Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Members of the Church · On Monks (Book II)
Chapter 32: The Fourth Objection from Natural Reason Answered
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. II, De Monachis (De Membris Ecclesiae, Book II), On Monks (On the Members of the Church, Book II). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The objections are to be dissolved which the adversaries take from various inconveniences which seem to arise from celibacy. The first reason. We seem to be repugnant to nature herself by celibacy, who will have labored in vain at the diversity of sexes and the generative power in man, if it is better to be celibate than married.
This reason is Jovinian’s, and was long ago refuted by Saint Jerome (Book 1 against Jovinian). But because it has been called back into the light again by Luther (in the sermon on marriage) and by Erasmus (in the Encomium of marriage), we answer that the generative power and the diversity of sexes are not in vain, even if very many do not use them. For those things which are instituted for the good of the species are not called in vain if they be exercised by some individuals, even if by many others they be not exercised; for otherwise all herbs and all fruits are born with seeds, and yet very few of them are borne to fruit.
The second reason. If all were continent, the world would perish; therefore continence ought not to be preached to all.
The Fathers answer that there is no danger that all should wish to be continent; for there will always be more imperfect than perfect, and therefore it ought to be preached to all, that at least a few may do it. Saint Jerome (in the book against Jovinian): “But thou wilt say,” he says, “If all be virgins, how will the human race stand? Fear not that all become virgins. Virginity is a difficult thing, and therefore rare, because difficult.”
Another solution Saint Augustine brings (chapter 10 On the Good of Marriage): “I know some who murmur, What if all should wish to abstain from all intercourse? whence would the human race subsist? Would that all wished this! Much more quickly would the city of God be filled, and the end of the age hastened.” So he. Which he teaches even more clearly (in the book On the Good of Widowhood, chapter 23); whence also the Apostle said (in the first epistle to the Corinthians 7): I would that all were as myself — that is, celibate. Which certainly he would not have said, if it were not lawful for all to choose celibacy, even if the world were to be ended.
From which we understand that it is not a certain opinion of those who say that if there were in the world only monks and nuns, they ought to be joined in marriage to preserve the species. For such could believe that the end of the world was at hand, and accordingly would not be bound to violate their vow to propagate the species. If, however, one should wish to defend what some probably teach, that men are bound to marriage in that extreme necessity of preserving the human race, there would be no cause to fear the vow. For vows cannot prescribe against the divine law.
The third reason. By the celibacy of so many monks, priests, and nuns, the Christian commonwealth is harmed, since the number of Christians is diminished, nor can the multitude of the infidels be conveniently resisted.
Saint Ambrose answers (Book 3 On Virgins): “I have heard some say,” he says, “that the world is perishing, the human race is failing, marriages are undermined. I ask, who at last has sought a wife and not found one?” And the rest, which thou canst read in him. But certainly at this time, if there be any cause of the fewness of Christians and the multitude of the infidels, it is not celibacy, but monogamy. For the Turks have also certain religious of their own, who are compelled to be celibate; but they are greatly multiplied because they have several wives at once. And I do not think the adversaries so blind as to wish to introduce polygamy even against the law of Christ.
Further, the cause why Christians are for the most part inferior in strength, when there is to be fighting against the Turks, is not the fewness of men, but the discord of the Christian princes. For otherwise Alexander the Great had a small army, but obedient and strenuous, and therefore in a short time subdued the whole world. The Romans too conquered not by multitude, but by art and discipline. Finally, in the time of Charlemagne the Christian cause flourished wondrously, and yet there were then very many priests, monks, and nuns who cultivated celibacy.
The fourth reason. From perpetual celibacy diseases not rarely arise, which cannot be cured otherwise than by the conjugal work; therefore such celibacy is rashly vowed. For in such cases the vow can and ought to be broken, that life may be provided for. I answer that no diseases arise from continence, but all, or nearly all, from excess and incontinence.
