Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book III: On Free Choice
Chapter 16: It is proved that God has free choice
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The judgment of the theologians, which without doubt is truest, will be proved by us first from the divine writings and the testimonies of the Fathers, against the heretics; then by natural reasons, against the philosophers. Psalm 113: he hath done all things, whatsoever he would. Psalm 110: Great are the works of the Lord: sought out according to all his wills. Ephesians 1: who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will. And 1 Corinthians 12: But all these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will. From these and like places it is made out that God works through cognition and will, and that created things are such as God willed them to be, not such as necessity compelled.
But again we have other places by which it is shown that God can do what he does not do, and contrariwise can not do what he does. Daniel 3: our God… is able to deliver us… out of thy hands, O king. But if he will not, be it known to thee… that… we… worship not… the statue which thou hast set up. In this place Scripture teaches that it could have come to pass that God should not will to deliver the three boys from the furnace — whom nevertheless he willed to deliver, and in fact delivered. Esther 13: there is no one that can resist thy will: if thou determine to save us, forthwith we shall be delivered. Here, besides that it is signified that God could have not done what he did, there is had also the word “determine,” which properly pertains to free choice. A like place is Wisdom 11: it was not impossible for thy hand… to send upon them a multitude of bears, or fierce lions, etc.; yet he did not do it; wherefore he could do what he did not do. In the same place: thou hast mercy upon all, because thou canst do all things, and overlookest the sins of men for the sake of repentance — but assuredly he is not truly said to overlook sins who does not punish because he cannot, but he who, though he can, will not. Matthew 3: God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham. On which place Jerome, Chrysostom, Theophylact, and also Ambrose on chapter 3 of Luke, write that God can raise up children to Abraham from true and properly so-called stones — though he never did it. Matthew 19: It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven. And a little after: With men this is impossible: but with God all things are possible. Nor does it avail if one say it can come to pass that a camel pass through the eye of a needle, if it be reduced to the fineness of a most slender thread — in the manner the Pelagians of old taught that a rich man can be saved if, all being sold, he become poor, but otherwise cannot. This, I say, does not avail, since the Lord says this is impossible with men, but that with God all things are possible; and it is not impossible for men to bring it about that a camel pass through the eye of a needle, if it first be reduced to the fineness of a thread. And so St. Gregory Nazianzen, book 4 On Theology, affirms from this testimony of the Gospel that God can bring it about that a camel, remaining a camel, pass through the eye of a needle — which yet he has not done, nor perhaps will ever do. Matthew 26: Thinkest thou that I cannot ask my Father, and he will give me presently more than twelve legions of angels? Christ, then, could have prayed the Father to send him more than twelve legions of Angels, and the Father could have sent them; and yet neither did what he could do. To this place Wyclif answered that Christ could have asked legions of the Father, not by which he might be defended, but which might attend upon him at that time; and that the Father too could have sent those legions if he had willed, but could not have willed. But it is an inept answer. For first, it is certain that in this place the question is not of a simple attendance of Angels, but of a defense against the violence which was being prepared against Christ: for these words are spoken to the Apostle Peter, who was striving to protect the Lord with the sword, that he might understand that Christ had no need of such defense, who had another far greater at hand. Next, be it that a simple attendance were in question, we still prove that God can do what he does not do, because he could have sent more than twelve legions of Angels to attend on Christ, which yet he did not send. Finally, that God could if he willed, but could not will, is said most ineptly — unless we say that Christ himself spoke ineptly. For Christ wished to teach that he underwent death freely, and not coacted; and he demonstrates this from the fact that he could have obtained from the Father a guard of many thousands of Angels; which demonstration of Christ availed nothing, if the Father could not will to send the guard that was asked. See Jerome and Chrysostom in the commentary on this place. Mark 14: Abba, Father, all things are possible to thee: remove this chalice from me. It is clear from this place that it would have been possible for God to remove the chalice of the passion from Christ — which yet we know was not done. Romans 1: the Apostle reprehends the gentiles because, when they knew God, they have not glorified him as God, or given thanks; but thanksgiving is not owed save to him who acts freely, and bestows benefits when he could not bestow them; therefore God acts freely, and freely administers human affairs.
