Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 14: The liberty of choice in moral matters is proved by an argument leading to the impossible
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The orthodox truth is now to be asserted, which teaches that man in the state of corrupt nature is endowed with free choice as to moral matters. And since John Calvin, book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 5, disposed the arguments of the Catholics in a certain order, and solved them as he could — or wished to seem to have solved them — we shall take our beginning from them, and in the same order shall propose not only the catholic arguments, but also his responses, that from the refutation of these the reader may understand that the arguments of the Catholics are most solid, and cannot be shaken by heretical machinations. Calvin, then, distributes our arguments into two ranks: in the former he places the reasons leading to the impossible; in the latter, the demonstrative reasons from the word of God.
The first argument of the Catholics is of this kind: Sin is either necessary or voluntary. If it is necessary, then it is not sin, and thereby sin will not be sin — which cannot be. If it is voluntary, then it can be avoided; and accordingly man is of free choice in moral matters, as being one who can sin and not sin. Which argument is taken from Augustine, in the book On True Religion, chapter 14. To this argument Calvin answers that sin is necessary and voluntary at once, and he denies each part of the consequence: namely, “therefore it is not sin, if it is necessary,” and “therefore it can be avoided, if it is voluntary.”
And indeed about the latter part there will be no great question, if the ambiguity be removed. For he by “voluntary” understands the spontaneous, or free from coercion alone — such as is also in cattle; and in this way the voluntary does not fight with the necessary and inevitable. But we take the voluntary as free from necessity; otherwise we should say ineptly, “it is either necessary or voluntary,” if the voluntary were not opposed to the necessary. In the same way also St. Augustine took the voluntary in the place cited — that is, book On True Religion, chapter 14 — as is clear from those words: “Which could in no way come to pass, if they served not by will, but by necessity.” And below, when he had said that Adam sinned voluntarily, he renders the reason: “since,” says he, “if he had done it by necessity, he would be held by no charge of sin.” And so that consequence — if sin is voluntary, therefore it can be avoided — would not have been denied by Calvin, had he taken the voluntary as he ought to have taken it; that is, as the very words of our argument demanded.
But why he denied the former part of the consequence, he renders four causes. The first: because the Pelagians had at some time brought forward the same argument against Augustine. The second: because the sins of men, though they be necessary, yet are truly sins for this reason, that they are born not from creation, but from the corruption of nature — which corruption the sin of the first man begot. The third: because the devil necessarily always acts ill, and yet truly sins; and the holy Angels necessarily always work well, and yet their works are truly good. The fourth: because St. Bernard, sermon 81 on the Canticles, writes that man after sin cannot avoid other sins, and yet truly and properly sins. Calvin adds, in book 4 against Pighius, a fifth cause from Aristotle, book 3 of the Ethics, chapter 5, where the Philosopher teaches that man becomes evil of his own accord, when he could have not become so; but when such he has become, he is now necessarily evil — as he who is sick fell into the disease of his own accord and freely, because he would not avoid hurtful things when he could easily have avoided them; yet after he has become sick, he is necessarily in ill health. “So too,&rdquoo; says Calvin, “the first man, by sinning of his own accord and freely, corrupted nature; but nature, now corrupted, necessarily works ill.” Let us add a sixth cause, from Bucer and Chemnitz, who prove that the transgression of the law is always sin, whether it be voluntary or necessary, since in the first epistle of John, chapter 3, sin is defined as anomia — that is, transgression of the law. If, then, we shall have demonstrated that these causes have no weight, that argument of the Catholics will retain entire its strength and force.
To the first cause I answer: the question is not the same, nor the argument the same, which we object to Calvin and which the Pelagians of old objected to Augustine. For the question of the Pelagians was not whether single sins could be avoided, but whether man could live without all sin, even venial — as can be understood even from the very title of the book, On the Perfection of Justice, which Calvin cites. Augustine indeed answered to that question that before the sin of Adam there was in man the liberty of living without all sin, but that now there is the necessity of having some sin. But this necessity of having sin does not prevent sin from being truly sin, since single sins can be avoided, though not all. Of which matter more will have to be said a little below.