But what if a disease contracted from elsewhere could be cured by the use of marriage, and could not otherwise? Saint Bonaventure answers (on Book 4, distinction 38, article 2, last question) that it is in no way lawful, on account of the danger of disease or death, to violate a vow of continence. First, because there is no disease which cannot be cured by some other means, as skilled and pious physicians consulted on this matter answer. Secondly, because even if a disease could not be cured otherwise than by the violation of a vow, the virtue of continence is better than any prolongation of the bodily life; for those who give their labor to letters and sacred meditations, especially if they add austerity of life, know almost for certain that they shorten their own life, and yet can rightly prefer an increase of wisdom and piety to a few years of bodily life.
Thou wilt say: If the law or vow of fasting greatly harm the health of the body, it can and ought not to be kept; why then is not the same said of the vow of continence?
I answer that the case of fasting and continence is not the same; for food is of itself ordered to the health of the individual; therefore not to use it when it is necessary to preserve health is a vice, not a virtue, and accordingly not matter of a vow. But the act of marriage is not of itself ordered to the health of the individual; nay, rather it harms. And if at any time it could profit, it would be known by accident, nor that altogether for certain. But it is not lawful, on account of an uncertain and accidental thing, to omit the fulfillment of a vow, which is certainly and of itself good. And it is like it, if one should wish to kill me unless I commit theft. For it is not lawful to steal, even though otherwise I be bound to preserve life; for theft is not a means of itself instituted to preserve life, but would only by accident profit, from another’s evil will. Martin Cromer relates (Book 29 On Polish Affairs) that a certain Casimir, son of a king, shone with miracles after his death, who had preferred to die rather than to be joined to a woman, as the physicians persuaded him. See more arguments on this subject in Michael Medina (Book 4 On Continence, controversy 4).
The fifth reason. The propensity to beget offspring is natural and good, seeing that it would have existed even in integral nature, and is in all animals. But to impede a natural and good propensity, which those do who perpetually cultivate celibacy, is a sin, since it is nothing else than to struggle against nature, and against God Himself who instituted nature. Therefore it is not lawful for those to cultivate perpetual celibacy who feel a propensity to begetting. And this is the reason on account of which Luther (in the sermon on marriage) dared to say that that, Increase and multiply (Genesis 1), is not a precept, but more than a precept.
Michael Medina answers (Book 4 On Continence, chapter 11) that to impede another, that he act not according to a natural propensity — as if one compel someone to be perpetually continent — is a sin; but that it is not a sin to impede in oneself a natural propensity, as if one of his own accord be perpetually continent; because right and injury are referred to another; for no one properly can do injury to himself.
But if it is so, why will it be a sin to kill oneself? Certainly Blessed Thomas (2a2ae, question 64, article 5) affirms that to kill oneself is a sin because it is against the propensity of nature; and if it is a sin to kill oneself because it fights with natural propensity, why will it not be a sin to be unwilling to procreate children, since this too fights with natural propensity? Francisco de Vitoria (in the relection on homicide) and Domingo de Soto (Book 5 On Justice and Right, question 1, article 5) answer that the propensity to generate is indeed natural, yet does not befit man as man, but as he agrees with the beasts; but the propensity to live is both natural and befits man as man; and therefore it is a sin to kill oneself, because it is against man’s natural propensity; but not to generate is not a sin, because it is not against a propensity properly human.
But this answer does not seem fully to satisfy; for if the propensity to generate is not properly human, because it is common to man with the beasts, certainly much less will the propensity to live be properly human, since it is common to man with all living things. They will perhaps say that to generate befits man by reason of the body only, but to live by reason of the body and by reason of the soul. But in this place we discourse only of the bodily life; besides, to live and to be, is it not common with other things? Then, if to kill oneself were a sin because it is against man’s natural propensity, certainly also to wish to be killed by another and to desire death would be a sin, because this too is against man’s natural propensity; for (John 21) it is said to Peter, When thou shalt be old, another shall gird thee, and lead thee whither thou wouldst not. And (2 Corinthians 5) Paul says, We desire not to be unclothed, but clothed over. And yet who would say that the same Paul sinned when he says, I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ (Philippians 1), or Saint Ignatius, when (as he himself writes in the epistle to the Romans) with highest ardor he desired to be devoured by beasts?