Now let the testimonies of the Fathers come. St. Gregory Nazianzen, in the former epistle to Cledonius: “They assert,” says he, “that it is possible for God to save man even without a mind — possible also without flesh, by the mere will.” Where St. Gregory answers the objection of the Apollinarists, who said that in the incarnation Christ lacked a human mind, the Word standing in place of the mind; and they proved it because it was possible for God to save the human race even had he not assumed a mind. Gregory, I say, answers that it was possible for God to save the human race even had he assumed not only no mind, but no flesh either; for by the will alone, without the mystery of the incarnation, God could have restored the world. God therefore, by Gregory's judgment, did what he could have not done; hence he did it not necessarily, but freely. St. Gregory of Nyssa, in the book On Fate, last chapter: “For God,” says he, “is not under necessity, nor is it right to say that his will serves necessity; for he is the founder of necessity.” And below: “The Almighty works neither by the necessity of nature nor by the prescription of law; but to him all things are contingent, even the necessary.” St. Ambrose, book 2 On the Faith, chapter 3: “These things,” says he, “one and the same Holy Spirit works, dividing to each as he wills — that is, by the free choice of the will, not by the obedience of necessity.” St. Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 95: “Then,” says he, “in the most clear light of wisdom will be seen how many things (God) can do and wills not; but wills nothing that he cannot.” And in book 13 On the Trinity, chapter 18, he says that God could have taken flesh from elsewhere than from Adam, and yet preferred this. In the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 7 [al. 26], he says that Christ could have raised Judas from spiritual death, in the manner he raised Lazarus from bodily death, and yet did not do it. In the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapters 8 and 6, he says that God can bring it about that all persevere even to the end, and yet does not do it. And Peter Damian, in epistle 4 to Desiderius, which is on the omnipotence of God, proves that God can do many things which he wills not to do, and does not. Add also the testimonies of Jerome, Chrysostom, and Theophylact cited above. The same is proved by a reason founded in the divine writings — which reason Nyssen uses, in the place cited, book On Fate, near the end. God works many things beside the order of nature: as when he made the sun stand still at the voice of Josue, and the same go backward at the prayers of Isaias, and be darkened at the time of full moon at the death of the Savior; likewise when he gave childbirth to the Virgin, sight to the blind, hearing to the deaf, life to the dead. But if God worked from the necessity of nature, he would always work in the same manner, nor could he now keep the order of nature, now change it; therefore he works freely, and acts at his pleasure, and is impelled to work by no force of necessity.
Now against the philosophers, who give no credit to the Scriptures, we can use these arguments. First: God is the efficient cause of all things — of the intelligences, the heavens, the elements, etc.; therefore he works not by necessity, but by will. The antecedent is proved: for if the intelligences lacked an efficient cause, and each of them had produced its own celestial orb (as the Philosopher seems to have held), no reason could be given why there are so many intelligences and not more; why of such virtue, and not of greater or lesser; why so subordinated among themselves; and who, then, had procreated the elements? If thou say the intelligences do not lack an efficient cause, and yet were not all produced by one, but the first produced the second, the