Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 11: The arguments from the Fathers are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There follow now the arguments from the Fathers, and especially from Augustine.
The first argument, from book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 15: “The will without charity is wholly vicious cupidity.” I answer: he speaks of the will as “will” signifies the power, not the act. For of the same he had said a little before: “how much is it that the will avails under dominating cupidity, unless perhaps, if it be pious, to pray for help?” Now the power of the will without charity is wholly vicious cupidity — that is, it is full of self-love. But the natural inclination to good is not thereby taken away; which is not a good or evil habit, such as are charity and cupidity, but is the very power of the will, inclined to good by its own nature; from which inclination some work can be done which is not sin, when occasion is not given to cupidity to put forth its force — as when someone, though otherwise covered with all vices, meets a poor and sick man, and from human mercy has compassion on him. And that not all the works of those who lack charity, and accordingly do not lack cupidity, are sins, the same Augustine teaches in the book On Patience, chapter 26, where, speaking of schismatics, he says that they do not sin if they suffer something for Christ, and yet that it profits them nothing toward eternal life, since they have not charity.
The second argument, from epistle 106, where he speaks thus of Pelagius: “Sometimes he so weighs the power of the will with an even balance, in equal scales, that he determines it to avail even somewhat toward not sinning. But if that is so, no place is reserved for the aid of grace, without which we say the choice of the will avails nothing toward not sinning.” I answer: St. Augustine does not signify, in my judgment, that man cannot by his own powers do some work which is not sin, but that he cannot live without all sin — so that that phrase, “toward not sinning,” is not “toward avoiding some sin,” but “toward living without sin.” For this is urged upon us, first, by that reason of the same Augustine — “but if that is so, no place is reserved for the aid of grace” — which concludes nothing if “toward not sinning” signify “toward avoiding some sin”; but concludes most efficaciously if “toward not sinning” signify “toward never sinning.” Then, the following words attest the same. For St. Augustine, explaining what it was that Pelagius said — that free choice avails somewhat toward not sinning — says that Pelagius held that man can keep all the commandments by the powers of nature alone, but painfully and with difficulty, while through grace easily and sweetly; and thereby that he can by his own powers never sin, but only “somewhat” — that is, painfully and with difficulty. I add also, third, that it was never numbered by any of the ancients among the errors of Pelagius that man can by his own powers do some morally good work, or (what is the same) do some work which is not sin; but that he can keep all the commandments and live without any sin — as is clear from Jerome, book 3 against the Pelagians, and Augustine, book On Heresies, chapter 88. It could also be answered to the same argument that by “toward not sinning” is signified “toward resisting temptation”; and then we most willingly confess that toward not sinning, without the aid of grace, free choice avails nothing.
The third argument is taken from the Enchiridion, chapter 30, where we read thus: “What of good can the lost man work, except insofar as he is freed from perdition?” I answer: St. Augustine speaks of the good work which leads to salvation. For he had said: “But this part of the human race, for which God has prepared deliverance and the eternal kingdom — can it be repaired by the merits of its own works? Far be it. For what of good can the lost man work?” etc.
The fourth argument, from book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 18: “If the will is either good or evil, and certainly we do not have the evil will from God, it remains that we have the good will from God.” I answer: by the will he does not take the act of the will, as the adversaries think, but the power — which, if it is endowed with charity, is good; if with cupidity, evil. For he had said a little before that that will is good which loves God, that evil which loves him not; and to love and not love pertains to the power. Now the evil will can work something morally good, as the good will can work something venially evil. But as the good will of the just man does not work venial sin from charity, but from the corruption of nature, so the evil will of the impious and unbelieving man does not work the moral good from cupidity, but from the good of nature — which the same Augustine wrote has not altogether perished, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 28 [al. 27], and in other places.