Finally, it is established that it is a most holy counsel, when one is attacked by a robber and cannot escape death except by killing the robber, to meet death rather than to inflict it, even though this seem most of all against the inclination of nature.
I answer, then, that there is a twofold natural inclination of man: one to a thing absolutely and considered in itself; the other to a thing considered with all its circumstances. For if thou consider death in itself, disease, fasting, and other things of that kind, thou wilt naturally abhor them; but if thou consider death, disease, and the like, as matter of patience, as a way to heaven, as an occasion of glorifying God, thou wilt now begin to be affected and to desire them. And because the latter propensity alone is truly and properly human, because it is according to the right judgment of reason, therefore to act against it is a sin. For that is to fight with reason, and therefore with the very law of nature, and with God the author of nature.
Further, celibacy, although it is against the former inclination, is yet not against the latter; nay, it is conformable to that latter inclination, because it is a means to loving God more purely and more fervently. But the killing of oneself is against both inclinations, unless perhaps it be commanded by God. Therefore it is never lawful to kill oneself, unless God command it; for if God command, it can be desired as a means to a greater good — that is, to fulfilling the will of God, and meriting His grace: for better is the mercy of the Lord than lives. But outside this case it can never be a means to a greater good; for all goods are either corporeal or spiritual. The foundation of the corporeal is life; therefore it cannot be that killing be a means to a greater corporeal good. But spiritual goods are acts of free will, and accordingly depend on the will, nor is there any such good which cannot be had without the killing of oneself.
The sixth reason. Virginity is not a virtue, but a thing altogether indifferent; for the virtues are sought for themselves, but virginity is not good, nor desirable, except referred to another — that is, to praying to and worshiping God more purely. Besides, to all the virtues vices are contrary, but to virginity no vice is opposed; therefore virginity cannot be matter of a vow.
I answer that virginity considered absolutely, as it says only a certain negation of marriage, is not a virtue; but the same, as it is a certain perfect restraining of concupiscence, and accordingly a means to worshiping God better and more purely, is altogether a virtue; nay, as Saint Fulgentius noted (in epistle 3, chapter 4), virginity is so a virtue that it took its name from virtue. Just as also to desire death absolutely is not a virtue, yet to desire death for defending the faith or the fatherland is a virtue of fortitude. Yet it is true that virginity, before it is consecrated to God by a vow, is not a special virtue, and therefore has not a contrary vice. For it is, if it be considered without a vow, a certain perfect and heroic act of temperance, and therefore no vice is opposed to it, but something less good. For vices are opposed to the necessary acts of the virtues, but not to the perfect and heroic acts. See Saint Thomas (2a2ae, question 152).
The seventh reason is Erasmus’ (in the colloquy of the Wooer and the Maiden), where he speaks most petulantly: An orchard is better which after flowers brings forth fruit; a vine is better which, embracing a pole or an elm, is heavy with grapes, than one which lying on the ground rots; a rose is happier which is handled by the hand of man, delighting meanwhile the eyes and the nostrils, than one which grows old on the bush; wine is happier which is drunk before it grows sour. From which he contends to effect that marriage seem better and more to be sought than celibacy. He adds also that one virgin, if she marry, can bring forth many virgins, and accordingly, if virginity please, the marriage of virgins cannot displease, since they render this very thing which pleases so greatly with interest.
