Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 13: The controversy on free choice in moral matters is proposed, and the follies and lies of Tilman are reported
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There follows the last question about moral good, which is the chief of all the questions on free choice. The controversy, then, is between all Catholics on the one side, and all the heretics of this time on the other (for in this matter there is no variety of opinions either among ours or among the adversaries): whether man, in the state of fallen nature, is of free choice in choosing moral good and avoiding evil — or, what is the same, in observing or transgressing the precepts of morals. And indeed the Catholics (as we have said), all, both ancient and more recent, preach the affirming side as a dogma of the Catholic faith; the heretics, contrariwise — both very many of the ancients and all the more recent — obstinately defend the denying side. The places both of the Catholics and of the heretics we noted at the beginning of the first book. Now, before we come to serious arguments, it pleases us briefly to set down some lies, or follies, of Tilman Heshusius, that the reader may from this one man — who is a bishop of no small name among the adversaries — form a judgment of the rest.
Tilman, then, in the book on the six hundred errors of the Pontificians, under the title of the servile choice, attributes to the Roman Church, among others, nineteen errors on free (or, as he speaks, servile) choice — which are all either manifest lies, or opinions of the ancients which not even the Lutherans themselves are wont to deny. With so keen a judgment, forsooth, does Heshusius collect the errors of the Papists.
The first error: “Free choice is a faculty of reason and will, by which good is chosen with grace assisting, or evil with the same desisting.” Likewise: “It is a faculty of applying oneself to grace.” And Peter Lombard is cited, book 2, distinction 24. But the former definition is taken from Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 95 [al. 105]; accordingly Tilman must confess that St. Augustine was a Papist. The latter is a mere dream of Heshusius.
The second error: “Free choice, as to spiritual things, is not utterly extinguished, but only broken and attenuated.” But this very thing the Council of Trent received from the Council of Orange, canon 8 [al. 25]. And so the Fathers of that Council, which was celebrated a thousand years ago against the Pelagians, were all Papists, Tilman being witness.
The third error: “Man from his pure natural endowments can love God above all things.” But this indeed a few Scholastics wrote; yet the opinion of a few ought not to be attributed to the Catholic Church, which in the same Church the more numerous and graver refute.
The fourth: “Man can by his own powers fulfill the precepts of the Theological virtues according to the substance of the work — as to believe, to hope, to love.” And Ruard is cited. But Ruard, in the explication of the article on free choice, reports this from the opinion of others, but does not approve it. Nor ought the dreams of individuals to be attributed to the Church. Certainly the Council of Trent, whose voice is the voice of the Catholic Church, delivers in express words, in the sixth session, canon 3, that no one can, without the help of God, believe, hope, or love as is fitting.
The fifth: “The gentiles could from Philosophy procure that knowledge which is enough for attaining salvation.” And Andradius is cited, book 3. But Andradius does not write that the gentiles could do this from Philosophy alone; and more than once in the same place he repeats that the light of divine grace was necessary to the gentiles for salvation. Let Heshusius see, then, with what good faith he cites authors, and whether this is not to impose on his readers, or to lie.
The sixth: “There is an equal liberty from necessity in God, in the Angels, and in men.” Likewise: “Liberty from necessity is inseparable from an intellective nature.” But if this is an error, it is that of Gregory of Nyssa, of Anselm, of Bernard, and of all the holy Fathers, whom we cited in the preceding book. Wherefore we owe not a little to Tilman, for having made Papists of Fathers so ancient, so learned, and so holy.
The seventh: “Without the help of grace man can do works pleasing to God.” And Andradius is cited, book 3. But Andradius does not say this, but only that man can do some works which are not sins — that is, morally good — not works pleasing to God, that is, meritorious of grace or of glory.
The eighth: “Synderesis is an inclination toward good.” But he who denies this knows not what he says; for how, I ask, can the light implanted in the human mind by the good creator not incline toward good?
