Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 15: The second argument for free choice in moral matters is brought forward and defended
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The second argument of the Catholics, proposed by Calvin (and, as he falsely believed, also solved), is this: “If there be not liberty of choice in man, there will be no place for punishment or reward; but that is refuted by the common consent and sense of the whole human race.” Which argument is drawn from Augustine, in the same chapter 14 of the same book On True Religion.
To this argument Calvin says three things. First, that this reasoning was indeed familiar to Chrysostom and Jerome, yet that the Pelagians also sometimes used the same. Second, that it does not follow that there will be no place for punishment, if there be no liberty of choice in man; for punishment is owed to fault, and the fault resides in us and flows from us: “For what does it matter,” says he, “whether one sin with free or with servile judgment, provided one sin by voluntary desire?” Third, he adds that good merits are rightly excluded by this, that there is no free choice in man; nor is that absurd, since, by the testimony of St. Augustine, God does not crown our merits, but his own gifts. And he cites some places of St. Augustine, with certain testimonies of divine Scripture adjoined. Let us now see what weight these three sayings of Calvin have.
To the first I reply three other things. First, I say: if we are to be reckoned Pelagians because we use an argument which the Pelagians of old used, certainly Calvin and his fellows will have to be reckoned Manichaeans, since the same argument which we use against Calvin was of old used by Chrysostom, Jerome, Augustine, and the other ancient Fathers against the Manichaeans. Second, I ask of Calvin — seeing he says that Jerome and Pelagius used the same argument — did they wish to prove the same thing, or diverse things? For if they wished to prove diverse things, it will not be true that they used the same argument; for it cannot be that men not foolish — and such certainly Jerome and Pelagius were not — should have wished to apply the same argument to proving diverse things. If they wished to prove the same thing, then Jerome and Pelagius thought the same; how then did Jerome fight so keenly against the Pelagians, if he thought the same as Pelagius? But these things left aside, I say, third, that our Fathers and Pelagius drew their argument from the same principle, but that the argument of our Fathers was plainly of iron, while that of Pelagius was of reed. For Chrysostom and Jerome, against the Manichaeans, most efficaciously prove from punishments and rewards the liberty of choice — which we, the sons of those Fathers, now do against the Calvinists, the sons of the Manichaeans; and the same did Augustine and all the other Fathers against the same Manichaean heretics, whose testimonies will be brought forward in their place. But the Pelagians strove to prove from punishments and rewards, not that free choice is not, but that it does not need grace; for thus Calvin himself reports from the Pelagians: “If the grace of God acts in us, then it, and not we who do not labor, will be crowned.” Which argument is no less feeble than the contrary one of the Calvinists, who from the necessity of grace contend that there is no liberty of choice. For the aid of grace and the liberty of choice do not fight between themselves, nor does the one destroy or hinder the other; but rather the one is wonderfully helped by the other, as the infirm man and the staff. For the infirm man cannot walk without a staff; yet he, helped by the staff, truly walks, and also walks freely, since he can, if he will, not walk. And so much for Calvin’s first saying.
To the second I answer briefly: Calvin commits that sin which the dialecticians call begging the principle. For he assumes what he ought to have proved: namely, that the fault resides in us and flows from us, even though we work driven by necessity, and can in no way avoid the sin. For this is what is placed in controversy: whether that is true fault which cannot be avoided. And when he asks, “What does it matter whether one sin with free or with servile judgment, provided one sin by voluntary desire?” — I answer: it matters as much as the difference between a man and a beast. For as animal is the genus for man and beast, so the voluntary — that is, the spontaneous — is the genus for the free and the not-free. And so man sins, because he acts of his own accord and freely; beasts do not sin, because they work spontaneously, but not freely.
To Calvin’s last saying I answer that it is destroyed and overturned by itself. For if there is no place for good merit without free choice, by the same reasoning there will be no place for evil merit; for the same liberty is required for good and for evil merit, for reward and for punishment. And so when Calvin, to that argument — if there is no liberty of choice, there will be no place for punishment or reward — denies the consequence as to punishments and concedes it as to rewards, with one part of his response he overturns the other. But perhaps he was not so inept that, having denied the consequence as to punishments, he should afterwards concede the same as to rewards? Behold, then, his own words, book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 5, § 2: “Acutely indeed do they observe this, that no place now remains for merits, if they do not proceed from the fountain of free choice. But in that they hold this to be so greatly discordant, they wander far astray. For Augustine does not hesitate everywhere to set down as necessary what they think it impious to confess.” Thus he — who, as he ineptly denied part of the consequence and granted part, so not without great fraud adduces the testimonies of Augustine and of Scripture, to destroy the merits of good works. For whereas he ought to prove that there are no human merits even with the grace of God helping — that thence he might overturn the liberty of choice — he proves that there are no good merits without grace, which no Catholic denies.