But arguments of this kind are such as horses and dogs, if they could speak, would propose, seeing that they know nothing better than the delights of the body. But that Christians of any sort, whose fatherland is the kingdom of heaven, whose present life is exile, whose author is Christ, a virgin of a virgin, and the preacher of virginity, could argue in that way is a marvel. For a Christian virgin has not flowers without fruits; nay, she has the hundredfold fruit, whereas marriage has but the thirtyfold, as the Fathers gather from Matthew 13. Whence Saint Augustine (in the book On Holy Virginity, chapter 8): “No fruitfulness of the flesh,” he says, “can be compared to holy virginity, even of the flesh.” And Saint Ambrose (Book 1 On Virgins): “Let us compare,” he says, “the goods of women with the last of virgins; let a noble woman boast of her fruitful childbearing,” etc. And Saint Jerome too (in the epistle to Demetrias, and epistle 22 to Eustochium) fully dissolves the same argument.
But Erasmus perhaps had not eyes by which the fruits of virgins can be seen; for the animal man perceiveth not those things that are of the spirit. By like reasoning a Christian virgin is not a vine lying on the ground and rotting, but is one clinging to a most noble elm, betrothed to Christ, and heavy with His spirit, as Saint Fulgentius beautifully teaches (in epistle 3 to Proba, chapter 4).
Finally, a Christian virgin is not a rose growing old on the bush, or wine growing sour, but perpetually flowering and vigorous. For marriages wither and grow sour, seeing that they are to have an end; but the flower of virginity here begins and is perfected in the future life, where no one marries, but all are as the angels of God.
Further, as to what Erasmus adds, that virgins are born of marriages, Saint Augustine elegantly refutes it (in the book On Holy Virginity, chapter 10): “For not even in this,” he says, “ought marriages to compare themselves with the merits of the continent, that virgins are procreated from them. For this is not the good of marriage, but of nature, which is so divinely instituted that by any human intercourse of either sex, whether ordered and honest, or base and unlawful, no female is born but a virgin. So it comes about that a virgin is born even of defilement, but a sacred virgin not even of marriage.” So he.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPDT XXXII. Solvitur quarta objectio ex ratione naturali. Diluendae sunt objectiones, quas adversa¬ rii sumunt ex variis incommodis, quae vi¬ dentur nasci ex coelibatu. Prima ratio. Coe¬ libatus naturae ipsi repugnare videmur, quae frustra sexuum diversitatem et vim genera- tivam molita erit in homine, si melius est cce- libem esse, quam conjugatum. Haec ratio Joviniani est, et jam olim a S. Hieronymo lib. I. in Jovinianum, refu¬ tata. Sed quia rursus a Luthero in sermone de matrimonio, et ab Erasmo in Encomio matrimonii revocata in lucem est, respon¬ demus, non esse frustra vim generativam, et sexuum diversitatem, etiam si permulti ea non utantur. Ea siquidem, quae propter bonum speciei instituta sunt, non dicuntur frustra, si a quibusdam individuis exercean¬ tur, etiam si a multis aliis non exerceantur, * CAPUT XXXII. 