Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 12: The arguments from reason are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The first argument from reason is drawn from the prayers of the pious. For all the pious, in all their works, even moral ones, implore God as helper, and, the work completed, give him thanks. But if this argument effected anything, it would also effect that mechanical works cannot be done without the special help of God; for in perfecting these also, pious craftsmen invoke God, and, the work finished, give him thanks. These things, then, do not prove that some good mechanical or moral work cannot be done by the powers of nature alone — as though the powers of nature, even corrupted, were not equal to those works unless they be aroused or helped by supernatural aid; but they prove that God is rightly invoked, that by his protection he may hinder the common enemy of the human race, who does not cease to molest us; and again, that throughout the course of the work he may by his providence conserve our life and strength, avert the hindrances that could befall from without, and finally always and everywhere direct us, lest through human ignorance and error we slip, amid so great a variety of actions. For the thoughts of men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.
The second argument is Philip Melanchthon’s. For he, in the Apology, under the title of justification, admits that certain works of unbelievers are adorned by God with temporal rewards; yet he says they are not to be praised with contumely to Christ — which those do, namely, who say that they are not sins before God. But we do not praise them with contumely to Christ, since we say they profit nothing toward the life and salvation which is in Christ Jesus; he indeed condemns them with contumely to the Creator. For is not injury done to God, if he be said to adorn sins with rewards? And is it not said with contumely to the maker, that things which are done from the good of the nature founded by him are sins?
The third argument is Calvin’s, in the Antidote, on canon 7 of session 6 of the Council, where he speaks thus: “The sinner and unbeliever is dead, and is raised up again through the Gospel; therefore, so long as he so remains, he can do nothing vital.” But the sinner and unbeliever is dead with the death of grace, not with the death of nature. For free choice, which pertains to the life of nature, has been not extinguished but attenuated, as the Council of Orange teaches, canon 8 [al. 25]. And so the sinful and unbelieving man cannot do anything vital that pertains to the life of grace; yet he can do something vital of those things which pertain to the life of nature — such as are moral works, which depend on natural principles, namely reason and will.
The fourth argument: Man through sin has been made perverse and distorted, and like a crooked leg. But a crooked leg cannot walk without limping; therefore neither can a sinful man work without sinning. I answer: man through sin is without doubt made perverse and distorted, but he does not necessarily work from that crookedness, which is nothing else than cupidity. For he can, cupidity being at rest, work from the natural propensity, which is straight. Wherefore the similitude of the crooked leg proves nothing, except that man always sins when he does something from cupidity.
The fifth argument: If for a good moral work nothing were required but the general help of God, it would follow that God does not concur more toward good works than toward evil. But that this is absurd St. Augustine teaches, in the book On the Grace of Christ, chapter 25. I answer: that God concurs more toward a good work than toward an evil can be understood in two ways. In one way, that he confer a greater help; in the other way, that with the same help he more truly reach the effect. In the former way it is not absurd that God concur no more toward a good moral work than toward an evil one, since sometimes the one is not more difficult than the other — nay, it can even come to pass that the evil work is far more difficult, and requires more, than the good, and therefore needs more the general help of God, which is never denied, unless God will to work a miracle. In the latter way God always concurs more toward the good than toward the evil. For in the good God makes both that it is, and that it is good; in the evil he makes that it is, but not that it is evil. And again, God concurs morally toward the good, because he commands or counsels it; toward the evil he in no way concurs morally. But (you will say) Pelagius would not deny that God concurs more toward the good work than toward the evil in this latter way. For he would say that God, through the operative power which he gave us, makes in the good work both what is and what is good; in the evil he does not make what is evil, but only what is — because the evil work, as evil, does not proceed from the power, as agent, which we have from God, but from the defect of the same power, which defect is not from God. I answer: St. Augustine, in the place noted, does not speak of the merely moral good, but of that which is meritorious of grace or of glory; for of this good it is truly absurd that God should not concur with greater help toward the good work than toward sins. And this absurdity followed most openly from the error of Pelagius.
The sixth argument: The demons have intelligence and will no less entire, as regards natural things, than men, and moreover lack carnal concupiscence; and yet they can do no good moral work, as all confess; therefore neither can men, unless they be divinely helped. I answer: the demons are hardened in actual hatred of God and of his things, and especially of the human race; for that pertains to the state of damnation, as confirmation in the actual love of God and neighbor pertains to the state of felicity; and therefore it is no wonder if whatever they do is evil, since they refer all things to that evil end. But men in this life, even unbelieving and most abandoned, do not always actually hate God and neighbor, nor do they always work from this hatred.