second the third, and so on — against this: for then no reason could be given why the last intelligence has not produced another. And further, we shall at least have this: that by the first substance, which is God, there was produced not only the first celestial orb, but also the second intelligence. Now is proved the consequence of the same argument: for if the first intelligence produced all things by itself, or at least its own celestial orb and the second intelligence, it could not but work freely. For things which work from the necessity of nature are determined to one, nor can they produce anything but some one thing like themselves; therefore an intelligence which produces things so various as are the other intelligences, and bodies, works not from the necessity of nature, but from counsel and art, and thereby freely. And it is confirmed by the example of man, who naturally produces nothing but another man, but by art produces very many things, and things most discrepant among themselves, and various. Second: God is of infinite power and virtue; therefore he can make things more perfect and better than he in fact makes; and thereby he never works according to his whole virtue — which is proper to things that work from the necessity of nature. The philosophers will perhaps deny that God is of infinite power; but certainly that seems plainly manifest. For what of itself is unlimited and infinite cannot be limited and bounded save either by an efficient cause or by a subject; but being of itself is unlimited and infinite; and in God it cannot be limited and bounded, since God lacks efficient cause and subject; therefore in God being is unlimited and infinite. And if being in God is infinite, why should not power also in God be infinite? For being is for the sake of operation, nor can there be given a being to which no power of working answers, since it would be idle. Third: if God did what he does from the necessity of nature, and not freely and at his pleasure, in vain would men implore his aid; in vain would be all altars, sacrifices, vows. The philosophers will perhaps answer that all these are indeed in vain; but the common instinct and sense of nature, and the consensus of all nations, will refute them. For all, with nature for guide, in calamities lift their eyes to heaven and implore the aid of the deity. Tertullian, in the Apologetic, chapter 17, when he had said that even the pagans themselves in their straits look not to the Capitol but to heaven, and are wont to speak thus — God sees; I commend it to God; God will repay me — subjoins: “O testimony of a soul naturally Christian!” He taught, namely, that it is natural to call upon the one God in afflictions. See like things in St. Cyprian, in the treatise against Demetrian. Fourth: nothing is necessarily desired except the end, and the things which have a necessary connection with the end. But created things are not the end of God, nor have they a necessary connection with the end of God; for God is the end of all things, and thereby is his own end to himself, nor does he need any thing for attaining his end, since he cannot lack himself; therefore he wills created things not necessarily, but freely. Fifth: man is of free choice, as almost all the philosophers also teach; therefore God too is of free choice. For it is not right to attribute to man any perfection which is not found more excellently in God.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVI. » Probatur, Deum esse liberi arbitrii. Sententia theologorum, quae sine dubio verissima est, probabitur a nobis primum ex divinis litteris et testimoniis Patrum, adver- (I) Eccl. XV, 14. — (2) Psal. VIII, 6. - (3) II Pet. II, 4. 