589 alioqui enim omnes herbee, omniaque poma cum seminibus nascuntur, et tamen paucis¬ sima ex eis feruntur. Secunda ratio. Si omnes continerent, mundus periret : non igitur oportet omnibus continentiam praedicari. Respondent Patres, non esse periculum, ut omnes continere velint; semper enim plures erunt imperfecti, quam perfecti, et ideo oportere omnibus praedicari, ut saltem pauci id faciant. S. Hieronymus lib. in Jovi- nianum : « At dices, inquit, Si omnes virgi¬ nes fuerint, quomodo stabit genus huma¬ num ? Noli metuere, ne omnes virgines fiant. Difficilis res est virginitas, et ideo rara, quia difficilis. )> Aliam solutionem adfert S. Augustinus, cap. 10. de bono conjugali: « Novi quos¬ dam, qui murmurent, Quid si omnes velint ab omni concubitu abstinere, unde subsis¬ tet genus humanum ? Utinam omnes hoc vel¬ lent J. Multo citius Dei civitas compleretur, et acceleraretur terminus saeculi. » Haec il¬ le. Quod etiam clarius docet libro de bono viduitatis, cap. 23. unde et Apostolus dixit in priori epist. ad Corint. VII : Volo omnes esse, sicut meipsum (1), id est, cmlibes. Quod certe non dixisset, si non liceret omnibus coelibatum eligere, etiamsi mundus finien¬ dus esset. Ex quo intelligimus, non esse certam opi¬ nionem eorum, qui dicunt, si soli essent in mundo Monachi et Sanctimoniales, debere eos conjungi matrimonio ad speciem conser¬ vandam. Possent enim ejusmodi credere mundi finem adesse, ac proinde non tene¬ rentur votum violare, ut speciem propaga¬ rent. Si tamen quis defendere velit, quod nonnulli probabiliter docent, teneri ad con¬ jugium homines in extrema illa necessitate conservandi generis humani, non esset cur votum timeret. Vota enim non possunt prae¬ scribere contra legem divinam. Tertio ratio. Ex ccelibatu tot Monachorum, Sacerdotum, et Sanctimonialium, laeditur Christiana Respublica , siquidem minuitur numerus Christianorum, nec potest commo¬ de resisti multitudini infidelium. Respondet S, Ambrosius lib. III de virgini¬ bus : « Nonnullos, inquit, dixisse audivi, quod periit mundus, defecit genus humanum, con¬ jugia labefactata sunt. Quaero, quis tandem quaesivit uxorem, qui non invenerit? » Et csetera, quae apud eum legere poteris. Sed certe hoc tempore, si qua causa est paucita¬ tis Christianorum, et multitudinis infide¬ lium, ea non coelibatus, sed monogamia est. Tureae siquidem habent etiam suos quosdam religiosos, qui coelibes esse coguntur; sed ideo valde multiplicantur, quod plures si¬ mul uxores habeant. Non puto autem adver¬ sarios tam esse caecos, ut velint etiam con¬ tra Christi legem introducere polygamiam. Porro causa, cur Christiani plerumque viribus inferiores sint, cum. est adversus Tur¬ eas pugnandum, non est paucitas hominum, sed discordia Principum Christianorum. Alioqui enim Magnus Alexander exiguum exercitum habuit, sed obedientem, et stre¬ nuum, ideo totum orbem terrarum brevi subegit. Romani quoque non multitudine, sed arte et disciplina vincebant. Denique, tempore Caroli Magni res Christiana mira¬ biliter floruit, et tamen plurimi tunc erant Sacerdotes, Monachi, et Sanctimoniales, qui coelibatum colebant. Quarta ratio. Ex coelibatu perpetuo non raro morbi oriuntur, qui non aliter curari possunt, quam opere conjugali : igitur te¬ mere vovetur ejusmodi coelibatus. Potest enim ac debet in ejusmodi casibus votum frangi, ut vitee consulatur. Respondeo, nul¬ los morbos ex continentia, sed ex crapula, et incontinentia omnes, aut fere omnes nasci. Sed quid si morbus aliunde contractus usu conjugii curari posset, et aliter non pos¬ set? Respondet S. Ronaventura in IV. dist. 38. art. 2. q. ult. nullo modo licere ob peri¬ culum morbi , vel mortis, votum continen¬ tias violare. Primo, quia nullus est morbus, qui non possit alia ratione curari, ut medici periti et pii de hac re consulti respondent. Secundo, quia etiamsi non posset aliter mor¬ bus curari, quam voti violatione, melior est virtus continentiae, quam aliqua prolixitas vitae corporalis; nam qui dant operam litte¬ ris, et sacris meditationibus praesertim si vitae asperitatem adjungant, fere certo sciunt se minuere sibi ipsis vitam, et tamen rectae possunt sapientiae, et pietatis accessionem anteponere paucis annis vitae corporalis. Dices, si jejunii lex, aut votum, corporis valetudini vehementer noceat, potest ac de¬ bet non servari ; cur igitur non idem dicatur de voto continentiae. (1) I. Cor. VII. 7. 