Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 17: The fourth argument for free choice in moral matters is proposed and defended
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The fourth argument, and likewise the last, which Calvin brings forward for the Catholics is of this kind: “If free choice be taken from the human race in the actions of morals, at the same time there will necessarily also be taken away exhortations, chidings, praises, censures, precepts, counsels, admonitions, and other things of that kind. For to what end should you praise or censure, admonish, command, reprehend, exhort, if men cannot do other than they do?”
Calvin answers in two ways. First, he admonishes us to be content with the examples of Christ and the Saints. For Christ said, Without me you can do nothing, John 15 — and yet he exhorted and rebuked all. The Apostle too testified, Romans 9, that it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy; and 1 Corinthians 3, that neither he that planteth is any thing, nor he that watereth — and yet he did not cease to exhort and rebuke all. The Prophets themselves also exhorted and rebuked men assiduously, and yet cried out that it is proper to God to circumcise hearts, and to give hearts of flesh for hearts of stone. Finally, St. Augustine, on account of this very objection, wrote an entire book, which he willed to be named On Correction and Grace; in which book, chapter 3, he speaks thus: “O man, in the precept learn what thou oughtest to have; in the correction learn that by thine own fault thou hast it not; in prayer learn whence thou mayst receive what thou wishest to have.” And chapter 6: “Let the damnable origin be rebuked, that from the pain of the rebuke the will of regeneration may arise — if, however, he who is rebuked is a son of the promise.” Then he answers that rebukes and exhortations are useful even if free choice be not present: for they are applied to the reprobate as a scourge of conscience in this life, and as a testimony in the other, that they may be made inexcusable at the tribunal of the Lord; but to the elect, that through the external word they may be aroused, as through the spirit they are inwardly illuminated, and may be prepared, through the external rebuke of the word, for receiving grace. But each response of Calvin can be refuted with little labor.
As to the former: we judge that from the examples of Christ and the Saints free choice is efficaciously proved. For since no one — unless he utterly lack judgment — exhorts or rebukes infants or the insane, but only adults and those in possession of their mind, we gather that they only are capable of exhortation and rebuke who have the use of free choice; for there is no other difference between insane men and sane, except that the former, after the manner of cattle, are carried by a certain natural instinct, and cannot do otherwise, while the latter by free judgment choose what they shall do, and can, if it so please them, not choose. And so, to exhort a man not free to choose the good, and to rebuke him if he choose not, would be like exhorting a man shut up in prison to run through the fields, and reprehending him if he did not obey. Calvin refutes this similitude: for he says it is one thing that a man tyrannically bound by another cannot run about through the fields, another that a man made evil by his own fault can now not choose the good. But imagine someone who by his own fault has fallen into a well: would he rightly be admonished to come out, and chided if he did not obey? He would indeed rightly be chided for having thrown himself into the well, since he had it in his power not to throw himself in; but he would not rightly be chided for not coming out thence, if that were now not in his power.
To those objections from Scripture — Without me you can do nothing; and, It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth; and, Neither he that planteth is any thing, nor he that watereth — I answer: by these testimonies it is rightly proved that free choice needs the grace of God. But that grace which is necessary for doing what God commands, or to which he exhorts, is wanting to no one; and therefore (as St. Leo writes, sermon 16 on the passion of the Lord) the Lord rightly presses with the precept, because he runs before with help. To the objection from Augustine, in the book On Correction and Grace, I answer: Augustine in that whole book assumes as certain that to those who are rebuked the help of grace is not wanting, by which they can, if they will, profit from the