The ninth: “Synderesis is not extinguished in the demons.” But this St. Augustine teaches, book 2 of the Confessions, chapter 4 [al. 9]: “The law,” says he, “is written in hearts, which not even iniquity itself effaces.” For though synderesis and the law of nature are not altogether the same — since synderesis is the very light of the intellect remaining in us after the manner of a habit, while the law of nature is certain first practical principles which are known by that light — yet it is certain that synderesis and the law of nature are inseparable. And so St. Jerome, on the first chapter of Ezechiel, writes that synderesis could not be effaced even in Cain himself after the sin committed. But the Fathers left aside, does not Isaias say this, last chapter: Their fire shall not be quenched, and their worm shall not die — which likewise the Lord several times repeats, Mark 9? And that the worm which does not die in the damned is synderesis, or the spark of conscience, Jerome teaches, and others, in the commentary on Isaias. And so now Tilman could number among the erring Papists not only the Fathers, but even Christ and Isaias.
The tenth: “The natural endowments remained entire after sin.” But this Dionysius the Areopagite plainly teaches, book On the Divine Names, chapter 4. Nor is it repugnant to what others say, that human nature was corrupted through sin. For nature was corrupted through the loss of the supernatural gifts, not through the destruction of any power or natural member. “For of human nature,” says St. Prosper, book against the Collator, chapter 26 [al. 9], “even after the transgression there remains the substance, there remains the form, there remains life, and sense, and reason, and the other goods of body and mind.” Nor do they who among Catholics write that the natural endowments remain entire after sin mean to signify anything else.
The eleventh: “The human mind understands many things of itself which pertain to the knowledge of divine things.” But this the Apostle teaches, Romans 1, where he says that the invisible things of God are known through the things that are made.
The twelfth: “Man after the fall has the right light of reason.” But he alone lacks it who denies it. For certainly, if we were altogether deprived of the light of right reason, we should differ in nothing from madmen, or from beasts.
The thirteenth: “Man, having received the first grace freely given, can merit condignly the grace that makes pleasing, and eternal life.” And Gabriel is cited, book 2, distinction 27, question 1, saying thus: “The soul informed by grace, through an act elicited by the will and grace together, merits condignly the reward of eternal beatitude.” But who would believe Heshusius could be so foolish, or so stupid, as himself to cite the words by which his own lies are confuted with no labor? For so far is Gabriel from saying that man merits condignly the grace that makes pleasing, that he even says glory cannot be merited unless one first have the grace that makes pleasing.
The fourteenth: “The beginning of faith is from us.” And it is proved from Gabriel, saying: “The meritorious act, as to its substance, is from the will as from the first and principal cause, and from grace as from a second, or less principal, cause.” But Heshusius, I believe, was dreaming, or laboring under a frenzy, while he pondered these things. For where is there mention of faith in the words of Gabriel? Does he not speak of the meritorious act, which prerequires not only faith, but also hope and charity?
The fifteenth: “The choice of believing is in our power.” And Ruard is cited, saying: “It is indeed in the power of man to change his will for the better; but that power is nothing, unless it be given by God.” But this sentence Ruard took word for word from Augustine, book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 22. Nor could Heshusius have been ignorant of this, if he read Ruard. But — deceit or valor, who would ask, in an enemy?
The sixteenth: “The reborn man can fulfill the whole law of God.” And the Council of Trent is cited, session 6. But this same thing is had in the Council of Orange, canon 25. Nay, St. John also says this, when he says: Whosoever is born of God sinneth not, 1 John 3. For that not to sin, and to fulfill the whole law of God, are the same, the same Apostle teaches, 1 John 3, when he says: And sin is anomia — that is, transgression of the law. And so now Heshusius does not fear to condemn even John himself of pontifical error.
The seventeenth: “The liberty of choice is the efficient cause of the application of the will to grace.” And Andradius is cited, book 4. But Andradius in the same place adjoins that free choice cannot do this unless strengthened by the firmest supports of divine grace. Further, that the will concurs efficiently toward acts of this kind is so certain and evident that Chemnitz, Heshusius’s colleague, strives to excuse Luther for having somewhere written that the will holds itself merely passively.
The eighteenth: “Man can perform more than the law of God commands.” But that this is true the Lord testifies, who in Matthew 19 says to him who said he had fulfilled the whole law: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all, etc.
The nineteenth: “Perseverance depends on grace and free choice.” But this St. Augustine teaches, book On Correction and Grace, chapter 12.
