Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 14: That free choice is not of the end, but of the means to the end
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The last question is whether the object of free choice is the end, or that which is toward the end. For the Philosopher, in book 3 of the Ethics, chapters 2 and 3, more than once repeats that election and deliberation are not of the end, but of the means only to the end. “For no one” (as he himself says) “deliberates whether he ought to be happy, nor chooses felicity; but he deliberates about the means, and of them chooses those which seem best for attaining felicity.” But on the contrary St. John Damascene, in book 2 On the Faith, chapter 22, writes that man not only freely deliberates and chooses, but also freely desires and wills; and to desire and to will seem properly to pertain to the end — for from the desiring and willing of the end we are moved to seek and choose the means. St. Thomas also, in the 1-2, question 10, article 2, teaches that man is free, as to exercise, even about the desiring of the highest good. Finally, it seems incapable of being called into doubt that we freely love God, who is the highest and last end — seeing that the love of God is an act most meritorious, and for it the crown of life is prepared as a wage, the Apostle James saying: he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him, James 1.
But the matter is easy. For if we consider whatever in any way pertains to free choice, then not only the means, but the end also, will pertain to free choice — since the intention of the end can be free, as Damascene rightly teaches. But if we consider the chief act of free choice, which is election, then the means alone, and not the end, will pertain to free choice, as Aristotle proves. Yet often the end puts on the notion of a means, and in that manner can pertain to the object of free choice. And indeed in subordinated ends no one is ignorant that one and the same thing has now the notion of end, now of means; and thereby the same thing, as end, falls not under deliberation and election, but as means, does fall. For example: health is the end of medicine; therefore the physician does not deliberate whether it is expedient to cure the sick man, nor does he choose health, but desires and intends health, and from love of this end is moved to seek means and choose remedies. But the judge, whose end is not the health of a private man, but peace and safety, deliberates not only about the health but even about the life of private men — whether, namely, it be useful to punish certain men with the cutting off of members, or even with death, for the peace and safety of the city. And further, some great prince, who commands many cities, has not for his end the peace of one city, but the safety of the whole kingdom, and hence will sometimes be able to deliberate whether it is expedient, for the preservation of the whole kingdom, utterly to overthrow and destroy some rebellious city. And as touching the last end: it cannot indeed put on the notion of a means; but the desiring of it can be a means toward attaining that same end. And so the desire of felicity, while we are pilgrims from our fatherland, is free as to exercise; and the very love of God is a means most apt for attaining beatitude. And by this reasoning all things are reconciled which at the beginning could seem to cohere little among themselves.
But there arises no small doubt about the first love of the end, which began to arise in the will when it was altogether resting from act — whether, namely, that love also is free, or necessary. For three judgments of the theologians are numbered, two extreme, the third middle. The first is Scotus's and Henry's: for the one, in quodlibet 21 [al. 16], the other in quodlibet 12, question 26, teach that the first act of the will, or the first love of the end, is not only elicited by the will, but is simply free. The second judgment, at the other extreme, is Capreolus's, who attributes it also to St. Thomas. Capreolus, then, on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 24, question 1, article 3, reply to the eighth, and distinction 25, question 1, article 3, reply to the seventh, teaches that the first act of the will is a certain actual complacency toward good in general, and that it is so wrought by God alone that the will concurs to it only passively. The third judgment, plainly middle, and in my judgment truer, is Cajetan's, in the 1-2, question 9, article 4, and Ferrara's, in book 1 against the Gentiles, chapter 72, and in book 3, chapter 89, who teach that the first act of the will is wrought efficiently by the will itself, but is attributed to God as author, since it is natural, and follows from that natural inclination which God impressed on the will — in nearly the manner in which heavy and light things are said to be moved by their generator. And this judgment seems truly to be St. Thomas's, in the 1-2, question 9, articles 4 and 6. And indeed, that the first act of the will is elicited actively by the will itself can, against Capreolus, easily be proved: since, if that complacency is actual, as he confesses, it will certainly be an act of the will; if an act of the will, certainly immanent and vital; therefore it will proceed actively from the will itself. On account of this reason the same Capreolus, in the same question 1, distinction 25, article 3, in the answer to Henry's first argument against the second conclusion, says that that complacency is not a second act (for he confesses that every second act is elicited actively by the will), but a first act. And if indeed by first act he understood the natural inclination which is always in the will, he would easily agree with the other followers of St. Thomas; but when he adds, in the same place, that this first act is never without a second act, he openly signifies that by that actual complacency is to be understood something superadded to the natural inclination, which is impressed by God on the will as often as it is about to come forth into act. But that superadded thing seems altogether gratuitously devised; and since it is neither a power, nor a habit, nor an act, it can scarcely be understood what it is. And now, that the first desiring of the end is natural, and to be attributed to God as author, St. Thomas excellently proves by this reason: everything that acts, acts for an end, or from the desiring of an end; therefore, when the will moves itself and acts, it moves itself and acts from the desiring of an end; therefore, before it move itself and act, it must have the desiring of an end; therefore, toward the first desiring of the end it does not move itself, nor properly act, but is moved and driven by the author of nature, through the natural inclination impressed on the will. For otherwise, if toward the first desiring of the end it moved itself and acted, it would have to move itself and act from another desiring of an end; and thus there would be given a desiring prior to the first, or else a process to infinity. And this reason is confirmed by a likeness. For the intelligence is said to act and move itself when from principles, by its own discourse, it searches out conclusions; but when it knows the principles themselves it is not properly said to act or move itself, because it does not investigate the cognition of those principles by discourse, but has it from the natural light impressed by God the creator. So then the will also properly acts when, from love of the end, through counsel it chooses the means for attaining the end; but not when, from the natural inclination put into it by God, it begins to desire the end itself.