rebuke. For when he says, chapter 3, “O man, in the precept learn what thou oughtest to have; in the correction acknowledge that by thine own fault thou hast it not; in prayer learn whence thou mayst receive what thou wishest to have” — certainly he does not doubt that to him who is rebuked, and commanded to pray, the help is not wanting by which he can pray. And when in chapter 5 he says, “Whoever thou art who wilt not be rebuked, for this very reason must thou be rebuked, that thou wilt not be rebuked; for thou wilt not have thy vices shown thee” — he sets down as established that the man who is reprehended because he will not be rebuked could have willed to admit the rebuke. And in chapter 6, when he says, “Let the damnable origin be rebuked, that from the pain of the rebuke the will of regeneration may arise” — without doubt he takes as certain that he who is rebuked can grieve and blush, and from that grief conceive the desire of a better life. Otherwise he would be most foolish who rebuked a sinner for this cause, that in him from the pain of the rebuke the will of regeneration might arise, unless he believed he could grieve if he would; for else he would apply a cause which he knew could effect nothing. And that clause — “if, however, he who is rebuked is a son of the promise” — does not signify that he who is not a son of the promise cannot be converted, but that he will not in fact be converted, though he can be. For the same Augustine, in the same book, chapter 7 [al. 11], most openly writes that even they can persevere who in fact are not going to persevere, and are deservedly accused and punished because they do not persevere: “For it can be said to him: in that which thou hadst heard and held, thou wouldst have persevered, if thou hadst willed.” And that it may be most clearly perceived that this book On Correction and Grace helps Calvin’s cause nothing at all, it is to be observed that Augustine wrote at the same time the book On Correction and Grace, and the book On Grace and Free Choice, and epistle 46 [al. 214] — for all these were written to Valentinus, on occasion of certain of his Monks, who so defended the grace of God as to deny free choice. In that epistle 46 to Valentinus, then, Augustine uses this very argument of ours, which Calvin strives to solve out of Augustine: “Unless there were free choice of the will,” says he, “it would not be said in the Psalm: Understand, ye senseless among the people; and, you fools, be wise at last.” Where Augustine proves free choice from admonition and rebuke. And he has like things in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 2. How then is it credible that Augustine, in the book On Correction and Grace written to Valentinus, wished to destroy what he had written at almost the same time, and on the same occasion, to the same Valentinus? And so much for Calvin’s former response.
I come to the latter, in which Calvin, according to his supreme knowledge of Dialectic, begs the principle. For when he says that the reprobate are to be rebuked — though they sin necessarily — that the rebuke may be to them in this life a scourge of conscience, and in the other a testimony, to render them inexcusable at the tribunal of the Lord, he assumes as altogether certain that what is done necessarily can be sin properly so called. But about this very thing is our whole controversy. And so I deny that a rebuke will be a scourge of conscience to him who lacks liberty of choice; I deny also that he will be inexcusable before God. Nay, this very thing will most easily excuse him, both in conscience and before God, if he shall be able truly to say that he sinned not by free will, but by compelling necessity. But, says Calvin, “experience testifies that even the most abandoned sinners feel the scourge of conscience when they are rebuked.” I confess it; but hence the liberty of choice is most openly proved. For they are scourged and blush precisely because they are conscious to themselves that they could have avoided the sin, had they been willing to apply diligence. By like reasoning, the other part of the same response — which holds that the elect are rebuked that they may be prepared, through the external word, for the internal renewal — confirms free choice. For if he who has sinned is rebuked that he may prepare himself for renewal, then he who is rebuked does not will to be prepared, and yet can will to be prepared for renewal; for if he wills to be prepared, to what end is he rebuked? If he cannot will to be prepared, is he not also rebuked in vain?
