Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book V: On the Merits of Works
Chapter 15: That a good work is not meritorious of eternal life unless it proceed from charity
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There remains the last condition, which was that the good work proceed from the virtue of charity. For there was the singular opinion of William of Auxerre, book 3, treatise 10, chapter 1, question 2, and chapter 2, question 1, that merit depends first and more principally on faith than on charity. Which opinion seems to favor not a little the errors of the heretics of this time, although he preaches faith in a far other sense than the heretics are wont to do; but certainly the testimonies of the Scriptures are so plain that it is a wonder that excellent man could slip in that matter. For first, in express words beatitude is promised to charity. John 14: If anyone love me, he shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him. And that in this manifestation beatitude is placed, the same Lord testifies, when he says, Matthew 5: Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God. And John 17: Now this is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent. And the Apostle John in his first epistle, chapter 3: Now we are the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that when he shall appear we shall be like to him, because we shall see him as he is. Besides, again of the reward of charity the Apostle Paul, 1 Corinthians 2: Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love him. And 1 Corinthians 13: If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. But in what manner, I pray, does faith first and more principally merit felicity than charity, if a man having faith without charity is nothing? The same Apostle, 2 Timothy 4: There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the just judge will render to me in that day; and not only to me, but to them also that love his coming. Likewise blessed James, chapter 1: Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him. Then, all the arguments by which it was proved above that the formal cause of justification is not faith without charity, but faith formed by charity, so that principally true and Christian justice consists in charity, prove also that merit depends principally on charity, since the reward of eternal life is nothing else than the wage and crown of justice. Third, the same is proved by a manifest reason. For the merit of eternal life so depends on the divine ordinance that those works alone can be properly meritorious of eternal life which God deigns to accept unto eternal life. For eternal life is as it were a prize, as the Scriptures speak; and it is in the free power of the prince setting forth a prize to define by what works, by what course, by what contest he wills the prize to be obtained. Further, that God requires unto eternal life the works of charity is plain, both from the Scriptures a little before cited, and also from the reason of the sweet providence of God; for God is wont to ordain to an end those means which have a greater proportion and conformity with it. But that there is nothing which has a greater proportion and conformity with eternal felicity than love, and the works flowing from love, can easily be proved. For eternal felicity is the attainment of the last end, and the obtaining of the highest good; but charity alone is that which regards the last end and the highest good as its proper object, and moves and orders toward it the acts of all the other virtues. Hence it is that charity alone is truly called, and is, the form and queen of the virtues; and to it alone the acts of all the virtues, as though they were proper to it, are attributed by the Apostle: Charity is patient, is kind, believeth all things, hopeth all things, etc., 1 Corinthians 13. And this is the reason why St. Augustine, book 1 On the Manners of the Church, chapter 15, said that virtue is the love of the highest good, and judged that all the virtues are to be defined by love. Not that he was ignorant that the proper notion of temperance, prudence, and the other virtues is placed not in love, but in another act; but that he might show that all the virtues are moved and formed by charity, and that the same virtues, unless formed by charity, cannot lead us to merit God. For this he had laid down at the end of chapter 14, that we cannot ascend to the highest good save by love, affection, charity. From which it can be understood what that was which deceived