Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book V: On the Merits of Works
Chapter 14: That for merit the gratuitous promise of God of eternal life is required
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There follows to be discussed the sixth condition, which we said to be a promise, or a liberal and gratuitous covenant. For that more recent Doctor, whose opinion we refuted in the two preceding chapters, taught besides that good works of their own nature are meritorious of eternal life, so that no covenant or gratuitous promise is required unto this, that of justice the reward of eternal life be owed to good works. He added also that from this very opinion it manifestly follows that Christ merited not eternal life for us, save in so far as he merited for us the grace of working well. But let us hear his words from the Bull of Pope Pius V; for this is the second condemned proposition: “As an evil work of its own nature is meritorious of eternal death, so a good work of its own nature is meritorious of eternal life.” And this is the eleventh: “That those who have conversed piously and justly in this mortal life unto the end obtain eternal life — this is to be imputed, not properly to the grace of God, but to a natural ordinance established from the very beginning of creation by the just judgment of God. Nor in this retribution of the good is regard had to the merit of Christ, but only to the first institution of the human race, in which it was established by natural law that, by the just judgment of God, eternal life be rendered to the obedience of the commandments.” But although, for all the sons of the Church, the authority of the Supreme Pontiff abundantly suffices to repudiate these opinions, yet we shall add also, for the greater confirmation of the truth, the authority of the Council of Trent, and reasons drawn from Scripture. The Council, then, in session 6, in the last chapter: “To those who work well unto the end and hope in God, eternal life is to be set forth, both as a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Christ Jesus, and as a reward from the promise of God himself faithfully to be rendered to their good works and merits.” And canon 29: “If anyone shall say that the just ought not, for the good works which have been done in God, to expect and hope for an eternal retribution from God through his mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if by well-doing and keeping the divine commandments they persevere unto the end, let him be anathema.” Here we have both a promise, and that a merciful and gratuitous one, and the merits of Christ in respect of eternal life to be given us as sons. But let us come to the reasons.
The first reason is taken on the part of the works themselves, which, if they be considered of their own nature, the promise and the dignity of the operating principle set aside, have no proportion to that supernatural beatitude; and thereby the reward of eternal life is not owed to them of justice, if they be considered only of their own nature. And this is what the Apostle says, Romans 8: I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come that shall be revealed in us. And 2 Corinthians 4: That which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory. For these teach not that good works are not meritorious of eternal life, but that they are not meritorious of so great a reward of their own nature, but from elsewhere — namely, from the promise, from the dignity of the principle, etc. Hither pertain also the testimonies of the Fathers. Of Athanasius, in the life of St. Antony: “Not even renouncing the whole world can we compensate anything worthy of the heavenly habitations.” Of Eusebius of Emesa, homily 3 to the Monks: “Though we sweat with all the labors of soul and body, though we be exercised with all the powers of obedience, yet we shall be able to compensate and offer nothing condign of merit for the heavenly goods.” Of Augustine, on Psalm 93: “Of how great labor is that rest worthy which hath no end? If thou wilt truly compare, and truly judge, eternal rest is rightly bought with eternal labor. True this is; but fear not, God is merciful.” Of Bernard, in sermon 4 On the Annunciation: “What are all merits to so great a glory?” Of Thomas, in 1a 2ae, question 114, article 3: “If the meritorious work be considered according to the substance of the work, and as it proceeds from free choice, so there cannot be condignity there, on account of the greatest inequality.” Since, therefore, our good works themselves, if they be considered by themselves and according to their own nature only, are temporal and vile, and in no way equal to a supernatural and everlasting reward, certainly it is necessary that dignity be added to them from elsewhere, if of justice the reward of eternal life is to be rendered to them.
