Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 15: Barclay's Digression Is Refuted
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the fifteenth chapter Barclay, not content with what he had said in answer to my first reason, before he passes to examining and refuting the second, repeats again his opinion on the ecclesiastical and political power, namely that temporal princes ought to be subject to bishops as to spiritual things, and on the other hand bishops ought to be subject to princes as to temporal things; and as bishops can compel temporal princes by spiritual punishments to obey in those things which pertain to the soul, so temporal princes can compel bishops by bodily punishments to obey in those things which pertain to temporal matters, provided they are not contrary to the Catholic faith and good morals. He excepts, however, the Supreme Pontiff, whom he says is subject to no temporal prince, since he too is a supreme temporal prince in the provinces of the ecclesiastical dominion. In sum, Barclay takes out of the way all exemption of churchmen from the power of secular princes. And first, to establish this opinion, he produces the testimony of Franciscus Romulus in the answer to certain chapters of the Apology, and so on, who affirms in express words that bishops ought to be subject to kings in temporal things, and kings to bishops in spiritual things. But the answer is easy. For Franciscus Romulus speaks in that place of the subjection which bishops and other clerics have to observing the political laws and not disturbing the political order established by kings; as also Pope Gelasius and Pope Nicholas teach, the one in the epistle to the emperor Anastasius, the other in the epistle to the emperor Michael, whom Franciscus Romulus alleged in that place. But from this it does not follow that a bishop can be compelled by a king to obey, or punished if he does not obey, since the king has no power over bishops or clerics, which is most plainly read in the council of Constance, session 31.
Second, he produces the testimony of Bellarmine himself, from the book on Clerics, chapter 28, where he teaches that clerics, as citizens, are parts and members of the political commonwealth, and thereby are obliged to observe the political laws. But because the same Bellarmine in the same place excepts the coercive power, from which he says clerics are free, Barclay protests and says: “It is truer that clerics can be compelled by the temporal judge to obedience to the laws, where the cause demands, so that in that matter they do not enjoy the benefit of their exemption, which it is sufficiently established they received from the laws of emperors and princes. For he invokes the help of the laws in vain who offends against them.” But here Barclay, after his manner, speaks against the opinion of all Catholics; for although theologians and canonists dispute about the right of exemption, yet that clerics are exempt by some right, and cannot be compelled by the lay power, all teach. But whether it is to be thought truer what one man teaches, or what the whole body teaches, I leave to others to judge; but of this matter we shall say more below, and we have also said much in the book on Clerics.
Third, Barclay produces the testimony of Saint Gregory, in epistle 15 of book 4, where Saint Gregory, writing to Maurice, speaks thus: “Let our Lord not be too quickly angered with priests from his earthly power; but with excellent consideration, on account of him whose servants they are, let him so rule over them as also to pay them due reverence.” “Let him rule, namely,” adds Barclay, “so far as they are citizens and parts of the commonwealth; let him pay reverence, so far as they are priests of God and spiritual fathers, to whom the emperor himself is subject as a son of the Church.” I answer: the words of Saint Gregory could be expounded in this sense, that he meant that the emperor can rule over priests by establishing political laws, which they too are bound to observe by force of reason, but not by force of the law; but that he ought to pay them that reverence, that he does not himself punish them if they do not keep the laws, but leaves them to their prelates to be punished. But since we have learned from Gregory himself, in the Commentary on Psalm 101, that Maurice ruled tyrannically in the last years of his reign, and began to rage chiefly against priests, it is no wonder if Saint Gregory speaks so as to strive at least to soften and moderate the tyrannical yoke, if he could not remove it.