William of Auxerre. For from this place of St. Augustine ill understood, he gathered that faith of its own notion, and as it is a virtue distinct from charity, includes not only the knowledge, but also the love of the first truth, so that it is proper to faith, as faith, to believe the first truth for the love of the first truth itself; and that this is distinguished from charity, in that faith is the knowledge and love of the first truth, but charity the love of the first goodness. But it will not be needful to labor longer in refuting these, since there is no one even moderately versed in moral discipline who knows not that faith is not love, and that love regards not truth, but goodness. These things, then, being thus established, it is wont to be asked by the theologians whether unto the merit of eternal life it suffice that the good work proceed from a man just and endued with the habit of charity, or whether it be also required that it proceed actually, or virtually, from charity itself. And although there are not wanting most grave authors who hold that every good work of a just man endued with the habit of charity is meritorious of eternal life, yet to us it seems more probable that unto merit it is exacted that the good work either, at the time when it is done, be actually commanded by charity, and referred to God as to the supernatural and last end; or at least be born of an act commanded by charity, and beforehand referred to God, which is to be referred to God virtually, not actually. In which place it is not to be omitted, what St. Bonaventure prudently admonishes, in book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 41, article 1, question 3, that it suffices not that a work be said to be virtually referred to God if one, at the beginning of the year, or month, or even day, by a certain general intention refer all his future works to God; but that it is necessary that that particular work itself be referred to God which is afterward to be done. For then are works said to be virtually referred to God when the preceding intention is a true cause of the works which are afterward done: as if one firmly determine within himself to bestow some sum of money on the poor for God’s sake, and afterward, an occasion offered, bestow that sum — he will be said to refer his work virtually to God, even though, while he distributes that money, he think nothing of God.
This opinion, which seems the more common in the schools, can be confirmed by these arguments. First, the Scripture testifies, John 15, that just men so stand to Christ as the branches to the vine; but it is plain that the branches bear not fruit unless they draw sap from the vine; therefore neither can just men (as the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 16, explains) do meritorious works save through that grace which Christ infuses into them, as the vine into the branches. Which is confirmed also from the epistle of Celestine to the Gauls, chapter 8, where we read that nothing pleases God save those works of which he himself is the author. Likewise from Augustine, who in epistle 105, and elsewhere everywhere, writes that our merits are gifts of God. Not, therefore, are those good works meritorious which are only morally good, which without a reference to God through an act of charity can be done by the just. Second, the Lord, Matthew 5, when he says, If you love them that love you, what reward shall you have? without doubt shows that a just man can do some moral goods, such as to love a friend because thou art loved by him, and yet have no reward in eternal life. The same too, Matthew 10, says not, He that receiveth a just man shall receive the reward of a just man, but, He that receiveth a just man in the name of a just man — that is, with that intention, because he is a servant of God. And Matthew 19, when he said, Every one that shall leave father or mother, etc., shall receive a hundredfold, and shall possess life everlasting, he took care to add, for my name’s sake; as also elsewhere he often adds, for me. And why does the Apostle so anxiously admonish, 1 Corinthians 10 and Colossians 3, that whatever we do, we do in the name of the Lord and to the glory of God, if all the works of the just are of themselves directed to God, and meritorious? Third, those works alone are meritorious of eternal life which of their own nature increase charity. For, according to the common opinion of the theologians, every merit of eternal life is at the same time a merit of the increase of charity; but