The fifth argument, from book 1 against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, last chapter, where St. Augustine writes that the good use of free choice is from grace. I answer: he is not said to use free choice well who mingles one or two morally good works among innumerable sins, but he who for the most part lives according to reason, and diligently keeps all the moral commandments — even as he does not use a pen well who paints one or two letters beautifully and writes whole words most corruptly, but he who forms and orders all the words fitly for reading, though he sometimes paint one or another character less rightly. This good use of free choice the Pelagians would have to be meritorious of grace; but we, with St. Augustine, say that it cannot be had except through grace. For we have already taught above that man cannot by his own powers keep all the commandments, especially if he be beaten upon by temptation.
The sixth argument, from book 3 against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 8: captive free choice avails only for sin; but for justice, unless divinely freed and helped, it avails not. I answer: free choice is rightly said to avail only for sin, both because it has great strength for sinning, and because for the most part it does in fact sin, unless it be divinely helped. For the few moral goods it can do are counted for nothing, since they both profit nothing toward eternal salvation and are buried under the multitude of sins. Like sentences occur most frequently in the divine Scriptures, where that is said to be done by all which is done by most — as Genesis 6, All flesh had corrupted its way; Matthew 2, Herod was troubled, and all Jerusalem with him; John 12, The whole world is gone after him; Acts 21, All Jerusalem is in confusion.
The seventh argument, from the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 18: “What is not done from charity is not done well.” I answer: it is not done well — that is, profitably unto salvation.
The eighth argument, from book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 3, and book 4 against Julian, chapter 3, and the tractate on Psalm 31, where St. Augustine teaches that all the works of unbelievers are sins, and draws thither that saying: All that is not of faith is sin. I answer: two solutions can be applied to this argument. The former is conformable to the things said to the preceding arguments: namely, that all the works of unbelievers are called sins because almost all are done for an evil end — as for the worship of false gods, or for empty glory; and in this way St. Augustine himself speaks, book 4 against Julian, chapter 3: “Whatever of good is done by man, and is not done for that end for which true wisdom commands it to be done, though by its office it seem good, yet by its not-right end it is sin.” And below: “Or will you provide some place, between damnation and the kingdom of heaven, for those who exhibited a Babylonian love toward their earthly fatherland, and by civil virtue — not true, but truth-resembling — served demons or human glory: for the Fabii, namely, and the Reguli, and the Fabricii, and the Scipios, and the Camilli?” Augustine, then, most rightly condemns those works of unbelievers which were referred by them to an evil end; and since almost all the things done by them were such (as he himself says in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 27), he therefore says simply that all the works of unbelievers were sins, attributing to all what befitted the greatest part; and he deservedly reprehends Julian, who rashly asserted that unbelievers can by the powers of nature keep all the moral precepts and live without sin. The latter solution will be if we say that by sin Augustine understands not only that which is properly sin, and to which punishment is owed, but also that which lacks all that perfection which it could have had, and which is sterile and useless for attaining true beatitude. For so he explains himself in the place cited, book 4 against Julian, chapter 3: “Know,” says he, “that we call that man good, that will good, that work good, through which alone man can be led to the eternal gift and kingdom of God.” Thus he — who, when he had so defined the good, signified also that contrariwise he calls evil, and sin, all that which does not lead to the kingdom of heaven, even though otherwise it be not such an evil as deserves punishment.
The ninth argument is taken from those testimonies of Augustine which teach that the moral virtues also are gifts of God, whether they be found in the faithful or in unbelievers. For Augustine teaches this of the virtue of continence in epistle 89, question 2, and 105, and 130 [al. 144] — in which last place he said the continence of an unbelieving man is a gift of God. The same he teaches of patience, in the book On Patience, from chapter 15 to the end. Finally, book 4 against Julian, chapter 3, he affirms the same of all the virtues of unbelievers. I answer: the moral virtues are deservedly called gifts of God, because they are not acquired except through frequent acts; and acts of that kind cannot be made frequent except by resisting the passions, and bridling and restraining them — which, as we said above, cannot be done without the aid and protection of God. But it does not follow, if the virtues are gifts of God, that man cannot by his own powers do some good work — when he is beaten upon by no temptation — which is morally good; that is, is not sin properly so called.