Fourth, he produces the testimony of Scripture, 3 Kings, chapter 2, where King Solomon pronounced the priest Abiathar guilty of death, because he had consented to the conspiracy of Adonijah, and cast him out, that he should not exercise the priesthood. Answer: it is not improbable that in the Old Testament the king was absolutely greater than the high priest, both because Saint Thomas so teaches in book 1 on the government of princes, chapter 12, and because in the Old Testament the promises were temporal and the sacrifices carnal; but because it is more probable that even in the Old Testament itself the high priest was greater than the king, as we showed in book 2 on the Pontiff, chapter 29, we therefore persist in that answer which we wrote in that place, that Solomon, not as king, but as a prophet by divine instinct, judged Abiathar guilty of death, and took the priesthood from him, and put another in his place. For what we read in Scripture, 3 Kings 2: That the word of the Lord might be fulfilled, which he spoke concerning the house of Eli in Shiloh, is the reason why Solomon did this. But, says Barclay, that phrase, that the word of the Lord might be fulfilled, “signifies nothing else than that what the Lord had foretold would happen was then fulfilled; as in Matthew 27, when it is said that the wicked soldiers divided the garments of Christ among themselves, that that saying of the Psalm might be fulfilled: They parted my garments amongst them.” I answer: that phrase, that the word of the Lord might be fulfilled, sometimes signifies only that the thing was foretold and afterwards fulfilled, as in the passage alleged by the adversary. Sometimes it signifies that the thing was done with that mind and that intention, that obedience might be rendered to God, who willed it to be done by him; as in 4 Kings, chapter 9, Jehu ordered King Joram, slain, to be thrown from the chariot into the field of Jezreel, that the word of the Lord might be fulfilled which he had spoken through the prophet Elijah: Take him up, he says, and cast him from the chariot into the ground, according to the word of the Lord. And that the passage brought from 3 Kings, chapter 2, ought to be understood in this second way can be proved from the Hebrew word; for where we have in the Latin text: Solomon therefore cast out Abiathar, that he should not be priest of the Lord, that the word of the Lord might be fulfilled which he spoke concerning the house of Eli in Shiloh; in the Hebrew there is a verb of active signification, to fulfil, or that he himself might fulfil the word of the Lord. Wherefore the words of the Latin text ought to be understood thus: that the word of the Lord might be fulfilled, supply, by Solomon himself, and so on. Add that by Barclay's opinion a king cannot punish a priest with a spiritual punishment, nor mix himself in spiritual affairs, but only in temporal; but Solomon deprived Abiathar of the priestly office, and put another in his place; therefore either he exceeded the measure of his power, or he did this not as king, but as a prophet, and by a special instinct of God, as we said above. Lastly, if these things do not satisfy the reader, we can say that in sacred Scripture the deed of Solomon is narrated, but it is not defined whether he did it by right or by wrong; as also in that place is narrated the killing of Adonijah, Solomon's brother, done by order of the same Solomon, because Adonijah asked that Abishag the Shunammite be given him as wife, which whether it was rightly done or otherwise can be disputed. So he would not gather well who should say: King Solomon deprived a priest of his function, and killed his brother because he had asked as wife that girl who had been his father's handmaid; therefore kings can deprive priests of their function and put others in their place, and can kill their brothers if they ask to be given as wife some beautiful girl whom the king himself perhaps loves. He, I say, would not gather well, because kings often do many things from power, not from justice; and one must look not so much at what they can do as at what they ought, or what they can do by right; for it is not true what was said to the emperor Antoninus Caracalla, that anything whatever is lawful for kings.
Barclay adds: “That most learned man is equally mistaken when he says in the same book 2 on the Supreme Pontiff, chapter 29, that it is no wonder if in the Old Testament the supreme power was temporal, in the New spiritual, because in the Old Testament the promises were only temporal, and in the New spiritual and eternal.” I answer: I set that opinion down as probable, on account of the authority of Saint Thomas in book 1 on the government of princes, or of the author of that book, whoever he was, and on account of the not contemptible reason brought forward by the same author. But Barclay says indeed that in both Testaments the royal power was only temporal, the pontifical power only spiritual, but proves it by no authority or reason. Wherefore no one ought to wonder if we set an ancient author speaking with reason before Barclay, a recent author carping at the ancients without reason.