The second reason is taken on the part of God, who needs no thing, and whose are all things by the right of creation. For hence it follows that God is not bound to accept our works unto a reward to be rendered of right, unless he himself, by his liberal promise, shall have willed beforehand to oblige himself. For hence Job says, chapter 35: If thou do justly, what shalt thou give him? or what shall he receive of thy hand? And the Apostle, Romans 11: Who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him? For of him, and by him, and in him are all things. And St. Augustine, sermon 16 on the words of the Apostle: “God became our debtor, not by receiving anything, but by promising what pleased him. For in one way we say to a man, Thou owest me, because I gave thee; and in another way we say, Thou owest me, because thou didst promise me. To God, then, what say we? Render to me, because I gave thee? What have we given God, when what we are, and what of good we have, we have from him? We have therefore given him nothing; there is no way in which by that word we may exact God our debtor. In that other way, then, we can exact of our Lord: Render what thou didst promise, because we have done what thou didst command. And this thou hast done, who hast helped us laboring.” St. Fulgentius, in the prologue of the books to Monimus: “For of his own bounty he deigned to make himself a debtor.” And St. Bernard, in the book On Grace and Free Choice, at the end: “Promised indeed of mercy, yet to be paid of justice.” And St. Thomas, in 1a 2ae, question 114, article 1, concludes that God, when he owes us anything, owes it not so much to us as to his own disposition and promise. Finally, this reason can be framed: God owes eternal life to good works either of commutative justice or of distributive. If of commutative, then a covenant or promise is required. For a work, however excellent and equal to the reward, cannot of commutative justice oblige another, unless a convention and covenant have gone before. For if perchance one, not hired but of his own accord, cultivate another’s vineyard, he cannot of right exact a wage, as all know, even though otherwise his work could be judged most worthy of a wage. And so in the parable of the vineyard, Matthew 20, certain workmen chose rather to sit idle all day in the marketplace than to come to labor in the vineyard unless they were first hired; and the lord of the vineyard is read to have made a convention with the workmen for a penny a day. But if God renders rewards to laborers of distributive justice, then too a promise and convention is necessary. For in distributive justice a covenant, or at least an express promise, is not wont to be exacted when a prince distributes common goods; but it is plainly exacted when he distributes his own goods, as when he sets forth a prize for a contest of his own accord. For a certain prize is not owed to the swifter runner unless a promise or covenant have gone before. God, therefore, who distributes not common goods, but his own, without doubt is not bound to render rewards to laborers, save because he beforehand promised that he would render them.
But if perchance anyone here desire it to be explained whether God will render rewards to the good merits of men according to distributive or according to commutative justice, let him briefly hold this: that the substance of the divine judgment will be according to distributive justice, but the manner according to commutative. For that the substance of that judgment will be according to distributive justice, St. Thomas teaches in part 1, question 21, article 1, and book 1 against the Gentiles, chapter 93. And the reason is manifest, since God, as supreme Judge, will distribute rewards for merits. Whence also in the sacred letters God is said to be no accepter of persons, which vice it is not doubtful is contrary to distributive justice. But that the manner of the same judgment will be according to commutative justice, the same St. Thomas teaches, in 2a 2ae, question 61, article 4, ad primum. And the reason too is manifest, since God will constitute not only a proportional equality between merits and rewards, that he have more of reward who has more of merit — which is proper to distributive justice — but will constitute also an absolute equality between works and wages, that every one have no less a wage than by just judgment he merits, which is of commutative justice. And therefore God in the divine letters now says that he will be a Judge who distributes rewards and punishments, as Matthew 25, in the parable of the talents; now a father of a family, who restores to laborers a wage by convention, as Matthew 20, in the parable of those hired to the vineyard for a penny a day. For this is the difference between distributive and commutative justice, that commutative constitutes a perfect equality between merit and reward; distributive, a proportional one, whether they be absolutely equal or be not. For a prince will not be an unjust distributor if he confer a most excellent office on a man worthier than all the rest, even though that man were worthy absolutely of a greater or a lesser. But God, who has infinite treasures of goods, not only (as we said) rewards the better more, but also attributes to each one no less of reward than their works by just judgment merit, and so plainly satisfies both parts of justice, that nothing at all can be desired in his justice.
