Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 14: The Confirmation of Bellarmine's First Reason Is Defended
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the fourteenth chapter Barclay examines those three arguments by which I proved the assumption of the first reason, or the antecedent of the first enthymeme, to use the words of the schools. The first argument was this: The temporal end is subordinated to the spiritual end; but faculties are subordinated as their ends are subordinated; therefore the temporal faculty or power is subordinated to the spiritual faculty or power. To this argument Barclay answers in these words: “I constantly deny that there is such an ordering or subordination of the ends of these powers, so far as they are such powers. For the end of the political or civil power, so far as it is political, embraces absolutely nothing else than temporal happiness, namely the common good and the ordered tranquillity of living one's life, as Bellarmine himself confesses elsewhere. The political power, he says, has its own princes, laws, judgments, and so on, and likewise the ecclesiastical its own bishops, canons, judgments. The former has for its end temporal peace, the latter eternal salvation.” So Barclay, who afterwards confirms the same thing from the Apostle, 1 Timothy 2, who commands us to pray for kings, that we may lead a quiet life in all piety and chastity. Likewise from Navarrus, who on the chapter Novit, on judgments, number 90, says that the end of the lay power is the good, blessed and quiet temporal life of mortals, which is also the end of the laws issuing from it; but that the end of the ecclesiastical power is eternal supernatural life, and that this is the end of the laws issuing from it.
I answer: Barclay denies a thing most certain by the consent of all the doctors; nor can he defend his paradoxes otherwise than by boldly denying everything that is objected to him. For what is better known among theologians and philosophers than that among causes, both efficient and final, there is an order, and that the lower are subordinated to the higher? Certainly God is the first efficient cause of all things, and to him are subordinated the second or universal causes, such as are these lower things, each of which produces effects like itself, not without the action of the heavens and the cooperation of God, namely the first and highest cause. In the same way, then, the last end absolutely is God, and to him in a certain order all other ends are referred and subordinated. The immediate end of the political power is indeed the temporal peace of the commonwealth; but this peace is subordinated to the supernatural peace of man with God; and that to the blessed peace which is in the Jerusalem above; which at last is subordinated to the glory of God the Creator, who is the first principle and last end of all things. And this very thing the authors teach whom Barclay here cites. For Bellarmine, whom he names in the first place, in book 5 on the Pontiff, chapter 6, where he wrote that the end of the political power is temporal peace and the end of the ecclesiastical power is eternal salvation, a little after adds these words: “When these powers are joined, they make one body, and therefore they ought to be connected, and the lower subject and subordinated to the higher”; and gives the reason for this in chapter 7, “because the end of the temporal power is subordinated to the end of the spiritual power.” The holy Apostle too, 1 Timothy 2, whom Barclay cited in the second place, when he commanded prayer for kings, that we may lead a quiet life, added, in all piety and chastity; to show that tranquillity of life, which is the end of the political power, is subordinated to piety and chastity, which is the end of the spiritual power, through which one arrives at the last end, which is everlasting happiness. Lastly Navarrus, whom Barclay brought forward in the third place, on the chapter Novit, on judgments, number 90, writes that the end of the temporal power is the good and blessed temporal life of mortals; the end of the spiritual power eternal life in heaven. But the same author in the same place, number 97, shows that the end of the temporal power is subordinated to the end of the spiritual power, when he teaches from Saint Thomas, book 3 on the government of princes, chapter 12, that “the dominion of Christ is ordered to the salvation of the soul and spiritual goods, although it is not shut out from temporal things, in that way in which they are ordered to spiritual. Weigh,” says Navarrus, “those words, in that way in which they are ordered to spiritual; for in that way and no other this supreme power of the Pope, the father of his country, extends to those things, that is, to temporal things.” In the same place Navarrus brings forward another passage of Saint Thomas from 2-2, question 40, article 2, to the third. “Every person,” says Saint Thomas, “or art, or virtue, to which the end belongs, has to dispose of those things which are for the end; but carnal wars in the faithful people are to be referred to the spiritual divine good, to which clerics are deputed; and therefore it belongs to clerics to dispose and induce others to wage just wars.” Where Saint Thomas teaches that carnal wars are ordered to the spiritual good, as to an end not immediate but mediate; for the immediate end of a carnal war is victory and temporal peace; but because this is ordered to the spiritual good, like all other temporal things, therefore a carnal war is said to be ordered, as to its end, namely mediate, to the spiritual good; and for that reason to dispose of just wars to be waged belongs in some way to clerics, that is, to the ecclesiastical power, whose immediate end is the spiritual good. The same Saint Thomas has many like things on the subordination of ends in 1-2, question 1, article 4, and book 3 against the Gentiles, chapters 17, 18 and following.
