Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book V: On the Merits of Works
Chapter 16: That the works of the just done from charity are meritorious of eternal life by condignity
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
We have discoursed hitherto of merit, whether it be and what it be; it follows now that we see of what sort it be. And there are three questions on this matter. One, whether the merit of the just is to be called of condignity or of congruity. The other, whether it is condign by reason of the promise only, or also by reason of the work. The third, whether God rewards the works of the just above condignity, and those of the impious below condignity. As to the first question, all Catholics acknowledge that the good works of the just are meritorious of eternal life; but yet some judge that these words “of condignity” and “of congruity” are not to be used, but that it must be said absolutely that the good works of the just are meritorious of eternal life from the grace of God. So teaches Thomas Waldensis, volume 3 On the Sacramentals, chapter 7, to whom Paul of Burgos seemed to subscribe, in his addition to the commentary of Nicholas of Lyra, on Psalm 35. Others will have the good works of the just to be meritorious of condignity in a broad way, so that this “condign,” in respect of the condign properly taken, can be called congruous, and, in respect of the congruous properly taken, can be called condign. So teach Durandus, in book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 27, question 2, and Gregory, in book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 17, question 1, article 2. But the common opinion of the theologians admits simply a merit of condignity. Which opinion is most true. And indeed, as to the words, our merits are rightly said to be from the grace of God, as also they are truly said to be gifts of God; yet no less rightly are they said to be of justice and of condignity. For the divine Scripture plainly enough acknowledges these words, when it says, Colossians 1, That you may walk worthy of God. And 2 Thessalonians 1, That you may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God. And Apocalypse 3, They shall walk with me in white, because they are worthy. But that some distinguish between “worthy” and “condign,” and admit a merit of the worthy, not of the condign, is too light. For the Latin translator renders the same Greek word now “worthy,” as in the cited places, now “condign,” as Romans 8, The sufferings are not condign, etc. But as to the thing itself, the opinion of Durandus, if it meant nothing else than that our merits are not of condignity, or of justice absolutely, but only on a supposition — that is, the liberal promise of God being laid down — would not be to be reproved. But he seems altogether to will that our merits, proceeding from the grace of God, and the promise being laid down, are still not such that of justice a reward is owed them, but only of the sole liberality of God. In which sense he is refuted by the theologians with the common consent of almost all, and deservedly; for against that opinion fight all the arguments which we have made against the heretics. For they all prove that by the just judgment of God the reward of eternal life is owed to the merits of good works. Nor will it be needful in this place to repeat those. It will suffice briefly to refute four of his sayings, on which chiefly his opinion seems to lean. For he says, first, that it is rash and blasphemous to say that God would be unjust if he rendered not to the merits of just men the promised reward. He says, second, that there is not extant in the sacred letters a promise which obliges God to render the reward, but only one which teaches that God has ordained and disposed to give eternal life to those who shall have kept the commandments. He says, third, that in those words of blessed Paul, 2 Timothy 4, Which the just judge will render to me in that day, it is rightly put “the just judge,” and rightly not put “by a just judgment,” because God, who renders rewards to the just and punishments to the unjust, is just and merciful, and as just, by a just judgment renders punishments to the unjust; as merciful, liberally bestows rewards on the just. He says, fourth, that none can of justice ask a reward from another unless he render him all that is his, and something more; but that we can never render to God all that is his, much less something more, since all things are his.