Behold, then, what kind of opinions Heshusius did not hesitate to call errors of the Pontificians. But he betrayed his impudence still more when he set about refuting them. For, having brought forward some sentences of Scripture which made nothing to the matter, he concluded thus: “Where it has been demonstrated that free choice in spiritual things is utterly extinguished, all the remaining errors of the Pontificians, which with full cheeks they impudently chant about the ill-named free choice, collapse of their own accord.” But neither did he demonstrate that free choice in spiritual things is utterly extinguished — of which matter we shall discourse in book 6; nor, had he truly demonstrated it, would the remaining opinions, which he wrongly calls errors, collapse of their own accord. For what kind of consequences would these be: free choice can do nothing in spiritual things, therefore it is not a faculty of reason or will; or, therefore synderesis is not an inclination toward good, or does not remain in the demons; or, therefore the gentiles did not have through philosophy a knowledge which suffices for salvation? But these trifles left aside, let us come to serious matters.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XIII. Proponitur controversia de libero arbitrio in moralibus , et Tilmanni ineptix, ac mendacia referuntur. Sequitur ultima quaestio de bono morali, quae est omnium potissima inter quaestiones de libero arbitrio. Igitur controversia est in¬ ter Catholicos omnes ab una parte, et haere¬ ticos hujus temporis omnes ab altera (neque enim in hac re vel apud nostros, vel apud adversarios ulla est opinionum varietas) sit ne homo in statu naturae lapsae liberi arbi¬ trii, in bono morali eligendo, et malo evi¬ tando, sive, quod idem est, in praeceptis morum observandis aut praevaricandis. Et quidem Catholici (ut diximus) omnes tum veteres , tum rccentiores , tamquam dogma fidei Catholicae praedicant partem affirmantem. Haeretici contra, tum ex vete¬ ribus plurimi, tum recentiores omnes, obsti¬ nate defendunt partem negantem. Loca tum Catholicorum , tum haereticorum annotavi¬ mus initio primi libri. Nunc antequam ad argumenta seria veniamus, placet breviter adseribere aliquot mendacia, vel ineptias Tilmanni Ileshusii, ut lector ex hoc uno, qui non parvi nominis episcopus apud adversa¬ rios est, judicium faciat de caeteris. Tilmannus igitur in libro de sexcentis er¬ roribus Pontificiorum, titul. de servo arbi¬ trio, inter alios, decem et novem errores*dc libero, vel (ut ipse loquitur) servo arbitrio, Romanae Ecclesiae attribuit, qui sunt omnes vel manifesta mendacia, vel sententiae vete- CAPUT XIII. 67 rum, quas ne ipsi quidem Lutherani negare solent. Tam acri judicio scilicet Papistarum errores Heshusius colligit. Primus error : « Liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis , qua bonum eligitur gratia assistente, vel malum eadem desistente. » Item : « Est facultas applicandi sese ad gratiam. » Et citatur Petrus Lom- bardus lib. n. distinet. 24. At prior definitio desumpta est ex Augustino in Enchiridio, cap. 95. proinde fateri debet Tilmannus, sanctum Augustinum fuisse Papistam. Poste¬ rior est merum somnium Heshusii. Secundus error : « Liberum „ arbitrium, quoad res spirituales, non est prorsus extin- ctum, sed tantum fractum et attenuatum. » At hoc ipsum accepit Concilium Tridentinum ex Concilio Arausicano, canon 8. Itaque Pa¬ tres illius Concilii, quod ante annos mille celebratum est, contra Pelagianos, Papistse omnes, teste Tilmanno, fuerunt. Tertius error : « Homo ex puris natura- . libus potest diligere Deum super omnia. » At hoc scripserunt Scholastici quidem pauci, sed non debet Ecclesiae Catholicae tribui opi¬ nio paucorum, quam in eadem Ecclesia plu- res et graviores refellunt. Quartus : « Potest homo suis viribus im¬ plere praecepta Theologicarum virtutum, se¬ cundum substantiam operis, ut credere, spe¬ rare, diligere. » Et