Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 10: The arguments against the proposition of the preceding chapter are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The arguments of the adversaries against the proposition of the preceding chapter are neither few nor light.
The first argument is Chemnitz’s. Scripture teaches that all the works of the impious displease God, however otherwise most splendid, and instituted by himself — as can be learned from those words: Incense is an abomination to me; my soul hateth your solemnities, Isaias 1. And again: He that sacrificeth an ox is as if he slew a man, Isaias 66. Likewise: The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination, Proverbs 15. Much more, then, will other works, less splendid and merely human, displease God, if they be done by the impious. I answer: there is much difference between sacrifices and moral works. For that a moral work be done well, it is not required that it be done with detestation of sins, or with a pure conscience; which yet is required for a sacrifice to be duly offered. The reason of this difference is that a sacrifice has for its end to appease and reconcile God, or to obtain some benefits from him, or to give thanks for those received; but he who strives to reconcile God to himself, and yet does not detest his sins nor leave them, fights with his own very action, and does not so much appease God as provoke him to anger. So also he who wishes to obtain benefits from God, or to give him thanks for those received, and yet wages enmity with him, and does not cease to offend him by transgressing his law, does not so much honor God as mock him. Wherefore it is no wonder if his sacrifice does not please God, seeing it is not duly offered. But a moral work, as an alms to a poor man, has no end but to bring help to the needy; and for attaining that end the purity or impurity of the life and conscience of him who gives the alms is nothing to the purpose.
The second argument Calvin and others commonly take from that of Genesis 6: Every imagination of man’s heart is only evil — for so they render it from the Hebrew. I answer: Scripture in this place, as in very many others, attributes to all what befits the greater part. The sense of this place, then, is that the greater part of the thoughts, or the chief bent, of the men of that age was evil. In which sense it is written in the same place, All flesh had corrupted its way; and yet in the same place it is added, Noe was a just and perfect man. Like expressions are Psalm 1, On his law he shall meditate day and night; Psalm 33, I will bless the Lord at all times; Luke 18, We ought always to pray, and not to faint; 1 Thessalonians, Pray without ceasing; John 12, The whole world is gone after him. Wherefore St. Augustine, in the book On the Unity of the Church, chapter 12, writes that in the sacred writings all men are often reprehended, when the Holy Spirit wishes to reprehend only the evil — and contrariwise.
The third argument they take from Psalm 13: They are all gone aside, they are become unprofitable together: there is none that doth good, no, not one — which place the Apostle also alleges, Romans 3. I answer: we willingly confess that all men are in the state of sin (which the Apostle in that place strives to prove, that he may make manifest the necessity of the grace of Christ), and unprofitable for doing works that please God, unless they first, through the grace of God and the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, be reconciled and justified. But that clause, there is none that doth good, no, not one, does not signify that there is no one who does some morally good work, but that there is no one who lives justly, keeping the whole moral law. For that goes before: there is none that is just, there is none that understandeth; they are all gone aside, etc. For he cannot be called just, or said simply to do good, who mingles some one good work with many sins.
The fourth argument Calvin takes from that verse of Psalm 61: The sons of men are liars in the balances, that by vanity they may together deceive. For in the Hebrew this is the sense of those words: the sons of men are liars, and vain in the balances beyond vanity itself — that is, if a man and vanity be weighed in a balance, the man will appear lighter and vainer. What of good, then, can be expected from him who is vainer than vanity itself? I answer, first: the Greek and Latin version of that place can be defended well enough. For that Hebrew phrase — “to go up because of vanity” — can excellently be rendered “to prevail by vanity”; for the Hebrew preposition min signifies “from,” “of,” and “by,” as well as “beyond”; so also “to go up,” especially among the Hebrews, not rarely signifies to prevail. And so the sense can be, even according to the Hebrew fountain: the sons of men are liars in the balances — that is, in the dealings which are transacted with measures and weights — to prevail by vanity, that is, that they may prevail by frauds and deceive: frauds, I say, full of vanity, which bring nothing of solid and true gain. Wherefore St. Jerome rendered from the Hebrew: “that they may defraud one another.” Then, suppose the interpretation of Calvin alone to be true and genuine: what will he gain thence? Will a man, because he is called vainer than vanity, be able to work nothing morally good? For men are called vain, as the Wise Man says, in whom the knowledge of the Lord is not, and who seek or desire nothing but human and earthly things, which, compared with the divine and heavenly, are deservedly named vain, or rather vanity, according to that of Psalm 4: Why do you love vanity? This alone, then, is gathered from man’s being called vanity: that he can of himself work nothing, or even think nothing, in order to salvation and eternal life.
The fifth argument the same Calvin takes from that of Isaias 60: Behold, darkness shall cover the earth, and a mist the peoples, etc. For hence it follows that the whole world, the Church excepted (which in Isaias is signified by Jerusalem), is utterly ignorant of the way of justice, and thereby also can of itself work nothing at all of good. I answer: Isaias does not speak of the natural light, which is required for knowing moral goods, but of the divine light, which is necessary for knowing Christ and the right way to everlasting felicity. For it cannot be denied that Aristotle in the books on morals, Plutarch in the little works, Epictetus in the Enchiridion, Cicero in the books On Duties, and Seneca in all his works show a more than middling natural light in delivering moral precepts and instruction.
The sixth argument they take from that of Jeremias 17: The heart of man is depraved and fraudulent above all things — for so they render it from the Hebrew. I answer: nothing follows from this testimony against the doctrine delivered by us. For the heart of man is called depraved and fraudulent not because it can do nothing morally good, but because in it is the fountain and origin of evils, both on account of the liberty of choice and on account of the corruption of nature; for out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, thefts, etc., Matthew 15. Add that that word “depraved” can rightly be rendered “deep,” in the Hebrew, as the Greeks rendered it, batheia; for there follows: and inscrutable; who shall know it? I am the Lord who search the hearts. But from the human heart’s being called deep and inscrutable, nothing is effected that pertains to the present matter.