The seventh argument: If man could do moral good by the powers of nature alone, certainly there would have remained in human nature, after the sin of Adam, some seeds of the virtues, as Cassian taught. But this St. Prosper reprehends, in the book against the Collator, chapter 28 [al. 13]. I answer: the seeds of the virtues, if they be properly taken, are nothing else than the light of the practical intellect, and the inclination of the will to pursue good and flee evil, as St. Thomas teaches in 1-2, question 63; and in this way the seeds of the virtues remained after sin, nor can they be abolished, unless man cease to be man. And these seeds Basil admits, homily 9 on the Hexaemeron, and in the rules expounded at large, chapter 2; Athanasius in the life of St. Antony, reporting the exhortation of blessed Antony himself to virtue; Jerome on chapter 1 to the Galatians; Damascene, book 3, chapter 14; and others. Ruard Tapper also, in the explication of article 10, reports this sentence from Augustine: “In the natural judgment-seat there are present certain rules and seeds of the virtues, which they call Synderesis.” Cassian, however, by the seed of the virtues took the seeds of true piety — that is, good thoughts and pious desires, by which man is prepared for grace. For thus he says, chapter 9 of the Conference on the Protection of God: “Here now, as through an inscrutable diversity, a definition is introduced, by which it may be taught that many come to grace without grace, and that some have this affection of asking, seeking, and knocking from the vigilance of their free will.” And below: “It cannot be doubted, therefore, that there are naturally present in every soul the seeds of the virtues,” etc. This opinion Prosper deservedly refutes in these words: “He, then, who says that without any work of grace the seeds of the virtues are naturally present in every soul — what does he labor to show, except that from those seeds certain sprouts of merits pullulate, going before the grace of God?”
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XII. Solvuntur argumenta ex ratione. Primum argumentum ex ratione ducitur ab orationibus piorum. Pii siquidem omnes in omnibus operibus, etiam moralibus, Deum implorant adjutorem, et opere perfecto illi gratias agunt. Sed si boc argumentum aliquid efficeret, efficeret quoque, non posse opera mechanica fieri sine speciali auxilio Dei ; nam et in illis perficiendis, pii opifices, Deum in¬ vocant, et opere absoluto, illi gratias agunt. Ista igitur non probant, non posse fieri solis viribus naturas aliquod opus bonum mecha¬ nicum, vel morale, quasi vires naturas, etiam corruptas, non sint pares illis operibus, nisi excitentur, aut juventur auxilio snpernatu- rali ; sed probant, recte inyocari Deum, ut protectione sua impediat hostem communem generis humani, qui nos infestare non cessat ; et rursum, ut inde cursu operis providentia sua nostram vitam et vires conservet ; impe¬ dimenta, quae extrinsecus accidere possent, avertat; denique semper et ubique nos diri¬ gat, ne humana ignorantia et errore laba¬ mur, in tanta actionum varietate. Cogita¬ tiones enim hominum timidae et incertae pro¬ videntiae nostrae. Secundum argumentum est Philippi Melan- chthonis, is enim in Apologia tit. de justifi¬ catione, admittit opera quaedam infidelium, ornari a Deo temporalibus praemiis ; tamen dicit, non esse laudanda cum contumelia Christi, quod illi faciunt, scilicet, qui dicunt, ea non esse peccata coram Deo. At nos non ea laudamus cum contumelia Christi, cum dicamus, nihil prodesse ad vitam et salutem^ quae est in Christo Jesu : ipse vero ea dam¬ nat, cum contumelia creatoris. Annon fit in¬ juria Deo, si dicatur, ornai’e praemiis pec¬ cata? et non dicitur cum contumelia condi¬ toris, peccata esse, quae ex bono naturae ab illo conditae fiunt ? Tertium argumentum est Calvini in Anti¬ doto canone 7. sess. 6. Concilii, ubi sic lo¬ quitur : « Peccator et infidelis mortuus est, et resuscitatur per Evangelium ; ergo quam- diu sic manet , non potest aliquid vitale agere. » At peccator et infidelis mortuus est morte gratiae, non moi'te naturae. Liberum enim arbitrium, quod ad vitam naturae per¬ tinet, non extinctum sed extenuatum esse docet Concilium Arausicanum canon 8. Ita¬ que non potest homo peccator et infidelis agere aliquid vitale, quod ad vitam gratiae pertineat ; potest tamen agere aliquid vitale ex iis, quae pertinent ad vitam naturae, qua¬ lia sunt opera moralia, quae ex naturalibus principiis, ratione videlicet et voluntate de¬ pendent. Quartum argumentum. Homo per pecca¬ tum factus est perversus et distortus, ac si¬ milis tibiae curvae. Sed curva tibia non potest ambulando non claudicare; igitur nec potest homo peccator operando non peccare. Re¬ spondeo: homo