610 LIBER 111. sus haereticos: deinde, naturalibus rationib. adversus philosophos. Psalm. xm : Omnia qusecumque voluit, fecit. Psalm exi : Magna ope¬ ra Domini exquisita in omnes voluntates ejus. Ephes. r : Qui operatur omnia secundum con¬ silium voluntatis suse. Et I Corinth. xu : H;ec autem operatur unus et idem spiritus, dividens singulis prout vult (1). Ex his, et similibus locis efficitur, Deum operari per cognitionem et voluntatem, et res creatas tales esse, qua¬ les Deus esse voluit, non quales necessitas coegit. Sed rursus habemus alia loca, quibus os¬ tenditur, Deum posse facere quae non facit, et contra non facere quae facit. Daniel. m : Potens est Deus , nos de manibus tuis, o rex, liberare; quod si noluerit, statuam tamen, quam fecisti, non adoramus (2). IIoc loco Scriptura docet, potuisse fieri, ut Deus nollet liberare tres pueros de fornace, quos tamen liberare voluit, et re ipsa liberavit. Esthcr. xm : Non est qui possit tuse resistere voluntati ; si decre¬ veris salvare nos, continuo liberabimur (3). Hic praeterquam quod significatur , potuisse » Deum non facere quod fecit, habetur etiam vocabulum decernendi, quod proprie ad li¬ berum arbitrium pertinet. Similis locus est Sapien. xi : Non erat im¬ possibilis manus tua , immittere illis multitudi¬ nem ursorum, aut audaces leones (4) etc. Nec tamen id fecit : quare poterat facere quod non fecit. Ibidem : Misereris omnium, qui omnia potes , dissimulans peccata homi¬ num propter poenitentiam. At certe non vere dicitur dissimulare peccata is, qui non punit, quia non potest, sed is, qui cum possit non vult. Matth. m : Potens est Deus de lapidibus istis suscitare filios Abrahse (5). In quem lo¬ cum Hieronymus, Chrysostomus, Theophy. lactus, necnon Ambrosius in cap. 3. Luc. scribunt, ex veris, proprieque dictis lapidi¬ bus posse Deum excitare filios Abrahae, quamvis id numquam fecerit, Matth. xix : Facilius est camelum per foramen acus trans¬ ire, quam divitem intrare inregnum coelorum. Et paulo post : Apud homines hoc impossibile est, apud Deum omnia possibilia sunt (6). Nec valet, si quis dicat posse - fieri ut ca¬ melus transeat per foramen acus, si rediga¬ tur ad subtilitatem tenuissimi fili. Quemad¬ modum olim Pclagiani docebant, posse divi¬ tem salvum fieri, si venditis omnibus pau¬ per fieret, alioqui non posse. Hoc (inquam) non valet, quoniam Dominus ait, hoc im¬ possibile esse hominibus : Deo autem esse omnia possibilia. Non est autem impossibile hominibus efficere, ut camelus transeat per foramen acus, si ad fili tenuitatem antea re¬ digatur. Itaque S. Gregorius Nazianzenus lib. iv. de Theologia, affirmat ex hoc Evan- gclii testimonio posse Deum facere, ut came¬ lus, manens camelus, transeat per foramen acus; quod tamen nec fecit, nec unquam fortasse faciet. Matth. xxvi : An putas quia non possum ro¬ gare Patrem meum, et exhibebit mihi modo plus- quam duodecim legiones Angelorum ? (7) Po¬ terat igitur Christus orare Patrem, ut mitte¬ ret ad seplusquam duodecim legiones Ange¬ lorum, et pater mittere poterat : et tamen neuter fecit, quod poterat facere. Ad hunc locum respondit Wiclefus, potuisse Christum a Patre legiones petere, non a quibus defen¬ deretur, sed quae sibi eo tempore adessent. Potuisse quoque Patrem mittere eas legiones, si voluisset, sed non potuisse velle. At inepta responsio est. Primum enim certum est, hoc loco non agi de simplici as¬ sistentia Angelorum, sed de praesidio adver¬ sus vim, quae in Christum parabatur. Dicun¬ tur enim haec verba Apostolo Petro, qui ni¬ tebatur gladio Dominum protegere, ut intel- ligeret, non esse opus. Christo tali defensione» qui aliam longe majorem in promptu haberet. Deinde, esto de simplici assistentia agere¬ tur, adhuc probamus, posse Deum facere quae non facit, quia potuit mittere plusquam duodecim legiones Angelorum, qui Christo assisterent, quas tamen non misit. Denique, Deum potuisse, si vellet, sed non potuisse velle, ineptissime dicitur, nisi Chri¬ stum ipsum inepte locutum esse dicamus. Vo¬ luit enim Christus docere, se libere, non au¬ tem coactum subire mortem. Id autem de¬ monstrat ex eo, quod poterat a Patre praesi¬ dium multorum millium Angelorum impe¬ trare. Quae Christi demonstratio nihil valebat, si Pater non poterat velle mittere praesidium, quod petebatur. Vide Hieronymum et Chry- sostomum in commentario ad hunc locum. Marci xiv : Abba Pater, omnia tibi possibilia sunt, transfer calicem hunc a me (8). Perspi- (1) Psal. CXIII, 3; CX, 2; Eph. I, \ 1; 1 Corin. XII, 11 . — (2)Dan. III, 17. — (3) Esth. XIII. 9. 