And from the things that have been said can be explained the testimonies of all the other Fathers, if any be found in appearance contrary to the doctrine now delivered. For either they ought to be understood of the good works which pertain to salvation — as that of the Council of Orange, canon 20: “Many good things are done in man which man does not do; but man does no good things which God does not enable man to do”; and that of Ambrose, book 2 on Luke: “You see that everywhere the divine power cooperates with human endeavors, so that no one can build without the Lord, no one begin without the Lord”; and that of Cyprian, book 2, epistle 2: “All that we can is God’s”; and that which was defined against the Pelagians, Augustine witnessing in epistle 106, that grace is given for single acts. Or they ought to be expounded of a work which is in fact referred to an evil end, or at least which is sin in the broad manner, because it does not have all the perfection it could have. So we understand that of Prosper, book 1 On the Vocation, chapter 7: “Without the worship of the true God, even what seems to be virtue is sin”; and that of Gregory, book 2 of the Morals, chapter 15 [al. 46]: “If faith be not first begotten in our heart, the rest also cannot be good, though they seem to be”; and that of Jerome, on chapter 3 to the Galatians: “Without Christ every virtue is in vice.” Or, finally, they ought to be taken of works not by reason of the difficulty which is in the act itself, but by reason of the temptations which either are at hand, or would be at hand, did not the protection and singular providence of God keep watch. For in this manner we understand what was said by Zosimus, as Celestine reports in the epistle to the Gauls — that in every act and motion God is to be invoked as helper and protector; and by the Council of Orange, canon 9: “It is of the divine gift when we keep our feet from injustice”; and canon 22, that we have nothing from ourselves but lying and sin. Although this can also be understood of the general help, which was likewise denied by Pelagius — so that the sense is: from ourselves we have lying and sin; truth and good works we have not, except with God concurring, through general or special help, according as the quality and variety of the works themselves demands. There remain the arguments from reason.
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CAPUT XI. Solvuntur argumenta ex Patribus. Sequuntur nunc argumenta ex Patribus, ac praesertim ex Augustino. Primum argumentum ex lib. i. Retract. cap. 15. <( Voluntas sine charitate tota est vitiosa cupiditas. » Respondeo : loquitur de voluntate, ut voluntas significat potentiam, non actum. Nam de eadem paulo ante dixe¬ rat, quantum est quod valet voluntas sub do¬ minante cupiditate, nisi forte, si pia est, ut oret auxilium? Porro potentia voluntatis sine charitate , tota est vitiosa cupiditas, id est, plena est amore proprio. Sed non tollitur propterea inclinatio naturalis ad bonum , qure non est habitus bonus, vel malus, qua¬ les sunt charitas et cupiditas, sed est ipsa potentia voluntatis, inclinata ad bonum na¬ tura sua, ex qua inclinatione fleri potest ali¬ ti)! Joan. II, 10. quod opus, quod non sit peccatum, quando non datur occasio cupiditati, ut vim suam exerat, ut cum aliquis, quamvis alioqui vi¬ tiis omnibus coopertus, occurrit pauperi et segroto, et ex humana misericordia illi com¬ patitur. Non esse autem peccata omnia opera illo¬ rum, qui charitate carent, ac proinde cupidi¬ tate non carent, docet idem Augustinus in libro de patientia, cap. 26. ubi de schisma¬ ticis loquens dicit, eos non peccare, si quid patiantur pro Christo, et tamen id eis non prodesse ad vitam seternam, cum charitatem non habeant. Secundum argumentum, ex epist. 