To the second, about the corruption of nature, I answer from the doctrine of the same Calvin. For he himself, in the place noted, writes that if our sins arose from a corruption con-created in us by God, we should have a just excuse for our sins before God, as the author of our crimes. But he himself, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 23, writes that the sin of the first man, from which the corruption of nature arose, was committed by the decree and inevitable will of God. We have, then, an excuse before God, if we sin from a corruption into which we fell by his decree, and not from our free will. Moreover, the corruption of nature, according to the doctrine of Calvin, is original sin itself; but original sin was remitted in baptism — either so that it is not, according to the truth, or at least so that it is not imputed, according to Calvin’s opinion; therefore neither will those sins be able to be imputed which are born from that corruption, unless a new cause of imputing be added — that is, that they be now done with a will so free that they could also have been avoided.
To the third, about the sins of the demons and the good works of the Angels, I answer: both the holy Angels and the evil demons, in respect of the last end, do not have choice free from necessity, but only from coercion; yet in respect of the means they have choice free even from necessity, because they do many things which they could not do, and contrariwise; and in things of this kind the demons truly sin, and the good Angels do a work truly praiseworthy — although neither the essential punishment nor the essential reward can grow, since both are at the term, and all their works pertain to the exercise of damnation, or of everlasting glory. And so that proposition of Calvin — “the demons always necessarily act ill” — is in one sense false, in another true. It is true indeed in general, that they can only act ill; yet it is false in particular, that all the evils they do they do necessarily; for they could (as we said) not do many things which they do, and therefore they commit sins not by necessity, but by will.
To the fourth, from Bernard, we answered in book 3, chapter 6. The sum is: the sinful man, while cupidity reigns in him, cannot avoid sin; but absolutely he can, because he can, with the aid of God, put off cupidity and put on charity.
To the fifth, from Aristotle, I answer: that testimony of the Philosopher makes nothing to the matter proposed. For he speaks of the habit of vice; we speak of the act. For although he who has contracted an evil habit cannot straightway expel it, and is necessarily vicious — as the sick man is necessarily in ill health after the sickness has been contracted — yet he can refrain from exercising the evil act, since habits incline but do not compel; and therefore he completes the evil act not by necessity, but by will, and truly and properly sins, even he who by living ill has contracted vicious habits. But what a thing it is, that Calvin should beg aid from Aristotle against the liberty of choice, when that Philosopher, in the third book of the Ethics, defended the liberty of choice most zealously and most accurately!
To the sixth, from the definition of sin: I answer that in the definition of sin free choice is contained in virtue. For the law, which is manifestly set down in that definition, is not given except to those who bear free choice. For law is nothing else than a rule directing actions; but a rule is given in vain to him who does not have his actions in his power. Otherwise, let the adversaries render the cause why no laws are prescribed to beasts, if liberty of choice is not required for the use of law. And hence again that argument is confirmed, and made more insoluble, which Calvin strove in vain to solve. For if what is done of one’s own accord, though it be done necessarily, can be sin properly so called, why do not infants, madmen, and cattle truly and properly sin?