The seventh argument Calvin, Chemnitz, and others take from that of Matthew 7: An evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit — which is again repeated Matthew 12 and Luke 6; and the evil tree is the impious man, from Augustine, book 4 against Julian, chapter 3. I answer: it is to be observed in this place that the testimony of Matthew 7 and that of Luke 6 are not altogether the same, but diverse, and uttered on another occasion. For in Luke a general doctrine is set down, for discerning all hypocrites; in Matthew, chapter 7, a sign is set down for knowing false Prophets only. Again, in Luke thorns are opposed to figs and brambles to grapes; in Matthew, contrariwise, thorns to grapes and thistles to figs. Finally, what Luke writes in chapter 6, Matthew writes in chapter 12; it is necessary, therefore, that what is written in Matthew 7 be diverse from what is written in Luke 6 — unless one would have Matthew to have repeated the same things twice without cause. This being posited, I say that in Matthew 7, by the good and evil trees are understood not the good or evil wills of men, but true or false doctrines — or the men themselves, insofar as they teach sound doctrine, or corrupt and pernicious. For the Lord wishes in that place to instruct us to beware of false prophets, who come to us in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly are ravening wolves; and he teaches that from the fruits it can be discerned whether they are wolves or shepherds — that is, heretical ministers or Catholic Bishops. Now it is certain that the doctrine cannot be known from the works of the very men who teach us, since internal works are not seen, while the external are common to both, and are therefore compared to the clothing of sheep, with which wolves also cover themselves. And so the same Lord, since he knew that doctrine cannot be discerned from work — since the evil often teach good things — admonished us, Matthew 23: What they say, do ye; but according to their works do ye not. The Lord wills, therefore, in Matthew 7, that from the fruits of the doctrine we judge of the doctrine itself and of the teachers. For the doctrine truly divine and Catholic is sound doctrine, and of itself begets obedience, peace, concord of minds, and the like; heretical doctrine begets, in a certain manner naturally, dissensions, sects, contumacy, license, contempt of elders, and other things of that kind. For it is common to all heretics to despise the ancient Doctors, to teach that the judgment of the Church is not to be acquiesced in, and to be split in a brief time into various sects. And so this testimony brought forward from Matthew does not pertain to the cause we now treat; but it only instructs us, by the way, that — unless we are blind — we should perceive that the doctrine of Luther and Calvin, and they themselves too, as authors of such doctrine, were very evil trees, and therefore cut down by the axe of the divine judgment and cast into the fire.
Further, in Matthew, chapter 12, and Luke, chapter 6, by the good or evil trees are understood the good or evil wills of men, or the men themselves, good or evil; for so the Lord himself seems to have expounded, when he says: A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth good things; and an evil man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth evil things. Now to the argument, which according to this exposition seems to have force, a threefold solution can be given. The first is that the Lord did not mean to signify that a good tree cannot make any evil fruit, but that it cannot make all, or most, of its fruits evil; and contrariwise, that an evil tree cannot make all, or most, of its fruits good, but ordinarily indeed, and for the most part, makes evil fruits, yet sometimes can make some good fruits. And this is very consonant to experience, both in real trees and in the men signified by them. For good trees always bear some good fruits, though sometimes they either do not bring some to maturity, or bear some corrupted by worms, and thereby evil. Likewise evil trees — that is, rotten, or too old and decayed (for that is what the Greek word sapron signifies) — produce not only many evil and corrupt fruits, but also some entire and good. The second solution is that by the trees is understood the actual good will, which is called charity, and the evil, which is called cupidity, as St. Augustine expounds in book 2 of the Acts with Felix the Manichaean, chapter 4 — or at least the men themselves, as they work from charity or from cupidity. And from this exposition the argument remains plainly solved. For we confess that the evil tree — that is, cupidity, or the man as he works from cupidity — can make only evil fruits. But it does not follow on that account that all the works of a sinful man are sins, since sometimes the sinner works not from cupidity, but from the good of nature, and then he does a morally good work — even as sometimes the just man does evil works, that is, venial sins, because he works not from charity, but from the corruption of nature. The third solution will be if we say that by the good fruits, which the evil tree cannot make, are understood works meritorious of eternal life; by the evil fruits, which the good tree cannot make, works meritorious of eternal death; by the good tree, the just man; by the evil, the sinner — as Augustine expounds this similitude, book 4 against Julian, chapter 3, and book On the Grace of Christ, chapters 18 and 19. For hence it will follow that, as the just man cannot commit deadly sins unless he cease to be just, and yet can, even remaining just, commit venial sins, so the impious man cannot do works worthy of the kingdom of heaven unless he cease to be impious, and yet can, even remaining impious, do morally good works. And certainly, according to the usage of Scripture, none are called good fruits but works that bring salvation, of which it is said, John 15: He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit. And Romans 6: You have your fruit unto sanctification. And Galatians 5: The fruits of the Spirit are charity, continency, etc. And Ephesians 5: The fruit of the light is in all goodness, etc.
The eighth argument Calvin takes from that of John 3: That which is born of the flesh is flesh. But the flesh is wholly evil, nor can it beget anything good; for the effect of the flesh is death, Romans 8; and the fruits of the flesh are fornication, uncleanness, etc., Galatians 5. Nor can it be answered that flesh is taken for the lower part of man when it is said, That which is born of the flesh is flesh; for the Lord says, You must be born again; but we must be born according to the higher part, for the Apostle says, Ephesians 4, Be renewed in the spirit of your mind. Therefore even the higher part, before justification, is called flesh, and can do nothing but the things proper to the flesh — that is, sins. I answer: flesh is indeed sometimes taken in the divine writings for the carnal man, as the carnal is distinguished from the spiritual — that is, for the man in whom the flesh claims the first parts for itself, as in the place cited, Galatians 5, The works of the flesh are fornication, etc. More often, however, through the figure of universal statement, it is taken simply for the whole man, as John 1, The Word was made flesh, and Isaias 40, All flesh is grass. And in this place it is certain that flesh is to be taken simply for man, as Chrysostom, Augustine, Cyril, and others take it in the commentary, and Basil, book 1 On Baptism, chapter 2, past the middle. For the Lord, to show that we must be born again if we would attain the divine inheritance, said, That which is born of the flesh is flesh — that is, it is not enough to have been born once of man; for man begets nothing other than man; but one must be born again, and that of God, that we may be in a certain manner gods, and may deserve to attain the inheritance of the sons of God. Wherefore that reasoning of Calvin is not to the purpose. For man must be born again, not because he is wholly carnal and can do nothing but the works of the flesh, but because through the first generation he has only a natural and human being, whereas he needs a divine and supernatural being, that he may be called, and be, a son and heir of God. Further, in Romans 8 flesh is taken for the lower part, as is clear from the whole preceding chapter; and the sense of that place is that to acquiesce in the concupiscences of the flesh is death, because he commits mortal sin who acquiesces in the flesh in all things. But although he who obeys the flesh cannot but sin, yet even the impious man is not compelled to obey the flesh in every work; but he can do some works from natural propensity, not from vicious cupidity, as has often been said above.