The places he adduces are these. The first, from epistle 52 [al. 54] to Macedonius: “What are the merits of any men whatsoever? For when he came, not with the wages that were owed, but with free grace, he — alone free from sin, and the deliverer — found all men sinners.” The second, from the preface on Psalm 31: “If what is owed thee be rendered thee, thou must be punished. What then is done? God has not rendered thee the punishment owed, but has given thee the grace not owed.” And below: “If thou wouldst be a stranger to grace, boast thy merits.” The third, from the second discourse on Psalm 70: “Thou art nothing through thyself; invoke God: thine are the sins, the merits are God’s. Punishment is owed thee; and when the reward shall come, he will crown his own gifts, not thy merits.” The fourth, from sermon 15 on the words of the Apostle: “Merit is from grace, not grace from merit.” By all these testimonies St. Augustine teaches nothing else than that man can do nothing without grace in order to salvation, and that there are no merits of men which are not gifts of God, by reason of preceding grace — as he himself explains in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 6: “If they so understood our merits as to know that they too are gifts of God, this opinion would not have to be rejected; but since they so preach human merits as to say that man has them from himself, most rightly is it altogether answered them: God crowns his own gifts, not thy merits, if they are to thee from thyself. For if they are such, they are evil; and what things are evil, God does not crown,” etc. And so St. Augustine denies that any human merits are crowned by God except those which are in us from ourselves without the aid of grace. And since all Catholics embrace and preach this, Calvin lies when he says that we think it impious to confess what Augustine sets down as necessary. And that human merits, in respect of everlasting beatitude, are not denied by Augustine, Calvin could have learned from that very epistle to Macedonius (to omit others now). For in it he speaks thus of eternal life: “This is the reward of the pious.” And below: “Accustom thyself, I beseech thee, good man, to be blessed meanwhile in hope, that thou mayst be so also in fact, when to most persevering piety shall be repaid the wages of eternal felicity.” And below: “The good life is now led, and afterwards its reward, the blessed life, which cannot but be eternal, is paid in full.” And below: “Here the virtues are in act, there in effect; here in the work, there in the wages.” Thus he.
With equal good faith the same Calvin cites three places of the Apostle — two for himself, one against himself. For himself he adduces these: Whom he predestinated, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified, Romans 8. And: What hast thou that thou hast not received? 1 Corinthians 4. But what, I beseech you, do these make against the true merits of the Saints? The Apostle teaches that the grace of God is always necessary — in the beginning, in the middle, in the end. Who of us denies this? He teaches that the justified are glorified — because, namely, being justified freely, they did just works, to which the crown of justice is owed. Who of us does not most gratefully confess this? He teaches that we have received all things from God — nature, grace, good merits, eternal life; nor does any Catholic deny this. But as good merits are born from grace, so we do not doubt that the wages flow from the merits — the same Apostle saying, 2 Timothy 4 (which place Calvin adduces against himself): There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day. “But,” says Calvin, “why, the Apostle being witness, are the faithful crowned? Because by the mercy of the Lord, not by their own industry, they have been elected, and called, and justified.” But the Apostle does not say this; nor does he in this place call eternal life a crown of mercy, but of justice; nor does he say it is given, but rendered; nor rendered by a Father, but by a Judge; nor by a kindly Judge, but a just one. And although it is true that eternal life is a gift of the Father’s mercy, on account of preceding grace — according to that: The grace of God, life everlasting, Romans 6 — yet it is also true that it is a crown of justice, and is rendered by a just judge on account of good works: “Since” (as is had in the Council of Orange, canon 18) “wages are owed to works, if they be done; but grace, which is not owed, goes before, that they may be done.” These things about merits the disputation brought in by Calvin outside the matter proposed has forced us to say in passing.