These things dispatched, Barclay reviews and counts in order the privileges of exemption which were given by kings or emperors to the ecclesiastical order; from which he gathers that churchmen are of themselves subject in temporal matters to the political power; for unless they were subject they would not need privileges, nor would they have sought them, or even accepted them when offered. To this I answer briefly that we have not undertaken in this place a disputation on the power of kings over churchmen, but on the power of the Supreme Pontiff in temporal matters; nor is it fair to pass from one disputation to another. Wherefore we refer the reader to what we disputed in the Controversies on the exemption of churchmen, especially in the editions after the year of the Lord 1598, in which we explained our opinion a little more plainly and fully than in the earlier editions. It is added also that Barclay below treats again of this matter, and more fully, namely in the thirty-second and thirty-third chapters, where he boasts that in the matter of exemption he has found a new doctrine against all the writers.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XV. Refutatur digressio Barclaii. In capite quinto decimo Barclaius non con¬ tentus iis, quae dixerat in responsione ad primam rationem meam : antequam transeat ad secundam examinandam, et refellendam, iterum repetit sententiam suam de potestate ecclesiastica, ac politica, quod videlicet, principes temporales subjecti esse debeant Episcopis, quo ad spiritualia, et contra Epi¬ scopi subjecti esse debeant principibus, quo ad temporalia : et quemadmodum episcopi cogere possunt spiritualibus pnenis principes temporales ab obediendum in iis, quae ad a- nimam pertinent, sic possunt principes tem¬ porales cogere Episcopos corporalibus poenis ad obediendum in iis, quae pertinent ad tem¬ poralia, modo fidei Catholicae, et bonis mo- IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 57 ribus non sint contraria. Excipit tamen summum Pontificem, quem dicit non esse subjectum ulli principi temporali, quoniam ipse quoque est princeps supremus tempo¬ ralis in provinciis ditionis ecclesiasticae. In summa tollit Barclaius de medio omnem ex¬ emptionem ecclesiasticorum a potestate prin- cipum saecularium. Ac primum ad hanc sen¬ tentiam stabiliendam producit testimonium Francisci Romuli in responsione ad certa ca¬ pita Apologiae, etc., qui disertis verbis affir¬ mat, Episcopos regibusin temporalibus rebus, et reges Episcopis in rebus spiritualibus de¬ bere esse subjectos. Sed facilis est responsio. Loquitur enim Franciscus Romulus eo loco de subjectione, quam habent Episcopi, et reliqui clerici ad observandas leges politicas, et non perturbandum ordinem politicum a regibus constitutum; ut etiam docent Gela- sius, et Nicolaus Pontifex, ille in epist. ad Anastasium imperatorem , hic in epistol. ad imperatorem Michaelem, quos eo loco Franciscus Romulus allegavit. Sed hinc non sequitur, posse cogi Episcopum a rege ad obediendum, vel puniri, si non obediat, cum rex nullam habeat in Episcopos, vel clericos potestatem, quod apertissime legitur in con¬ cilio Constantiensi, sess. 31. Secundo producit testimonium ipsius Bel- larmini, ex lib. de Clericis cap. 28. ubi do¬ cet, clericos, ut cives, esse partes, et mem¬ bra reipub. politicae, ac per hoc obligari ad leges politicas observandas. Sed quoniam idem Bellarminusin eodem loco, excipit po¬ testatem coactivam a qua liberos esse dicit clericos : Barclaius reclamat, ac dicit : « Ve¬ rius est clericos ad obsequium legum, ubi causa postulat, a temporali judice cogi posse, ut nec in ea re exemptionis suae bene¬ ficio gaudeant, quod ab imperatorum, et Principum legibus, eos accepisse satis con¬ stat. Frustra enim legum auxilium invocat, qui contra eas committit. » At hic Barclaius more suo contra senten¬ tiam Catholicorum omnium loquitur: quam¬ vis enim disputent theologi, et canonistee de jure exemptionis, tamen esse clericos aliquo jure exemptos, et non posse cogi a laica po¬ testate omnes docent. Utrum autem verius sit existimandum, quod unus, an quod uni¬ versitas docet, aliis judicandum relinquo : sed de hac re inferius plura dicemus, et multa etiam in lib. de Clericis diximus. Tertio Barclaius producit testimonium S. Gregorii, in epist. 