Barclay then attacks my second argument, which was of this kind: Kings and pontiffs, clerics and laymen, do not make two commonwealths but one, that is, one Church; for we are one body, Romans 12 and 1 Corinthians 12. But in every body the members are connected and dependent one on another; and it is not rightly asserted that spiritual things depend on temporal; therefore temporal things depend on spiritual, and are subjected to them. Of this second argument Barclay speaks thus: “But the second argument is so frivolous and fallacious that nothing more ignorant can be said, or more faultily gathered, than what is concluded by it; for what old woman is so witless as not to know that this consequence does not hold: they are members of one body, therefore one depends on another; for neither does foot depend on foot, nor arm on arm, nor shoulder on shoulder, but on one third thing.” I answer: Barclay had forgotten, when he wrote this, what he had said a little before, that no one proposes arguments more acutely than Bellarmine, no one concludes more briefly and subtly; for these things do not hang well together, that arguments proposed most acutely and concluded most subtly can be dissolved without labour by any witless old woman. But I pass over Barclay's inconstancy, who now raises Bellarmine to heaven with praises, now sinks him into the abyss with reproaches; for it is a small thing to Bellarmine to be judged by Barclay, or by others like him, who are not his lawful judges; for we shall all stand before the tribunal of Christ, and be judged by him justly and truly, and without any disturbance of mind. What I said, then, that the members of the same body are connected, and one depends on another, I understood of members of different kinds, such as are the finger, the hand, the arm, the shoulder and the head; not of members of the same kind, such as are two hands, two feet, two eyes, two ears; for the political and ecclesiastical power, of which we were speaking, are of different kinds, as is known; and words are to be understood according to the matter in hand; otherwise there would be no demonstration so certain that it could not suffer calumny. So the royal power, which in its own kind is principal, if it grows together into one body with the pontifical power, which is also principal in its own kind, must necessarily either be under or be over, lest there be two heads in one body; and since it is sufficiently established that the Pontiff is head of the Church in Christ's stead, it plainly follows that the king must either not be a member of this body, or be under the Pontiff; and in the same way the political power, which resides chiefly in the king, must either be subject to the spiritual, which resides chiefly in the Pontiff, or remain outside the Church; as there cannot be a finger in the body which does not depend on the hand, nor a hand which does not depend on the arm, nor an arm which does not depend on the shoulder, nor a shoulder which does not depend on the head. But what Barclay says a little after, that the spiritual and political power are like two shoulders in the body, of which neither is subjected to the other, but each is subjected to the one head, Christ, is not only false, because those powers are not of the same kind, so as to be compared to two shoulders, in the way that two royal powers would rightly be compared to two shoulders; but also belongs to the heresy which at this time most flourishes; for what do the heretics of this time strive with greater effort to persuade the peoples of, than that the Supreme Pontiff is not the visible head of the body of the Church, to which all Christians, however great, must necessarily be subjected if they wish to be saved? And yet this Barclay grants them of his own accord, who nevertheless through the whole book makes himself a Catholic. So the spiritual and political power are not rightly compared to two shoulders; but they ought to be compared either to spirit and flesh, as Saint Gregory Nazianzen does in the oration often cited to the people struck with fear and the governor in anger; or to the arm and the head, principal members namely, one of which nevertheless, though in itself very powerful and strong, ought to be directed and governed by the other, the higher.