That we may return, then, to the matter: that argument of the Catholics which is taken from punishments and rewards can be confirmed by this reason. The notion of what is owed — whether it be an owed punishment or an owed reward — necessarily demands that what is given be one’s own; for if someone give a thing not his own but another’s, nothing will on that account be owed him by right. But nothing is one’s own except that of which we are lords; and we are lords only of that which is in our power, so that we are able, at our choice, to give or not give, to do or not do. St. Hilary, canon 6 [al. 4] on Matthew: “From what is ours must that blessed eternity be earned; something must be performed from what is our own.” And St. Paulinus, in epistle 2 to Severus: “What thanks have we, if we shall have been faithful only in what is another’s, unless we serve from our own?” Blessed Paul himself also said for this reason, Romans 7: If I do that which I will not, it is no more I that work it — since nothing is ours, nor do we properly do anything, except what we do freely. Wherefore, although the beasts serve us most usefully in many things, yet we think no reward owed to them, since they serve not freely, but from necessity. It is clear, then, that if there be no liberty of choice, there will be (as we said at the beginning) no place for punishments or rewards; and that Calvin sweated in vain in the solution of this argument.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XV. Ad, fertur et defenditur secundum argumentum , pro libero arbitrio in rebus moralibus. Argumentum secundum Catholicorum a Calvino propositum, atque (ut ipse falso cre¬ didit, etiam solutum) tale est : « Si non sit in homine libertas arbitrii, nullus erit poenae aut prajmio locus, id autem communi totius hamani generis consensu , sensuque refel¬ litur ». Quod argumentum depromptum est ex Augustino, in eodem cap. 14. ejusdem libri, de vera religione. Ad hoc argumentum Calvinus tria dicit. Primo, fuisse quidem hanc ratiocinationem Ghrysostomo et Hieronymo familiarem, ea¬ dem tamen usos esse quandoque Pelagianos. Secundo , non sequi , nullum foi'e locum poena;, si nulla sit in homine libertas arbi¬ trii. Nam poena deb.etur culpa; ; culpa vero in nobis residet, et a nobis manat : « Quid enim refert, inquit, libero ne, an servili ju¬ dicio, modo voluntaria cupiditate peccetur? » Tertio addit, recte bona merita excludi, ex eo, quod non sit in homine liberum arbi¬ trium : neque id esse absurdum, cum testi¬ monio sancti Augustini, Deus non coronet merita nostra, sed munera sua. Et citat ali¬ quot loca S. Augustini, adjunctis etiam qui¬ busdam testimoniis divina; Scriptura;. Vi¬ deamus nunc, quid ponderis habeant tria ista dicta Calvini. Ad primum, refero alia tria. Primum, dico, si propterea nos Pclagiani censendi sumus, quoniam utimur argumento, quo utebantur olim Pelagiani, certe Calvinus, ejusque so¬ dales Manichaei censendi erunt , quoniam eodem argumento, quo nos utimur contra Calvinum utebantur olim Chrysostomus , Hieronymus, Augustinus, aliique Patres ve¬ teres, contra Manichaeos. Secundo, quaero a Calvino, quandoquidem ipse dicit , eadem argumento usos fuisse Hieronymum et Pelagium, idem ne eos pro¬ bare | voluisse, an diversa? Nam si pro¬ bare volebant diversa, non erit verum, eo¬ dem illos argumento usos. Neque enim fieri potest, ut homines non stulti, quales certe non erant Hieronymus et Pelagius, idem ar¬ gumentum ad res diversas probandas adhi¬ bere voluerint. Si probare volebant idem ; idem igitur sentiebant Hieronymus ct Pela¬ gius ; quomodo igitur Hieronymus tam acri¬ ter pugnabat contra Pelagianos, si idem cum Pelagio sentiebat? Sed his omissis. Dico tertio, ex eodem principio duxisse argumentum Patres nostros, et Pelagium , sed argumentum Patrum nostrorum fuisse plane ferreum, Pelagii vero arundineum. Chrysostomus enim et Hieronymus contra Manicha;os efficacissime probant ex poenis et praemiis arbitrii libertatem, quod nos eorum Patrum filii modo facimus , contra Mani¬ chaeorum filios Calvinistas ; et idem fecerunt Augustinus , aliique Patres omnes contra eosdem haereticos Manichaeos, quorum tes¬ timonia suo loco proferentur. Pelagiani autem ex poenis et