citatur Ruardus. At Ruardus in expli¬ catione articuli de libero arbitrio, refert hoc ex aliorum sententia, sed non probat. Nec debent Ecclesiae tribui singulorum somnia. Certe Concilium Tridentinum, cujus vox Ec¬ clesiae Catholicae vox est , disertis verbis tradit in sexta sessione, canone tertio, nemi¬ nem posse sine Dei auxilio credere, sperare, aut diligere sicut oportet. Quintus : « Gentes potuerunt ex Philoso¬ phia eam notitiam comparare, quae satis est ad salutem consequendam. » Et citatur Andradius lib. m. Atqui Andra- dius non scribit ex sola Philosophia gentes id potuisse, et non semel in eodem loco re¬ petit, necessarium fuisse gentibus ad salutem lumen divinae gratiae. Viderit igitur Heshu¬ sius, quam bona fide auctores citet, et utrum hoc non sit lectoribus imponere vel men¬ tiri. )> . Sextus : « Par libertas a necessitate est in Deo, in Angelis et hominibus. » Item : « Li¬ bertas a necessitate inseparabilis est a na¬ tura intellectiva. » At hic si error est, Gre- goriiNysseni, Anselmi, Bernardi, et omnium sanctorum Patrum est, quos libro superiore citavimus. Quare non parum Tilmanno de¬ bemus, quod tam antiquos, et tam doctos ac sanctos Patres Papistas fecerit. Septimus : « Sine auxilio gratiae potest homo facere opera Deo grata ». Et citatur Andradius lib. iii. At non dicit hoc Andra¬ dius, sed tantum posse hominem facere ali¬ qua opera, quae non sint peccata, id est, bo¬ na moraliter, non quae Deo sint grata, id est, gratiae vel gloriae meritoria. Octavus : « Synderesis est inclinatio ad bonum ». At qui hoc negat, nescit quid lo¬ quatur; nam quomodo, quaeso, potest non inclinare ad bonum, lumen humanae menti a bono conditore insitum ? Nonus : « Synderesis non extinguitur in daemonibus » . At hoc docet sanctus Augusti¬ nus lib. ii. confess. cap. 4. « Lex, inquit, scripta est in cordibus, quam ne ipsa quidem delet iniquitas ». Tametsi enim non sunt omnino idem synderesis, et lex naiturae, cum synderesis sit ipsum lumen intellectus per modum habitus in nobis manens, lex naturae sint prima quaedam principia practica, quae lumine illo cognoscuntur, tamen certum est, esse inseparabilia synderesim, legemque naturae. Itaque sanctus Hieronymus, in pri¬ mum caput Ezechielis scribit, synderesim in ipso etiam Gain post peccatum commissum deleri non potuisse. Sed omissis Patribus, nonne Isaias hoc dicit cap. ultim. Ignis eo¬ rum non extinguetur, et vermis non morie¬ tur (1). Quod item repetit aliquoties Dominus, Marci ix. Vermem autem, qui in damnatis non moritur, synderesim esse, sive scintil¬ lam conscientiae, docet Hieronymus, et alii in commentario Isaiae. Itaque jam non Pa¬ tres tantum, sed etiam Christum et Isaiam Tilmannus inter errantes Papistas numerare potuerit. Decimus : « Naturalia manserunt integra post peccatum » . At hoc perspicue docet Dionysius Areopagita, lib. de divinis nomi¬ nibus cap. 4. Neque repugnat ei, quod alii dicunt, naturam humanam, per peccatum esse corruptam. Corrupta siquidem est na¬ tura per amissionem donorum supernatura- lium, non per destructionem alicujus poten¬ ti) Isaire LXYI, 24. G8 LIBER V. tise, aut membri naturalis. « Natura; quippe humanae (inquit sanctus Prosper, libro con¬ tra Collatorem cap. 26.) etiam post praeva¬ ricationem manet substantia, manet forma, manet vita, et sensus, et ratio, caeteraque corporis et animi bona». Nec aliud signifi¬ care volunt, qui inter Catholicos scribunt, naturalia manere integra post peccatum. Undecimus : « Mens humana multa per se intelligit, quae ad cognitionem divinarum re¬ rum pertinent ». At hoc docet Apostolus ad Rom. i. ubi dicit : « Invisibilia Dei per ea, quae facta sunt, cognosci » . Duodecimus : « Homo post lapsum habet rectum lumen rationis » . At solus eo caret, qui id negat. Certe enim si lumine rcetae ra¬ tionis omnino privati essemus, nihil a furio¬ sis, vel a bestiis differremus. Tertius decimus : « Homo accepta prima gratia gratis data, de condigno mereri potest gratiam gratum facientem, et vitam a;ter- nam». Et citatur Gabriel lib. ii. distinet. 