To the first I answer that it is not rash nor blasphemous, but pious and holy, to say that God would be unjust if he kept not his promises. For so the Scriptures and the Fathers speak. For what means that of Psalm 144, The Lord is faithful in all his words? And in the same place, The Lord is just in all his ways? And that of 2 Esdras 9, Thou thyself, O Lord God, who didst choose Abraham, and didst find his heart faithful before thee, and madest a covenant with him to give him the land of the Amorrhite and of the Jebusite, and hast fulfilled thy words, because thou art just? And that to the Hebrews 6, God is not unjust, that he should forget your work and labor? Certainly he who says, “God fulfils his words, because he is just, and God forgets not their labor and work, because he is not unjust,” manifestly signifies that he would be unjust if he did otherwise. St. Augustine, in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 2: “God is not unjust, that he should defraud the just of the wage of justice.” And book 4 against Julian, chapter 3: “By that which is true justice, by that also is the kingdom of God; for God himself — which be far from us — will be unjust, if the true just man be not admitted to his kingdom.” Thou seest how St. Augustine fears not rashness or blasphemy, if he say that God would be unjust if he exclude the just from the kingdom. Add that, if God, by not keeping his promises, were not unjust, he could certainly not keep his promises; and thereby could not be faithful, could lie, could deny himself — which are truly rash and blasphemous. For, If we believe not, he continueth faithful, he cannot deny himself, 2 Timothy 2. Likewise, Which God, who lieth not, hath promised, Titus 1. Likewise, It is impossible for God to lie, Hebrews 6. Likewise, He is faithful that hath promised, Hebrews 10. To the second I answer: every true promise carries with it an obligation, and therefore is to be fulfilled and kept of justice. For therefore is he called faithful who stands to his promises, unfaithful who performs not his promises. But that there is extant in the Scriptures not only an ordinance and disposition, or purpose, but also a promise, which truly pertains to fidelity, is plain from the cited place, Titus 1, Unto the hope of life everlasting, which God, who lieth not, hath promised. And James 1, He shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him. Then, the similitude of the prize, to which the Apostle compares eternal life, 1 Corinthians 9; the similitude of the penny a day promised by convention to those laboring in the vineyard, Matthew 20; the similitude of the deposit, which is had 2 Timothy 1; and many others of that kind — do they not most plainly signify a promise to be rendered of debt and obligation? What that the Fathers everywhere say that God becomes a debtor to men on account of good works. St. Cyprian, in the sermon On Alms, at the end, of him who works well: “He reckons God his debtor.” St. Basil, in the oration to the rich: “Show thy works, and exact the retribution.” St. Ambrose, sermon 7 on Psalm 118, on that, Be mindful of thy word: “God wills to be sued, that if one, following the proposed rewards for the virtues, have contended well, he may expect the fruit of the retribution, nay even exact it.” St. John Chrysostom, homily 3 on Matthew: “That God may confess himself thy debtor, not only for the works, but also for this grace and humble sentiment.” St. Augustine, on Psalm 83, on that, The Lord loveth mercy and truth: “Behold, we see that Paul holds him his debtor.” Likewise: “The Lord himself made himself a debtor, not by receiving, but by promising. It is not said to him, Render what thou hast received, but, Render what thou hast promised.” Like things we cited above from Paulinus to Victricius, and Fulgentius to Monimus. To the third I answer that the opinion of the Apostle is not rightly expounded by Durandus. For that those words, Which the just judge will render to me, are to be taken formally, so that the sense is, “the Lord will render to me, in so far as he is a just judge, and thereby of justice, not of sole liberality,” is plain, first, from almost the several words of that sentence, as from that, I have fought a good fight; likewise from