The third reason is taken on the part of the men who merit. For since we are all by condition servants and bondmen of God, there could be no justice between us and God, unless he himself, by a liberal convention, had willed to constitute a reward for our works — otherwise owed, even though no wage were to be rendered them. And this (as we said above) the Lord signified when he said, Luke 17: When you shall have done all these things, say, We are unprofitable servants. And St. Augustine, sermon 3 on the words of the Lord: “O great goodness of God, to whom, though we ought by our condition to render homage — as servants to a lord, bondmen to God, subjects to the powerful, chattels to the redeemer — he promises the rewards of friendship.” And St. Bernard, in the sermon On the Fourfold Debt, demonstrates for many causes wholly that all our good works are owed to God, so that he can exact them all, even though he will give no reward. Among others he numbers creation: “Behold, he is at the gates, who made heaven and earth, and is thy Creator, thou the creature, thou the servant, he the Lord, he the potter, thou the thing formed. All, then, that thou art, thou owest to him from whom thou hast all.” They will say, perhaps, that a convention is necessary, but no other than that which was made in the very creation by the law of nature, that eternal life be rendered to good works. But if the convention was made by the law of nature, and by the nature of the thing eternal life is owed to good works even done without the grace of God, God could not but make that convention; for the law of nature is not mutable. And thereby it is not a gratuitous, but an owed, convention. And this indeed that Doctor grants; but the Scripture, and the testimonies of Augustine and Bernard now cited, and the very reason drawn from our condition, cry out against him. Besides, the same Augustine, sermon 13 on the words of the Apostle, most plainly attributes the promise of eternal life to grace, not to the law of nature: “The human race, condemned by his just judgment, God would not leave in everlasting destruction, but sent a physician, sent a Savior, sent him who should heal freely. It is little that he should heal freely, who to the healed should also give a reward. Nothing can be added to this benevolence. Who is there that would say, I heal thee, and I give thee a reward?” Here we plainly see that the promise of the reward is attributed not to the law of nature, but to an admirable benevolence. The same Augustine too, on Psalm 93, when he had said that eternal rest was to be bought with eternal labor, added not, “fear not, because God is just,” but, “fear not, because God is merciful.” Where he shows that it was of mercy that to good works, though unequal to so great a reward, eternal life was promised.
The fourth reason is taken from the very state of the wayfarers, which is required for meriting. For no cause can be rendered why good works which are done in this life should merit a reward with God, and good works which are done in the other life should not merit, save because there is required unto merit a promise of God, liberal and gratuitous; and it pleased God not to extend his promise beyond the time of the present life. For otherwise the holy angels, and men in heaven, do many good works, freely, in homage to God, by which they could merit an increase of glory, had not the time prescribed for meriting passed. And yet if, by the law of nature, or by the nature of the thing, a reward were owed absolutely to good works, no certain time could be prescribed for merit, unless after that time those ceased to be good works which before that time were good works. But that there is a space defined by a certain time for meriting, the Scriptures everywhere testify. 1 Corinthians 7: The time is short. 2 Corinthians 6: Behold, now is the acceptable time; behold, now is the day of salvation. Galatians 6: Whilst we have time, let us work good, etc. The fifth reason is taken from the virtue of the merits of Christ. For if the distribution of rewards were owed by the law of nature to the obedience of the law, Christ would not have merited eternal life for us immediately, but only the grace of working well. Which the adversary seems to grant. But against him is a reason manifestly founded in the divine letters. For by this very thing, that we begin to be sons of God, we begin to have a right to the inheritance of eternal felicity. For if sons, heirs also, says the Apostle, Romans 8; and, Galatians 4, And if a son, an heir also through God. But we begin to be sons of God before we begin to work well; for (as we proved above from Augustine) men live not rightly unless they be first made sons of God; therefore we have a right to the eternal inheritance through the grace of regeneration, before we begin to work well. Nay, even baptized infants, through that grace alone, before all good works, are saved. Christ, therefore, merited for us the inheritance itself, when he merited the grace of regeneration and adoption. But that he willed that we should merit the same also by good works is an argument of his ampler grace and benignity, who (as we demonstrated above) willed us to have eternal life not only by the right of inheritance, but also by the right of merits — which, that we might have them, he himself also gave. Rightly, therefore, the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 16, concludes that eternal life is to be set forth to the faithful, both as a grace of the sons of God promised through Christ, and as a reward to be justly and faithfully rendered by God to good works. There are no arguments to be solved against this doctrine. For if there were any, they were solved in the preceding chapter.