106. ubi sic loquitur de Pelagio : « Aliquando ita pa¬ ribus momentis potestatem voluntatis aequa lance perpendit, ut aliquantum etiam ad non peccandum valere definiat. Quod si ita est, nullus locus adjutorio gratiae reservatur, sine qua nos dicimus, ad non peccandum nihil voluntatis arbitrium valere; » Respondeo, Non significat, meo judicio, sanctus Augu¬ stinus, non posse hominem suis viribus facere aliquod opus, quod non sit peccatum, sed non posse vivere sine omni peccato, ita ut illud, « ad non peccandum », non sit, ad peccatum aliquod vitandum, sed, ad viven¬ dum sine peccato. Nam hoc nobis persuadet in primis illa ratio ejusdem Augustini « Quod si ita est, nullus locus adjutorio gratiae reser¬ vatur » quae nihil concludit, si « ad non peccandum », significet, ad peccatum ali¬ quod vitandum : concludit autem efficacis¬ sime, si, « ad non peccandum », significet ad numquam peccandum. Deinde, verba sequentia idem testantur. Nam explicans S. Augustinus quid sit, quod Pelagius dicebat, liberum arbitrium aliquan¬ tum ad non peccandum valere, dicit, sen¬ sisse Pelagium, posse hominem servare solis naturse viribus omnia mandata, sed segre, ac difficulter, per gratiam vero facile, ac sua¬ viter, ac per hoc posse suis viribus numquam peccare, sed aliquantum, id est, segre ac dif¬ ficulter. Addo etiam tertio, non fuisse ab ullo ve¬ terum inter errores Pelagii enumeratum, posse hominem, suis viribus, facere aliquod opus bonum moraliter, vel (quod est idem) facere aliquod opus, quod non sit peccatum, sed posse omnia mandata servare et vivere, absque omni peccato, ut patet ex Hieronymo I CAPUT XI. G3 lib. ni. contra Pelagianos, et August. lib. de haeresibus, cap. 88. Posset etiam responderi ad idem argu¬ mentum, perillud, « ad non peccandum, » significari ad resistendum tentationi, et tunc libentissime confitemur, ad non peccandum, sine adjutorio gratia; liberum arbitrium ni¬ hil valere. Tertium argumentum sumitur ex Enchi¬ ridio, cap. 30. ubi sic legimus : « Quid boni operari potest perditus, nisi in quantum a perditione liberatur » ? Respondeo : loquitur S. Augustinus de opere bono, quod ad salu¬ tem perducat. Dixerat enim : « Verum ha;c pars generis humani, cui liberationem Deus, regnumque paravit a;ternum, numquid me¬ ritis operum suorum reparari potest ? absit. Quid enim bonum operari potest perditus ? etc. » Quartum argumentum ex lib. ii. de pecca¬ torum meritis et remissione, cap. 18. u Si voluntas aut bona est, aut mala, et utique malam non habeamus ex Deo, restat ut bo¬ nam voluntatem habeamus ex Deo » . Re¬ spondeo : per voluntatem non accipit actum voluntatis, ut adversarii putant, sed poten¬ tiam, quae si praedita est charitate, est bona; si cupiditate, est mala. Dixerat enim paulo ante, illam esse bonam, quae diligit Deum, illam malam, qua; non diligit. Dibgere enim et non diligere, ad potentiam pertinet. Po¬ test autem voluntas mala operari aliquid boni moralis, sicut potest voluntas bona operari aliquid mali-venialis. Sed sicut voluntas bona hominis justi non operatur peccatum veniale ex charitate, sed ex corruptione natura;, ita voluntas mala hominis impii et infidelis, non operatur bonum morale ex cupiditate, sed ex bono natura;, quod non omnino periisse idem Augustinus scripsit in libro de spiritu et lit¬ tera, cap. 34. et aliis in locis. Quintum argumentum ex lib. i. contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, cap. ult., ubi sanctus Augustinus scribit, bonum usum li¬ beri arbitrii esse ex gratia. Respondeo : non