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XIV. Probatur Ubertas arbitrii in moralibus argu¬ mento ducente ad impossibile. Asserenda nunc est veritas orthodoxa, quae docet, hominem in statu naturae corruptae libero arbitrio praeditum esse, quoad mora¬ lia. Quoniam autem Joannes Calvinus lib. n. Institut. cap. 5. argumenta Catholicorum certo ordine disposuit, eaque ut potuit, sol¬ vit, aut solvisse videri voluit, nos ab illis initium ducemus, et eodem ordine non so¬ lum catholica argumenta, sed etiam ipsius responsiones proponemus, ut ex illarum re¬ futatione lector intelligat, argumenta Catho¬ licorum solidissima esse, neque haereticis machinationibus labefactari posse. Calvinus igitur in duos ordines argumenta nostra di¬ stribuit, in priore constituit rationes ducen¬ tes ad impossibile, in posteriore rationes ostensivas ex verbo Dei. Primum catholicorum argumentum ejus¬ modi est : « Aut peccatum est necessarium, aut voluntarium ; si est necessarium, igitur non est peccatum, ac per hoc peccatum non erit peccatum, quod fieri non potest : si est voluntarium, igitur vitari potest : et proinde homo est liberi arbitrii in moralibus. Quippe qui potest peccare et non peccai’e »,. Quod argumentum sumptum est ex Augustino, in lib. de vera religione cap. 14. Ad hoc argumentum, respondet Calvinus, peccatum esse necessarium et voluntarium simul, et negat utramque partem consecu¬ tionis, videlicet, ergo non est peccatum, si est necessarium, et ergo vitari potest, si est voluntarium. Et quidem de posteriore parte non erit magna quaestio, si tollatur ambiguitas. Nam ipse per voluntarium intelligit spontaneupj, seu liberum a sola coactione, quale est etiam in pecoribus, et hoc modo voluntarium non pugnat cum necessario et inevitabili. Nos au¬ tem accipimus voluntarium pro libero a ne¬ cessitate, alioqui inepte diceremus, aut est necessarium, aut est voluntarium, si volun¬ tarium non opponeretur necessario. Eodem etiam modo accepit voluntarium S. Augusti¬ nus loco cit. id est, lib. de vera relig. cap. 14. ut patet ex illis verbis : « Quod nullo modo fieri posset, si non voluntate, sed ne¬ cessitate servirent » . Et infra, cum dixisset, Adamum voluntarie peccasse, reddit ratio¬ nem : « Quoniam, inquit, si necessitate fe¬ cisset, nullo peccati crimine teneretur », Itaque consecutio illa, si peccatum est vo¬ luntarium, ergo vitari potest, non fuisset a Calvino negata, si voluntarium accepisset, ut accipere debebat, id est, ut ipsa nostri ar¬ gumenti verba postulabant. Priorem vero partem consecutionis cur negaverit, 'quatuor causas reddit. Primam, quoniam idem argumentum ali¬ quando Pelctgiani contra Augustinum protu¬ lerant. Secundam., quoniam peccata hominum, licet sint necessaria, tamen ideo sunt vere peccata, quia non nascuntur ex creatione, sed ex corruptione natura;, quam corruptio¬ nem peccatum primi hominis peperit. Tertiam, quia diabolus necessario semper male agit, et tamen vere peccat, et Angeli sancti necessario semper bene operantur, et tamen vere bona sunt ipsorum opera. Quartam, quia sanctus Bernardus serm. 81. in Cantica scribit, hominem post pecca¬ tum non posse vitare alia peccata, et tamen vere proprieque. peccare. Addit Calvinus in lib. iv. adversus Pi- ghium. Quintam causam ex Aristotele, lib. m. Ethicor. cap. 5. ubi docet Philosophus, hominem sponte fieri malum, cum posset non fieri, sed ubi talis effectus est, jam ne¬ cessario esse malum : sicut qui aegrotat, sponte et libere in morbum incidit, quia no¬ luit vitare res noxias, cum eas facile posset vitare, tamen posteaquam eegrotus factus est, necessario male valet : « Ita quoque (in¬ quit Calvinus) primus homo sponte ac libere peccando naturam corrupit, sed jam corru¬ pta natura necessario male operatur ». Addamus sextam causam ex Bucero et Kemnitio, qui probant, legis prsevaricatio- nem semper esse peccatum, sive sit volunta¬ ria, sive necessaria, quoniam in priore Joan- nis epistola cap. 3. peccatum definitur avopla id est , legis praevaricatio. Jam igitur si causas istas nihil ponderis habere demon- 70 LIBER V. straverimus, argumentum illud Catholico¬ rum robur suum ac vires integre relinebit. Ad primam causam respondeo, non eam- dem esse quaestionem, neque idem argumen¬ tum, quod nos objicimus Calvino, et quod olim Pelagiani objecerunt Augustino. Nam quaestio Pelagianorum non erat, an singula peccata vitari possent, sed an posset homo vivere sine omni peccato, etiam veniali, ut