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CAPUT XIV. Requiri ad meritum, vitee eeternee promissionem Dei gratuitam. Discutienda sequitur conditio sexta, quam esse diximus promissionem, sive pactum li¬ berale, atque gratuitum. Nam recentior ille Doctor, cujus sententiam superioribus duo¬ bus capitibus refutavimus, docuit praeterea, opera bona ex natura sua esse meritoria vita# CAl’L’1 XIV. aeterna?, ita ut non requiratur pactum ali¬ quod, vel gratuita promissio, ad hoc ut ex justitia merces vitae aeternae bonis operibus debeatur. Addidit etiam quod ex hac ipsa sententia manifeste sequitur, Christum nobis non me¬ ruisse vitam aeternam, nisi quatenus gratiam bene operandi nobis meruit. Sed verba ejus ex Bulla Pii V. Pontificis audiamus ; haec enim est secunda propositio damnata : « Si-' cut opus malum ex sua natura est mortis internae meritorium, sic opus bonum ex sua natura, est vitee aeternae meritorium » . Et haec est undecima : « Quod pie et juste in hac mor¬ tali vita conversati usque in finem, vitam con¬ sequuntur aeternam, id non gratiae Dei pro¬ prie, sed ordinationi naturali statim initio creationis constitutae, justo Dei judicio depu¬ tandum est. Neque in hac retributione bono¬ rum ad Christi meritum respicitur, sed tan¬ tum ad primam institutionem humani gene¬ ris, in qua lege naturali constitutum est, ut justo Dei judicio obedientiae mandatorum vita aeterna reddatur ». Quamvis autem omnibus Ecclesiae filiis ad has sententias repudiandas satis abunde suf¬ ficiat Pontificis Maximi auctoritas : tamen addemus etiam ad majorem veritatis confir¬ mationem auctoritatem Concilii Tridentini, et rationes ex Scriptura depromptas. Conci¬ lium igitur in 6. sess. cap. ult. « Bene ope¬ rantibus (inquit) usque in finem, et in Deo sperantibus proponenda est vita aeterna, et tamquam gratia filiis Dei per Christum Jesum misericorditer promissa, et tamquam merces ex ipsius Dei promissione bonis ipsorum ope¬ ribus et meritis fideliter reddenda ».Et Can. 29. « Si quis dixerit, justos non debere pro bonis operibus, quae in Deo fuerunt facta, expectare et sperare aeternam retributionem a Deo per ejus misericordiam, et Jesu Chri¬ sti meritum, si bene agendo et divina man¬ data custodiendo usque in finem persevera¬ verint, anathema sit ». Hic habemus et pro¬ ra ssionem camque misericordem, et gratui¬ tam, et Christi merita respectu vitae aeternae nobis tamquam filiis donandae. Sed veniamus ad rationes. Prima ratio. Sumitur ex parte ipsorum operum qua; si considerentur ex natura sua remota promissione et dignitate principii operantis, nullam habent proportionem ad beatitudinem illam supernaturalem ; proinde 871 non eis debetur ex justitia merces aeternae vitae, si ex natura sua tantummodo conside¬ rentur. Atque hoc est, quod Apostolus dicit., ad Bom. viii : Existimo, quocl non sunt condi¬ gna; passiones hujus temporis ad futuram glo¬ riam, quae revelabitur in nobis. Et II Corinth. iv. Quod in praesenti est momentaneum, et leve tribulationis nostrae, supra modum in sublimita¬ te aeternum gloriae pondus operatur in nobis (1). Haec enim non docent opera bona non esse meritoria vitae aeternae, sed non esse meri¬ toria tanti praemii ex natura. sua, sed aliun¬ de, nimirum ex promissione, ex dignitate principii, etc. Huc etiam pertinent testimonia Patrum, Athanasii in vita sancti Antonii : « Nec uni¬ verso orbi renunciantes, dignum aliquid ha¬ bitaculis possumus compensare coelestibus » . Eusebii Emisseni, homil 3. ad Monachos : « Totis licet anima?, et corporis laboribus desudemus, totis licet obedientiae viribus exerceamur, nihil tamen condignum merito pro coelestibus bonis compensare, et offerre valebimus ». Augustini, in Psalm. xcm. « Quanto labore digna est requies, quae non habet finem? Si verum vis comparare, et ve¬ rum judicare, aeterna requies aeterno labore recte emitur, verum hoc est, sed noli timere, misericors est Deus ». Bernardi, in serm. 4. de Annunciatione : « Quid sunt merita omnia ad tantam gloriam » ? Thomae, in 4. 