1 (4) Sap. XI, 18. - (5) Matth. III, 9. — (0) Matth. XIX, 24. - (7) Matth. XXVI, 53. - (8) Mare, XIV, 36. CAPUT XVI. cuum est ex hoc loco, possibile Deo fuisset transferre calicem passionis a Christo, quod tamen factum non esse scimus. Itoman. i, reprehendit Apostolus gentiles, quod cum Deum cognovissent, non sicut Deum glo- rificaverunt, aut gratias egerunt : at non de¬ betur gratiarum actio nisi ei, qui libere agit, et beneficia praestat, cum possit non praesta¬ re : igitur Deus libere agit, et libere procurat res humanas. Accedant nunc testimonia Patrum. S.Gre- gorius Nazianzenus in epist. priore ad Cali- donium : « Asserunt, inquit, Deo possibile esse, hominem etiam sine mente salvare. Possibile etiam sine carne, solo velle. » Ubi sanctus Grego rius respondet objectioni Apol- linaristarum, qui dicebant, Christo in incar¬ natione defuisse mentem humanam ; Verbum enim pro mente fuisse. Id autem probabant, quia possibile erat Deo salvare g&ius huma¬ num, etiamsi mentem non assumpsisset : re¬ spondet (inquam) Gregorius, possibile Deo fuisse salvare genus humanum, etiamsi non solum mentem, sed etiam carnem non as¬ sumpsisset. Sola enim voluntate sine incar¬ nationis mysterio potuit Deus mundum in¬ staurare. Fecit igitur Deus ex Grcgorii sen¬ tentia id quod potuit non facere; proinde non necessario, sed libere fecit. S. Gregorius Nyssenus, in lib. de Fato, cap. ult. « Non enim, inquit, sub necessitate est Deus, neque voluntatem ejus servire necessi¬ tati, fas est dicere. Etenim necessitatis est conditor. » Et infra : « Omnipotens, inquit, neque natura; necessitate, neque legis prae¬ scripto operatur, sed sunt illi omnia conlen- gentia, etiam necessaria. » S. Ambrosius in ii. lib. de fide, cap. 3. « Haec operatur, inquit, unus 'et idem Spiri¬ tus sanctus dividens singulis [pro ut vult, id est, pro libero voluntatis arbitrio, non pro necessitatis obsequio. » S. Augustinus in Enchiridio, cap. 93 : « Tunc, inquit, in clarissima luce sapientiae videbitur, quam multa possit (Deus) et non velit ; nihil autem velit, quod non possit. » Et in lib. xm. de Trinit. cap. 18. dicit, Deum potuisse sumere carnem aliunde, quam ex Adam ; et tamen hoc maluisse. In lib. de na¬ tura et grat. cap. vii. dicit, Christum potuisse resuscitare Judam a morte spirituali, quo modo excitavit Lazarum a morte corporali, nec tamen fecisse. In libro de bono perseve¬ rantiae, cap. 8. et 6. dicit, Deum posse facere ut omnes perseverent usque in finem : nec 61 4 amen facere. Petrus autem Damianus in epist. 4. ad Desiderium, qua; est de omnipo¬ tentia Dei, probat Deum multa posse facere quae non vult facere, nec facit. Adde etiam testimonia Hieronymi, Chry- sostomi et Theophylacti supra citata. Proba¬ tur hoc idem ratione fundata in divinis litte¬ ris. Qua ratione utitur Nyssenus loc. citat, lib. de fato prope extremo. Multa Deus ope¬ ratur praeter ordinem naturae, ut cum solem stare fecit ad vocem Josue; eteumdem retro¬ cedere ad preces Isaiae ; et obscurari tempo¬ re plenilunii ob mortem Salvatoris; item cum Virgini partum, caecis visum, surdis audi¬ tum, mortuis vitam donavit. At si Deus ope¬ raretur ex necessitate naturae, semper eodem modo operaretur, nec posset nunc servare naturae ordinem nunc immutare; igitur libere operatur, et pro arbitrio agit, non ulla ne¬ cessitatis vi ad operandum impellitur. Jam vero adversus philosophos, qui scri¬ pturis fidem non