Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 15: That the subject of free choice can be nothing but an intelligent nature
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Now must be discussed that particle of the definition, “of an intelligent nature,” which briefly explains the subject of free choice — that is, what things are endowed with free choice. There are in all six things which could come into question: inanimate things, plants, beasts, men, Angels, God. And, that we may separate the certain from the doubtful: first, it is beyond controversy that none of those things which lack cognition — whether inanimate, as the elements and stones, or animate, as herbs and plants — can have free choice; for it cannot be but that those things lack free choice which lack all choice.
Next, it is certain that living things devoid of reason are endowed with a certain image and, as it were, shadowing of free choice, yet not with free choice truly and properly so called. That the beasts are endowed with a certain image of free choice, which can metaphorically be named free choice, is clear from this: that their desiring is in some manner indifferent to many things, not so bound to one only as the heating power of fire is to heating, and the like; next, that they seem to use a kind of judgment — for sheep in the fields crop one herb and pass over another, flee the wolf, follow the dog; horses and dogs are terrified by threats, allured by caresses; finally, that they display in their works not only judgment, but even a certain wondrous prudence and sagacity — as the spider, the ant, the bee, the swallow, and others. Wherefore Plutarch dared to entitle a certain little work, that brute animals use reason; and Lorenzo Valla, not in jest, as Plutarch, but seriously, attributed reason to beasts in his Dialectic, chapter 9 — and would without doubt have attributed to them free choice also, had he not denied it to men. But that all beasts lack free choice properly so called the Philosopher witnesses, book 3 On the Soul, text 57; Gregory of Nyssa witnesses it, book 1 On Philosophy, chapter 1, and book 5, chapter 4; all the theologians and philosophers witness it, whom it would be long, and by no means necessary, to adduce here; the divine Scripture itself witnesses it, in Psalm 31, when it says: Do not become like the horse and the mule, who have no understanding; and in Psalm 48: he is compared to senseless beasts, etc. Finally, reason too witnesses it: for the supreme power which is in beasts — whether it be named imagination or estimative — is bodily and material; hence it cannot reach to universal cognition, which is the foundation of reasoning, nor can it be bent back upon itself and judge of its own judgment, which is the foundation of liberty. Nor is it repugnant to these things that their desiring seems indifferent to many things: for that indifference is determined by a natural judgment, which they cannot resist. And as men in certain matters have a conditional necessity but an absolute liberty, so contrariwise the beasts have a conditional liberty and an absolute necessity: for they can desire this rather than that, if their estimative so judge; but the estimative necessarily judges one thing. For the beasts have from nature determinate judgments, nor can they compare one thing with another, as we said above. And hence it arises that all animals of the same kind always work in the same manner: for all sheep flee wolves; all swallows build their nests in the same manner; all bees make honey in the same manner; all spiders lie in wait for flies in the same manner; all ants store up grains in the same manner — nor do they know anything besides. But (say they) to be terrified by threats and allured by caresses seems a manifest judgment of reason. It is not so: for that arises from this, that from the memory of blows or of benefits they know that something of good or evil is shown to them; and they cannot not know and esteem it, or not follow such a judgment.
Moreover, it is certain that man, absolutely considered, is of free choice; for the heretics do not contend about this, but only about man cast down from his state through the sin of the first parent — of which matter we shall discourse in the following book. And that testimony of Ecclesiasticus is clear, chapter 15: he left him in the hand of his own counsel, etc. Nor is it less certain that the Angels are endowed with free choice, above all if they be considered absolutely according to their nature, before their confirmation in good or obduration in evil. For first, the sacred writings speak of the Angels as of understanding things, as is agreed from Genesis, chapters 18 and 19, from Tobias, chapter 12, from Luke, chapters 1 and 2, and from very many other places; and where there is intelligence, there without doubt is liberty also. Next, Scripture witnesses that the Angels are of a nature more excellent than men, Psalm 8: Thou hast made him a little less than the angels; therefore, if men are endowed with free choice, why not much more the Angels? Moreover, the divine Scripture witnesses that Angels at one time sinned and were punished, 2 Peter 2: God spared not the angels that sinned; but sin and the punishment of sin cannot be without liberty of choice. Finally, the holy Fathers in express words attribute free choice to the Angels: see Irenaeus, book 4, chapter 71; Basil in the book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 16; Augustine in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 10; Gregory, homily 7 on Ezekiel; and Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, chapters 3 and 4.