590 LIBER II. Respondeo, non esse eamdem rationem jejunii et continentiae; nam cibus ordinatur per se ad salutem individui : idcirco illo non uti cum necesse est ad salutem conservan¬ dam, vitium est, non virtus, proinde nec voti materia. At conjugii actus non ordina¬ tur per se ad salutem individui , imo po¬ tius nocet. Quod si quando prodesse posset, scium esset per accidens, neque id omnino certo. Non autem licet propter incertum, et per accidens, omittere voti impletionem, quae certo, et per se bona est, et simile est, si quis me velit occidere, nisi furtum faciam. Non enim licet furari, etiamsi alioqui tenear servare vitam, nam furtum non est medium per se institutum ad vitam servandam, sed solum per accidens prodesset ex mala alte¬ rius voluntate. Refert Martinus Cromerus lib. XXIX. de rebus Polonicis, Gasimirum quemdam regis filium miraculis post obitum claruisse, qui maluerat mori, quam ftfeminte admisceri, ut ei medici suadebant. Yide de hoc argumenta plura apud Michaelem Me- dinam lib. IY. de continentia, controver¬ sia 4. Quinta ratio. Propensio ad gignendam prolem naturalis est et bona, quippe quse etiam in natura integra fuisset, et in omni¬ bus animantibus est. At impedire natura¬ lem, ac bonam propensionem, quod faciunt qui coelibatum perpetuo colunt, peccatum est, cum id nihil sit aliud, quam naturae, ac Deo ipsi, qui naturam instituit reluctari. Igi¬ tur non licet coelibatum perpetuo colere il¬ lis, qui propensionem ad gignendum sen¬ tiunt. Atque haec est ratio, ob quam Luthe- rus in sermone de matrimonio dicere ausus est, non esse praeceptum, sed plus quam praeceptum, illud : Crescite et multiplicamini , Genes. I. (1) Respondet Michael Medina lib. IY. de continentia, capit. 11. impedire alterum ne operetur juxta naturalem propensionem, ut si quis cogat aliquem perpetuo continere, peccatum esse ; non autem esse peccatum impedire in seipso naturalem propensionem, ut si quis sponte sua perpetuo contineat : quia jus et injuria ad alterum referuntur; nec enim aliquis proprie sibi ipse injuriam facere potest. At si ita est, cur peccatum erit occidere seipsum? Certe B. Thomas in 2. 2. quaest. LXIY. art. 5. ideo affirmat peccatum esse, seipsum occidere, quod sit contra naturae propensionem : et si peccatum est occidere se, quia id pugnat cum naturali propensio¬ ne, cur non erit peccatum nolle filios pro¬ creare, cum id etiam pugnet cum naturali propensione ? Francicus Yictoria in relec- tione de homicidio, et Dominicus a Soto lib. V. de justitia et jure, quaest. I. art. 5. respondet propensionem ad generandum es¬ se quidem naturalem, tamen non convenire homini, ut homo est, sed ut convenit cum bestiis. At propensionem ad vivendum, et naturalem esse, et convenire homini ut ho¬ mo est : propterea peccatum esse seipsum occidere, quod id sit contra propensionem hominis naturalem; at non generare non esse peccatum, quod non sit contra propen¬ sionem proprie humanam. Sed non videtur haec responsio plene sa¬ tisfacere ; nam si propensio ad generandum non est proprie humana, quia