The ninth argument they take from that of John 15: Without me you can do nothing. I answer: the Lord speaks of those works which pertain to salvation, of which he had said a little before: He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit. And in this way the Council of Orange understands that place, canon 7. And hither pertain also those places which are objected by some, from 1 Corinthians 4, What hast thou that thou hast not received? and 2 Corinthians 3, We are not sufficient to think any thing of ourselves; from Ephesians 2, For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works; from Philippians 2, It is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish. For all these pertain to the works of piety and salvation, which, as we shall demonstrate below, can neither be begun nor completed without God.
The tenth argument they take from those words of the epistle to the Romans, chapter 14: All that is not of faith is sin — which argument is proposed not only by Chemnitz, but also by Calvin, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 13 [al. 14], and by Melanchthon in the Apology of the Confession, under the title of Justification. But the response is at hand. For in that place blessed Paul, by the name of faith, does not understand the faith by which we believe in Christ — whence they are called faithful who are endowed with that faith, and unfaithful who lack the same faith — but the faith by which we believe something to be lawful, which can also be called conscience. And the sense of that place is that whatever is done with conscience crying out against it, and protesting that it ought not to be done, is sin. And that this is the genuine exposition of that place cannot be doubted: both because almost all the interpreters, Greek and Latin, so expounded it — as the commentary ascribed to Ambrose, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius, and others, and besides, Pope Innocent in the Lateran Council, whence stands the final chapter On Prescription; and because the text itself seems plainly to compel it. For the Apostle discourses of clean and unclean foods according to the law, and says: He that discerneth, if he eat, is condemned, because not of faith — that is, he who distinguishes between clean and unclean foods, thinking some to be truly unclean, if he eat all alike, is condemned, because he acts against that which he believes ought to be done. For all that is not of faith — that is, according to what he believes ought to be done — is sin. And hence was born that axiom of the Theologians, that conscience (though erroneous) always binds; for it is never lawful to act against conscience. I am not ignorant that St. Augustine expounded this place a little otherwise; but of his opinion we shall speak a little later.
The eleventh argument they take from that of 1 Corinthians 10 and Colossians 3: Whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God. I answer: these words sound a pious admonition, not a precept properly so called — unless we understand that this only is commanded: that all things be done to the glory of God explicitly or implicitly. For he refers all things to the glory of God at least implicitly who works for some good end; for from good works it always follows — even if he who does them perhaps think not of God — that they who see them glorify, or at least can glorify, our Father who is in heaven.
The twelfth argument, from that of Ephesians 4: “I testify in the Lord, that henceforward you walk not as also the Gentiles walk, in the vanity of their mind, having their understanding darkened with darkness, being alienated from the way of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart; who, despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness, unto covetousness.” I answer: the Apostle does not say that all the works of unbelievers are sins, but that very many are evil and unclean, and that all at least are vain — that is, useless toward true felicity, since they lack both the light of faith and the hope of the heavenly kingdom.
The thirteenth argument, from that of 2 Timothy 2: By whom they are held captive at his will. But the will of the devil is that men always sin. I answer: sinners are said to be held captive in the snares of the devil at his will, not because they are compelled to do or suffer whatever the devil wills, but because they cannot, at their own choice and by their own powers alone, be freed from that captivity.
The fourteenth argument, from that of Titus 1: All things are clean to the clean; but to them that are defiled and to unbelievers, nothing is clean: but both their mind and their conscience are defiled. I answer: St. Jerome in the commentary, and St. Augustine, book 31 against Faustus, chapter 4, explain this place, teaching that the Apostle speaks not of the works of unbelievers, but of foods clean and unclean according to the law — so that this is the sense of the place: All things are clean to the clean — that is, all foods are by their nature clean, and at this time, after the abrogation of the old law, are justly and holily eaten by just men, who indeed know that nothing is unclean which is received with giving of thanks; but to the defiled and to unbelievers nothing is clean — that is, to unjust men, and those who will not believe that the law has been abrogated, such as the Jews, all foods are unclean: not only those which the law judged unclean, but the rest also, because they receive them so unfaithfully that they think those alone to be clean. For both their mind and their conscience are defiled — that is, all foods are unclean to them for this reason, that they carry a defiled mind and an erroneous conscience. But if anyone contend altogether that that clause, “to unbelievers nothing is clean,” signifies that all the works of unbelievers are sins, he must be asked what that signifies, “all things are clean to the clean.” For this sentence cannot signify that all the works of the just are just, since they are just who are commanded to say, Forgive us our debts, and, The just man falleth seven times a day. The sentence, then, will have to be restricted to those works which are done from justice — that is, from charity and piety; in which manner we shall easily concede that all the works of the impious and unbelieving are sins, provided that “all” be restricted to those works which proceed from impiety and unbelief.
The fifteenth argument, from that of Hebrews 11: Without faith it is impossible to please God. I answer: without faith it is impossible to please God so that one be constituted a friend of God. But as human nature, like the other created things, because it is good with the goodness of nature, cannot but please God, who is supremely good, and whom all good things please — so also works done from the good of nature, without the admixture of any evil circumstance, are good, and please God, though they be not of such price as to merit either grace or eternal life. And since the Pelagians attributed to good works, effected by the powers of nature alone, the power of meriting the grace of God, therefore St. Augustine, book 4 against Julian, chapter 3, rightly uses against them this testimony of the Apostle: Without faith it is impossible to please God.
