Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 16: The third argument for free choice in moral matters is proposed and defended
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The third argument brought forward by Calvin for the Catholics is this: “If there were not liberty of choice in men, some would not be good and others evil, but all would be good, or all evil; and if all were good, some would not be better than others, but all equally good; and if all were evil, some would not be worse than others, but all equally evil. But that this is false experience teaches so openly that it can in no way be denied.”
Calvin answers that this argument is taken from Chrysostom, homily 22 on Genesis, and from Ambrose (or rather Prosper), in book 2 On the Vocation of the Gentiles, chapter 4; yet that it is not solid, because the diversity of good and evil which is discerned in men does not arise from free choice, but from the divine election. For men in the state of corrupt nature are all evil; but it pleased God, by his election, to make some of them good, and to leave others to be evil.
But we, in the first place, judge that Calvin will not take it ill if we prefer to follow and hear Chrysostom and Prosper rather than himself — especially since Augustine wrote the same thing, after Chrysostom and before Prosper, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 34 [al. 28]. Then we say that that argument of the Catholics is most solid, and can in no way be dissolved through the divine election and reprobation. For the divine election, that it may make men good, prerequires in them the liberty of choice; otherwise election could make morally good even infants and madmen — nay, even oxen and horses — if liberty of choice were not required for moral goodness. And so St. Bernard rightly writes, at the beginning of the book On Grace and Free Choice, that without either of these salvation cannot be accomplished: for if there is no free choice, there is nothing to be saved; if there is no grace, there is nothing whereby it may be saved. And in the same way it can be said: if there is no free choice, there is nothing to be made good; if there is no grace, there is nothing whereby it may be made so. There would not, then, be some good and others evil, unless there were liberty of choice.
Moreover, why among the evil some are worse than others — certainly the cause cannot be referred to the divine election, since that does not make, but permits, men to be evil. Whence, then, so great a diversity among evil men — that some detest many vices in which others wonderfully delight, and some are moderately, others middlingly, others extremely evil — unless on account of the liberty of choice?
Finally, why among the good some advance more from day to day, and persevere even to the end, while others fail, and miserably fall and perish — no reason can be rendered, unless there be in man free choice. For the election of God is to no one a cause of falling; nor does God desert anyone, unless he be first deserted by him, as St. Augustine teaches, in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 26, tractate 2 on John, and elsewhere. Nay, Scripture itself teaches this, in the second book of Paralipomenon, chapter 15: The Lord is with you, because you have been with him — or more clearly, according to the interpretation of the seventy men: As long as you are with him. If you forsake him, he will forsake you. And in Psalm 36: Decline from evil, and do good, and dwell for ever and ever; for the Lord loveth judgment, and will not forsake his saints. They, therefore, who from good become evil could have not become so — because they would not be deserted by God unless they themselves first deserted God — and thereby they become evil freely. Wherefore, unless there were liberty of choice, as the argument of the Catholics rightly proves, there would not be that diversity of good and evil which we discern among men.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVI. Proponitur et defenditur tertium argumentum pro libero arbitrio in moralibus. Argumentum tertium a Calvino pro Catho¬ licis allatum, hoc est ; « Si non esset in ho¬ minibus libertas arbitrii, nou essent alii boni, alii mali, sed omnes boni, aut onpnes mali, et si essent omnes boni, non essent alii aliis meliores, sed omnes a;que boni ; et si essent omnes mali, non essent alii aliis pejores, sed omnes a;que mali. Id autem falsum esse tam aperte -experientia docet, ut nulla ratione ne¬ gari possit i) . < . Respondet Calvinus, hoc argumentum esse acceptum ex Chrysostomo, hom. 2. in Genes, ct Ambrosio (seu potius) Prospero in lib. u. de vocatione gentium cap. 4. tamen non esse solidum, propterea quod diversitas bonorum et malorum, qua; in hominibus cernitur, non oriatur ex libero arbitrio, sed ex electione divina. Homines enim in statu natura; cor¬ rupta;, omnes esse malos, sed placuisse Deo, alios ex illis electione sua bonos facere, alios relinquere ut sint mali. At nos in primis existimamus, Calvinum non asgre laturum, si velimus potius Chry- sostomum et Prosperum sequi, ct audire, quam ipsum, praesertim cum rem eandem post Chrysostomum et ante Prosperum , scripserit Augustinus in libro de spiritu et littera cap. 34. Deinde dicimus, argumentum illud Catholicorum solidissimum esse, neque per divinam electionem et reprobationem ullo modo posse dissolvi. Nam electio divina, ut homines faciat bonos, pra;requirit in illis arbitrii libertatem. Alioquin etiam infantes et furiosos immo etiam boves, et equos pos¬ set electio facere bonos moralitei’, si libertas arbitrii ad moralem bonitatem non require¬ retur. Itaque recte scribit sanctus Bernardus, initio libri de gratia et libero, arbitrio, sine altero horum, salutem perfici non posse. Nam si non est liberum arbitrium, non est quod salvetur: si non est gratia, non est. nu¬ de salvetur. Et eodem modo dici potest, si non est liberum arbitrium, non est quod bonum fiat ; si non est gratia, non est uude fiat; non igitur essent alii boni, alii mali, nisi esset libertas arbitrii. (1) II Tim. IV, 8. — (:>) Rom. VI, 53. - (3) Rom. VII, 10. Tom. VI. 6 u LIBER V. Praeterea cur inter malos alii sint aliis de¬ teriores, certe non potest causa referri in electionem divinam, cum illa non faciat, sed sinat esse malos. Unde igitur tanta diversi¬ tas inter homines malos, ut alii multa vitia detestentur, quibus alii mirifice delectantur, et alii modice, alii mediocriter, alii extreme sint mali, nisi propter arbitrii libertatem? Denique cur inter bonos alii proficiant in dies magis, et perseverent usque in finem, alii deficiant, et misere cadant, ac pereant, non potost reddi ratio, nisi sit in homine liberum arbitrium . Siquidem electio Dei nulli est causa cadendi, neque Deus ullum deserit, nisi prius ab illo deseratur, ut S. Augustinus docet, in lib. de natura et gratia cap. 26. tract. 2. in Joan. et alibi. Immo Scriptura ipsa hoc docet, in ii. lib. Parali- pomenon cap. xv. Dominus, vobiscum est , quia vos fuistis cum illo (1). Vel clarius secundum interpretationem septuaginta virorum: Quam- diu vos estis cum illo. Si dereliqueritis eum , derelinquet vos. Et in Ps. xxxvi. Declina a malo , et fac bonum , et inhabita in saeculum saeculi , quia Dominus amat judicium , et non derelinquet sanctos suos (2). Illi igitur qui fiunt ex bonis mali, poterant non fieri, quia non desererentur a Deo, nisi prius ipsi desererent Deum, ac per hoc libere fiunt mali. Quare nisi esset libertas arbitrii, ut argumentum Catholicorum recte probat, non esset ista, quam cernimus inter homines , bonorum, malorumque diversitas.