But Barclay presses, and objects to me my own writings, book 2 on the Pontiff, chapter 29, where I admit that the kings of the earth have no judge on earth, so far as political matters are concerned; and he contends that I speak contraries, when in one place I teach that kings have no judge on earth as to political matters, and in another place I admit that the Pontiff is the judge of kings, so that he can even deprive them of their kingdom by sentence. I answer: Innocent III, in the chapter Per venerabilem, which children are legitimate, writes that kings have no superior in temporal matters; and yet he himself deposed the emperor Otto IV. Let Barclay dare, then, to charge Innocent with fighting against himself; and I shall not take it ill to be censured along with so great a Pontiff. But the defence is at hand: for kings have no judge on earth as to political matters, or in temporal matters, so long as their government so keeps itself within political and temporal things that it does not harm spiritual. Besides, kings are said to have no judge in political and temporal matters because they have no political or temporal judge above them, although they have a spiritual judge, by whom they can be directed and judged even in temporal matters through an order to spiritual. And what Barclay adds, that the distinction of the words directly and indirectly pertains to the form and manner, not to the force and effect of the judgment, has already been refuted above in the twelfth chapter, where we disputed of these words of set purpose.
There remains my third argument, which was such: If the temporal administration hinders the spiritual good, in the judgment of all the temporal prince is bound to change that manner of administration, even with harm to the temporal good; therefore it is a sign that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual. Barclay meets this argument in two ways: for first he notes that, although I undertook to demonstrate the matter, I brought forward only a sign; then he denies the consequence of the argument; for from the fact that the temporal prince is bound to change the form of government if the spiritual good is hindered by it, Barclay says it follows that spiritual things are worthier than temporal, but not that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual. I answer: it is neither new nor unusual, after demonstrations, to bring forward also arguments from a sign. But as to the consequence, Barclay is mistaken. For from that antecedent, the political prince is bound to change his administration if it harms the spiritual good, it does not follow absolutely, therefore the spiritual good is nobler and worthier than the temporal; but it follows, therefore the temporal good is ordered to the spiritual good as to its end, and thereby the temporal power is subject to the spiritual power; for the necessity of changing the administration in that case does not arise precisely from the dignity or nobility of the spiritual good, but from the subordination of the one to the other; which I clearly showed in my book 5 on the Pontiff, chapter 7, in the explanation of this third argument, to which Barclay answered nothing.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XIV. Defenditur confirmatio primae rationis Bellarmini. In cap. 14. Barclaius examinat tria illa argumenta, quibus ego probavi assumptio¬ nem prima) rationis, sive antecedens primi anthimematis, ut scholarum verbis utamur. Primum argumentum illud fuit : Finis tem¬ poralis subordinatur fini spirituali ; sed fa¬ cultates subordinantur, ut subordinantur fi¬ nes ; igitur facultas, sive potestas temporalis, subordinatur facultati, sive potestati spiri¬ tuali. Ad hoc argumentum respondet Bar¬ claius his verbis : « Nego constanter talem ordinationem, vel subordinationem finium harum potesta¬ tum esse, quatenus ipsa) tales potestates sunt. Nam