The last argument is taken from that of 1 John 2: All that is in the world (that is, in the lover of the world) is the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life. I answer: if by the world we understand, with Augustine, the man who is a lover of the world, the sense will be that in the lover of the world, as such, there is nothing but these three — since all sins are brought back to these three fountains: luxury, avarice, pride. For otherwise John does not deny that there are in man, however great a sinner, many natural goods — body, soul, intelligence, will, etc.; but (as I said) he speaks of the lover of the world, not as he is a man made by God, but as he is a sinner made by himself. If, however, with other expositors, we understand by the world this universe of things, the sense will be that there is nothing in the world but the objects of luxury, avarice, and pride; and that therefore not the creature is to be loved, but the Creator, in whom is the object of true and perfect felicity.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT X.
Solvuntur argumenta contra propositionem,
capitis superioris.
Adversariorum argumenta contra propo¬
sitionem capitis superioris nec pauca sunt,
nec levia.
Primum argumentum Kemnitii est. Scri¬
ptura docet, Deo displicere opera omnia im¬
piorum, quamvis alioqui speciosissima, et a
se instituta, ut cognosci potest ex illis ver¬
bis : Incensum abominatio est mihi , etsolemni-
tates vestras odit anima mea , Isaise i. Et rui-
sus / Qui immolat bovem, quasi qui interficiat
virum, Isaise lxvi. Item Sacrificium impio¬
rum abominatio. Proverb. xv (4). Multo igitur
magis Deo displicebunt alia opera, minus
speciosa et humana, si ab impiis fiant. Re¬
spondeo : multum interest inter sacrificia et
opera moralia, nam ut fiat hene opus morali
non requiritur, ut fiat cum detestatione
peccatorum, vel cum conscientia pura, quod
tamen requiritur ad sacrificium rite offeren¬
dum. Cujus differentiae ratio est, quia sacri¬
ficium habet pro fine placare et reconciliare
Deum, vel ab illo beneficia aliqua impetrare,
aut pro acceptis gratias agere : qui autem
Deum sibi reconciliare nititur, et tamen pec¬
cata non detestatur, nec relinquit, is pugnat
cum ipsa sua actione, nectam Deum placat,
quam ad iracundiam provocat. Sic etiam qui
vult a Deo beneficia impetrare, vel ei pro
acceptis gratias agere : et tamen cum eo ini¬
micitiam gerit, eumque offefidere, legem i-
psius praevaricando, non cessat, is Deum non
tam honorat, quam irridet. Quare nihil est
mirum, si sacrificium ejus Ileo non placeat,
quippe quod non rite offertur. At opus mo¬
rale, ut eleemosyna in pauperem, non habet
pro fine, nisi egenti opem ferre, ad quem
finem consequendum nihil pertinet puritas,
vel impuritas vitee, et conscientiae ejus, qui
eleemosynam facit.
Secundum argumentum sumunt Calvinus
et alii, communiter ex illo Genes, vi. Omne
figmentum cordis humani tantum est malum (2).
Sic enim ipsi vertunt ex Hebraeo. Respondeo :
Scriptura hoc loco, ut in aliis plurimis, tri¬
buit omnibus, quod convenit majori parti.
Sententia igitur hujus loci est, majorem par¬
tem cogitationum, sive praecipuum studium
hominum illius saeculi fuisse malum. Quo
sensu in eodem loco scribitur : Omnis caro
corruperat viam suam. Et tamen ibidem ad¬
ditur : Noe vir justus fuit, atque perfectus.
Simile locutiones suntPsal. i. In lege Domini
meditabitur clie ac nocte. Psalm. xxxm : Be¬
nedicam Dominum in omni tempore. Lue. xvm.
Oportet semper orare, et numquam deficere
I ad Thessalon. Sine intermissione orate.
Joanxu. Mundus totus post eum abil[ 3). Quare
sanctus Augustinus in lib. de unitate Eccle¬
siae, cap. jcii. scribit, in sacris litteris saepe
reprehendi omnes homines, cum solos malos
Spiritus sanctus reprehendere velit, et con¬
tra.
Tertium argumentum sumunt ex Psalm.
xiii. Omnes declinaverunt , simul inutiles facti
sunt, non est qui faciat bonum, non est usque
ad unum (4). Quem locum allegat etiam Apo¬
stolus ad Roman. iii (5). Respondeo : libenter
fatemur, omnes homines esse in statu pec¬
cati (quod Apostolus eo loco probare con¬
tendit, ut necessitatem gratiae Christi ma¬
nifestam faciat et inutiles ad opera facienda,
quae Deo placeant, nisi prius per Dei gratiam
et redemptionem, quae est in Christo Jesu,
reconcilientur et justificentur. Illud autem :
Non est qui faciat bonum, non est usque ad
unum, non significat, neminem esse qui fa¬
ciat aliquod opus bonum morale, sed, nemi¬
nem esse, qui juste vivat, servando totam
legem moralem. Id enim praecedit, non
est justus quisquam, non est intolligens, om¬
nes declinaverunt, etc. Neque enim justus
dici potest, aut simpliciter bonum facere,
qui multis peccatis unum aliquod bonum
opus admiscet.
Quartum argumentum sumit Calvinus ex
illo versu Psalm. lxi. Mendaces filii hominum
in stateris, ut decipiant ipsi de vanitate in
idipsum (6). Siquidem in Hebraeo hic est ver¬
borum illorum sensus : Mendaces filii homi¬
num, et vani in stateris prse ipsa vanitate, id
est, si ponderentur homo, et vanitas in sta-
(1) Isaiae I, 43; Isaise LXVI, 3; Prov. XV, 9. — (2) Gen. VI, 5.— (3) Psal. I, 2; ibid. XXXIII, 2; Luc
XVIII, 1; I Thess. I, 2; Joan XII, 19. — (4) Psalm. XIII, 2. — (5) Eom. III, 12. — (6) Psalm. LXI, 40.*
Tom. VI. 5
58
UBER V.
tera, homo levior et vanior apparebit. Quid
igitur boni ab illo expectari ■ potest, qui est
ipsa vanitate vanior?