praemiis pro¬ bare nitebantur, non liberum arbitrium non esse, sed gratia non indigere, sic enim ex Pelagianis Calvinus ipse refert ; « Si gratia Dei in nobis agit, illa ergo non nos, qui non laboramus, coronabitur ». Quod argumen¬ tum non minus debile est, quam contrarium Calvinistarum, qui ex gratiae necessitate con¬ tendunt, nullam esse arbitrii libertatem. Si¬ quidem adjutorium gratiae, et libertas ar¬ bitrii non pugant inter se, neque unum al¬ terum destruit aut impedit, sed mirifice potius alterum juvatur ab altero, quemad¬ modum infirmus et baculus. Neque enim infirmus sine baculo ambulare potest, ipse tamen adjutus baculo vere ambulat, ct li¬ bere etiam ambulat’, cum possit, si velit, non ambulare. Atque haec de primo Calvini dicto. Ad Secundum breviter respondeo, Calvi¬ num peccatum illud committere, quod dia¬ lectici vocant petitionem principii. Assumit enim id, quod probare debuisset, culpam videlicet in nobis residere, et a nobis pro- manare, etiamsi necessitate adacti operemur, nec peccatum ulla ratione vitare possimus. Id enim est positum in controversia, sitne vera culpa, quae vitari non potest. Cum autem rogat, quid referat, libero ne, an servili judicio, modo voluntaria cupiditate peccetur? Respondeo, tantum referre, quan¬ tum interest inter hominem et pecudem. Nam quemadmodum animal est genus ad hominem et pecudem ; ita voluntarium , id est, spontaneum, ad liberum et non libe¬ rum. Itaque homo peccat, quia sponte libe- reque agit ; pecudes non peccant , quia spontanee, sed non libere operantur. Ad Postremum Calvini dictum respondeo, 72 LIBER V. / ipsum a se destrui, atque everti. Nam si non est locus bono merito sine libero arbitrio, eadem ratione non erit locus malo merito, eadem enim libertas ad bonum et malum meritum, ad praemium et paenam requiritur. Itaque cum Calvinus ad argumentum illud, si nulla est arbitrii libertas, nullus erit poenae aut praemio locus , negat consecutionem quantum ad poenas, et concedit quantum ad praemia, una parte responsionis alteram evertit. At rfortasse non fuit tam ineptus, ut cum negasset consecutionem quoad poenas, eam- dem postea concederet quoad praemia. En igitur verba ipsius libri secundi Institut. cap. 5. §. 2. « Acute sane, inquit, hoc animad¬ vertunt, nullum jam superesse locum me¬ ritis, si non ex liberi arbitrii fonte prodeunt. Sed quod istud tantopere dissentaneum esse ducunt, longe aberrant, Neque enim dubitat Augustinus passim pro necessario ducere, quod uti nefas confiteri putant » . Haec ille. Qui sicut inepte partem consecutionis, par¬ tem negavit, ita non sine magna fraude tes¬ timonia Augustini et Scripturae adducit, ut merita bonorum operum destruat. Nam cum probare deberet, nulla esse merita humana, etiam adjuvante gratia Dei, ut inde arbitrii libertatem everteret : ipse probat, nulla esse bona merita, sine gratia, quod nemo Catho¬ licorum negat. Loca quae ipse adducit, haec sunt. Pri¬ mum, ex epist. 52. ad Macedonium : « Me¬ rita quorumlibet hominum quae sunt? quando ille non cum mercede debita, sed cum gra¬ tuita venit, omnes peccatores solus a pec cato [liber, et liberator invenit ». Alterum, ex praefatione in Psalm. xxx,i. « Si redditur tibi quod debetur, puniendus. Quid ergo fit? non tibi reddidit Deus debitam poenam, sed donavit indebitam gratiam ». Et infra : « Si vis alienus esse a gratia, jacta merita tua ». Tertium, ex concion. 2. in Psalm. lxx. « Nihil es per te, Deum invoca; tua peccata sunt, merita Dei sunt. Supplicium tibi debetur, et cum praemium venerit, sua dona coronabit, non merita tua ». Quartum, ex serm. 15. de verbis Apostoli : « Meritum ex gratia, non gratia ex merito est » . His omnibus testinloniis nihil aliud S. Au¬ gustinus docet , nisi hominem nihil posse sine gratia in ordine ad salutem, et nulla esse merita hominum, quae non sint Dei mu¬ nera, ratione praecedentis gratiae, ut ipse ex plicat in lib. de gratia, et libero arbitrio, cap. 6. « Si merita nostra, inquit, sic intel- ligerent, ut etiam ipsa Dei dona esse cognos¬ cerent, non esset reprobanda ista sententia, quoniam vero merita humana sic praedicant, ut ea ex semetipso habere hominem dicant, prorsus rectissime illis dicitur, dona sua co¬ ronat Deus, non merita tua, si tibi a