finis politica), seu civilis potesta¬ tis, quatenus politica est, nihil aliud absqlute complectitur quam felicitatem temporalem, commune scilicet bonum, et vita) degendae ordinatam tranquillitatem, ut ipsemet alibi Bellanninus fatetur. Politica potestas, inquit, habet suos principes, leges, judicia, etc. et similiter Ecclesiastica suos episcopos, cano¬ nes, judicia. Illa habet pro fine temporalem pacem, ista salutem alternam. » Ha)c Barcla¬ ius, qui poslea, rem eamdem confirmat ex Apostolo I ad Timoth. n, qui jubet nos orare pro regibus, ut tranquillam vitam agamus in omni pietate, eteasthate. Item ex Na var¬ ro, qui in cap. Novit, de judic. num. 90, di¬ cit, finem potestatis laica) esse vitam bonam, beatam, et quietam temporalem mortalium, qua) et finis est legum ab ipsa emanantium : potestatis vero Ecclesiastica), finem esse vi¬ tam a)tern m supernaturalem, eumdemque esse finem legum ab ipsa emanantium. Respondeo : Negat Barclaius rem certis¬ simam omnium consensione Doctorum ; nec poted aliter paradoxa sua defendere, nisi audacter omnia negando, qua) illi objiciun¬ tur. Quid enim apud theologos, et philoso¬ phos notius, quam inter causas tum efficien¬ tes, tum finales ordinem esse, et inferiores superioribus subordinari ? Certe Deus est prima causa efficiens omnium rerum, eique subordinantur causae secunda), sive univer¬ sales, quales sunt res istae inferiores, quarum unaquaeque producit effectus sibi similes, non absque actione cadorum, et cooperatione Dei, primae videlicet, atque altissimae causae. Eodem igitur modo finis ultimus absolute Deus est, atque ad eum ordine quodam refe¬ runtur, et subordinantur omnes alii fines. Finis quidem immediatus potestatis politicae, est pax reip. temporalis, sed haec pax subor¬ dinatur pacisupernaturali hominis cum Deo ; ista vero paci beatae, quae est in superna Hierusalem : qua) tandem subordinatur glo¬ riae Dei Conditoris, qui est primum princi¬ pium, et ultimus finis omnium rerum. Atque hoc ipsum docent auctores, quos hic Barcla¬ ius citat. Bellarminus enim, quem primo loco nominat, lib. v de Pontif. cap. 6, ubi scripsit, finem politica) potestatis esse pacem tempo¬ ralem, et finem potestatis Ecclesiasticae esse salutem aeternam : paulo post addit haec verba : « Quando istae potestates sunt con¬ junctae, unum corpus efficiunt, ideoque de- b nt esse connexae, et inferior superiori sub¬ jecta, et subordinata » : cujus rei rationem reddit cap 7.,. a quia finis temporalis potesta¬ tis subordinatur fini potestatis spiritualis ». Sanctus quoque Apostolus I ad Timoth. cap. ii, quem Barclaius secundo loco citavit, cum jussit orari pro regibus, ut tranquillam vitam agamus; adjunxit, in omni pietate, et castitate; ut ostenderet tranquillitatem vitee, qme est finis politica) potestatis, subordinari pietati, et castitati, quee finis est potestatis spiritualis, per quem ad finem ultimum per¬ venitur, qui est felicitas sempiterna. Deni¬ que Navarrus, quem tertio loco Barclaius attulit, in cap. Novit, de Judic. num. 90, scribit, finem potestatis temporalis esse vitam bonam, et beatam mortalium temporalem; finem spiritualis potestatis esse vitam alter¬ nam in coelis. Sed idem auctor eodem loco, num. 97, demonstrat, finem temporalis po- IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS o5 testntissubordinari fini potestatisspiritu 'ilis, cum elocet ex S. Thoma lib. m de Regimine principum cap. 12, « Christi dominium ordi¬ nari ad salutem anima) et spiritualia bona, licet a temporalibus non excludatur, eo modo, quo ad spiritualia ordinantur. Expende, in¬ quit Navarrus, illa verba, eo modo, quo ad spiritualia ordinantur : nam illo et non alio modo suprema haec Papae patriae patris po¬ testas extenditur ad ilia, id est, ad tempora¬ lia. » Ibidem Navarrus adducit alium locum S. Thomre ex 2. 