charity is not increased save by acts which proceed from it; for this is common to all habits. Therefore those works alone are meritorious of eternal life which either are acts of charity elicited, or at least commanded. Fourth, it is agreed among all that a work ought to be referred to God as to a supernatural end, if it is to be meritorious of eternal life; but the works of the other virtues are not referred to God as to a supernatural end unless they be commanded and directed by charity; for if they be moral, they are not referred of their own nature to God save as to a natural end; if they be theological, they regard indeed God as a supernatural object, but are not referred to him as to a supernatural end, or as to the highest good; therefore the acts of the other virtues are not meritorious unless they be commanded and moved by charity. They will answer, perhaps, that all the good works of the just are referred to God as to a supernatural end, even though they be not commanded by charity: both because the worker himself, by reason of habitual charity, is ordered to God; and because whoever receives the habit of infused charity, by this very thing refers and orders all his to the glory of God. But the answer solves not the argument rightly. For a subject ordered through some habit to an end does not necessarily communicate to the work an ordering to the same end, unless it work from that habit; otherwise all the works of a man habitually turned away from God, and turned to the creature as to the last end, would be ordered to a perverse last end, and so would be mortal sins — which we taught above to be false and heretical. Likewise there could be in a just man no idle words or deeds; for those are called and are idle which lack a due end; but no words or deeds of the just would lack a due end, if by reason of the subject they were understood to be directed and ordered to God as to their end. Nor indeed does that general and confused reference of works to God suffice, which they ought to make, or are wont to make, who receive the habit of infused charity; otherwise (as we said) the Apostle would not so diligently exhort that we should do all things to the glory of God, nor would he say, 1 Corinthians last chapter, Let all your things be done in charity, if it could not happen that the works of the just be not done in charity, or from charity. Let it remain, therefore, that meritorious works of necessity require to be directed and ordered to God actually or virtually by charity.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XV. Bonum opus non esso metutorum vi/x xternx , nisi ex charitate procedat . Restat postrema conditio, quae' erat, ut opus bonum ex charitatis virtute procedat. Fuit enim singularis opinio Gulielmi Altisio. dorensis lib. ili. tractat. 10. cap. 1 quaest. 2. et cap. 2. quaest. 1. Meritum prius, et prin¬ cipalius a fide, quam a charitate pendere. Qua? sententia non parum favere videtur erroribus hujus temporis haereticorum, quam¬ vis ille longe alio sensu fidem ita praedicet, ac haeretici facere soleant, sed profecto tam sunt aperta Scripturarum testimonia, ut mirum sit, egregium Jllum virum in ea re labi potuisse. Primum enim disertis verbis charitati bea- titudo promittitur. Joan. xiv. Si quis diligit me , diligetur a Patre meo , et ego diligam eum , et manifestabo ei me ipsum (1). Esse autem in hac manifestatione sitam beatitudinem, idem Dominus testatur, cum ait, Mat¬ thaei v. Beati mundo corde , quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. Et Joan xvii. Hxc est autem vita x terna , ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum , et quem misisti Jesum Christum. Et Apostolus Joannes in I. epist. cap. m. Nunc filii Dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quid e- rimus. Scimus enim quia cum apparuerit similes ei t rimus, quia videbimus eum sicuti. esi ii). Praeterea rursus de praemio charita¬ tis Apostolus Paulus I Corinth. ii. Oculus , inquit, non vidit, auris non audivit , in cor hominis non ascenderunt qux praeparavit Deus diligentibus se. Et I Corinth. xiii. Si habue¬ ro omnem fidem, ita ut montes transferam, charitatem autem non habeam , nihil sum (3). At quo pacto, quaeso, fides prius et princi¬ palius felicitatem meretur, quam charitas, si homo fidem habens sine charitate nihil est ? Idem Apostolus II ad Timoth iv. Re¬ posita est mihi corona justitix, quam reddet mihi in illa die justus judex, non solum au¬ tem mihi, sed et iis qui diligunt adventum ejus. Item B. Jacobus cap. i. Beatus vir qui suffert