teipso sunt. Haec enim si talia sunt, mada sunt : quae mala sunt, non coronat Deus ete » . Itaque non alia merita humana, S. Augus¬ tinus negat coronari a Deo, nisi illa, quae sint in nobis a nobis sine adjutorio gratiae. Quod cum omnes Catholici amplectantur, et praedicent; mentitur Calvinus, cum dicit, nos putare nefas, confiteri id, quod Augu¬ stinus pro necessario ponit. Non negari au¬ tem ab Augustino merita humana respectu sempiternae beatitudinis, ex illa ipsa epist. ad Macedonium (ut alia nunc omittamus) Calvinus discere potuisset. Nam in ea sic loquitur de vita aeterna : « Hoc piorum prae¬ mium est. Et infra : Assuesce, obsecro, te, vir bone , beatus esse interim spe, ut sis etiam re, cum pietati perseverantissimae re¬ tribuetur merces fcelicitatis aeternae. Et in¬ fra : Bona vita nunc agitur, et postea prae¬ mium ejus, quae nisi aeterna esse non potest, beata vita persolvitur. Et infra : Hic sunt vir- tutes in actu, ibi in effectu, hic in opere, ibi in mercede » (1). Haec ille. Pai'i fide citat idem Calvinus tria loca Apostoli, duo pro se, unum contra se. Pro se adducit illa : Quos praedestinavit , hos vo¬ cavit , quos vocavit , hos justificavit; quos justi¬ ficavit, hos inaynificavit. Rom. vm. Et : Quid habes, quod nonaccepistil ad Corinth. iv. (2) ? Sed quid haec (obseci*o) faciunt conti’a vera me¬ rita Sanctorum? Docet Apostolus, gratiam Deisemper esse necessariam, in principio, in medio, in fine. Quis nostrum hoc negat? Docet magnificari justificatos, quia videlicet justificati gratis, opera justa [fecerunt, qui¬ bus debeiotur corona justitiae. Quis nostrum hoc non gratissime confitetur? docet a Deo nos omnia accepisse, naturam, gi'atiam, bona merita, vitam aeternam, neque id ullus Catholicorum inficiatur. Sed sicut bona me¬ rita nasci ex gratia, ita mcrcedem ex meri¬ tis promanare, non dubitamus, dicente eo¬ dem Aposto]p, II ad Thimoth. iv. (quem locum coptra se Calvinus adducit) Reposita (1) Rom. VIII, 30. - (2) Corin. IV, 7. CAPUT XVI. 73 est mihi corona justitiae , quam reddet mihi ih illa die justus judex (1). « At (inquit Calvinus) cur, teste Apostolo, coronantur fideles? quia Domini miseri¬ cordia non sua industria, et electi, et vocati, et justificati sunt. » Sed non hoc dicit Apo¬ stolus, neque vocat hoc loco vitam aeternam, coronam misericordiae, sed justitiae; nec dicit donari, sed reddi; nec reddi a Patre, sed a Judice; nec a Judice benigno, sed justo. Et quamvis verum sit, vitam aeternam esse donum Patris misericordiae propter gra¬ tiam praecedentem, juxta illud : Gratia Dei vita wterjia , ad Itom . vi (2), tamen verum est etiam, eanfesse coronam justitiae, etreddi a justo judice propter opera bona : « Quo¬ niam (ut habetur in Concilio Arausicano can. 18.) merces debetur operibus, si fiant, sed gratia, quae non debetur, praecedit, ut fiant ». Haec de meritis, nos mpipqoK, dicere coegit a Calvino extra rem propositam allata disputatio. Ut igitur redeamus ad rem, argumentum illud Catholicorum, quod sumitur ex poenis, et praemiis, hac ratione confirmari potest. Ratio debiti, sive poenae, sive praemii debi¬ tum sit, id necessario postulat, ut id quod datur sit proprium. Nam si quis rem non suam, sed alienam donet, nihil ei propterea jure debebitur. Non est autem proprium, nisi id, cujus domini sumus : illius vero tantum domini sumus, quod est in potestate nostra, ita ut dare vel non dare, facere vel non fa¬ cere pro arbitrio valeamus. S. Hilarius, can. 6. in Matth. « De nostro, inquit, est beata illa mternitas promerenda, praestandumque est aliquid ex proprio ». Et S. Paulinus, in epist. 2. ad Severum : « Qua; nobis, inquit, est gratia, si in alieno tantum fideles fuerimus, nisi de proprio servia¬ mus? » Ipse etiam B. Paulus ideo dixit, ad Itom. vil. Si quod nolo facio , jam non eejo operor illud (3). Quoniam non est nostrunt , neque nes proprie facimus, nisi quod libere facimus. Quocirca tametsi bestia; nobis mul¬ tis in rebus utilissime serviant, nihil tamen eis praunii deberi putamus, quoniam non libere, sed ex necessitate deserviunt. Per¬ spicuum igitur est, si nulla sit libertas arbi¬ trii, nullum fore (ut initio dicebamus) poenis, aut praemiis locum, frustra Calvinum in hujus argumenti solutione sudasse.