intelligi potest vel ex ipso titulo libri, de Perfectione justitiae, quem Calvinus citat. Respondit vero ad eam quaestionem Augu¬ stinus, ante peccatum Adae fuisse in homine libertatem vivendi sine omni peccato, nunc autem esse necessitatem habendi aliquod peccatum. Ideo autem haec necessitas haben¬ di peccatum, non facit, quominus peccatum sit vere peccatum, quoniam possunt vitari singula, quamvis non omnia. De qua re plu¬ ra paulo infra dicenda erunt. Ad secundam de corruptione naturae, re¬ spondeo, ex doctrina ejusdem Calvini. Ipse enim loco notato scribit, si peccata nostra orirentur ex corruptione nobis a Deo con¬ creata, justam excusationem peccatorum nos habituros apud Deum, tamquam nostrorum criminum auctorem. At ipse idem lib. ili. Institut. cap. 23. scribit, peccatum primi hominis, ex quo naturae corruptio orta est, fuisse Dei decreto, et inevitabili voluntate commissum. Habemus igitur excusationem apud Deum, si ex corruptione! in quam ejus decreto incidimus, et non ex nostra libera voluntate peccamus. Praeterea naturae cor¬ ruptio ex doctrina Calvini, est ipsum origi¬ nale peccatum, peccatum autem originale dimissum est in baptismo, vel ut non sit juxta veritatem, vel certe ut non imputetur juxta Calvini sententiam : igitur neque pec¬ cata illa imputari poterunt, quae ex ea cor¬ ruptione nascuntur, nisi accedat nova causa imputandi, id est, quod ita libera voluntate jam flant, ut etiam vitari potuerint. Ad tertiam, de peccatis daemonum, et bo¬ nis operibus Angelorum, respondeo, tam Angelos sanctos, quam malos daemones, re¬ spectu fluis ultimi, non habere liberum ar¬ bitrium a necessitate, sed solum a coactione : tamen respectu mediorum, liberum arbi- ' trium etiam a necessitate habere, quia multa faciunt, quae possent non facere, et contra ; et in hujusmodi, daemones vere peccare, et bonos Angelos opus vere laudaibile facere : quamvis nec poena, nec praemium essentiale crescere possit, cum utrique sint in termino, et omnia ipsorum opera ad exercitium dam¬ nationis, vel gloriae sempiternae pertineant. Itaque propositio illa Calvini, daemones semper necessario male agunt, in aliquo sen¬ su falsa est, in aliquo vera. Verum siquidem est in genere, eos non posse nisi male agere ; falsum tamen est in particulari, omnia mala, quae faciunt, illos necessario facere, possent enim (ut diximus) multa non facere, quae fa¬ ciunt, et ideo non necessitate, sed voluntate peccata committunt. Ad quartam, ex Bernardo respondimus, in iii. lib. cap. 6. summa est, hominem pec¬ catorem, dum in eo regnat cupiditas, non posse vitare peccatum, absolute autem pos¬ se, quia potest cum Dei adjutorio cupidita¬ tem exuere et induere charitatem. Ad quintam, ex Aristotele respondeo, tes¬ timonium illud Philosophi nihil ad rem pro¬ positam facere. Nam loquitur ille de habitu vitii, nos loquimur de actu. Quamvis autem, qui malum habitum con¬ traxit, non possit illum continuo expellere, et necessario sit vitiosus, sicut aegrotus ne¬ cessario male valet post contractam aegritu¬ dinem : tamen potest actum malum non exercere, cum habitus inclinent, sed nou cogant ; et ideo non necessitate, sed volun¬ tate perficit actum malum, et vere proprie- que peccat etiam ille, qui vitiosos habitus male vivendo contraxit. Sed quale est, ut Calvinus ab Aristotele subsidium contra li¬ bertatem arbitrii postulet, cum ille Philoso¬ phus in libro tertio Ethicorum, libertatem arbitrii studiosissime accuratissimcque de¬ fenderit? Ad sextam, ex definitione peccati ? Re¬ spondeo : in definitione peccati virtute conti¬ neri liberum arbitrium. Lex enim, quee in ea definitione manifeste ponitur, non datur nisi iis, qui liberum gerunt arbitrium. Nihil enim est aliud lex, nisi regula dirigens actiones. Frustra autem datur regula ei, qui non ha¬ bet in potestate actiones suas. Alioqui red¬ dant adversarii causam, cur bestiis nulla; praescribantur leges, si ad legis usum non rcquiriturlibertas arbitrii. Atque hinc rursus confirmatur, et insolubilius efficitur argu¬ mentum illud, quod frustra Calvinus solvere conatus est. Nam si quod sponte fit, licet necessario fiat, potest esse' peccatum pro¬ prie dictum, cur non vere propricquc pec- *Mnt infantes, furiosi, pecudes? CAPUT XV. 71