2. q. 414. art. 3. « Si consideretur opus merito¬ rium secundum substantiam operis et secun¬ dum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio, sic non potest ibi esse condignitas, propter maxi¬ mam inaequalitatem » . Cum igitur opera ipsa nostra bona, si perse, et secundum naturam suam tantum considerentur, sint temporalia et viiia, et nullo modo aequalia praemio su- pernaturali et sempiterno : certe necesse est, ut addatur eis dignitas aliunde, si ex ju¬ stitia merces aeternae vitae illis reddenda sit. Secunda ratio sumitur ex parte Dei, qui nulla re indiget, et cujus sunt omnia jure creationis. Hinc enim sequitur, ut non teneatur Deus acceptare opera nostra ad praemium, jure reddendum, nisi ipse promis¬ sione sua liberali, se antea obligare volu¬ erit. Hinc enim Job dicit, cap. xx.\v. Si juste egeris , quid donabis ei ? aut quid de manu tua accipiet ? Et apostolus ad Roman. II. Quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? Nam ex ipso, per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia ( 2). Et, (1) Rom. VIII, 18; 1! Cor. IV, 17. - (2) Job. XXXV, 7; Rom XI, 35. UBER V. 372 S. Augustinus, serm. 10. de verbis Apostoli : <> Debitor (inquit) nobis factus est Deus, non uliquid accipiendo, sed quod ei placuit pro¬ mittendo. Aliter enim dicimus homini, debes mihi, quia dedi tibi. Et aliter dicimus, de¬ bes mihi, quia promisisti mihi. Deo igitur quid dicimus ? Redde mihi, quia dedi tibi ? Quid dedimus Deo, quando quod sumus, et quod habemus boni, ab illo habemus ? Nihil ergo ei dedimus, non est quemadmodum ista voce exigamus debitorem Deum : illo ergo modo possumus exigere Dominum nostrum, redde quod promisisti, quia fecimus quod jus- sisti.Et hoc tu fecisti, qui laborantesjuvisti». S. Fulgentius, in prologo librorum ad Mo¬ nituum : « Nani (inquit) et se ipsum sua lar¬ gitate dignatus est facere debitorem ». Et sanctus Bernardus, in libro de gratia et libero arbitrio, extremo: «Promissum qui¬ dem (inquit) ex misericordia, sed tamen ex justitia persolvendum » . Et sanctus Thoraas ini. 2. quaest. 114. articul. 1 . concludit, Deum cum nobis aliquid debet, non tam nobis de¬ bere quam dispositioni et promissioni suae. Denique potest institui haec ratio : Vel de¬ bet Deus vitam aeternam bonis operibus red¬ dere, ex justitia commutati va, vel ex distri- butiva : si ex commutati va, igitur requiri¬ tur pactum, sive promissio. Neque enim opus, quamtumvis eximium, et aequale mer¬ cedi, potest ex justitia commutativa alterum obligare, nisi conventio, et pactum ante praecesserit. Nam si quis forte non condu¬ ctus, sed sponte sua vineam alterius colat, non potest jure mercedem exigere, ut omnes noverunt, etiamsi alioqui opus ejus mercede dignissimum judicari posset. Itaque in para¬ bola vineae, Matth. xx. Operarii quidam toto die otiosi in foro sedere malebant, quam ad laborandum in vinea, nisi prius conduceren¬ tur, accedere, et Dominus vineae conventio¬ nem fecisse legitur, cum operariis ex dena¬ rio diurno. Si vero ex justitia distributiva Deus reddit praemia laborantibus ; tunc quoque necessa¬ ria est promissio, atque conventio. Nam in justitia distributiva non solet exigi pactum, vel promissio saltem expressa, quando prin¬ ceps distribuit bona communia ; sed plane exigitur, quando propria bona distribuit, ut cum ad certamen bravium sponte proponit. Neque enim debetur velocius currenti cer¬ tum praemium, nisi promissio pactum prae¬ cesserit. Deus igitur qui non distribuit bona communia, sed propria, sinedubio non lene- tur praemia reddere laborantibus, nisi quia redditurum se ante promisit. Quod si quis forte hic explicari cupiat, Utrum Deus secundum justitiam distributi- vam, an secundum commutativam bonis hominum meritis sit praemia redditurus ; il¬ lud breviter habeat, substantiam divini ju¬ dicii secundum distributi vam justitiam fore ; modum autem secundum commutativam. Substantiam enim illius judicii futuram esse secundum justitiam distributivam, docet sanctus Thomas in 1. part. quaest. 