est homini communis cum bestiis, certe multo minus propensio ad vivendum erit proprie huma¬ na, cum sit homini communis cum omnibus viventibus. Dicent fortasse, g enerare conve¬ nire homini ratione corporis tantum, vivere autem ratione corporis, et ratione animae. At hoc loco non disserimus nisi de vita cor¬ porali ; praeterea ipsum vivere, et esse, non¬ ne commune est cum aliis rebus ? Deinde si occidere seipsum esset peccatum, quia est contra naturalem hominis propensionem : certe etiam velle occidi ab alio et optare mortem, esset peccatum, quia id etiam est contra hominis propensionem naturalem; nam Joan. XXI, Petro dicitur : Cum senueris , alius cinget te , et ducet quo tu non vis. Et II. Cor. Y. Paulus ait: Cupimus non spoliari , sed supervestiri : Et tamen quis dixerit peccasse eumdem Paulum, cum ait : Cupio dissolvi , et esse cum Christo (1), Philipp. I. et S. Igna- tium, cum (ut ipse scribit in epistola ad Ro¬ manos) summo ardore cuperet abestiis devo¬ rari ? Denique constat, consilium esse sanctissi¬ mum, cum quis invaditur a latrone, et non potest mortem evadere, nisi latronem occL dendo, ut mortem potius oppetat, quam in¬ ferat, etiamsi id maxime videatur contra na¬ turae inclinationem. Respondeo igitur, duplicem esse hominis inclinationem naturalem; unam in rem ab¬ solute, et secundum se consideratam ; alte- (1) Gen. I, 28. — (2) Joan. XXI; 18; II. Cor. V, 4; Philipp. I, £3. CAPUT XXXII. 591 / ram in rem consideratam cum omnibus cir¬ cumstantiis. Nam si consideres mortem se¬ cundum se, morbum, jejunium, atque alia id genus, naturaliter abhorrebis ; at si con¬ sideres mortem, morbum et similia, ut ma¬ teriam patientiae, ut viam ad coelum, ut oc¬ casionem glorificandi Deum, jam incipies affici et appetere. Quia vero posterior pro¬ pensio sola est vere, ac proprie humana, quia est secundum rectum judicium ratio¬ nis, ideo contra illam facere peccatum est. Est enim id pugnare cum ratione, atque ideo cum ipso jure naturae, et cum Deo auctore naturae. Porro coelibatus etsi est contra priorem inclinationem, non tamen contra posterio¬ rem, imo conformis est posteriori illi incli¬ nationi quia est medium ad purius, et fer¬ ventius amandum Deum. At occisio sui ip¬ sius est contra utramque inclinationem, nisi forte a Deo praecipiatur. Idcirco nunquam licet semetipsum occidere, nisi Deus jubeat; nam si Deus jubeat, poterit appeti ut me¬ dium ad majus bonum, id est ad implendam Dei voluntatem, et gratiam ejus promeren¬ dam: Melior est enim misericordia Domini super vitas (1). At extra hunc casum nunquam po¬ test esse medium ad majus bonum ; nam bona omnia vel corporalia, vel spiritualia sunt ; corporalium fundamentum est vita, idcirco fieri non potest, ut occisio sit medium ad majus bonhm corporale ; spiritualia vero sunt actus liberi arbitrii, proinde a volun¬ tate pendent, nec est ullum ejusmodi bo¬ num, quod non possit haberi sine sui ipsius occisione. Sexta ratio. Virginitas non est virtus, sed res omnino indifferens ; nam virtutes per se expetuntur, virginitas autem non est bona, nec appetibilis, nisi relata ad aliud, id est, ad Deum purius orandum et colendum* Prae¬ terea virtutibus omnibus contraria sunt vi¬ tia, virginitati autem nullum opponitur vi¬ tium, non igitur virginitas materia voti esse potest. Respondeo, virginitatem absolute consi¬ deratam, ut solum dicit negationem quam¬ dam conjugii, non esse virtutem : sed eam- dem, u£ est perfecta quaedam refraenatio concupiscentiae, et proinde medium ad me¬ lius, ac purius Deum colendum, omnino esse virtutem; imo ut S. Fulgentius notavit in epist. 