27. quaest. 1. ita dicens : « Anima gratia infor¬ mata per actum a voluntate simul, et gratia elicitum de condigno meretur aeternae beati- tudinis praemium » . At quis crederet Heshusium tam stultum, vel stupidum esse potuisse, ut ipse verba ci¬ taret, quibus mendacia ipsius nullo labore confutarentur ? Tantum enim abest, ut Ga¬ briel dicat, hominem de condigno mereri gratiam gratum facientem, ut etiam dicat, non posse mereri gloriam, nisi prius habeat gratiam gratum facientem. Decimus quartus : « Initium fidei a nobis est ». Et probatur ex Gabriele dicente : « Actum meritorium, quantum ad substan¬ tiam ejus, esse a voluntate, tamquam a cau¬ sa prima et principali, et a gratia tamquam a causa secunda, sive minus principali ». At somniabat credo, vel phrenesi laborabat Heshusius, dum haec meditaretur. Ubi enim est mentio fidei in verbis Gabrielis? an non loquitur de actu meritorio, qui non solum fi¬ dem, sed etiam spem et charitatem praere- quirit? Decimus quintus : « Arbitrium credendi in nostra est potestate » . Et citatur Ruardus, dicens : « In potestate hominis quippe est, in melius mutare voluntatem, sed ea pote¬ stas nulla est, nisi detur a Deo ». At hanc sentfentiam Ruardus desumpsit ad verbum ex Augustino lib. i. retract. cap. 22. Neque id ignorare potuit Heshusius, si Ruardum legit. Sed dolus, an virtus quis in hoste re¬ quirat ? Decimus sextus : « Homo renatus totam Dei legem implere potest». Et citatur Concilium Tridentinum sess. 6. At hoc idem habetur in Concilio Arausicano, canon 25. Immo et san¬ ctus Joannes hoc dicit, cum ait : Qui natus est ex Deo , non peccat , i. Joan. ii. Idem enim esse non peccare, et legem Dei totam implere, docet idem Apostolus, I. Joan. iii. cum ait : Et peccatum est avogta id, est, legis praevaricatio (I). Itaque jam ipsum etiam Joanne merroris pontificii damnare non vere¬ tur Heshusius. Decimus septimus : « Libertas arbitrii est causa efficiens applicationis voluntatis ad gratiam ». Et citatur Andradius, lib iv. At¬ qui Andfadius in eodem loco adjungit, id non .posse liberum arbitrium, nisi confirma¬ tum firmissimis divina; gratise praesidiis. Porro voluntatem efficienter concurrere ad ejusmodi actus, adeo certum atque evi¬ dens est, ut Kemnitius Heshusii collega ex¬ cusare nitatur Lutherum, quod alicubi scri¬ pserit, voluntatem mere passive se habei'e. Decimusoctavus ; « Homo plus praestare potest, quam lex Dei praecipiat » . At id ve¬ rum esse testatur Dominus, qui Matth. xix. ei, qui totam legem se implevisse dicebat, ait : « Si vis perfectus esse, vade, vende om¬ nia ete » . Decimus nonus :« Perseverantia ex gratia, et libero arbitrio pendet ». At hoc docet S. Augustinus, lib. de corrept. et grat. cap. 12. En igitur quales sententias Heshusius er¬ rores Pontificiorum, appellare non dubita¬ vit. Sed magis adhuc impudentiam suam prodidit, cum eos refutare aggressus est. Nam prolatis aliquot Scriptura; sententiis, quae nihil ad rem faciebant, ita conclusit : <( Ubi demonstratum est, quod liberum ar¬ bitrium in rebus spiritualibus prorsus sit ex- tinctum, sua sponte corruunt omnes reliqui errores Pontificiorum, quos plenis buccis de male libero arbitrio impudenter decantant ». At neque demonstravit, liberum arbitrium in rebus spiritualibus esse prorsus extin- ctum, de qua re in vi. lib. disseremus ; ne¬ que si id vere demonstrasset, reliquae sen¬ tentiae, quas ipse perperam vocat errores, sua sponte corruerent. Quales enim essent (I) Joan. III, 9; ibid. III, 4. CAPUT XIV. 69 istae consecutiones? liberum arbitrium in rebus spiritualibus nihil potest, igitur qon est facultas rationis, aut voluntatis; vel igi¬ tur synderesis non est inclinatio ad bonum, aut non remanet in damionibus ; vel, igitur gentes per philosophiam non habuerunt no¬ titiam, qua; sufficit ad salutem. Sed his nu¬ gis omissis, ad seria veniamus. •