But not only does Calvin, by this latter response, fail to solve the argument of the Catholics; he also falls into several snares, from which he will not easily extricate himself. For he wrote that through exhortation the elect are prepared to receive the grace by which they obey the exhortation itself. For these are his words, book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 5, § 5: “For the receiving of this very grace, by which it comes to pass that the exhortation is obeyed, he wills that we be prepared through the exhortation.” And below: “In two ways God works in his elect: within, through the Spirit; without, through the word. By the Spirit, illuminating their minds, forming their hearts to the love and cultivation of justice, he makes them a new creature; by the word, he arouses them to desire, to seek, and to attain the same renewal.” Thus he. From these words it follows, first, that man can, without grace, through the external word, be prepared for grace, and desire and seek it. For Calvin distinguishes the operation of the word from the operation of the spirit, and will have the operation of the word — by which man is prepared for grace — to be prior, and the operation of the spirit — which brings grace itself — posterior. But this is the Pelagian error, which Calvin says he wishes to refute. How then does he not fight with himself, who teaches that very error which he strives to refute? Calvin answers, book 4 against Pighius, that the ministry of the word is called the ministry of the spirit because God, through his spirit, engraves in the hearts of men that which the preacher of the word speaks to the ears — not before, nor after, but at the same time; so that the external operation through the word, and the internal through the spirit, are done altogether together. But that response does not loosen the knot, but binds it tighter. For God’s engraving the word of exhortation in hearts either is to persuade it efficaciously, and thereby to make the man assent; or is to bring it about that it be thought, or understood, yet not persuaded. If he shall say the first, that fourth book against Pighius will fight with book 2 of the Institutes. For in book 2 of the Institutes, as we have already cited, Calvin says in express words that through the word man is prepared to desire and seek that grace of the spirit by which it comes to pass that the word is obeyed — accordingly, that the operation of the word preparing is prior to that of the spirit inwardly persuading; but in book 4 against Pighius he says that both are together, and that without any other preparation the word uttered without is engraved within by the spirit — that is, efficaciously persuaded. If he shall say the second, he will not exclude the Pelagian error. For grace for thinking and understanding is not enough, according to the Catholic faith; but grace is required for desiring, and seeking, and altogether for preparing oneself for renewal. Nor would Augustine excuse from Pelagianism him who should say that, after the word of exhortation has been heard by the body and perceived by the heart, a man can by his own powers, by desiring and seeking grace, prepare himself for it. It follows, second, from those words of Calvin cited above, that before the renewal of man, which is done through the spirit, something of good can be pressed out of the man himself — namely, the desire of that very renewal, and the preparation for the same. But this openly clashes with what the same Calvin writes in the same book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 3, § 6, where he says that nothing of good can ever be pressed out of the human heart, unless it become utterly other through renewal — that is, unless from stony it become fleshly. For it cannot be denied that the preparation and desire of renewal, which is wrought through the word in a heart not yet renewed, is good. It follows, third, that that preparation is both prior and posterior to the renewal itself — which things are repugnant. For according to the principles of Calvin, and of all the heretics of this time, the renewal of man is done through faith alone. But faith, according to the Scriptures, precedes prayer: For how shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? Romans 10. And besides, prayer, unless it be made from faith, avails nothing. Renewal, therefore, precedes prayer, and thereby the desire, and the seeking, and the preparation; and yet the preparation, the desire, and the seeking precede the renewal — because no one prepares himself for what he already has, nor desires what he has already received, nor seeks what he has already found. The preparation, therefore, precedes the renewal, and the renewal the preparation.