2. q. 40, art. 2, ad tertium. « Omnis persona, inquit S. Thomas, vel ars, vel virtus, ad quam pertinet finis, habet dis¬ ponere de his, quae sunt ad finem : bella au¬ tem carnalia in populo fideli sunt referenda ad spirituale bonum divinum, cui clerici de- putahtur : et ideo ad clericos pertinet dispo¬ nere, et inducere alios ad bellandum bella justa. » Ubi S. Thomas docet bella carnalia ordinari ad bonum spirituale, ut ad finem non immediatum, sed mediatum : finis enim belli carnalis immediatus est victoria, et pax temporalis : sed quia haec ordinatur afi bo¬ num spirituale, ut alia omnia temporalia, ideo dicitur bellum carnale ordinari ut ad finem, mediatum videlicet, ad bonum spiri¬ tuale : et ea de causa disponere de bellis justis agendis pertinet aliquo modo ad cle¬ ricos, id est, ad ecclesiasticam potestatem, cujus finis immediatus est bonum spirituale. Multa similia habet idem S. Thomas, desub- ordinatione finium in 1, 2, q. 1, art. 4, et lib. m, cont. gent. cap. 17, 18, et seq. Aggreditur deinde Barclaius secundum argumentum meum, quod erat hujusmodi : Reges, et Pontifices, clerici et laici non fa¬ ciunt duas respublicas, sed unum,id est, unam Ecclesiam : sumus enim unum corpus Rom. xii, et I Cor. xii. At in omni corpore mem¬ bra sunt connexa, et dependentia unum ab alio : non autem recte asseritur spiritualia pendere a temporalibus, ergo temporalia a spiritualibus pendent, iliisque subjiciuntur. De hoc secundo argumento ita loquitur Barclaius : « Secundum vero argumentum usque adeo frivolum est, et fallax, ut nihil inscitius dici, aut vitiosius colligi possit, quam quod eo concluditur : ecqua enim anus tam excors est, ut nesciat non valere hanc consecutionem, sunt membra unius corporis, ergo unum ab alio pendet : nam neque pes a pede, neque brachium a brachio, neque humerus ab humero pendet, sed ab uno tertio. » Respondeo : ObVtus erat Barclaius, cum haec scriberet, eorum, quae paulo ante dixe¬ rat, neminem Bellarnihio argutius argumenta proponere, neminem brevius, subtiliusque conrludere, ista siquidem non benecohserent argumenta proposita argutissime, subtillissi- meque conclusa a quaobet excorde anu posse nullo labore dissolvi. Sed omitto Bar- claii inconstantiam, qui Bellarminum nunc laudibus evehit in coelum, nunc conviciis deprimit in abyssum : parum enim Bellarmi- no est, ut a Barclaio judicetur, aut ab aliis ei similibus, qui judices ejus legitimi non sunt : omnes enim stabimus ante tribunal Christi, et ab illo juste vereque, ac sine omni animi perturbatione judicabimur.Quod ergo dixi, membra ejusdem corporis esse connexa, et unum pendere ab alio ; de membris diversi generis intellexi, qualia sunt digitus, manus, brachium, humerus, et caput : non de mem¬ bris ejusdem generis, qualia sunt duse ma¬ nus, duo pedes, duo oculi, duse aures : po¬ testas enim politica, et ecclesiastica, de qui¬ bus loquebamur, diversi generis sunt, ut notum est : et secundum post materiam verba intelligenda sunt ; alioqui nulla esset tam certa demonstratio, quae calumniam pati non posset. Itaque potestas regia, quse in suo genere principalis est, si cum pote¬ state Pontificia, quse etiam in suo genere principalis est, in unum corpus coalescat, necessario debet, aut subesse, aut praeesse, ne sint in uno corpore duo capita : et cum satis constet Pontificem esse caput Ecclesiae vice Christi, aperte sequitur, ut debeat rex, aut non esse membrum hujus corporis, aut Pontifici subesse ; et eodem modo potestas politica, quse praecipue residet in rege, aut debet subjecta esse spirituali, quae praecipue residet in Pontifice, aut extra Ecclesiam re¬ manere : quemadmodum non potest esse di¬ gitus in corpore, qui non pendeat a manu ; neque manus, quae non pendeat a brachio ; neque brachium quod non pendeat ab hu¬ mero : neque humerus, qui non pendeat a capite. Quod autem Barclaius dicit paulo post, potestatem spiritualem, et politicam, esse veluti duos humeros in corpore, quo¬ rum neuter alteri subjicitur; sed uterque subjicitur uni capiti Christo : non solum est