But against this some object: if the will, toward the first desiring of the end, be moved by God, it follows that that act is natural, and thereby not free; but that is repugnant not only to experience, but even to the doctrine of St. Thomas himself. For in part 1, question 62 [al. 63], article 5 [al. 4], St. Thomas concedes that in the first instant of their creation the Angels merited before God; but there is no merit where there is no liberty. I answer: the first act of the will is called natural, and from God, because it is born of the natural inclination, not of an actual desiring of the end; yet the same act can be free as to exercise, and hence free so far as is required for merit. For the same St. Thomas, in the 1-2, question 10, article 2, teaches that, as to exercise, in this life man is free with respect to any object whatever, even if it be good itself in common. They object second: there will be no difference between animals and things inanimate, if the human will itself does not move itself when it elicits its act, but is moved by God in that manner in which heavy and light things are moved by their generator. I answer: the difference between animals and things inanimate is not to be sought in the first act (though even in it some difference is not wanting), in which animals work after the manner of nature, but in the following acts. For, cognition and desiring of the end being had beforehand, animals of themselves seek the way of acquiring that end; but things inanimate, which neither know nor desire the end by any proper act of their own, cannot of themselves seek the way of acquiring the end; but as they are naturally inclined to their end, so also they are naturally borne to it, driven and moved by him who gave them their nature. And between animals devoid of reason and those endowed with reason this is the difference: that, although both naturally desire the end as to specification, yet those devoid of reason desire it naturally even as to exercise, while those endowed with reason desire it, as to exercise, freely; likewise, that from love of the end the animals devoid of reason move themselves to the means which lead to that end by an animal motion, and without deliberation; those endowed with reason, by a rational motion — that is, with counsel and comparison of the means, and thereby with deliberation and election.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XIV. Liberum arbitrium non esse finis , sed mediorum ad finem . Postrema quaestio est, sit ne objectum li¬ beri arbitrii tinis, an id quod est ad finem, siquidem Philosophus in lib. m. Ethicorum, cap. 2. et 3. non semel repetit, electionem et consultationem non esse tinis, sed medi¬ orum tantum ad finem. « Nemo enim (ut ipse dicit) consultat, an debeat esse felix, neque elegit felicitatem, sed consultat dc mediis ; et ex iis illa eligit, quae optima vi¬ dentur esse ad felicitatem assequendam. » Contra autem S. Joannes Damascenus, in ii. lib. de fide, cap. 22. scribit, hominem non solum libere consultare et eligere, sed etiam libere appetere et velle. Appetere au¬ tem et velle proprie ad finem pertinere vi¬ dentur. Nam ex appetitione et voluntate fi¬ nis movemur ad quaerenda et eligenda media. Sanctus etiam Thomas in 1. 2. quaest. 