that, will render; and from that, the crown of justice. Second, because that “just judge” would be superfluous in that place, where there is no question of the punishments of the impious, but only of the rewards of the just, if God inflicted punishments only as a just judge, but poured out rewards as a liberal giver. Third, from Augustine, who in the cited place on Psalm 83, treating this place of the Apostle, says that God is a bestower of indulgence, but a debtor of the crown, and therefore bestows indulgence as a father, the crown of justice as a just judge. Likewise in the book On Grace and Free Choice, expounding the same place, chapter 6: “To whom would the just judge render the crown, if the merciful Father had not given the grace?” And in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 13, he says that not only eternal life, but also mercy in the remission of venial sins, is rendered by a just judgment to good merits. Finally, in other places the same Apostle said not only that God is a just judge in the reward of good works, but also that it is just with God that he reward good works, 2 Thessalonians 1; and in the same place he says in express words that by the just judgment of God the Thessalonians were counted worthy of the kingdom of God, for which they suffered. To the fourth I answer that absolutely a man cannot exact anything from God, since all things are his; yet, his will and covenant being laid down, whereby he wills not to exact our works from us for nothing, but to render a reward according to the proportion of the works, we can truly exact a reward from him: as a servant cannot absolutely demand any reward from his lord, since all things which the servant acquires he acquires for his lord; yet if it please the lord to give him his works, and for the same, as not owed to himself, to promise a reward, he will of right demand a reward for his works. Then, that objection of Durandus would have place if God rendered a reward to good works of commutative justice; but since God has decreed to give rewards to those who work well of distributive justice, there is no need that we properly give him anything. For neither do they who run for the prize give anything to the king, and yet the king is bound to bestow the prize on him who shall have surpassed the rest in the course. Let it remain, therefore, that the good works of the just merit eternal life of justice, and so of condignity.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVI. Opera justorum ex charitate facta , meri¬ toria esse vitx xlernse ex condigno. Disseruimus hactenus de merito, an sit, et quid sit : sequitur nunc, ut quale sit vi¬ deamus. Sunt autem tres, de hac re quae¬ stiones. Una sitne meritum justorum dicen¬ dum ex condigno, an ex congruo. Altera, sitne. condignum ratione promissionis tan¬ tum, an etiam ratione operis. Tertia, num Deus remuneret opera justorum supra con¬ dignum, et impiorum citra condignum. Quod attinet ad primam quaestionem, Catholici omnes agnoscunt opera bona justo¬ rum esse meritoria vite aeternae, sed tamen aliqui censent non esse utendum his vocibus de condigno, et de congruo, sed absolute dicendum, opera bona justorum esse meri¬ toria vitae seterrne, ex gratia Dei. Ita docet Thomas Waldensis, tomo 3. de Sacramenta- libus cap. 7. cui subscribere visus est Paulus Burgensis, in additione ad commentarium Nicolai Lyrani, in Psal. xxxv. Alii volunt opera bona justorum esse me¬ ritoria de condigno, largo modo, ita ut hoc condignum respectu condigni proprie sum¬ pti possit dici congruum, respectu congrui proprie sumpti possit dici condignum. Ita docent Durandus in 2. sentent. distinet. 27. quaest. 2. Et Gregorius in I. Sentent. dist. -17. quoest. 