falsum, quia potestates illae non sunt ejusdem generis, ut duobus humeris comparari pos¬ sint, quo modo recte compararentur duobus humeiis duae regiae potestates: sed etiam ad haeresim pertinet, quae hoc tempore maxime 56 DE POTESTATE PAPjE viget : quid enim haeretici hujus temporis majori conatu popuiis persuadere conantur, quam non esse Summum Pontificem caput visibile corporis Ecclesiae, cui omnes Chri¬ stiani, quantumvis magni necessario subjici debeant, si salvi esse velint? atqui hoc illis ultro concedit Barclaius, qui tamen in toto libro Catholicum se facit. Itaque potestas spiritualis, et politica non recte comparantur duobus humeris; sed vel spiritui, et carni comparari debent, ut facit S. GregoriusNa- zianzenus in oratione saepe citata ad popu¬ lum timore perculsum, et praesidem ira- scentem : vel brachio, et capiti, membris vi¬ delicet principalibus, quorum tamen unum, quamvis in se valde potens, et robustum, ab altero superiore dirigi debeat, et gubernari. Sed instat Barclaius, atque objicit mihi mea ipsius scripta, lib. m de Pontifice cap. 49, ubi admitto reges terree non habere in terris judicem, quantum ad res politicas pertinet : et contendit, me contraria loqui, cum uno in loco doceo, reges non habere judicem in terris, quoad res politicas : in alio loco admitto, Pontificem judicem esse regum, ut etiam eos per sententiam regno privare possit. Respondeo : Innocentius III, in cap. Per venerabilem, Qui filii sint legit., scribit reges in temporalibus, non habere superiorem : et tamen ipse idem Othonem quartum impe¬ ratorem deposuit. Audeat ergo Barclaius In¬ nocentium, tamquam secum ipsum pugnan¬ tem arguere : et ego cum tanto Pontifice reprehendi non moleste feram. Sed defensio in promptu est : reges enim non habent ju¬ dicem in terris, quoad res politicas, sive in temporalibus, dum eorum regimen ita intra res politicas, et temporalia se continet, ut spiritualibus t on officiat. Praeterea dicuntur reges non habere judicem in politicis, et temporalibus, quia non habent super se ju¬ dicem politicum, sive temporalem, quamvis habeant judicem spiritualem, a quo dirigi, et judicari possunt etiam in temporalibus per ordinem ad spiritualia. Quod vero Barclaius addit, discrimen vo¬ cum directe, et indirecte ad formam, et mo¬ dum pertinere, non ad vim, et effectum ju¬ dicii : jam supra refutatum est in capite duo¬ decimo, ubi de his vocibus ex proposito dis¬ putavimus. Restat argumentum meum tertium, quod tale erat: Si temporalis administratio impe¬ dit spirituale bonum, omnium judicio tenetur princeps temporalis mutare illum modum administrationis, etiam cum detrimento temporalis boni, ergo signum est, subjectam esse temporalem potestatem spirituali. Huic argumento duobus modis Barclaius occurrit: primum enim notat quod cum rem demonstrandam susceperim, signum tantum protulerim: deinde negat consecutionem ar¬ gumenti : nam ex eo quod tenetur princeps temporalis mutare formam regiminis, si per eam bonum spirituale impediatur : dicit Barclaius sequi, spiritualia esse digniora temporalibus, non autem potestatem tempo¬ ralem spirituali esse subjectam. Respondeo : Non est novum, neque inso¬ litum post demonstrationes adferre quoque argumenta a signo. Quod autem attinet ad consecutionem fallitur Barclaius. Nam ex illo antecedente: Tenetur princeps politicus mu¬ tare administrationem suam, si obsit bono spirituali; non sequitur absolute, ergo bonum spirituale est nobilius, ac dignius temporali : sed sequitur, ergo ad bonum spirituale or¬ dinatur, ut ad suum finem bonum temporale, ac per hoc potestas temporalis subjecta est potestati spirituali : necessitas enim mutandi administrationem in eo casu non oritur ex dignitate, vel nobilitate boni spiritualis prae¬ cise, sed ex subordinatione unius ad alterum quod perspicue ostendi in meo lib. v de Pon¬ tifice cap 7. in explicatione hujus argumenti tertii, ad quae Barclaius nihil respondit.