One doubt remains: whether God also is truly and properly of free choice. For many have held the contrary, and arguments not to be contemned make the question difficult. First, then, there were not wanting philosophers who said that God acts from necessity, whose judgment St. Thomas reports in book 2 against the Gentiles, chapter 23; and though St. Thomas did not indicate the names of those philosophers, yet his commentator Francis of Ferrara writes that they are Aristotle and Avicenna. And indeed not Ferrara alone, but Henry too, and Scotus, and others, place Aristotle in the number of these philosophers — and not without cause, as can be known from book 8 of the Physics, texts 10 and following, and book 12 of the Metaphysics, texts 30 and 38. In the same error was engaged, of Christians, Peter Abelard, Thomas Waldensis witnessing, book 1 of the Doctrinal of the Faith, chapter 10; for the aforesaid Peter taught that God cannot do anything but the things he does. Which same John Wyclif afterward taught, as is agreed from his Trialogue, chapters 10 and 11, and from Thomas Waldensis, who refutes him, book of the Doctrinal of the Faith, chapters 10 and following. The same Luther approves, who in the assertion of article 36 says that Wyclif's judgment is true which holds that all things come to pass from absolute necessity. Martin Bucer also, in the book on the concord of doctrine, chapter on free choice, delivers plainly enough that God does necessarily whatever he does, and cannot do otherwise. Finally John Calvin, book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 16, §3, teaches that God cannot do anything but what he does: “Assuredly,” says he, “God claims for himself, and wills that we ascribe to him, an omnipotence — not such as the sophists feign, empty, idle, and almost drowsy, but watchful, efficacious, industrious, and engaged in continual act.” And a little after: “Therefore,” says he, “he is reckoned omnipotent, not because he can indeed do, but ceases, but because,” etc. Where thou seest reprehended by Calvin the common judgment of the theologians (whom he calls sophists), which holds that God can do many things which he does not do, and contrariwise can leave undone many things which he does, and is therefore truly and properly free. The arguments for the judgment of the adversaries are many and grave. For the liberty of choice, by which one can will this or that, and will this or not will it, seems repugnant to the eternity, immutability, simplicity, and other attributes of God. Nay, since in God to will is the same as to be, if the willing of God could not be, God himself also could not be; or, if the being of God is simply necessary, how shall the willing of God not be also simply necessary? But all these things will be expounded more plainly when they are to be refuted.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XV. Subjectum liberi arbitrii non posse esse nisi naturam intelligentem. Discutienda nunc est illa particula defini¬ tionis « intelligeutis naturae » quae breviter explicat subjectum liberi arbitrii, id est, quae res praeditae sint libero arbitrio. Sex omnino sunt res, quae in quaestionem venire possent, res inanimae, plantae, bestiae, homines, Angeli, Deus. Ac ut certa separe¬ mus a dubiis. Primum, extra controversiam est, nihil eorum, quae cognitione carent, sive sint inanima, ut elementa et lapides, sive animata, ut herbas et plantas liberum arbi¬ trium habere posse. Neque enim fieri potest, ut non careant libero arbitrio, quae omni ar¬ bitrio carent. Deinde certum est, animantia rationis ex¬ pertia