3. cap. 4. adeo virtus est virginitas, ut a virtute nomen acceperit. Quomodo etiam mortem appetere absolute non est vir¬ tus, tamen mortem appetere ad fidem, vel patriam defendendam, virtus est fortitudi¬ nis. Verum est tamen virginitatem antequam Deo per votum consecretur, non esse virtu¬ tem specialem, et ideo non habere contra¬ rium vitium. Est enim, si absque voto consi¬ deretur, actus quidam perfectus, et heroi¬ cus temperantiae, et idcirco non vitium illi opponitur, sed aliquid minus bonum. Vitia enim opponuntur actibus necessariis virtu¬ tum, non autem actibus perfectis, et heroi¬ cis. Vide S. Thomam in 2. 2. quest, CLII. Septima ratio est Erasini in colloquio Proci et Puellae, ubi petulantissime loquitur: Pomarium melius est, quod post flores fruc¬ tus parturit; vitis melior, quae amplexa pa¬ lum, vel ulmum, uvis gravida est, quam quae humi jacens computrescit ; rosa felicior, quae manu hominis atteritur, delectans in- terim oculos, et nares, quam quae senescit in frutice ; vinum felicius, quod bibitur an¬ tequam acescat. Ex quibus illud efficere contendit, ut conjugium melius, magisque expetendum videatur, quam coelibatus. Il¬ lud etiam addit, unam virginem si nubat, posse multas virgines parere , proinde si virginitas placet, non posse nuptias virgi¬ num displicere, quod hoc ipsum, quod tan¬ topere placet, cum fcenore reddunt. Sed ejusmodi argumenta talia sunt, qua¬ lia equi et canes, si loqui possent, propone¬ rent, quippe qui nihil melius noverunt cor¬ poris deliciis. At Christianos qualescumque, quibus regnum coelorum patria est, vita praesens exilium, auctor Christus virgo de virgine, et virginitatis praedicator, mirum est potuisse eo modo argumentari. Nam virgo Christiana non habet flores sine fruc¬ tibus , imo fructum habet centesimum , cum conjugium non habeat nisi tricesimum, ut Patres colligunt ex cap. XIII Matth. unde S. Augustinus lib. de sancta virginitate, cap. 8: « Nulla, inquit, carnis foecunditas sanctae virginitati, etiam carnis, potest com¬ parari. » Et S. Ambrosius lib. I. de virgini¬ bus : « Conferamus, inquit, bona mulierum cum ultimis virginum, jactet licet foecundo se mulier nobilis partu etc.» Et sanctus quo¬ que Hieronymus in epist. ad Demetriadem, et epist. 22, ad Eustochium, idem argumen¬ tum fuse diluit» (1) Psal. LXII, 4; o92 LIBER II. Sed Erasmus non habuit forte oculos, quibus fructus virginum conspici possunt : Animalis enim homo non percipit ea quae sunt spiritus. (1) Pari ratione non est virgo Chris¬ tiana vitis humi jacens, et putrescens, sed est ulmo nobilissimae adhaerens, Christo des¬ ponsa, ejusque spiritu gravida, ut pulchre docet S. Fulgentius in epist. 3. ad Probam, cap. 4. Denique, virgo Christiana non est rosa in frutice senescens, aut vinum acescens, sed perpetuo florens, et vigens. Conjugia enim marcescunt, et acescunt, quippe quae finem habitura sunt : virginitatis autem flos hic in¬ cipit, et in futura vita perficitur, ubi nemo nubit, sed omnes sunt velut Angeli Dei. Porro, quod addit Erasmus, ex nuptiis virgines nasci, eleganter refellit S. Augusti¬ nus lib. de sancta virginitate, cap. 10 : « Nam, inquit, ne illo quidem debent con¬ tinentium meritis se conferre conjugia, quod ex eis virgines procreantur. Hoc enim non conjugii bonum est, sed naturae, quae sic divinitus instituta est, ut quolibet humano utriusque sexus concubitu sive ordinato, et honesto, sive turpi, et illicito, nulla fcemina, nisi virgo nascatur. Ita fit ut virgo nascatur etiam de stupro, sacra autem virgo nec de conjugio. » Haec ille.