10. art. 2. docet, hominem esse liberum, quoad exercitium , etiam circa appetitionem sum¬ mi boni. Denique non videtur posse in dubium re¬ vocari, quin libere diligamus Deum, qui est summus atque ultimus finis, quandoquidem amor Dei est actus maxime meritorius, et ei corona vitae, tamquam merces parata, est, dicente Apostolo Jacobo : Accipiet coronam vitae, quam ?'epromisit Deus diliyentibiis se, Jae. i. (1). Sed res est facilis, nam si consideremus quidquid aliquo modo pertinet ab liberum arbitrium, tunc non solum media, sed etiam finis ad liberum arbitrium pertinebit : si¬ quidem intentio finis libera' esso potest, ut Damascenus recte docet. Si vero considere¬ mus praecipuum actum liberi arbitrii, qui est electio, tunc sola media, non autem finis ad liberum arbitrium pertinebunt, ut Aristoteles probat. Caeterum saepe finis induit rationem medii, et eo modo ad objectum liberi arbitrii pertinere potest. Et quidem in finibus subor- dinatis nemo nescit, quin unum et idem nunc finis, nunc medii rationem habeat, ac per hoc res eadem, ut finis, sub consultationem et electionem non cadat, ut medium, cadat. Exempli causa, sanitas finis est medicina;. Propterea non consultat medicus, an expe¬ diat curare aegrotum, neque eligit sanitatem sed appetit, atque intendit sanitatem , et ex amorp hujus finis movetur ad quaerenda media, et eligenda pharmaca. Judex autem, cujus finis non est sanitas privati hominis, sed pax et incolumitas, consultat non solum de sanitate, sed etiam de vita privatorum hominum, an videlicet utile sit certos ho¬ mines membrorum truncatione, aut etiam morte mulctare pro pace et salute civitatis. Porro magnus aliquis princeps, qui multis ci¬ vitatibus imperat, non habet pro fine pacem unius civitatis, sed regni totius incolumita¬ tem, ac proinde consultare poterit aliquando utrum expediat ad regni totius conservatio¬ nem civitatem aliquam rebellem poenitus evertere ac delere. Quod autem attinet ad ultimum finem, non potest ille quidem induere rationem medii, sed potest tamen appetitio ejus esse medium ad eumdem finem assequendum. Itaque de¬ siderium felicitatis dum peregrinamur a pa¬ tria, liberum est quoad exercitium, et ipsa dilectio Dei, medium est aptissimum ad asse¬ quendam beatitudinem. Atque hac ratione omnia conciliantur, qua; initio parum inter se cohaerere videri poterant. Sed existit non exigua dubitatio de primo amore finis, qui in voluntate oriri ceepit, cum ipsa ab actu omnino cessaret, an videlicet ille etiam amor sit liber, an vero necessarius. Tres enim Theologorum sententia; numeran¬ tur, duae extremae, tertia media. Prima Scoti et Henrici est, ille enim in quodlib. 21, hic in quodlib. 12. quaest. 26. docent, primum actum voluntatis, sive pri¬ mum amorem finis non solum elici a volun¬ tate, sed simpliciter esse liberum. Altera sententia in altero extremo est Ca¬ preoli, qui eam S. Thomae etiam attribuit. Capreolus igitur in 2. sentent. distinet. 24. quaest. 1. art. 3. ad 8. et dislin. 23. quaest. 1. art. 3. ad 7. docet, primum actum volunta¬ tis esse quamdam complacentiam actualem erga bonum in universum, eamque itu ficr (1) Jacob. 1, 12. CAPUT XIV. 007 a solo Deo, ut ad eam voluntas, non nisi pas¬ sive concurrat. \ Tertia sententia plane media, et meo judi¬ cio verior est Cajetani in 1. 2. quaest. 9. art. 4. Et Ferrariensis in lib. i. contra gentes, cap. 23. ct in 3. cap. 89. qui docent, primum actum voluntatis fieri efficienter ab ipsa vo¬ luntate, sed tribui Deo auctori, quoniam sit naturalis, et sequatur ex inclinatione illa na¬ turali, quam Deus in voluntate impressit : ad eum fere modum quo gravia et levia di¬ cuntur moveri a generante. Et haec sententia videtur esse vere S. Thomae in 1. 2. quaest. 6. art. 4. et G. Et quidem primum actum voluntatis elici active ab ipsa voluntate, contra Capreolum, facile probari potest, quoniam si complacen¬ tia illa est actualis, ut is fatetur; certe erit actus voluntatis ; si actus voluntatis, certe immanens et vitalis, ergo ab ipsa voluntate active procedet. Propter hanc rationem idem Capreolus in eadem quaest. 1. distinet. 23. art. 3. in respon¬ sione ad 1. Henr. contr. 