tentationem, quoniam cum probatus fuerit, accipiet coronam vitx, quam repro¬ misit Deus diligentibus se (4). Deinde argumenta omnia, quibus supra probatum est, formalem causam justifica¬ tionis non esse fidem sine charitate, sed fi¬ dem charitate formatam, ita ut principali¬ ter justitia vera et Christiana in charitate consistat, probant etiam meritum principali¬ ter ex charitate pendere , quandoquidem praemium vita, aeternae nihil est aliud nisi merces et corona justitiae. Tertio, idem probatur manifesta ratione. Nam meritum vitae aeternae ita ex divina or¬ dinatione dependet, ut illa sola opera pro¬ prie meritoria vitae aeterna? possint esse, quae Deus ad vitam aeternam acceptare dignatur. Est enim vita aetex-na veluti bravium quod¬ dam, ut Scriptui'ae loquuntur; et in libei'a potestate principis proponentis bravium est, ut definiat quibus opeiibus, quo cursu, quo certamine bravium obtineri velit. Poito charitatis opera ad vitam aeternam a Deo 1'equiri, pex'spicuum est, tuxn ex Scripturis paulo ante citatis, tum etiam ex i'atione suavis providentiae Dei; illa enim media Deus ordinare solet ad finem, quae majorem cum illo proportionem et confor- mitatem habent. Nihil autem esse, quod majorem proportionem et conformitatem cum aeterna felicitate habeat, quam dile¬ ctionem, et opera ex dilectione manantia, facile probari potest. Nam aeterna felicitas est consecutio ultimi finis, atque adeptio summi boni ; sola vero charitas est, quae fi¬ nem ultimum, summumque bonum tam¬ quam objectum proprium i’espicit, atque ad (1) Joan. XIV. 23. - (2) Math. V. 8: Joan. XVIT, 3; I Joan. HI, 2. — T Cor. IT. 0: ! Coe. XIU. 2. - 4) Tiro. IV, 8: Jaro!.. I. 12. CAPUT XV. illud movet et ordinat actus virtutum om¬ nium reliquarum. Inde est enim, quod ipsa sola vera dicitur et est forma et regina vir¬ tutum ; et ipsi soli actus virtutum omnimn quasi proprii ejus essent, ab Apostolo tri¬ buuntur : Charitas patiens est, benigna est, omnia credit , omnia sperat , elc. (1). I ad Corinth. xm. Atque hsec est ratio, cur S. Augustinus lib. i. de moribus Ecclesim cap. Io. dixerit, virtutem esse amorem summi boni; et om¬ nes virtutes per amorem definiendas esse censuerit. Non quod ignoraret propriam ra¬ tionem temperantiae, prudentiae et aliarum virtutum non in amore, sed in alio actu si¬ tam esse, sed ut ostenderet virtutes omnes a charitate moveri atque formari. Et easdem virtutes, non nisi charitate formatas, nos ad Deum promerendum posse perducere. Id enim in cap. 14. extremo posuerat, nos ad summum bonum non posse nisi dilectione, amore, charitate conscendere. Ex quo intelligi poterit, quid illud fuerit, quod Allisiodorensem fefellit. Nam ex hoc loco S. Augustini perperam intellecto, col¬ legit fidem ex propria ratione, et ut est vir¬ tus a charitate distincta, includere non so¬ lum cognitionem, sed etiam amorem primae veritatis, ut proprium sit fidei, ut fides est, credere primae veritati propter amorem ip¬ sius primae veritatis, et hoc distinguatur a charitate, quod fides sit cognitio, et amor primae vei itatis ; charitas vero amor primae bonitatis : sed non erit opus in his refellen¬ dis diutius laborare, cum nemo sit vel me¬ diocriter in morali disciplina versatus, qui nesciat, fidem non esse amorem, et amorem, non veritatem, sed bonitatem respicere. His igitur ita constitutis queeri solet a Theologis : Utrum ad meritum vitae aeternae satis sit, ut opus bonum procedat ab homi¬ ne justo, et habitu charitalis praedito, an e- tiam requiratur, ut actu, vel virtute ab ipsa charitate procedat. Et quamvis non desint gravissimi auctores, qui sentiant, omne opus bonum hominis justi, et habitu charitatis praediti, vitae aeternae meritorium esse : no¬ bis tamen probabilius videtur ad meritum exigi, ut opus bonum, vel tunc, cum fit, a- ctu imperetur a charitate, atque in Deum ut finem supernaturalem et ultimum referatur : vel certe nascatur ab actu imperato a eha- jitate , atque in Deum ante relato, quod 37 r> est virtute, non actu in Deum referri. Quo loco non est omittendum, quod pru denter monet S. Bonaventura in 2. sent. dis¬ tinet. 41. art. 1. qmest. 