1. art. 2. Communis autem sententia Theologorum admittit simpliciter, meritum de condigno. Quae sententia verissima est. Et quidem quod ad voces attinet, recte dicuntur, me¬ rita nostra esse ex gratia Dei, sicut etiam vere dicuntur esse munera Dei, tamen non minus recte dicuntur esse ex justitia et ex condigno. Nam Scriptura divina satis aper- CAPUT XVI. te agnoscit has voces, dum dicit, Colos¬ seos. i. Ut ambuletis digne Deo. Et II. Thessal. i. Ut digni habeamini regno Dei. Et Apoc. iii. Ambulabunt mecum in albis, quoniam digni sunt (I). Quod vero q tidam distinguunt inter dig¬ num et condignum, et meritum ex digno admittunt, non ex condigno, nimis leve est. Nam interpres Latinus eamdetn vocem Grae¬ cam, nunc vertit dignum, ut in locis citatis, nunc condignum, ut ad Rotnan. vm. Non sunt condignae passiones etc. (2). Quod vero attinet ad rem ipsam, Durandi sententia, si nihil aliud vellet, nisi merita nostra non esse ex condigno, sive ex justitia absolute, sed tantfcm ex hypothesi, id est, posita liberali Dei promissione non esset re¬ probanda. Caeterum videtur omnino velle, merita nostra ex gratia Dei procedentia, et posita promissione, adhuc non esse talia, ut eis ex justitia debeatur merces, sed ex sola Dei liberalitate. In quo sensu refellitur a Theologis communi fere omnium consensu, et merito, pugnant enim contra eam senten¬ tiam omnia argumenta, quae fecimus adver¬ sus haereticos. Omnia enim probant justo Dei judicio deberi meritis operum bonorum mereedem vitee aeternae. Neque necesse erit hoc locp illa repetere. Satis erit, paucis refutare quatuor ejus dicta, quibus potissimum ejus sententia niti vide¬ tur. Dicit enim primo, temerarium et blas- phemum esse dicere, Deum fore injustum, si meritis hominum justorum non reddat mereedem promissam. Dicit secundo, non exstare in sacris litteris promissionem, quae Deum obliget ad red¬ dendam mereedem, sed tantum, quae doce¬ at, Deum ordinasse, ac disposuisse vitam aeternam dare iis, qui mandata servaverint. Dicit tertio, in illis B. Pauli verbis, II ad Tim. iv. Quam reddet mihi in illa die justus Judex [ 3); recte positum esse, Justus judex , 'et recte non esse positum, justo judicio, quia Deus, qui reddit praemia justis, et poenas injustis, justus et misericors est, et ut justus, justo judicio poenas reddit injustis; ut mise¬ ricors, liberaliter praemia tribuit justis. Dicit quarto, non posse ullum ex justitia mereedem ab alio petere, nisi reddat ei om¬ nia, quae illius sunt, et aliquid amplius ; nos autem, non posse Deo unquam reddere om- 377 nia, quae illius sunt, nedum aliquid amplius, cum omnia sint ipsius. Ad primum respondeo, non esse temera¬ rium nec blasphemum, sed pium et sanctum dicere Deum fore injustum, si non servaret promissa. Sic enim loquuntur Scripturae et Patres. Quid enim sibi vult illud Psal. cxliv. Fidelis Deus in omnibus verbis suis ? Et ibi¬ dem : Justus Dominus in omnibus viis suis ? Et illud II Esdrae i>». Tu ipse Domine Deus, qui elegisti Abraham , et invenisti cor ejus fi¬ dele coram te, et percussisti cum eo foedus, ut dares ei terram A morrsehi, et Jebusaei, et im • plesti verba tua, quoniam justus es ? Et illud ad Hebr. vi. Non est injustus /*eus, qui oblivi¬ scatur operis vestri et laboris (4)? Certe qui di¬ cit, Deus implet verba sua, quoniam justus est, et non obliviscitur Deus laboris et operis suorum, quia injustus non est : manifeste significat, eum injustum fore, si secus face¬ ret. S. Augustinus libro de natura et gratia cap. 2. (( Non est, inquit, injustus Deus, qui justos fraudet mercede justitiae ». Et lib. iv. in Julianum cap. 3. «Per quod, inquit, vera justitia, per hoc et regnum Dei, Deus nam¬ que ipse, quod absit, erit injustus, si ad ejus regnum verus non admittitur justus ». Vides quam non timeat S. Augustinus te¬ meritatem, vel blasphemiam, si dicat, Deum injustum fore, si jastos excludat a regno. Adde, quod si Deus non servando pro¬ missa, non esset injustus, posset certe non servare promissa : ac per hoc posset non esse fidelis, posset mentiri, posset negare se ipsum, quae vere temeraria sunt, atque blasphema : Nam si nos negaverimus, ille fi¬ delis permanet , negare se ipsum non potest, II ad Timoth. 2. Item : Quam promisit, qui non mentitur Deus, Tit. i. Item : Impossibile est mentiri Deum, Ilebr. vi. Item : Fidelis est, qui repromisit. Hebr. x. Ad secundum respondeo : Omnem veram promissionem ferre secum obligationem, et ideo ex justitia implendam esse, atque ser¬ vandam. Nam idcirco fidelis dicitur, qui stat promissis, infidelis, qui promissa non preestat. Extare autem in Scripturis non so¬ lum ordinationem et dispositionem, sive propositum, sed etiam promissionem, qute ad fidelitatem vere pertineat, perspicuum est ex loco citato, ad Tit. i. Secundum spem vi- (i) Coi. I; II Thess. I, 5; Ap. III, 4. - (3) Rom. VIII, 18. - (2, II Tini. IV, 