15. lib. iv. ubi S. Grego- rius ad Mauritium scribens, sic loquitur: (( Sacerdotibus non ex terrena potestate Do¬ minus noster citius indignetur; sed excellenti consideratione propter eum, cujus servi sunt, eis ita dominetur, ut etiam debitam reveren¬ tiam impendat. » « Dominetur nimirum », addit Barclaius, « quatenus cives sunt, et partes reipub. re¬ verentiam impendat, qua Dei sacerdotes, et patres spirituales, quibus ipse imperator, ut Ecclesite filius subjicitur. Respondeo : Possent verba S. Gregorii in eum sensum exponi, ut significare voluerit, imperatorem dominari posse sacerdotibus constituendo leges politicas, quas ipsi quo¬ que vi rationis, sed non vi legis observare tenentur ; sed eis reverentiam illam impen¬ dere debere, ut non eos ipse puniat/ si leges non serviant, sed praelatis ipsorum puniendos relinquat. Sed quoniam ex ipso Gregorio in Commentario Psalm. ci didicimus, Mauri¬ tium tyrannice imperasse in ultimis imperii sui annis, ac potissimum in Sacerdotes sie- vire ccepisse : mirum non est, si S. Gregorius ita loquatur, ut jugum tyrannicum si auferre non poterat, mitigare saltem, et moderari niteretur. Quarto producit testimonium Scripturae lib. III Reg. cap. n. Ubi Salomon rex sacer¬ dotem Abiatharem reum mortis pronuncia- vit, quod conjuranti Adoniae consensisset : et ejecit eum, ne sacerdotio fungeretur. Responsio : Non est improbabile in testa¬ mento veteri regem absolute majorem fuisse Pontifice, tum quod ita doceat S. Thomas in lib. i de Regimine principum cap. 12, tum quod in testamento veteri promissiones es¬ sent temporales, et sacrificia carnalia; sed quoniam probabilius est, in ipso etiam te¬ stamento veteri, majorem fuisse Pontificem rege, ut ostendimus lib. n de Pontif. cap. 29, ideo persistimus in ea responsione, quam in eo loco scripsimus, Salomonem non ut regem, sed ut prophetam divino instinctu judicasse Abiatharem mortis reum, et ei sa¬ cerdotium abrogasse, aliumque ei substituis¬ se. Nam quod in Scriptura III Reg. n. legi¬ mus : Ut impleretur sermo Domini , quem lo¬ cutus est super domum Heli in Silo (1) : ratio est, cur Salomon hoc fecerit. At inquit Bar¬ claius, illud : « Ut impleretur sermo Domini , (1) III Reg. II. 27. * 58 DE POTESTATE PAPAE nihil aliud significat, nisi tunc impletum fuisse, quod Dominus praedixerat futurum : quemadmodum Matth. xxvn cum dicitur, impios milites divisisse inter se vestimenta Christi, ut impleretur illud Psalmi : Inoi se¬ runt sibi cestimenta mea. » Despondeo : Illud, ut impleretur verbum Domini, aliquando significat solum, illud fuisse praedictum, et postea impletum, ut in loco allegato ab adversario Aliquando signi¬ ficat ict lactum esse eo animo eaque inten¬ tione, ut obedientia praestaretur Deo, qui voluit per eum id fieri, ut lib. IV Reg. cap. ix, Jehu jussit, Joram regem occisum projici de curru in agrum Jezrael, ut impleretur verbum Domini, quod locutus fuerat per Eliam Prophetam : Tolle, inquit, eum, et pro¬ jice dc curru in terram, juxta verbum Do¬ mini. Quod autem locus allatus ex lib. III Reg. cap. n. debeat intelligi hoc secundo modo, probari potest ex voce hebraica : nam ubi nos habemus in textu latino : Ejecit ergo Salomon Abiathar, ut non