3. non sufficere, ut opus virtute referri dicatur in Deum, si quis ad initium anni, vel mensis, vel etiam diei, generali quadam intentione referat omnia sua futura opera in Deum ; sed necesse esse, ut illud ipsum opus particulare referatur in Deum., quod postea faciendum est. Tunc e- nim dicuntur opera virtute in Deum relata, cum intentio praecedens est vera causa ope¬ rum, quae postea fiunt, ut si quis apud se certo constituat aliquam nummorum sum¬ mam propter Deum pauperibus erogare, et postea summam illam oblata occasione ero¬ get : is dicetur virtute referre opus suum in Deum, etiamsi dum pecunias illas distribuit, nihil de Deo cogitet. Haec sententia, quae communior in scholis esse videtur, his argumentis confirmari po¬ test. Primo Scriptura testatur Joan. xv. ita se habere homines justos ad -Christum, ut palmites ad vitem ; constat autem palmites non ferre fructum, nisi succum a vite traxe¬ rint; igitur neque homines justi (ut Conci¬ lium Tridentinum, sess. 6. cap. 16. expli¬ cat) opera meritoria facere possunt, nisi per illam gratiam, quam Christus in ipsos, ut vitis in palmites influit. Quod etiam confir¬ matur ex epistola Ccelestini ad Gallos cap. 8. ubi legimus, non placere Deo, nisi opera il¬ la, quorum ipse auctor est. Item ex Augu¬ stino, qui in cpistol. 103. et alibi passim scribit, merita nostra munera esse Dei. Non igitur meritoria sunt opera bona tantum moraliter, quae sine relatione ;n Deum per actum charitatis, a justis fieri possunt. Secundo, Dominus Matth. v. cum ait : Si diligitis eos, qui vos diligunt, quam mercedem habebitis (2). Sine dubio demonstrat, posse hominem justum facere aliqua bona mora¬ lia, quale est diligere amicum, quoniam ab illo diligeris, et tamen non habere mercedem in vita aeterna. Idem etiam Mat.h. x. non ait : Qui recipit justum , mercedem justi ac¬ cipiet (3). Sed qui recipit justum, in no¬ mine justi, id est, ea intentione, quia servus jjei est. Et Matth. xix. cum diceiet : Omnis qui reliquerit patrem , vel matrem , ete ., centu¬ plum accipiet , et vitam veternam possidebit, addere curavit, propter nomen meum (4) ; ut etiam alibi saepe addit, propter me. EI (1) I Cor. XIII, 4. — f-2) Math. V, 46. — «3) Mat. X, 41. — MI Matth. XIX. 20. 370 LIBER V. cur Apostolus tam sollicite monet I ad Co- rinth. x. et ad Colosseos, m. ut quicquid fa¬ cimus, in nomine Domini, et in gloriam Dei faciamus ; si omnia justorum opera ex se di¬ riguntur in Deum, et meritoria sunt ? Tertio, illa solum opera meritoria sunt vi- tfc aeterna;, qua; ex natura sua charitatem augent. Nam juxta communem Theologo¬ rum sententiam, omne meritum vitae aeter¬ na,*, simul etiam incrementi chari tatis meri¬ tum est : at charitas non augetur nisi per actus, qui ex ipsa procedunt ; id enim om¬ nibus habitibus commune est. Igitur illa so¬ lum opera meritoria sunt vite aeternae, quae vel sunt actus charitatis eliciti, vel saltem imperati. Quarto, convenit inter omnes, ut opus re¬ ferri debeat in Deum, ut finem supernatura- Jem, si futurum sit meritorium vite cetera a* ; at opera virtutum creterarum non referun¬ tur in Deum ut (inem supernaturalem, nisi a charitate imperentur, et dirigantur, nam si morales sint, non referuntur ex natura sua in Deum nisi ut finem naturalem ; si theo¬ logica; sint, respiciunt quidem Deum, ut ob¬ jectum supernaturale, sed non referuntur in eum, ut finem supernaturalem, vel ut sum¬ mum bonum ; igitur non sunt meritorii ac¬ tus virtutum reliquarum, nisi a charitate im¬ perentur et moveantur. Respondebunt fortasse omnia bona opera justorum referri in Deum, ut finem superna¬ turalem, etiamsi a charitate non imperentur, tum quia ipse operans ratione habitualis charitatis est ordinatus in Deum. Tum quia quicumque recipit habitum charitatis infusae, hoc ipso refert, atque ordinat omnia sua ad gloriam Dei. At responsio non recte solvit argumen¬ tum. Nam subjectum' ordinatum per habi¬ tum aliquem in finem non necessario com¬ municat operi ordinationem in eumdem fi¬ nem, nisi ex illo habitu operetur, alioqui omnia opera hominis habitualiter a Deo a- versi, et ad creaturam, ut ad finem ul¬ timum conversi, essent ordinata ad per¬ versum ultimum finem, atque adeo peccata essent mortalia, quod esse falsum et haereti- cum, supra docuimus. Item nulla esse possent in homine justo verba, vel facta otiosa ; nam illa dicuntur et sunt otiosa, qua; carent debito fine : nul¬ la vero justi verba, vel facta debito fine ca¬ rerent, si ratione subjecti directa atque or¬ dinata inlelligcrentur in Deum, ut finem. Neque vero sufficit generalis illa, et confusa relatio operum in Deum, quam facere de¬ bent vel solent, qui recipiunt habitum cha- rilatis infusa; ; alioqui (ut diximus) non ita sedulo Apostolus hortaretur, ut omnia in Dei gloriam faceremus, neque diceret 1. Co- rinth. ultirn., omnia vestra in charitate fiant, si non posset accidere ; ut opera justorum in charitate, vel ex charitate non fierent. Ma¬ neat igitur opera meritoria, id ex necessita¬ te requirere, ut actu vel virtute a charitate dirigantur, atque ordinentur in Deum.