21. aitic. 1. et lib. i. contra Gent. cap. 93. Et ratio manifesta est, quoniam Deus, ut summus Judex praemia pro meritis distribuet. Unde etiam in sacris litteris dicitur Deus non esse acceptor personarum, quod vitium, justitiae distributivae contrarium esse non dubium est. Modum autem ejusdem judicii futurum secundum justitiam commutativam, docet idem sanctus Thomas, in 2. 2. quaest. 61. artic. 4. ad primum. Et ratio est etiam ma¬ nifesta, quoniam Deus non solum constituet proportionalem aequalitatem inter merita et praemia, ut ille plus habeat praemii, qui plus habet meriti, quod proprium est justitiae dis¬ tributivae, sed etiam constituet absolutam aequalitatem inter opera et mercedes, ut unusquisque non minorem habeat mercedem, quam justo judicio mereatur, quod est justi¬ tiae commutativae. Et ideo Deus in divinis lit¬ teris, nunc se Judicem fore dicit, qui prae¬ mia, poenasque distribuat, ut Matth. xxv. in parqbola de talentis, nunc patrem familias, qui laborantibus mercedem ex conventione restituat, ut Matth. xx. in parabola de con¬ ductis ad vineam pro denario diurno. Hoc enim interest, inter justitiam distri-, butivam et commutativam, quod commuta¬ tiva perfectam aequalitatem constituit inter meritum et praemium ; distributiva propor¬ tionalem, sive sint absolute aequalia, sive non sint. Neque enim injustus distributor prin¬ ceps erit, si officium praestantissimum in ho¬ minem, caeteris omnibus digniorem confe¬ rat, etiamsi ille absolute majoi’e, vel minore dignus esset. Caeterum- Deus qui thesauros bonorum infinitos habet, non solum (ut dixi¬ mus) meliores magis remunerat, sed etiam singulis non minus mercedis attribuit, quam ipsorum opera justo judicio mereantur, at¬ que ita utrique parti justitiae ita plane satis¬ facit, ut nihil omnino in ejus justitia desi¬ derari queat. CAPUT XIV. m Tertia ratio, sumitur ex parte hominum, qui merentur. Nam cum simus omnes condi¬ tione servi, et mancipia Dei, non posset esse justitia inter nos et Deum, nisi ipse liberali conventione operibus nostris, alioqui debi¬ tis, etiamsi nulla merces illis reddenda esset, praemium constituere voluisset. Atque hoc (ut supra diximus) significavit Dominus cum ait, Luc xvii. Cum feceritis haec omnia dicite, servi inutiles sumus (1). Et sanctus Augustinus, sermon. 3. de verbis Domini : « 0 magna bonitas Dei, cui cum pro conditione reddere debeamus obsequia, ut servi domino, famuli Deo, subjecti potenti, mancipia redemptori, amicitiarum nobis praemia repromittit i>. Et S. Bernardus, in sermone de quadruplici debito, demonstrat pluribus de causis in so¬ lidum, omnia nostra opera bona esse debita Deo, ita ut possit omnia exigere, etiamsi praemium nullum dare velit. Inter alia nu¬ merat creationem : « Eccc (inquit) in januis est, qui fecit coelum et terram, et creator tuus est, tu creatura, tu servus, ille Domi¬ nus, ille figulus, tu figmentum. Totum ergo quod cs, illi debes, a quo totum habes d . Dicent fortasse, conventionem esse neces¬ sariam sed non aliam, quam quae in ipsa creatione lege naturae facta est, ut operibus bonis vita aeterna reddatur. At si lege natu¬ rae oonventio facta est, et ex natura rei bo¬ nis operibus etiam sine gratia Dei factis, de¬ betur vita aeterna, non potuit Deus istam conventionem non facere ; non enim lex na¬ turae mutabilis est. Proinde non est gratuita, sed debita conventio. Atque hoc quidem Doctor ille concedit ; sed reclamant Scriptura et Augustini, ac