praedita esse quadam imagine, et quasi adumbratione liberi arbitrii, non tamen vero proprieque dicto libero arbitrio. Praeditas esse bestias imagine quadam liberi arbitrii, quae liberum arbitrium methaphorice nomi¬ nari possit, perspicuum est ex eo, quod ea¬ rum appetitio aliquo modo est indifferens ad multa, non ita ad unum tantum alligata, ut potentia calefactiva ignis ad calefaciendum et similes . Deinde , quod quasi judicio quodam uti videntur. Oves enim in campis unam herbam carpunt, aliam negligunt, lu¬ pum fugiunt, canem sequuntur; equi et ca¬ nes terrentur minis, alliciuntur blanditiis. Denique quod non solum judicium, sed quae- dam etiam miram prudentiam et sagacitatem pra) se ferant in operibus suis, ut aranea, formica, apis, hirundo, et alia. Quocirca Plutarchus opusculum quoddam inscribere ausus est, quod animantia bruta ratione utan" tur. Laurentius autem Valla, non per jocum, ut Plutarchus, sed serio bestiis rationem 'attribuit in sua Dialectica, cap. 9. attribu¬ turus iisdem sine dubio etiam liberum ar¬ bitrium, nisi illud hominibus denegasset. Caeterum carere bestias omnes libero arbi¬ trio proprie dicto, testatur Philosophus in ii. lib. de anima, text. 157. testatur Gregorius Nyssenus ini. lib. de Philosophia, cap. i. Etin lib. v. cap. 4. testantur omnes Theologi, et Philosophi, quos longum esset, minimeque necessarium huc adducere. Testatur ipsa divina Scriptura in Psalm. xxxi. cum ait : Nolite fieri sicut equus et mulus , quibus non est intellectus. Et in Psalm. xlviii. Compara¬ tus est jumentis insipientibus (i), etc. Testatur denique etiam ratio. Nam potentia suprema, quae est in bestiis, sive imaginatio, sive aesti¬ mati va nominetur, corporalis ac materialis est, proinde pertingere non potest ad cogni¬ tionem universalem, quae fundamentum est ratiocinationis, neque potest reflecti ipsa in se etjudicare de suo judicio, quod est funda¬ mentum libertatis. Neque his repugnat, quod earum appetitio videatur indifferens ad multa. Nam indiffe¬ rentia illa determinatur per naturale judi¬ cium, cui reluctari non queunt. Et quema¬ dmodum homines in certis rebus habent conditionalem necessitatem, sed absolutam libertatem : sic etiam contra, bestiae habent conditionalem libertatem, et absolutam ne¬ cessitatem. Possunt enim hoc potius, quam illud appetere, si aestimativa eorum ita judi¬ cet ; sed aestimativa necessario judicatunum. llabent enim bestiae a natura determinata judicia, neque possunt unum conferre cum altero, ut supra diximus. Atque hinc nasci¬ tur, ut omnia animantia ejusdem generis, semper eodem modo operentur. Omnes enim oves lupos fugiunt; omnes hirundines eodem modo nidificant. Omnes apes eodem modo mellificant, omnes araneae eodem mo¬ do insidiantur [muscis, omnes formicae eo¬ dem modo grana recondunt, neque praeterea aliud norunt. At (inquiunt) terreri minis, atque allici blanditiis, videtur esse manifestum judicium rationis. Sed non ita est. Illud enim oritur ex eo, quod ex memoria verberum, aut be¬ neficiorum cognoscunt aliquid boni vel mali sibi demonstrari, et non possunt id non cog- (I) Psal. XXXI, 9; Psal. XLVIII, 13, %\. CAPUT XVI. noscere et aestimare, aut judicium ejusmodi non sequi. Adhfec certum est, hominem absolute con¬ sideratum esse liberi arbitrii. Neque enim haeretici de hac re contendunt, sed solum de homine per peccatum primi parentis, de statu suo dejecto, de qua re in sequenti li¬ bro disseremus. Perspicuum est autem illud Ecclesiastici testimonium, cap. xv : Reliquit hominem in manu consilii sui , etc. (1) Neque minus est certum, Angelos libero arbitrio praeditos esse, praesertim si absolute secundum