Respondeo primum : Graeca et Latina ver-
sio ejus loci satis commode defendi potest.
Illud enim nama nib^b, id est, ad ascen¬
dendum prffi vanitate, potest optime reddi,
ad praevaleadum ex vanitate. Nampraepositio
Ilsebraica ■}£ significat tam ex, et de, et ab,
quam prai. Sic etiam ascendere, praesertim
apud Hebraeos, significat non raro praevale¬
re. Itaque sensus esse potest, etiam secun¬
dum Hebraicum fontem : Mendaces filii ho¬
minum in stateris, id est, in negotiis, quae
mensuris et ponderibus transiguntur, ad
praevalendum ex vanitate, id est, ut fraudi¬
bus praevaleant et decipiant, fraudibus (in¬
quam) vanitate plenis, quae nihil solidi et veri
lucri apportent. Quare sanctus Hieronymus
ex Hebraeo reddidit : Ut fraudent invicem.
Deinde, fac interpretationem Calvini solam
esse veram et germanam, quid inde lucra¬
bitur? an quia dicitur homo vanior vanitate,
nihil boni moralis operari poterit? Vani enim
dicuntur homines, ut ait Sapiens, in quibus ’
non inest scientia Domini, et qui nihil quae¬
runt aut appetunt, nisi humana et terrena,
quaj cum divinis et coelestibus comparata
vana, vel potius vanitas merito nominantur,
juxta illud Psalm. iv : Ut quid diligitis vani¬
tatem ? Hoc igitur solum ex eo colligitur,
quod homo vanitas esse dicatur, ut nihil
possit ex se operari, aut etiam cogitare in
ordine ad salutem et vitam aeternam.
Quintum argumentum sumit idem Calvi¬
nus ex illo Isai. lx. : Ecce tenebrae operient
terram , et caligo populos , etc. (1). Hinc enim
sequitur ut omnis mundus, excepta Eccle¬
sia, quae per Hierosolymam, apud Isaiam,
significatur, ignoret penitus viam justitiae,
ac per hoc etiam nihil omnino boni per se
valeat operari . Respondeo : non loquitur
Isaias de lumine naturali, quod ad bonamo-
ralia cognoscenda requiritur, sed de lumine
divino, quod necessarium est ad cognoscen¬
dum Christum, et rectam viam ad sempiter¬
nam felicitatem. Neque enim negari potest,
quin Aristoteles in libris de moribus, Plu-
tarchus in Opusculis, Epictetus in Enchiri¬
dio, Cicero in libris de Officiis , et Seneca in
omnibus suis operibus, non ostenderin lu¬
men naturale plus quam mediocre in tra¬
dentis praiceptis, et institutione morali.
Sextum argumentum sumunt ex illo Hic-
rcm. xvn. Pravum est cor homini, et fraudu¬
lentum prae omni re (2). Sic enim ipsi vertunt
ex Hebrceo. Respondeo : nihil ex hoc testi¬
monio sequitur contra doctrinam, a nobis
traditam. Non enim dicitur cor hominis pra¬
vum et fraudulentum, quia nihil boni mora¬
tis facere possit; sed quia in eo fons est,
et origo malorum, tum propter arbitrii liber¬
tatem, tum propter naturse corruptionem. De
corde enim exeunt cogitationes malrn, adul¬
teria, furta, etc. Matth. 15. Adde quod re¬
cte verti potest illud pravum, Hebraice
profundum, ut Graeci reddiderunt BccOeia
sequitur enim : Et inscrutabile , et quis cogno¬
scet illud ? Ego Dominus scrutans corda. Ex
eo vero, quod cor humanum dicitur profun¬
dum et inscrutabile, nihil efficitur quod ad
rem preesentem pertineat.
Septimum argumentum sumunt Calvinus,
Kemnitius et alii, ex illo Matth. vn. Non
potest arbor mala, bonos fructus facere (3).
Quod iterum repetitur Matth. 12. et Luc. vi.
arbor autem mala est homo impius, ex Au¬
gustino lib. iv. Julianum, cap. 3. Respon¬
deo : observandum est hoc loco, non esse
omnino idem testimonium Matth. vii. et
Luc. vi. sed diversa, et alia occasione pro¬
lata. Nam apud Lucam ponitur doctrina
generalis, ad dignoscendos omnes hypocri¬
tas ; apud Matth. cap. vii. ponitur signum
cognoscendorum falsorum Prophetarum tan
tum. Rursus, apud Lucam spinai opponun¬
tur fioubus, et rubi uvis : apud Matthaeum
contra spinae uvis et tribuli ficubus. Denique
ea, quae scribit Lucas, cap. vi. scaibitMatth.
cap. xii. necesse igitur est, ut quae scribun¬
tur Matth. vii. diversa sint ab iis, quae scri¬
buntur Luc. vi. nisi quis velit Matthaeum
bis eadem sine causa repetivisse.
Hoc posito dico, Matthaei vii. per arbores
bonas et malas, non intelligi voluntates ho¬
minum bonas vel malas ; sed doctrinas veras
vel falsas, vel ipsos homines, quatenus do¬
cent sanam doctrinam, aut corruptam et
perniciosam. Dominus enim vult eo loco nos
instruere, ut caveamus a falsis prophetis,
qui veniunt ad nos in vestimentis ovium, in¬
trinsecus autem sunt lupi rapaces. Docet
autem, ex fructibus posse dignosci, utrum
lupi sint, an pastores, id est, hseretici mini¬
stri, an Catholici Episcopi. Certum vero est,
ex operibus ipsorum hominum, qui nos do-
(1) Isaiie LX, 2. - (2) Hier. XVII, 9. - (3) Matth. VII, 18.
CAPUT X.