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CAPUT XVII. Proponitur et defenditur argumentum quar¬ tum , pro libero arbitrio in moralibus. Argumentum quartum, idemque postre¬ mum, quod adfert Calvinus pro Catholicis ejusmodi est ; « Si tollatur liberum arbitrium ab humano genere in actionibus morum , simul etiam tolli neccsse erit cohortationes, objurgationes, laudes, vituperationes, prae¬ cepta, consilia, monita et alia id genus. Quor¬ sum enim laudes, aut vituperes, admoneas, praecipias, reprehendas, horteris, si non pos¬ sunt homines aliud facere, quam faciunt? » Respondet Calvinus duobus modis. Pri¬ mum admonet, ut contenti simus exemplis Christi et Sanctorum. Christus enim dixit : Sine me nihil potestis facere, Joan. xv. et ta men hortabatur et corripiebat omnes. Apo¬ stolus quoque testatus est, Rom. ix. Non esse currentis , neque volentis , sed miserentis Dei. Et I ad Corinth. m. Neque qui plantat esse aliquid , neque qui rigat (3), et tamen hortari et corripere omnes non cessabat. Ipsi etiam Prophetae hartabantur et corripiebant ho¬ mines assidue, et tamen clamabant, proprium esse Dei circumcidere corda, et pro lapideis dare carnea. Denique S. Augustinus propter hanc ipsam objectionem scripsit integrum librum , quem nominari voluit de corre¬ ptione. et gratia. In quo libro cap. 3. sic ait: « 0 homo in praeceptione cogosce,, quid de¬ beas habere ; in correptione cognosce, tuo te vitio non habere ; in oratione cognosce, unde accipias quod vis habere». Et cap. 6. «Cor¬ ripiatur origo damnabilis, ut ex dolore cor¬ reptionis voluntas regenerationis oriatur, si tamen qui corripitur, filius est promis¬ sionis » . Deinde respondet, porreptiones et exhor¬ tationes utiles esse, etiam si non adsit libe¬ rum aabitrium, nam reprobis adhiberi ad flagellum couscientiee in hac vita, et ad te¬ stimonium in alia, ut inexcusabiles ad Domini tribunal efficiantur : electis autem ut per ver¬ bum exterius excitentur, sicut per spiritum intus illuminantur, et ad gratiam recipien¬ dam per externam verbi correptionem prae¬ parentur. Sed utraque Calvini responsio parvo negotio refutari potest. Quod enim ad priorem attinet, nos ex Christi et Sanctorum exemplis liberum arbi¬ trium efficaciter probari existimamus. Quo¬ niam enim nemo, nisi prorsus judicio ca- reat, hortatur, aut corripit infantes, vel in¬ sanos, sed solum adultos et mentis compo¬ tes, colligimus eos dumtaxat hortationis et correptionis capaces esse, qui liberi arbitrii usum habent : non enim aliud interest, inter homines insanos et sanos, nisi quod illi more pecudum, naturali quodam instinctu ferun¬ tur, nec possunt aliter facere : isti libero judicio eligunt quid agant, et possunt, si ita libitum fuerit , non eligere. Itaque simile esset hortari hominem non liberam, ad eli¬ gendum bonum, et corripere, si non eligat ; ac si quis hominem in carcere conclusum, hortaretur ad currendum per campos, et re¬ prehenderet si non pareret. Refellit hanc similitudinem Calvinus ; aliud enim esse dicit, hominem tyrannice ligatum ab alio, non posse per campos discurrere : (I) II Par. XV, 2. — (2) Psal. XXXVI, 27. — (3) Joan. XV, 5; Rom. IX, 15; I Corin. 111, 7. CAPUT XYJf. 75 aliud, hominem proprio vitio effectum ma¬ lum, jam non posse eligere bonum. At finge aliquem, qui sua culpa in puteum lapsus fuerit ; utrum is recte admoneretur, ut exiret et objurgaretur nisi pareret? Objurgaretur quidem recte, quod in puteum se dejecisset, cum in potestate haberet, non se dejicere ; at non recte objurgaretur, quod non inde emergeret, si id jam in ejus potestate non esset. Ad objectiones illas ex Scriptura : Sine me nihil potestis facere. Et : Non est volentis , ne¬ que currentis. Et : Neque qui plantat est ali¬ quid, neque qui rigat. Respondeo, recte pro¬ bari his testimoniis, liberum arbitrium egere gratia Dei. Caeterum eam gratiam, quse ne¬ cessaria est ad faciendum quod Deus prae¬ cipit, vel ad quod