esset Sacerdos Do¬ mini; ut impleretur sermo Domini, quem lo¬ cutus est super domum Deli in Silo : in he- braeo est verbum activae significationis "p -2 adimplendum, sive ut ipse impleret sermo¬ nem Domini. Quare verba textus latini de¬ bent sic intelligi, ut impleretur, supple, ab ipso Salomone sermo Domini, etc. Adde, quod ex sententia Barclaii, rex non potest punire Sacerdotem poena spirituali, neque miscere se in negotiis spiritualibus, sed solum in temporalibus : Salomon autem privavit Abiathar munere sacerdotali, et alium ejus loco substituit ; ergo vel excessit modum po¬ testatis suae, vel hoc fecit non ut rex, sed ut propheta, et peculiari instinctu Dei, ut nos supra diximus. Denique si haec lectori non satisfaciunt, dicere possumus, in Scriptura sacra narrari factum Salomonis, sed non de¬ finiri, jure ne, an injuria fecerit : quemad¬ modum etiam in eo loco narratur caedes Ado¬ niae fratris Salomonis, jussu ejusdem Salo¬ monis patrata, ob iu, quod Adonias petierit sibi dari in uxorem Abisag Sunamitidem, quod recte ne, an secus factum fueiit, dispu¬ tari potest. Itaque non bene colligeret, qui diceret, rex Salomon privavit sacerdotem functione sua, et occidit fratrem suum, quia petierat in uxorem illam puellam, quae fue¬ rat ancilla patris sui : ergo possunt reges privare functione sua Sacerdotes, aliosque in eorum locum substituere : et possunt fratres suos interficere, si speciosam aliquam puel¬ lam, quam rex ipse f udasse amat, sibi dari postulent in uxorem. Iste, inquam, non bene co ligeret, quia reges multa saepe faciunt ex pnt"slate n >n e.x justitia : et videndum est n m lain quid possint, quam quid debeant, sive quid jure possint : non enim verum est, quod imperatori Antonino Caracallae dictum fuit, Regibus quodbbet licet. Addit Barclaius: « /Eque fallitur viridem doctissimus, cum ait eodem lib. n de Summo Pontif. cap. 29 non mirum esse, si in Testa¬ mento veteri summa potestas fuisset tempo¬ ralis, in novo spiritualis, quia in veteri Te¬ stamento promissiones tantum temporales fuerunt, et in novo spirituales, et aeternae. » Respondeo : Eam ego sententiam ut pro¬ babilem posui, propter auctoritatem S. Tho- mae in lib. i de Regimine principum, sive auctoris illius libri, quicumque fuerit, et propter non contemnendam rationem ab eodem auctore allatam. Barclaius autem dicit quidem in utroque testamento potesta¬ tem regiam, fuisse solum temporalem; pote¬ statem pontificiam, solum spiritualem, sed nulla vel auctoritate, vel ratione probat. Quare nemo mirari debetsi veteremauctorem cum ratione loquentem anteponamus Bar- claio, auctori recenti, et sine ratione veteres carpenti. His expeditis percenset, ac numerat Bar¬ claius ordine privilegia exemptionum, quae data sunt a regibus, vel imperatoribus ordini ecclesiastico: ex quibus colligit, ec¬ clesiasticos ex se subjectos esse in tempo¬ ralibus politicae potestati : nisi enim subjecti essent non egerent privilegiis, neque illa vel quaesivissent, vel etiam oblata accepissent. Ad haec breviter respondeo, nos hoc loco non suscepisse disputationem de potestate regum in Ecclesiasticos, sed de potestate Summi Pontificis in temporalibus : neque ae¬ quum estde una disputatione ad aliam trans¬ ire. Quare lectorem remittimus ad ea quae in Controversiis de exemptione Ecclesiasti¬ corum disputavimus, praesertim in editioni¬ bus post annum Domini 15. 8, in quibus pau¬ lo planius et plenius sententiam nostram ex¬ plicuimus, quam in editionibus prioribus. Accedit etiam, quod Barclaius infra iterum de hac re, et fusius tractat, capite videlicet trigesimo secundo, et trigesimo tertio, ubi se iu materia exemptionis novam doctrinam contra scriptores omnes invenisse gloria¬ tur. IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 39