naturam suam consideretur, ante confirmationem in bono, vel obfirmationem in malo. Nam in primis litterae sacrae de An¬ gelis ita loquuntur, ut de rebus intelligenti- bus, ut constat ex Genes, cap. xvm. et xix. ex Tobia, cap. xii. ex Luc. cap. i et ii.et ex aliis plurimis locis. Ubi autem intelligentia est, ibi sine dubio et libertas est. Deinde, Scriptura testatur Angelos esse naturae prae- stantioris, quam homines, Psalm. vm. Mi¬ nuisti eum paulo minus ab Angelis (2). Igitur si homines libero arbitrio praediti sunt, cur non multo magis^ Angeli. Adhaec, Scriptura divina testatur, Angelos aliquando peccasse, et punitos esse, n. Petr. ii. Angelis peccan¬ tibus non pepercit (3). At peccatum et poena peccati sine arbitrii libertate esse non pos' sunt. Detiique, sancti Patres disertis verbis liberum arbitrium Angelis tribuunt. Vide Ire- naeum lib. iv. cap. 71. Basilium in lib. de Spiritu, sancto, cap. 16. August. in lib. de correptione et grat. cap. 10. Gregor, homil. 7. in Ezech. et Damascenum lib. ii. de fide, cap. 3. et 4. Una superest dubitatio, sitne Deus etiam vere ac proprie liberi arbitrii. Nam et multi contra senserunt, et argumenta non contem¬ nenda difficilem quaestionem efficiunt. Pri¬ mum igitur non defuerunt ex philosophis, qui dicerent, Deum ex necessitate agere, quorum sententiam refert S.Thom. in lib. ii. contra Gent. cap. 23. et quamvis S. Thomas non indicaverit nomina eorum philosopho¬ rum, tamen commentator ejus Franciscus Ferrarien. scribit, eos esse Aristotelem et A- vicenam. Et sane non solus Ferrariensis, sed etiam Ilenricus, Scotus, et alii in horum phi¬ losophorum numerum referunt Aristotelem, nec sine causa, ut cognosci potest ex lib. vm physic. text. 10. et seq. Et lib. xii. Mctaph. text. 30 et 38. 600 In eodem errore versatus est ex Christia¬ nis, Petrus Abailardus, teste Thoma Wal- densi lib. i. doctrinalis fidei, cap. 10. docuit enim praedictus Petrus, Deum non posse fa¬ cere, nisi ea, quae facit. Quod idem postea docuit Joan. Wiclef. ut constat ex ejus Tria- logo, cap. 10 et 11. Et ex Thoma Waldensi, qui eum refellit, lib. doctrin. fidei, cap. 10. et seq. Idem approbat Lutherus, qui asser¬ tione art. 36. dicit, veram esse Wiclefi sen¬ tentiam, quae habet, omnia ex necessitate absoluta evenire. Martinus quoque Bucerus in lib. de concordia doctrinae, cap. delibero arbitrio, satis aperte tradit, Deum necessa¬ ria agere quidquid agit, nec posse aliter fa¬ cere Denique Joannes Calvinus, lib. i. Instit. cap. 16. §.3. docet, Deuni non posse facere, nisi id quod facit : « Sane, inquit, omnipo¬ tentiam sibi vendicat, ac deferri a nobis vult Deus, non qualem sophistae fingunt, inanem otiosam, et fere sopitam; sed vigilem, effica¬ cem, operosam, et quae in continuo actu versetur. » Et paulo post : « Ideo, inquit, censetur omnipotens, non quod possit qui¬ dem facere, cesset autem, sed quia etc. » Ubi vides a Calvino reprehendi communem The¬ ologorum (quos ipse sophistas vocat) senten¬ tiam, quae habet, Deum multa posse facere, quae non facit, et contra, posse multa non fa¬ cere quae facit, et idcirco vere, proprieque li¬ berum esse. Argumeuta pro sententia adversariorum multa sunt et gravia. Videtur enim libertas arbitrii qua quis potest velle hoc aut illud, et velle hoc aut non velle, repugnare aeterni¬ tati, immutabilitati, simplicitati, aliisque at¬ tributis Dei. Immo cum velle in Deo sit idem quod esse, si velle Dei posset non esse, ipse etiam Deus posset non esse : vel si esse Dei est simpliciter necessarium, quomodo velle Dei non erit etiam simpliciter necessarium ? Sed haec omnia planius exponentur, cum re¬ fellenda erunt.