisse, quod certe doctrinae scholarum minime con¬ sentaneum esse videtur. Quarto, illud quoque efficeretur, ut num- quam piis operibus aliquid mereremur. Non enim meremur quando nihil agimus, ut no¬ tum est, neque meremur quando aliquid agi¬ mus, quia non libere agimus, si ad prae¬ sentia non est libertas, numquam igitur me¬ remur. Denique accedit et illud absurdum, ut qui peccant, tunc minime peccent, quando ma¬ xime peccant : nam tum maxime peccat quis, cum est in ipso actu et ardore peccati, at si praesentium non est liberum arbitrium, ille qui actu peccat, non libere peccat, pro¬ inde nec peccat. Quo argumento probatur etiam pars illa posterior de continuatione. Nam si neces¬ sario continuari debet actio, et in ipsa conti¬ nuatione non est libei’tas, sequitur, hominem per aliquod tempus bene operando non me¬ reri, et male agendo non peccare. At certe valde absurdum est, ut bona vel mala actip, per hoc solum quod perseverat et continu¬ atur, desinat esse bona vel mala. Neque argumenta contraria aliquid effi¬ ciunt. Objiciunt enim primo sententiam illam Philosophi, « Omne quod est, dum est, ne- cesse est esse, » lib. i. de Interpretatione, cap. ult. Sed facilis est responsio; loquitur enim Philosophus de necessitate conditio- nata, non de absoluta. Quemadmodum enim si quis dicat, si homines inter se disputant, necessario loquuntur; disputant autem, igi¬ tur necessario loquuntur : illa propositio, ne¬ cessario loquuntur, non intelligitur absolute sed ex hypothesi, in hunc sensum, posito quod illi disputent, fieri non potest, 'quin lo¬ quantur ; absolute tamen libere loquuntur, non necessario, quia poterant pro arbitrio disputationem non inchoare, et inchoatam eadem possunt libertate dimittere : sic etiam cum dicimus, Id quod est, quando est, ne¬ cessario est, de necessitate conditionata, non de absoluta accipi debet. Siquidem actio, si libera sit, non potest quidem non esse, quando est, tamen absolute non necessario, sed contingenter fluit a sua causa, et in quo¬ libet momento potest interrumpi et dimitti. Posset etiam per aliam distinctionem ar- gumentnm solvi. Nam id quod fit, potest considerari duobus modis. Uno modo, ut est jam in se, et extra causas suas, et hoc modo ipsum fieri, transiit in factum esse, et prae- sens in praeteritum, et ideo non potest res illa non esse, dum est, quia non potest non facta esse, quse facta est. Alio modo, ut fluit a causa, sive ut habet ordinem ad cau¬ sam, et hoc modo, si causa est libera, aut contingens, potest res illa non esse, et con¬ tingenter est, non necessario, quia videlicet ordinem ad causam non necessarium, sed contingentem habet. Objiciunt secundo, liberum arbitrium eo¬ rum esse, quorum est consultatio ; at consul¬ tationem non praesentium, sed futurorum esse ; igitur et liberum arbitrium non prae¬ sentium, sed futurorum esse. Respondeo, li¬ berum arbitrium non solum esse eorum, quo¬ rum est consultatio, sed etiam eorum, quo¬ rum fuit consultatio, et ipsius quoque con¬ sultationis. Nam et libere in praesenti con¬ sultamus de futuris : et libere eligimus in praesenti, quod antea consultavimus. Objiciunt tertio, non posse in eodem in¬ stanti aliquid fieri et desinere, quia simul esset, et non esset, quae sunt contradicentia; et rursus non posse desinere in proximo in¬ stanti, quia non datur proximum instans ; proinde necessario actionem esse continuan¬ dam ad aliquod tempus, acperhoc actionem dum continuatur, non esse liberam, sed ne¬ cessariam. Respondeo, non posse quidem in eodem instanti aliquid esse, et non esse, tamen posse in eodem instanti incipere et desinere. Quia quae desinunt in instanti, in quo fiunt, incipiunt per primum sui esse, et desinunt per ultimum sui esse. Itaque non dicitur de ejusmodi rebus, haec res nunc est, quia incipit esse ; et nunc non est, quia desinit esse : sed dicitur, haec res nunc est, quia incipit esse, et post hoc non erit, quia desinit esse. Porro multa esse quae non continuantur, sed |ineodem instanti per¬ eunt, in quo nascuntur, perspicuum est ex ipsis instantibus in tempore, et mutatis esse 606 LIBER III. in motu. Actiones etiam spirituales omnes, et ipsam illuminationem corporalem in in¬ stanti fieri, et per primum sui esse incipere, ac per ultimum sui esse desinere, notissimum est. Nihil igitur argutise Ariminensis contra veritatem efficiunt.