8. - (4) Psal. CXLIV, 13; ibid. 17; II Esd. IX, 8; Heb. VI, 10. — (5) II Tim. II, 12; Tit. I, 2; Heb. VI, 18; ibid. X, 24. tom. vi, as 378 LIBER V. tae aeternae , quam promisit, qui non mentitur, Deus. Et Jacobi i. Accipiet coronam vitae, quam repromisit Deus diligentibus se (1). Deinde, similitudo bravii, cui comparat Apostolus vitam ajternam, I Corinth. ix. si¬ militudo denarii diurni ex conventione pro¬ missi laborantibus in vinea, Matth. xx. simi¬ litudo depositi, quse habetur II Timoth. i. et alia id genus multa, nonne apertissime significant promissionem ex debito et obli¬ gatione reddendam ? Quid quod Patres passim dicunt, Deum fieri hominibus propter bona opera debito¬ rem. S. Cyprianus, in serm. de eleemosyna, extremo, de eo, qui bene operatur : « Deum, inquit, computat debitorem ». S. Basilius, orat, ad divites : « Opera, in¬ quit, ostende, et exige retributionem » . S. Ambrosius serm. 7. in Psal. cxviii. in illud : Memor esto verbi tui : « Vult, inquit, Deus conveniri, ut si quis proposita secutus virtutibus praemia bene certaverit, fructum remunerationis expectet, quin etiam exi¬ gat » . S.. Joannes Chrysostomus hom. 3. in Matth. « Ut se, inquit, Deus tibi debitorem fateatur non solum pro operibus, sed etiam pro hac gratia, humilique sententia ». S. Augustinus in Psal. lxxxiii. in illud : Mi¬ sericordiam et veritatem diligit Dominus : « Ecce, inquit, videmus, quia tenet eum Pau¬ lus debitorem ». Item : « Debitorem, inquit, Dominus ipse se fecit, non accipiendo, sed promittendo. Non ei dicitur, redde quod ac¬ cepisti, sed redde quod promisisti ». Similia supra citavimus ex Paulino ad Victricium, et Fulgentio ad Monimum. Ad tertium respondeo, non recte a Du¬ rando exponi sententiam Apostoli, quod e- nira illa verba, quam reddet mihi justus ju¬ dex, sint apcipienda formaliter, ut sensus sit, reddet mihi Dominus, quatenus est ju¬ stus judex, ac per hoc ex justitia, non ex so¬ la liberalitate, planum est, primo, ex singu¬ lis pene verbis illius sententias, ut ex illis, bonum certamen certavi. Item ex illo, reddet, cJt ex illo, corona justitiae. Secundo, quia supervacaneum esset illud, justus judex, eo loco, ubi non agitur de poe¬ nis impiorum, sed de proemiis tantum justo¬ rum, si Deus poenas solum ut justus judex infligeret, praemia vero, ut liberalis donator, effunderet. Tertio ex Augustino, qui loco citato in Psalm. lxxxiii. hunc locum Apostoli tractans, dicit, Deum indulgentias esse largitorem, co¬ ronae autem debitorem, et ideo indulgen¬ tiam tribuere ut patrem, coronam justitiae, ut judicem justum. Item in lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio, eumdem locum exponens cap. 6. « Cui redderet, inquit, coronam ju¬ stus judex, si non donasset gratiam miseri¬ cors Pater » ? Et in lib. de correptione ct gratia cap. 13. non solum vitam aeternam, sed etiam misericordiam in remissione ve¬ nialium dicit, justo judicio bonis meritis reddi. Denique, in aliis locis idem Apostolus non solum dixit, justum judicem esse Deum in remuneratione operum bonorum, sed etiam justum esse apud Deum, ut bona opera re¬ muneret, II Thess. i. Et ibidem disertis ver¬ bis dicit, justo judicio Dei Thessalonicenses dignos haberi regno Dei, pro quo patieban¬ tur. Ad quartum respondeo , absolute non posse hominem a Deo aliquid exigere, cum omnia sint ipsius, tamen posita ejus volun¬ tate, et pacto, quo non vult exigere a nobis opera nostra gratis, sed mercedem reddere juxta proportionem operum, vere possumus ab eo mercedem exigere : quomodo servus non potest absolute a domino suo ullum praimium postulare, cum omnia, quaj servus acquirit, domino suo acquirat : tamen si do¬ mino placeat donare illi opera sua, et pro iisdem tamquam sibi non debitis mercedem promittere, jure mercedem pro suis operibus postulabit. Deinde, objectio ista Durandi locum ha¬ beret, si Deus ex justitia commutativa mer¬ cedem redderet operibus bonis : sed cum Deus ex justitia distributiva praunia bene operantibus dare decreverit, non est opus, ut ei proprie aliquid demus. Nam neque ii, qui currunt ad bravium, dant aliquid regi, ct tamen tenetur rex bravium tribuere ei. qui CEeteros in cursu superaverit. Maneat igitur, opera bona justorum ex justitia, at¬ que adeo ex condigno mereri vitam ajtcr- nam. (J) Tit. I, 2; Jacob. I, 12. GAPUT XVll. 379