89
cent, non posse cognosci doctrinam, cum
opera interna non videantur* externa autem
sint communia utrisque, et propterea com¬
parentur vestimentis ovium, quibus lupi
quoque se tegunt. Itaque idem Dominus,
quoniam sciebat, non posse discerni doctri¬
nam ex opere, cum saepe mali bona doceant,
monuit nos Matth. xvm. Quse dicunt facite ,
secundum autem opera illorum nolite facere (1).
Vult igitur Dominus Matth. vii. ut ex fru¬
ctibus doctrinae, de ipsa doctrina, et docto-
ribus judicemus. Nam doctrina vere divina
et Catholica est doctrina sana, et ex se parit
obedientiam, pacem, concordiam animorum,
et similia. Doctrina haeretica parit quodam¬
modo naituraliter dissensiones, sectas, con¬
tumaciam, licentiam, contemptum majorum,
et adia id genus. Commune siquidem est om¬
nibus haereticis, ut despiciant veteres Docto-
res, ut doceant, non esse acquiescendum
Ecclesiae judicio, ut in sectas varias brevi
tempore scindantur. Itaque hoc testimonium
ex Mavtthaeo prolatum, non pertinet ad cau¬
sam, quam nunc tractamus; sed solum obi¬
ter nos instruit, ut, nisi caecisimus pcrspicia-
mus doctrinam Lutheri et Calvini, et ipsos
quoque, ut talis doctrinae auctores, fuisse
arbores valde malas, et ideo securi divini
judicii excisos, in ignemque projectos.
Porro apud Matthaeum, cap. xii. et Luc.
cap. vi. per arbores bonas vel malas, intel-
liguntur voluntates hominum nonae vel ma¬
lae, sive ipsi homines boni, vel mali. Sic enim
Dominus ipse videtur exposuisse, cum ait :
Bonus homo de bono thesauro cordis sui pro¬
fert bona ; et malus, de malo thesauro profert
mala (2).
Ad argumentum autem, quod secundum
hanc expositionem vires habere videtur, tri¬
plex solutio dari potest. Prima est, Dominum
non voluisse significare, arborem bonam non
posse facere ullum fructum malum, sed non
posse facere omnes, aut plurimos fructus
malos. Et contra, arborem malam, non
posse facere omnes, aut plurimos fructus
bonos, sed ordinarie quidem, et ut plurimum
facere fructus malos, interdum tamen facere
posse aliquos fructus bonos. Atque hoc est
valde consentaneum experientia!, tuniin ve¬
ris arboribus, tum in hominibus, per eas
significatis. Nam arbores bonse semper ali¬
quos bonos fructus ferunt, quamvis inter-
(1) Matth. XXIII, 3
Eph. V, 9 ; Joan. 111, 6.
dum aliquos aut non perducant ad maturita¬
tem, aut a vermibus corruptos, ac per hoc
malos gerant. Arbores item malae, id est,
putrida;, seu nimis antiquae et cariosae (id
enim significat vox Graeca tra^pov) non tan¬
tum producunt multos fructus malos et cor¬
ruptos, sed etiam aliquos integros et bonos.
Altera solutio est, per arbores intelligi
actualem voluntatem bonam, quae dicitur
cliaritas, et malam, quae dicitur cupiditas,
ut exponit S. Augustinus in lib. n. de actis
cum Felice Manichaeo, cap. A. vel certe ip¬
sos homines, ut operantur ex charitatc, vel
ex cupididate. Ex hac autem expositione
argumentum plane solutum remanet. Fate¬
mur enim arborem malam, id est, cupidita¬
tem, sive hominem, ut operatur ex cupidi¬
tate, non posse facere nisi mados fructus.
Sed non sequitur propterea, opera omnia
hominis peccatoris esse peccata, quoniam
interdum peccator non operatur ex cupidi¬
tate, sed ex bono naturae, et tunc faicit opus
bonum morale. Sicut etiam interdum homo
justus facit opera mala, id est, peccata ve¬
nialia, quia non operatur ex chairitatc, sed
ex corruptione naturae. /
Tertia solutio erit, si dicamus, per fructus
bonos, quos non potest facere arbor mala,
intelligi opera meritoria vitae aeterna; ; per
fructus autem malos, quos non potest facere
arbor bona, intelligi opera meritoria mortis
a;ternae ; per arborem bonam hominem ju¬
stum, per malam, peccatorem, ut hanc si¬
militudinem exponit Augustinus lib. iv. in
Julianum, cap. 3. et lib. de gratia Christi,
cap. 18. et 19. Hinc enim sequetur, ut sicut
justus non potest facere peccata lethalia,
nisi desinat esse justus; et tamen potest,
etiam manens justus facere peccata venialia :
sic impius non possit facere opera digna re¬
gno coelorum, nisi desinat esse impius, et
tamen possit, etiam manens impius, facere
opera bona moraliter. Et certe secundum
usum Scriptura, fructus boni non dicuntur,
nisi opera salutifera, de quibus dicitur Joan.
xv. Qui manet in me, et ego in eo, hic fert
fructum multum. Et ad Rom. vi. Habetis
fructum vestrum in sanctificationem. Et ad
Galat. v. Fructus spiritus sunt charitas , con¬
tinentia, etc. Et ad Ephes. v. Fructus lucis
est in omni bonitate, etc. (3).
Octavum argumentum sumit Calvinus ex
(2 j Matth. XII, 35; Luc VI, 45.-(3) Joan XV, 5; Rom. VI, 22; Gal. V, 22;
6b
LIBEH y.
illo Joan. 3. Quod natum est ex carne, caro
est. At caro tota est mala, neque bonum ali¬
quid gignere potest. Nam effectus carnis mors
est, ad Roman. viii. Et fructus carnis sunt
fornicatio, immunditia, etc. ad Galat. v.
Neque responderi potest, accipi carnem pro
parte hominis inferiore, cum dicitur : Quod
natum est ex carne , caro est. Nam Dominus
ait : Oportet vos nasci denuo. At nasci debe¬
mus secundum partem superiorem. Ait enim
Apostolus ad Ephes. iv. Renovamini spiritu
mentis vestrse (1). Igitur pars etiam superior
ante justificationem dicitur caro, et nihil fa¬
cere potest, nisi propria carnis, id est, pec¬
cata.