dicitur bene uti libero arbitrio, qui inter in¬ numerabilia peccata admiscet unum aut al¬ terum opus bonum morale, sed qui ut plu¬ rimum vivit secundum rationem, et omnia mandata moralia diligenter servat, quemad¬ modum non bene utitur calamo, qui unam, aut duas litteras pulchre depingit, et integras dictiones corruptissime scribit, sed qui ap¬ posite ad legendum verba omnia format ac digerit, quamvis unum, aut alterum chara¬ cterem interdum minus recte pingat. Hunc bonum usum liberi arbitrii Pelagiani meritorium gratite esse volebant, nos vero cum sancto Augustino dicimus, eum haberi non posse, nisi per gratiam. Jam enim su¬ pra docuimus, non posse hominem suis viri¬ bus, omnia mandata servare, prasertim si tentatione pulsetur. Sextum argumentum, ex lib. m. contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, cap. 8: liberum arbitrium captivatum, non nisi ad peccatum valet, ad justitiam vero, nisi divinitus libe¬ ratum, adjutumque non valet. Respondeo: recte dicitur liberum arbitrium non nisi ad peccatum valere, tum quia magnas vires ad peccandum habet, tum quia ut plurimum reipsa peccat, nisi divinitus adjuvetur. Nam pauca quaedam bona moralia, quae potest fa¬ cere, pro nihilo reputantur, cum et nihil prosint ad salutem aeternam, et obruantur multitudine peccatorum. Similes sententiae frequentissime occurrunt in Scripturis divinis ubi dicitur, ab omnibus fleri- quod a pluri¬ mis fit, ut Gen. vi. Omnis caro corruperat viam suam. Matth. ii. Turbatus est Herodes , et omnis Hierosolyma cum illo. Joan xii. Mundus totus post illum abit. Actor, xxi. To¬ ta confunditur Hierusalem (1). Septimum argumentum ex libro de gratia et libero arbitrio, cap. 18. « Quod non fit ex charitate, non bene fit. » Respondeo : non fit bene, id est, utiliter ad salutem. Octavum argumentum ex lib i. de nu¬ ptiis et concupisc. cap. 3. et lib. iv. in Julia¬ num, cap. 3. et Tract. in Psalm. xxxi. ubi sanctus Augustinus docet, omnia opera infi¬ delium esse peccata, et eo trahit illud : Omne quod none st ex fide, peccatum est. Respondeo: duae adhiberi possunt ad hoc argumentum solutiones. Prior est conformis iis, quae dicta sunt ad argumenta superiora, videlicet vocari peccata omnia opera infidelium, quia fere omnia fiunt ob malum finem, ut in cul¬ tum falsorum Deorum, vel ad inanem glo¬ riam ; et hoc modo loquitur ipse sanctus Augustinus lib. iv. in Julianum, cap. 3. « Quidquid boni fit ab homine, et non pro¬ pter hoc fit, propter quod fieri vera sapientia jubet, et si officio videatur bonum, ipso non recto fine peccatum est» .Etinfra: « Anet istis, (I) Gen. VI, 12; Matth. II, 3; Joan. XII, 19 ; Act. XXI, 31. 64 LIBER Y. qui exhibuerunt terrenae patriae Babylo- vicam dilectionem, et virtute civili, non vera se verisimili daemonibus, vel humanae glo¬ riae servierunt ; Fabiis videlicet, et Regulis, et Fabriciis, et Scipionibus, et Camillis pro¬ visuri «estis aliquem locum inter damnatio¬ nem, regnumque coelorum ? » Damnat igi¬ tur rectissime Augustinus illa opera infide¬ lium, quae ad malum ab eis referebantur ; et quoniam talia erant fere omnia, quae ab illis fiebant (ut ipse idem dicit in libro de spiritu et littera, cap. 27.) ideo simpliciter omnia o- pera infidelium peccata fuisse dicit, tribuens omnibus, quod maximae parti conveniebat ; et merito reprehendit Julianum, qui posse infideles viribus naturae praecepta omnia mo¬ ralia servare, et sine peccato vivere, temere asserebat. Posterior solutio erit,' si dicamus, per pec¬ catum, intelligi ab Augustino non solum id, quod est proprie peccatum, et cui debetur poena, sed illud etiam, quod caret omni illa perfectione, quam habere potuisset, quod¬ que sterile