Bernardi testimonia jarn ci¬ tata, et ipsa ratio a conditione deprompta. Praeterea idem Augustinus ser. 13. de ver¬ bis Apostoli, apertissime tribuit gratiae, non legi naturae promissionem vitae aeternae : « Genus, inquit, humanum justo suo judicio condemnatum noluit Deus in interitum sempi¬ ternum relinquere, sed misit et medicum, misit Salvatorem, misit eum, qui gratis sana¬ ret. Parum est, qui gratis sanaret, qui sana¬ tis etiam mercedem daret. Nihil addi ad i- stam benevolentiam potest. Quis est, qui dicat, sanem te, et do tibi mercedem » ? Hic aperte videmus, non legi naturae, sed admirabili benevolentia? tribui promissionem mercedis. Idem quoque Augustinus in Psal. xcm. cum dixisset, aeternam requiem aeterno labore comparandam fuisset, non addidit, noli ti¬ mere, quia justus est Deus : sed, « noli ti¬ mere, quia misericors est Deus ». Ubi osten¬ dit, ex misericordia factum esse, ut bonis operibus, quamvis imparibus tanto praemio, vita promitteretur aeterna. Quarta ratio sumitur ex ipso statu viato¬ rum, qui requiritur ad merendum. Nulla enim causa reddi potest, cur opera bona, quae fiunt iu hac vita, mereantur praemium apud Deum, et non mereantur bona operu, quae fiunt in alia vita ; nisi quia requiritur ad meritum promissio Deo liberalis, atque gra¬ tuita ', placuit autem Deo, ut promissionem suam non ultra tempus vitae praesentis exten¬ deret. Alioqui enim multa faciunt S. Angeli, atque homines in coelo opera bona, libere, in obsequium Dei, quibus gloriae incremen* tum mereri possent, nisi tempus ad meren- “ dum praescriptum praeteriisset. Et tamen si lege naturae, sive ex natura rei bonis operi¬ bus absolute praemium deberetur, nullum certum tempus ad meritum praescribi pos¬ set, nisi post illud tempus desinerent esse opera bona, quae ante illud tempus erant opera bona. Esse autem certo tempore definitum spa¬ tium ad merendum, Scripturae passim testan¬ tur, I Corinth. vii. Tempus breve est. II Corinth vi. Ecce nunc tempus acceptabile, ecce nunc dies salutis. Galat vi. Dum tempus habemus operemur bonum , etc. (2). Quinta ratio sumitur a virtute meritorum Christi. Nam si distributio praemiorum lege naturae deberetur obedientiae legis, Christus nobis non meruisset vitam aeternam imme¬ diate, sed solam gratiam bene operandi. Id quod adversarius concedere videtur. At con¬ tra est ratio in divinis litteris manifeste fun¬ data. Nam hoc ipso quod incipimus esse fi¬ lii Dei, incipimus jus habere ad haereditatem felicitatis aeternae. Nam si filii et haeredes , inquit Apostolus ad Rom vm; et ad Gal. iv. Quod si filius et haeres, per Deum (3). Incipimus autem esse filii Dei, antequam incipiamus bene operari, nam (ut supra ex Augustino probavimus) non vivunt homines recte, nisi prius filii Dei efficiantur ; igitur jus habemus ad aeternam haereditatem per gratiam rege¬ nerationis, antequam incipiamus bene ope¬ rari : iramo etiam Baptizati infantes, per so¬ lam eam gratiam, ante omnia opera bona salvantur : meruit igitur Christus nobis ipsam (I) Luc. XVII, 10.- (2) I Cor. VII, 29; 11 Cor VI, V; Gal. VI, 10. -(3) Rom. VM, 17; Gal. IV, 17. 374 LIBER V. hsereditatem, dum gratiam regenerationis et adoptionis promeruit. Quod autem voluerit, ut eamdem etiam nos bonis operibus mereremur, argumen¬ tum est amplioris gratia? et beniguitatis ip¬ sius, qui (ut supra demonstravimus) non solum vitam aeternam nos habere voluit ju¬ re haereditatis, sed etiam jure promerito¬ rum, quae ut haberemus, ipse etiam dedit. Recte igitur Concilium Tridentinum sess. 6. cap. 16. concludit, vitam aeternam propo¬ nendam esse fidelibus, et tamquam gratiam filii Dei per Christum promissam, et tam¬ quam mercedem bonis operibus a Deo juste, fideliterque reddendam. Argumenta solvenda contra hanc doctri¬ nam nulla sunt. Si qua enim erant, soluta sunt cap. superiore.