Respondeo : caro sumitur quidem inter¬
dum in divinis litteris pro homine carnali, ut
carnalis distinguitur a spirituali, id est, pro
homine, in quo primas partes sibi vendicat
caro, ut in loco citato, ad Galat. v. Opera
carnis sunt fornicatio, etc. Saepius tamen per
figuram intellectionis pro toto homine sim¬
pliciter accipitur, ut Joan. 1. Verbo caro fa¬
ctum est. Et Isai. xl. Omnis caro fcenum (2).
Hoc autom loco certum est, carnem acci¬
piendam esse simpliciter pro homine, ut ac¬
cipiunt Ghrysostomus, Augustinus, Cyrillus
et alii in commentario, et Basilius lib. i. de
Baptismo, cap. 2. ultra medium. Dominus
enim, ut ostenderet, oportere nos nasci de¬
nuo, si velimus haereditatem divinam con¬
sequi, dixit, Quod natum est ex carne , caro
est, hoc est, non sufficit natum esse semel ex
homine. Nam homo nihil aliud quam homi¬
nem gignit. Sed nascendum est iterum, id-
que ex Deo, ut simus quodammodo Dii, et
hereditatem filiorum Dei consequi merea¬
mur.
Quare illa ratiocinatio Calvini non est ad
propositum. Non enim debet homo nasci
denuo, quia sit totus carnalis, et nihil possit
facere, nisi opera carnis, sed quia per pri¬
mam generationem non habet esse, nisi na¬
turale et humanum, indiget autem esse di
vino et supernaturali, ut filius et haeres Dei
dici, et esse possit. Porro ad Roman. viii.
accipitur caroproparte inferiori, ut patet ex
toto praecedente capite, et sensus ejus loci
est, acquiescere carnis concupiscentiis mor¬
tem esse, quia peccatum mortale admittit,
qui carni in omnibus acquiescit. Quamvis
autem non possit non peccare, qui carni
obedit ; tamen non cogitur etiam homo im¬
pius in omni opere carni obedire, sed potest
aliqua opera facere ex naturali propensione,
non ex vitiosa cupiditate, ut saepe dictum est
supra.
Nonum argumentum sumunt ex illo Joan.
xv. Sine me nihil potestis facere (3). Respondeo,
Loquitur Dominus de his operibus, quae ad
salutem pertinent, de quibus paulo ante di¬
xerat : Qui manet in me, et ego in eo, hic fert
fructum multum. Et hoc modo locum istum
intelligit Concilium Arausicanum, cap. 7.
Atque huc pertinent illa etiam loca, quae a
quibusdam objiciuntur ex I ad Corinth. iv.
Quid habes, qocl non accepisti? Et II. ad Co¬
rinth. ni. Non sumus sufficientes cogitare ali¬
quid ex nobis. Ex Ephes. ii. Ipsius enim sumus
factura, creati in Christo Jesu, in operibus
bonis. Ex Philipp. n. Deus est, qui operatur
in nobis velle et perficere (4). Haec enim omnia
ad opera pietatis et salutis pertinent, quae
sine Deo , neque inchoari , neque perfici
posse, infra demonstraturi sumus.
Decimum argumentum sumunt ex illis
verbis epistolas ad Roman. cap. 14 : Omne
{quod non est ex fi.de, peccatum est, quod ar¬
gumentum non solum a Kemnitio proponi¬
tur, sed etiama Calvino lib. m. Institut.c. 13.
et a Melanchthone in Apologia Confessionis,
titul. de Justificatione.
Sed responsio in promptu est. Nam eo
loco beatus Paulus, nomine fidei, non intel¬
ligit fidem, qua credimus in Christum, unde
dicuntur fideles, qui ea fide praediti sunt, et
infideles, qui eadem fide carent ; sed fidem,
qua credimus aliquid esse licitum, quae etiam
conscientia dici potest. Et sententia illius
loci est, peccatum esse quidquid fit conscien¬
tia reclamante et protestante, illud fieri non
debere.
0 •
Hanc autem esse germanam-.ejus loci ex¬
positionem, dubitari non potest, tum, quo¬
niam ita exposuerunt fere omnes interpretes
Grseci et Latini, utcomment. adseriptus Am.
brosio, Chrysostomus, Theodoretus, Theo-
phylactus, QEcumenius et alii, et praeterea
Innocentius Papa in Concilio Lateranensi,
unde extat caput finale de praescriptione ;
tum, quia textus ipse plane cogere videtur.
Disserit enim Apostolus de cibis mundis et
immundis, secundum legem, et ait : Qui dis¬
cernit, si manducaverit, damnatus est, quia
(I) Eph. IV, 23. -(2) Gal. V, 19; Joann. I, 14 ; Isai XL, 6.-(3)Joan. XV, 5.— (4)1 Corin. IV, 7;
II Corin. III, 5; Eph. II, 10; Phil. II, 13. - (5) Rom. XIV, 23.
CAPUT X.
61
non ex / ule ; id est, qui discernit inter cibos
mundos et immundos, existimans aliquos
vere esse immundos, si omnes (eque mandu
caverit, damnatus est, quia facit contra id,
quod credit esse faciendum. Omne enim
quod non est ex fide, id est, Secundum id,
quod credit faciendum, peccatum est. Atque
hinc natum est axioma illud Theologorum,
conscientiam (quamvis erroneam) semper
ligare. Numquam enim licet contra con¬
scientiam facere. Non ignoro, sanctum Au¬
gustinum paulo aliter hunc locum expo¬
suisse, sed de ejus sententia paulo post dice¬
mus.
Undecimum argumentum sumunt ex illo
I ad Corinth. X. et Coloss. m. Sive man¬
ducatis, sive bibitis, sive quid aliud facilis ,
omnia in gloriam Dei facite (1). Respondeo,
sonant haec verba piam admonitionem, non
praeceptum proprie dictum; nisi intelliga-
mus, hoc tantum imperari, ut omnia fiant
in gloriam Dei explicitc vel implicite. Nam
saltem implicite omnia refert in gloriam Dei,
qui operatur propter bonum aliquem finem.