et initule est ad veram beatitu- dinem consequendam. Ita enim se ipse ex¬ plicat loco citato, lib. iv. in Julianum, cap. 3. (( Scito, inquit, nos illum bonum hominem dicere, illam voluntatem bonam, illud opus bonum, per quod solum homo potest ad al¬ ternum Dei donum, regnumque perduci. » Haic ille, qui cum ita definiverit bonum, sig¬ nificavit etiam contra malum se appellare, et peccatum illud omne, quod ad regnum coelorum non perducit, etiamsi alioqui non sit tale malum, quod poenam mereatur. Nonum argumentum sumitur ex illis Au¬ gustini testimoniis, quse docent, virtutes mo¬ rales esse etiam dona Dei ; sive in fidelibus, sive in infidelibus inveniantur. Id enim docet Augustinus de virtute continentia; in epist, 89. qusest. 2. et 105. et 130. in quo loco po¬ stremo continentiam infidelis hominis, dixit esse donum Dei. Idem docet de patientia, in libro de patientia, a cap. IS. usque ad finem. Denique lib. iv. in Julianum, cap. 3, idem affirmat de omnibus virtutibus infidelium. Respondeo, virtutes morales dicuntur me¬ rito dona Dei, quia non acquiruntur/ nisi per actus frequentes : non possunt autem frequentari ejusmodi actus, nisi resistendo passionibus, easque framando et coercendo, quod supra diximus, sine adjutorio et pro¬ tectione Dei fieri non posse. Sed non sequi¬ tur, si virtutes sint dona Dei, non posse ho¬ minem suis viribus aliquod bonum opus fa¬ cere quando nulla tentatione pulsatur, quod sit bonum moraliter, hoc est, non sit pecca¬ tum proprie dictum. Atque ex his, qua; dicta sunt, explicari possunt testimonia omnium aliorum Patrum, si qua inveniantur in speciem contraria do¬ ctrinae jam traditae. Yel enim intelligi debent de bonis operibus, quae ad salutem pertinent, ut illud Concilii Arausicani , canon. 20. « Multa bona fiunt in homine, quae non facit homo, nulla autem bona facit homo, quse non praestet Deus, ut faciat homo. » Et illud Ambrosii lib. n. in Lucam : « Yides quod ubique studiis humanis virtus divina coope¬ ratur, ut nemo possit aedificare sine Domino, nemo incipere sine Domino. » Et illud Cy¬ priani lib. ii. epist. 2. « Dei est omne quod possumus. » Et illud, quod definitum fuit contra Pelagianos, teste Augustino in epist. 106, gratiam ad singulos actus dari. Yel debent exponi de opere, quod reipsa ad malum finem refertur, aut certe quod est peccatum largo modo, quia non habet om¬ nem perfectionem quam habere posset. Sic intelligimus illud Prosperi lib. i. de voca¬ tione cap. 7. « Sine cultu veri Dei, etiam quod virtus esse videtur, peccatum est. » Et illud Gregorii lib. n. Moralium cap. 15. « Si non prius in corde nostro fides gignitur, re¬ liqua quoque esse bona non possunt, licet esse videantur. » Et illud Hieronymi in cap. in. ad Galat. » Sine Christo omnis virtus in vitio est. » Vel denique accipi debent de operibus, non ratione difficultatis, quee sit in ipso actu, sed ratione tentationum, quse vel adsunt, vel adessent, nisi Dei protectio, et singularis providentia vigilaret. Hoc enim modo dictum esse intelligimus a ZoziiUo, ut refert Coelesti- nus in epist. ad Gallos, in omni actu et motu adjutorem et protectorem invocandum esse Deum. Et a Concilio Arausicano canon 9. « Divini muneris est, cum pedes nostros ab injustitia detinemus. » Et canone 22. nihil nos habere a nobis, nisi mendacium et pec¬ catum, Quamvis hoc possit etiam intelligi de au¬ xilio generali, quod a Pelagio pariter nega¬ batur, ut sensus sit, a nobis habemus men¬ dacium et peccatum ; veritatem et bona , opera non habemus, nisi concurrente Deo, per auxilium generale, vel speciale, prout operum ipsorum qualitas et varietas postulat. Supersunt argumenta ex ratione. 65 CAPUT XII.