hortatur, nemini deesse ; et ideo (ut S. Leo scribit serm. 16. de pas¬ sione Domini) recte Dominum instare prae¬ cepto, quia praecurrit auxilio. Ad objectionem ex Augustino, in lib. de correptione et gratia, Respondeo, Augusti¬ num in toto eo libro pro certo assumere, eis, qui corripiuntur, non deesse auxilium gratiae, quo possint, si velint, ex correptione proficere. Nam cum dicit, cap. 3. « 0 homo in praeceptione cognosce, quid debeas ha¬ bere: in correptione agnosce, te tuo vitio non habere; in oratione cognosce, unde ac¬ cipias quod vis habere » . Certe non dubitat, ei qui corripitur, et jubetur orare, auxilium non deesse, quo possit orare. Et cum cap. 5. dicit : « Quicumque corripi non vis, ideo cor¬ ripiendus est, quia corripi non vis; non vis enim tibi tua vitia demonstrari » ; pro com¬ perto ponit, eum hominem, qui reprehendi¬ tur, quia non vult corripi, potuisse velle correptionem admittere. Et cap. 6. cum di¬ cit : « Corripiatur origo damnabilis, ut ex dolore correptionis voluntas regenerationis oriatur » ; sine dubio ut certum sumit, eum qui corripitur, posse dolere et erubescere, et ex eo dolore concipere desiderium vitee melioris. Alioqui stultissimus esset, qui ea de causa corriperet peccatorem, ut in eo ex dolore correptionis oriretur voluntas rege¬ nerationis, nisi crederet eum posse dolere, si velit; alias enim adhiberet causam, quam sciret nihil efficere posse. Rla vero correctio « si tamen is, qui corripitur, filius est pro¬ missionis » non significat eum, qui non est filius promissionis, non posse converti, sed non convertendum re ipsa, licet converti possit. Nam idem Augustinus in eodem libro cap. 7. apertissime scribit, posse perseverare etiam eos, qui re ipsa non sunt persevera¬ turi, et merito argui et puniri, quia non per¬ severant. « Potest enim, inquit, dici ei, In eo quod audieras et tenueras, perseverares, si velles. » Ac ut clarissime perspiciatur, librum hunc de correptione et gratia, nihil omnino Cal¬ vini causam adjuvare, observandum est, eodem tempore scripsisse Augustinum li¬ brum de correptione et gratia, et librum de gratia et libero arbitrio, et epistolam 46. omnia enim haec scripta sunt ad Valenti- num, occasione quorumdam ejus Monacho¬ rum, qui gratiam Dei sic defendebant, ut li¬ berum arbitrium denegarent. In epist. igitur illa 46. ad Yalentinum utitur Augustinus, hoc ipso nostro argumento, quod Calvinus ex Augustino solvere nititur : « Nisi esset, inquit, liberum voluntatis arbitrium , non diceretur in Psalmo, Intelligite insipientes in populo, et stulti aliquando sapite. » Ubi probat Augustinus, ex admonitione et cor¬ reptione liberum arbitrium. Et similia habet in lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 2. Quomodo igitur credibile est, Augustinum in libro de correptione et gratia ad Valen- tinum scripto, destruere voluisse, quae scri¬ pserat eodem fere tempore, et eadem occa¬ sione ad eumdem Valentinum? atque haec de priore responsione Calvini. Yenio ad posteriorem, in qua Calvinus pro sua summa scientia Dialecticae principium petit. Nam cum dicit, reprobos ideo corri¬ piendos esse, tametsi necessario peccent, ut correptio sit illis in hac vita flagellum con¬ scientiae, et in altera testimonium, quod eos reddat ad tribunal Domini inexcusabiles, omnino pro certo assumit, id quod neces¬ sario fit, posse esse peccatum proprie di¬ ctum. At de hoc ipso tota nostra controversia est. Itaque nego correprionem futuram esse flagellum conscientiae illi, qui libertate arbi¬ trii careat, nego etiam futurum illum coram Deo inexcusabilem. Immo hoc ipsum illum, et in conscientia, et coram Deo facillime excusabit, si vere dicere poterit, se non libera voluntate , sed cogente necessitate peccasse. At inquit Calvinus, « experientia testatur, peccatores etiam perditissimos sentire fla¬ gellum conscientiae, quando corripiuntur ». Fateor sed hinc libertas arbitrii apertissime- comprobatur. Propterea enim flagellantur et, erubescunt, quoniam conscii sunt ipsi sibi, se potuisse peccatum vitare, si studium ad¬ hibere voluissent. 