Semper enim ex bonis operibus, etiamsi is,
qui ea facit, forte de Deo non cogitet, sequi¬
tur, ut qui ea vident, glorificent, aut certe
glorificare possint patrem nostrum, qui in
coelis est.
Duodecimum argumentum ex illo ad Eph.
iv. « Testificor in Domino, ut jam non am¬
buletis, sicut et gentes ambulant in vanitate
sensus sui, tenebris obscuratum habentes
intellectum, alienati a via Dei per ignoran¬
tiam, quae est in illis, propter’ caecitatem
cordis ipsorum, qui desperantes, semetipsos
tradiderunt impudicitia! , in operationem
omnis immunditia!, in avaritiam (2) ». Res¬
pondeo : non dicit Apostolus, omnia opera in¬
fidelium esse peccata, sed plurima esse mala
et immunda, omnia autem saltem esse vana,
id est, inutilia ad veram foelicitatem, cum
ipsi et lumine fidei et spe regni coelestis ca-
reant.
Tertiumdecimum argumentum, ex illo ii.
ad Timoth. n. A quo captivi tenentur ad ipsius
voluntatem (4). At voluntas diaboli est, ut ho¬
mines semper peccent. Respondeo : dicuntur
peccatores teneri laqueis diaboli captivi ad
ipsius voluntatem, non quod cogantur fa¬
cere, aut pati quidquid diabolus vult, sed
quia non possunt pro suo arbitrio, et suis so¬
lis viribus, ab illa captivitate liberari.
Quartumdecimum argumentum, ex illo ad
Titum i. Omnia munda mundis, iniquitatis au¬
tem, et infidelibus, nihil est mundum, sed in-
quhatse sunt eorum et mens et conscientia (i).
Respondeo : explicant hunc locum sanctus
Hieronymus in commentario et sanctus
Augustinus lib. xxxx. contra Faustum, cap.
4. qui docent, Apostolum non loqui de ope¬
ribus infidelium, sed de cibis mundis et im¬
mundis, secundum legem, ut hsec sit senten¬
tia hujus loci : Omnia munda mundis, id est,
omnes cibi natura sua mundi sunt, et hoc
tempore post abrogatam legem veterem
juste et sancte a justis hominibus man¬
ducantur , quippe qui sciunt nihil esse
immundum, quod cum gratiarum actione
percipitur : Iniquitatis autem et infidelibus,
nihil est mundum, id est, hominibus injustis,
et qui nolunt credere, legem esse abrogatam
quales sunt Judaei, omnes cibi sunt immundi
non solum illi, quos lex judicabat immundos,
sed etiam caeteri, quod isti ita infideliter su¬
munt, ut existiment, eos solos esse mundos.
Inquinata enim est eorum et mens et con¬
scientia, id est, idcirco omnes cibi sunt istis
immundi, quoniam inquinatam mentem, et
erroneam conscientiam gerunt.
Quod si quis omnino contendat, illud : In¬
fidelibus, nihil est mundum, significare, omnia
opera infidelium esse peccata : interrogan¬
dus erit, quid significet illud : Omnia munda
mundis. Nam non potest haec sententia signi¬
ficare, omnia opera justorum esse justa, cum
justi sint, qui jubentur dicere : Dimitte nobis
debita nostra. Et : Septies in die cadit justus,
Restringenda igitur erit sententia ad illa
opera, quae fiunt ex justitia, id est, ex cha-
ritate et pietate : quo modo facile concede¬
mus, omnia opera impiorum et infidelium,
esse peccata, dum illud omnia restringatur
ad illa opera, quae ex impietate et infidelitate
procedunt.
Quintumdecimum argumentum, ex illo ad
Hebraeos xi. Sine fide impossibile est placere
Deo (5). Respondeo : impossibile est sine fide
placere Deo, us quis amicus Dei constituatur.
At sicut natura humana, ut res aliae creatae,
quia bona est, bonitate natura! , non potest
non placere Deo, qui summe bonus est, et
cui placent omnia bona : sic etiam opera
facta ex bono naturae, sine admixtione malae
alicujus circumstantiae, bona sunt, et Deo
placent, tametsi non sint ejus pretii, ut vel
(1) I Corin. X, 37. - (2) Eph. IV, 17. - (3) IITimo. II, 26. - (4) Tit. I, 15. — (5) Reb. XI, 6.
62
LIBEll Y.
gratiam , vel vitam mereantur seternam.
Quoniam vero Pelagiani bonis operibus, so¬
lis naturse viribus effectis, tribuebant, ut gra¬
tiam Dei mereri possent, ideo recte sanctus
Augustinus lib. iv. in Julianum, cap. 3. uti¬
tur adversus eos hoc Apostoli testimonio •
Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo.
Postremum argumentum sumitur ex illo
I Joan. ii. Quidquid est in muiqdo (id est, in
amatore mundi) concupiscentia carnis est , aut
concupiscentia oculorum , aut superbia vitee (1).
Respondeo : si per mundum intelligamus
cum Augustino hominem mundi amatorem,
sensus erit, in amatore mundi, ut talis est,
nihil esse, nisi hsec tria, quoniam omnia
peccata revocantur ad hoc tres fontes, luxu¬
riam, avaritiam, superbiam. Alioqui enim
non negat Joannes, quin sint in homine,
quantumvis peccatore, multa bona naturalia,
corpus, animam, intelligentiam, voluntatem
etc. sed (ut dixi) loquitur de amatore mundi*
non ut est homo factus a Deo, sed ut est pec¬
cator factus a se. Si tamen cum aliis exposi¬
toribus intelligamus per mundum hanc re¬
rum universitatem, sensus erit, nihil esse in
mundo, nisi objecta luxuriae, avaritiae et su¬
perbiae, et ideo non esse diligendam creatu¬
ram, sed creatorem, in quo objectum vera?,
perfectaeque felicitatis.