habent, his argumentis uti possumus. Primo, Deus est causa efficiens omnium rerum, intelligentiarum, coelorum, elemen¬ torum, etc. Igitur non necessitate, sed volun¬ tate operatur. Antecedens probatur. Nam si intelligentiae carerent efficienti causa, et unaquaeque ea¬ rum suum coelestem orbem produxisset (ut videtur sensisse Philosophus) nullaratio reddi posset, cur tot essent intelligentiae, et non plures ; cur tantae virtutis, et non majoris aut minoris; cur ita inter se subordinatac ; quis deinde procreasset elementa. Si dicas, non carent intelligentiae causa efficiente, nec tamen omnes productae sunt ab una ; sed prima produxit secundam, secunda tertiam et sic deinceps. Contra, nam tunc non posset reddi ratio, cur ultima intelligentianon pro¬ duxerit aliam. Deinde, saltem hoc habebi¬ mus a prima substantia, quae Deus est, non solum productum esse primum orbem coele¬ stem, sed etiam secundam Intelligentiam. Probatur nunc ejusdem argumenti conse¬ cutio. Nam si prima intelligentia produxit omnia per se, vel saltem suum orbem coele¬ stem, et alteram intelligentiam ; non potuit non libere operari. Nam qua; operantur ex necessitate natura;, determinata sunt ad unum, nec possunt producere, nisi unum ali¬ quid simile sibi. Igitur intelligentia, qua; producit res tam varias, quales sunt alia; Intelligentiae, et corpora, non operatur ex necessitate naturae, sed ex consilio et arte ; 012 UBER 111. ac per hoc libere. Et confirmatur exemplo hominis, qui naturaliter nihil producit, nisi alium hominem ; at ex arte res plurimas, et inter se maxime discrepantes, variasque producit. Secundo, Deus est infinita) potentia; ac virtutis, igitur potest res perfectiores et me¬ liores facere, quam re ipsa faciat, ac per hoc numquam operatur secundum totam suam virtutem, quod est proprium eorum, qua; operantur ex necessitate naturae. Negabunt philosophi fortasse, Deum esse potentiae in¬ finitae, sed certe id plane manifestum esse videtur. Nam quod ex se est illimitatum et infinitum, non potest limitari et finiri, nisi vel a causa efficiente, vel a subjecto : esse autem ex se, est illimitatam et infinitum ; et in Deo non potest limitari et finiri, cum Deus causa efficiente et subjecto careat ; igitur in Deo esse, est illimitatum et infinitum. Quod si, esse in Deo est infinitum ; cur non etiam potentia in Deo sit infinita? Esse enim est propter operationem, nec dari potest esse, cui non respondeat potentia operandi, quo¬ niam otiosum esset. Tertio, si Deus ex naturiae necessitate, non libere, et pro arbitrio faceret quas facit, fru¬ stra opem ejus homines implorarent, frustra essent omnes arae, sacrificia, vota. Respon¬ debunt fortasse philosophi, frustra esse haec omnia, sed refellet eos communis naturae instinctus et sensus, atque consensus om¬ nium gentium. Omnes enim natura duce in calamitatibus tollunt oculos ad ccelum, et numinis opem implorant. Tertullianus in Apologetico cap. 7. cum dixisset, ipsos etiam paganos in Angustiis suis non ad Capitolium, sed ad coelum respicere, ac ita loqui solere, Deus videt, Deo commendo, Deus mihi red¬ det ; subjungit : « 0 testimonium animae na¬ turaliter Christianae ». Nimirum naturale esse docuit, in aerumnis unum Deum invoca¬ re. Yide similia apud S. Cyprianum in tracta¬ tu adversus Demetrianum. Quarto, nihil est 'quod necessario appeta¬ tur, nisi finis, et quae cum fine necessariam connexionem habent. At res creatae non sunt finis Dei, neque cum fine Dei necessa¬ riam connexionem habent ; Deus enim est finis omnium rerum, ac per hoc ipse sibi est finis, neque eget ulla re ad finem suum asse¬ quendum, cum se ipse carere non possit : igitur non necessario vult res creatas, sed li¬ bere. Quinto, homo est liberi arbitrii, ut philo¬ sophi etiam fere omnes docent : ergo et Deus liberi arbitrii est. Neque enim fas est ullam perfectionem homini tribuere, quae non ex¬ cellentius reperiatur in Deo.