76 LIBER Y. Pari ratione altera pars ejusdem respon¬ sionis, queo habet corripi electos, ut praepa¬ rentur per verbum externum ad renova¬ tionem internam, confirmat liberum arbi¬ trium. Nam si corripitur, qui peccavit, ut praeparet se ad renovationem, ergo qui cor¬ ripitur, non vult praeparari, et tamen potest velle praeparari ad renovationem; si enim vult praeparari, quorsum corripitur? Si non potest velle praeparari, nonne etiam frustra corripitur? Sed non solum hac posteriore responsione Calvinus argumentum Catholicorum non solvit, sed incidit in plures laqueos, unde non facile se expediat. Scripsit enim per horta¬ tionem praeparari electos ad 1'ecipiendam gratiam, qua ipsi hortationi pareant. Nam haec sunt verba ipsius lib. ii. Institut. cap. 5. §. 5. (< Ad recipiendam hanc ipsam gratiam, qua fit ut hortationi parcatur, per hortatio¬ nem vult nos praeparari » . Et infra : « Bifariam Deus in electis suis operatur, intus per Spi¬ ritum, extra per verbum : Spiritu mentes illuminando, corda in justitiae amorem, cul¬ tumque fonnando , novam eos creaturam facit : verbo ad eamdem innovationem expe¬ tendam , quaerendam , assequendam exci¬ tat i) . Haec ille. Ex his verbis Sequitur primo, posse homi¬ nem sine gratia per verbum externum prae¬ parari ad gratiam, camque expetere et quae¬ rere. Nam. distinguit Calvinus operationem verbi ab operatione spiritus, et priorem esse vult operationem verbi, qua homo praepa¬ ratur ad gratiam, posteriorem operationem spiritus, qui gratiam ipsam adfert. At hic est error Pelagianus, quem Calvinus refel¬ lere se velle dicit. Quomodo igitur non pug¬ nat secum, qui illum ipsum errorem docet, quem refutare studet? Respondet Calvinus lib. 4. adversus Pi- ghium , ministerium verbi vocari ministe¬ rium spiritus, quoniam Deus per spiritum suum insculpit in cordibus hominum id, quod praedicator verbi non ante, nec post, sed simul ad aures loquitur; ita simul om¬ nino fieri externam operationem per verbum, et internam per spiritum. At responsio ista non solvit nodum, sed magis ligat. Nam Deum insculpere in cordi¬ bus verbum exhortationis, vel est- persua¬ dere illud efficaciter, et per hoc facere ut homo assentiatur; vel est efficere, ut cogi¬ tetur, vel intelligalur, non tamen persua¬ deatur. Si dixerit primum, pugnabit liber iste quartus adversus Pighium cum lib. ir. Institutionis. Nam in lib. ir. Institutionis ut jam citavimus, disertis verbis Calvinus dicit, per verbum hominem praeparari ad illam gratiam spiritus desiderandam et quaeren¬ dam, qua fit, ut verbo pareatur, proinde priorem esse operationem verbi praepa¬ rantis, quam spiritus intus persuadentis : in lib. autem iv. contra Pighium dicit, utram- que esse simul, et sine alia praeparatione verbum extra prolatum intus a spiritu in¬ sculpi, id est, efficater persuaderi. Si dixerit secundum, non excludet errorem Pelagia- num. Non enim satis est gratia ad cogitan¬ dum, et intelligendum secundum fidem Catholicam, sed requiritur gratia ad deside¬ randum, et quaerendum, et omnino ad prae¬ parandum se ad renovationem. Neque Au¬ gustinus a Pelagianismo excusaret eum, qui diceret post verbum exhortationis ante cor¬ poris auditum et corde perceptum, posse suis viribus expetendo, et quaerendo gra¬ tiam, ad eam se praeparare. Sequitur secundo, ex illis verbis Calvini, supra citatis, posse ante renovationem ho¬ minis, quae fit per spiritum ex ipso homine aliquid boni exprimi, desiderium videlicet ipsius renovationis, et praeparationem ad e -mdem. At hoc aperte repugnat iis, quae idem Calvinus scribit in eodem ii. lib. In¬ stitut, cap. 3. § G. ubi dicit, nihil unquam boni ex corde humano exprimi posse, nisi penitus aliud fiat per renovationem, id est, nisi ex lapideo fiat carneum. Neque enim negari potest, quin sit bona praeparatio et cupiditas renovationis, quae fit per verbum in corde nondum renovato. Sequitur tertio, praeparationem istam es¬ se priorem et posteriorem ipsa renovatio¬ ne, quae tamen repugnantia sunt. Nam se¬ cundum principia Calvini, et omnium hujus temporis haereticorum, renovatio hominis fit per solam fidem. Fides autem secundum scripturas praecedit orationem. « Quomodo enim invocabunt, in quem non credide¬ runt » ? Rom. x. Et praeterea oratio nisi fiat ex fide, nihil valet. Renovatio igitur praece¬ dit orationem, ac per hoc desiderium, ct in¬ quisitionem et praeparationem, et tamen praeparatio desiderium, et inquisitio prae¬ cedunt renovationem, quia nemo se praepa¬ rat ad id, quod jam habet ; neque desiderat, quod jam accepit ; neque inquirit, quod jam (») Rom. X, 14. CAPUT XVIII. 77 invenit. Praeparatio igitur praecedit renova¬ tionem, et renovatio praeparationem.