2. conclusionem, di¬ cit, complacentiam illam non esse actum se¬ cundum (fatetur enim omnem actum secun¬ dum elici active a voluntate) sed actum pri¬ mum. Et si quidem per actum primum intelligeret inclinationem naturalem, quae semper est in voluntate, facile cum aliis 5. Thomae sectatoribus conveniret : sed cum addit in eodem loco, actum istum primum numquam esse sine actu secundo, aperte sig¬ nificat, per illam complacentiam actualem intelligendum esse aliquid superadditum in¬ clinationi naturali, quod imprimatur a Deo in voluntate quotiescumque illa est proditura in actum. Istud autem superadditum, videtur omnino gratis excogitatum, et cum non sit potentia, neque habitus, neque actus, vix in- telligi potest quid sit. Jam vero primam appetitionem finis esse naturalem, et Deo auctori tribuendam, hac ratione probat egregie S. Thomas : Omne quod agit, agit propter finem, sive ex appe¬ titione finis : ergo quando voluntas movet se ct agit, ex appetitione finis se movet et agit : ergo antequam se moveat et agat, debet ha¬ bere appetitionem finis : ergo ad primam fi¬ nis appetitionem non se ipsa movet, neque proprie agit, sed movetur et agitur ab auc¬ tore naturae, per naturalem inclinationem vo¬ luntati impressam. Alioqui enim si ad primam appetitionem finis se ipsa moveret et ageret, deberet ex alia appetitione finisse movere et agere, et sic daretur appetitio prior prima, vel certe processus in infinitum. Et confirmatur haec ratio a simili. Nam in- telligentia dicitur agere et se movere, cum ex principiis per proprium discursum indagat conclusiones ; at cum ipsa principia cogno¬ scit non dicitur proprie agere aut se movere quia non per discursum investigat eorum principiorum cognitionem, sed illam habet ex naturali lumine a Deo creatore impresso : sic igitur et voluntas proprie agit, cum ex amore finis per consilium eligit media ad as¬ sequendum finem: non autem cum ipsum fi¬ nem ex naturali inclinatione sibi a Deo, indita incipit appetere. At contra objiciunt aliqui, si voluntas ad primam appetitionem finis moveatur a Deo, sequi, ut actus ille sit naturalis, ac per hoc non sit liber : id autem repugnat non solum experientiae, sed etiam ipsi sancti Thomae doctrinae. Nam in 1. par. quaest. 63, art. 3. concedit S. Thomas, in primo instanti suae creationis, Angelos meruisse apud Deum : non est autem meritum, ubi non est libertas. Respondeo : primus actus voluntatis naturalis dicitur, et a Deo, quia nascitur ex naturali inclinatione, non ex appetitione actuali finis : tamen idem actus liber esse potest, quoad exercitium, ac proinde in tantum liber, in quantum requiritur ad meritum. Nam idem sanctus Thomas in 4. 2. quaest. 40. art. 2. docet, quoad exercitium in hac vita, hominem esse liberum, respectu cujuscumque objecti, etiamsi sit ipsum bonum in communi. Objiciunt secundo, nullum fore discrimen inter animalia, et inanima, si ipsa etiam hu¬ mana voluntas non se ipsa moveat, cum eli¬ cit actum suum, sed moveatur a Deo eo modo quo gravia et levia moventur a generante. Respondeo : discrimen inter animalia et ina¬ nima, non est quaerendum in primo actu (quamvis ct in eo non desit aliqua differentia) in quo animalia operantur per modum na¬ tura}, sed in seq. actib. Nam praehabita cog¬ nitione et appetitione finis, animalia per se quanunt modum acquirendi illum finem; in¬ anima vero, qua} non cognoscunt, neque ap¬ petunt proprio aliquo actu finem, non pos¬ sunt per se quaerere modum acquirendi fi¬ nem, sed sicut naturaliter inclinantur ad suum finem, sic etiam naturaliter ad illum feruntur ab illo acta et mota, qui naturam eis dedit. Inter animalia vero rationis expertia et ratione praedita hoc interest, quod tametsi (308 LIBER III. utraque naturaliter appetant finem, quoad specificationem ; tamen rationis expertia na¬ turaliter eum appetunt, etiam quoad exer¬ citium ; ratione praedita quoad exercitium appetunt libere. Item, quod ex amore finis animalia rationis expertia se movent ad me¬ dia, quae ducunt ad illum finem motu ani¬ mali, et sine deliberatione ; ratione praedita, motu rationali, id est, cum consilio et colla¬ tione mediorum ac per hoc cum deliberatione et electione.