per peccatum sine dubio per¬ versus ac distortus efficitur, sed non neces¬ sario ex illa curvitate, quae nihil est aliud, quam cupiditas, operatur. Potest enim quie¬ scente cupiditate operari ex propensione na¬ turali, quae recta est. Quare similitudo de curva tibia nihil probat, nisi semper homi¬ nem peccare, quando ex cupiditate aliquid facit. Quintum argumentum. Si ad bonum opus morale non requireretur, nisi auxilium Dei generale, sequeretur, Deum non magis con¬ currere ad opera bona, quam ad mala. Hoc autem esse absurdum, docet S. Augustinus in libro de gratia Christi, cap. 25. Respondeo: Deum magis concurrere ad bonum opus, quam ad malum, potest duobus modis intel- lihi. Uno modo quod majus auxilium con¬ ferat. Alio modo, quod eodem auxilio magis attingat effectum. Priore modo non est ab¬ surdum, Deum non magis concurrere ad bonum opus morale, quam ad malum, cum aliquando non sit unum magis difficile quam alterum, imo etiam possit fieri, ut opus ma¬ lum sit longe difficilius, et plura requirat, quam bonum, et ideo magis egeat auxilio Dei generali, quod numquam negatur, nisi Deus miraculum facere velit. Posteriore modo semper Deus magis concurrit ad bo¬ num, quam ad malum. Nam in bono facit Deus et quod est et quod bonum est, in malo facit quod est, sed non quod malum est. Et rursus, Deus concurrit ad bonum moraliter, quia praecipit illud, vel consulit, ad malum non concurrit ulla ratione moraliter. At (inquies) Pelagius non negaret , Deum magis concurrere ad opus bonum, quam ad malum, hoc modo posteriore. Diceret enim, Deum per virtutem operativam, quam nobis dedit, facere in opere bono, quod est, et quod bonum est ; in malo non facere, quod malum est, sed solum quod est, quia opus 66 LIBER Y. malum, ut malum non procedit a virtute, ut agente, quam habemus a Deo, sed a defectu ejusdem virtutis, qui defectus non est a Deo. Respondeo, sanctum Augustinum loco no¬ tato, non loqui de bono tantum morali, sed de eo, quod est meritorium gratias vel glo¬ riae, de hoc enim bono vere est absurdum, Deum non majori auxilio concurrere ad opus bonum, quam ad peccata. Et hoc absurdum ab errore Pelagii apertissime sequebatur. Sextum argumentum. Daemones habent intelligentiam et voluntatem, non minus in¬ tegram, quod attinet ad naturalia, quam ho¬ mines, et praeterea carent concupiscentia carnali ; et tamen nullum opus bonum mo¬ rale facere possunt, ut omnes fatentur : igi¬ tur nec homines possunt, nisi divinitus adju¬ ventur. Respondeo: daemones sunt obfirmati in actuali odio Dei, ctrerum ipsius, ac prae¬ sertim humani generis, id enim pertinet ad statum damnationis, sicut confirmatio in ac¬ tuali amore Dei et proximi pertinet ad sta¬ tum felicitatis ; et ideo non est mirum, si quicquid faciunt, malum est, quoniam ad malum illum figem omnia referunt. Homines autem in hac vita, etiamsi infideles, et perdi¬ tissimi, non semper actu Deum et proximum oderunt, neque ex hoc odio semper operan¬ tur. Septimum argumentum. Si posset homo bonum morale facere viribus solius naturae, certe remansissent in natura humana, post Adae peccatum, semina aliqua virtutum, ut Cassianus docuit. Atqui hoc reprehendit sanctus Prosper in libro contra Collatorem cap. 28. Respondeo : semina virtutum, si proprie accipiantur, nihil sunt aliud, nisi lumen intellectus practici, et inclinatio volun¬ tatis ad bonum prosequendum, et malum fugiendum, ut sanctus Thomas docet in. I. 2. quaest. 63. Et hoc modo semina virtutum remanserunt post peccatum , nec possunt aboleri, nisi homo desinat esse homo. Et haec semina admittunt Basilius, homil. 9. in Exa- meron, et in regulis fuse explicatis, cap. 2. Athanasius in vita sancti Antonii, ipsius beati Antonii exhortationem ad virtutem re¬ ferens, Hieronymus in cap. 1. ad Galat. Da- mascenuslib. iii. cap. 14. et alii. Refert etiam Ruardus Tapper, in explicatione articul. 10. hanc sententiam ex Augustino : «In naturali judicatorio adsunt quaedam regulae, et semina virtutum, quse dicunt Syndcrosim. » Cassianus tamen pro semine virtutum, ac¬ cepit semina verse pietatis, id est, bonas co¬ gitationes et pia desideria, quibus homo praeparatur ad gratiam. Sic enim ait, cap. 9. Collationis de protectione Dei : « Jam hic, inquit, quasi per inscrutabilem diversitatem introducitur definitio, qua doceatur multos ad gratiam venire sine gratia, et hunc affe¬ ctum petendi, quaerendi, atque pulsandi ha¬ bere quosdam de vigilantia liberae volunta¬ tis. )> Et infra : « Dubitari ergo non potest, inesse naturaliter omni animae virtutum se¬ mina etc. » Hanc sententiam merito refellit Prosper his verbis : « Qui ergo dicit, sine ullo opere gratiae, naturaliter omni animae semina inesse virtutum, quid laborat osten¬ dere, nisi de istis seminibus quaedam ger¬ mina praecedentium Dei gratiam pullulare meritorum? »